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ABSTRACT 
It is clear from common experiences that abstract ideas are often difficult to understand, 
and that the use of concrete examples is often useful, perhaps always necessary. The 
research investigates some aspects of the relation between abstraction and examples: 
how 11-12 year old children move in their thinking between more and less generic 
levels; between greater and lesser degrees of abstraction; from example to generalization 
and vice versa, in the context of science education. The central interest is in how 
children use and modify concrete reasoning schemes. Its significance is in eliciting deep 
and implicit ideas which affect how children learn science. The empirical work consists 
of four related studies. The analysis is both qualitative and quantitative, in both cases 
looking for patterns in response. 
The first study explores the limitations of the boundaries of ontological categories in 
children's transformations of entities. Results provide evidence that ontological 
categories such as natural kinds and artefacts exist in thinking and that schemes are the 
"bridges" which can make possible even cross-ontological transformations. 
The second study explores the way that dimensions organise various entities and 
suggests a novel analysis of analogies. Results show that schemes appear in children's 
reasoning as packages. The presence of one scheme may predict the presence of another. 
Children use schemes such as "flow" and "path", which interact and modify one 
another. 
The use of examples in science teaching varies. The focus of the third study is on the 
analysis of examples of ideas in terms of objects which can be seen schematically. 
Results show that children are able to give consistent examples, in many cases different 
from the examples in their text books. Schemes that are used by children in the 
description of objects appear together across the various examples. Examples constrain 
the schemes children use to describe entities that take part in them. Examples work 
rather like metaphors. 
The fourth study shows that children are able to establish connections between concrete 
examples and generalizations. They think of some instances as better examples of ideas 
than others. The fit between examples and ideas is good when schemes such as 
`support', 'border', 'autonomous action' or better when several such anticipated 
schemes, are satisfied and poor when some are and some not. 
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Chapter 1: 
CHILDREN'S REASONING IN SCIENCE 
1.1 Introduction to the thesis 
This research describes children's commonsense reasoning about entities in science, 
and particularly, the way that children use concrete physical schemes in order to reason 
about entities. Its significance is in eliciting deep and implicit ideas which affect how 
children learn science. The research investigates how children move in their thinking 
between more and less generic levels; between greater and lesser degrees of 
abstraction; from example to generalisation and vice versa. 
The theoretical basis draws on Piagetian ideas on the meaning of objects (Piaget & 
Garcia, 1987), on Rosch's work on prototypical classifications (Rosch, 1978); and 
generally on work on analogy and metaphor such as that of Lakoff (1987) and Johnson 
12 
(Lakoff & Johnson, 1981) amongst others. My central interest concerns how children 
use and modify concrete reasoning schemes. 
The focus of the theoretical discussion and the empirical work in this study, is: 
a) on describing children's commonsense reasoning about entities in science in terms 
of various levels of abstraction in their mental representations, and 
b) on relating these levels of abstraction to some fundamental categories of 
thought as described by Johnson (1987, 1988), diSessa (1993), Johnson- Laird 
(1983), and Ogborn & Bliss (1990). 
1.2 An example 
It may help the reader to have an example of the kind of reasoning I am interested in, 
to bring to life necessarily abstract notions of "schemes", etc. 
One child, whom I asked what a battery is like, said (to my surprise) that it is like an 
orange. Why? I asked. He replied that an orange has juice inside, as a battery has 
electricity inside, both ready to come out. Squeezing the orange is like connecting the 
battery to a lamp -what is inside comes out. Also, juice provides energy as a battery 
does. What is interesting about this is two-fold: the analogy is very abstract, or at least 
generalised at the level of 'container', 'fluid', 'flow', 'energy'. Yet the reasoning can 
be very concrete and straightforward - fluids are kept in containers and can provide a 
resource (energy). Finally, the analogy is a pure product of the child's concrete 
imagination. 
It is exactly this interplay between imagination, concrete reasoning and abstraction 
through generalised schemes which motivates the whole thesis. Nor is this early use 
of a specific example an accident. I shall try to show how essential examples are to 
abstract thinking. 
13 
1.3 The structure of the thesis 
The thesis consists of three parts: a theoretical discussion, an analysis of the data 
drawn from four empirical studies and a discussion of these results. The first part is 
divided into two Chapters: 
Chapter 2: Schematic Representations, and 
Chapter 3: Rationale for the research. 
Relevant theories about mental representations, analogies and examples share a 
common assumption: considering the levels of abstraction they describe we can 
characterise them as "multilevel-systems". Cognitive scientists and psychologists have 
approached this issue by asking an important question: To what extent is there a 
prototypical-basic level which is used by humans and particularly by children in their 
reasoning? 
In Chapter 2, a theoretical framework about the nature of mental representations is 
described (i.e. image schemata, mental models, p-prims, primitive schemes) giving 
the most emphasis to their level of abstraction. So, representational studies in 
cognitive science are chosen to provide the fundamental theoretical background for 
the research, because they focus specifically on representing knowledge. The focus is 
on the description of schemes as the mental representations that children use in their 
thinking. 
The research attempts to identify variation and change in children's use of concrete 
schemes and the way that they produce, manipulate and modify these schemes, when 
they make imaginative transformations at three levels: a. an object into another, b. an 
event into another (analogies), c. an example into a generalization. 
Chapter 3 presents the rationale of the thesis, providing at the same time a theoretical 
analysis of transformations, analogies and examples that justify the use of schemes as 
tool of their analysis. So, the theoretical part of Chapter 3 deals with three issues: the 
role of imagination, analogy and examples. 
14 
First, the role of imagination of concrete objects in the process of conceptualization of 
a scientific entity is explored. If the reasoning of children transforming one object into 
another is based on schemes, then the boundaries of ontological categories (such as 
artifacts versus natural kinds) have to be more flexible than other researchers have 
suggested. This should be the case because the boundaries of ontological categories 
can not here just be defined by 'what their members are' but also by schemes which 
describe 'what they can do'. 
Second, transformations of events involving analogical thinking, have a fundamental 
role in thinking and reasoning. Keane, Ledgeway, & Duff (1994) claim that "work on 
analogy is in advanced state and has the potential to be an exemplar for cognitive 
science theory and methodology". In this part of the research, work on the use of 
concrete examples and analogies by children that has been done in psychology and in 
problem solving is reviewed. This review suggests an analysis that stays close to the 
content (viewing it through schemes) rather than, as is common, just to the form of 
analogies. 
Third, schemes seem useful as tools in the exploration of a little explored area which 
is nevertheless important to science education, the nature of examples of ideas and 
the way children match an abstract structure (generalization) to a concrete example, 
and the other way round. 
The second part of the thesis presents the analysis and discussion of results of four 
studies carried out in Greece with 11-12 year-old children. The various studies suggest 
appropriate ways of looking at children's concrete schemes: schemes such as 
containment, passive and active objects, actions as causes, etc. The identification of 
these schemes uses diSessa's (1993) ideas about the existence of p-prims, Johnson's 
(1987, 1988) work on image schemata, and Ogborn & Bliss's (1990) work on 
primitive schemes. 
The first study (Chapter 4) consists of transformation tasks between objects. Children 
were asked to imagine changing one object into another e.g. to turn an eagle into an 
aeroplane. Results show how children distinguish essential features of a scheme, e.g. 
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flying without obvious support, which they preserve during transformation, from 
"accidental" features, which they change e.g. nature of material. 
The second study (Chapter 5) consists of analogy tasks. Children were asked to think 
of things which are alike, for example, an electric circuit. Result show that children use 
schemes such as "flow" and "path", and that these interact and modify one another, in 
agreement with Black's (1979) interactive view of metaphor. 
In the third study (Chapter 6) children described examples of various ideas using 
schemes. The results show the way that examples constrain the schemes that are used 
in the description of the objects that take part in them, and how examples of the same 
idea differ from each other. 
In the fourth study (Chapter 7), children were asked to choose "good" examples of a 
generalisation, to form generalisations from examples, and to deal with counter 
examples. I look for fundamental dimensions such as time, decision making, necessity, 
interaction support etc., which are responsible for 'a good fit' between example and 
generalisation, and how they lead children to extend or restrict their generalisations. 
The analysis of these studies is both qualitative, looking for categories to describe the 
reasoning, and quantitative, looking for patterns in responses (e.g. by cluster methods). 
In general terms, the outcome of these studies - which are presented in the third part of 
the thesis (Chapter 8)- is the powerful role that schemes have in children's 
imaginative transformations of objects, analogies or examples. Schemes are useful 
tools in the description of children's thinking and can be used by science educators for 
the analysis of the movement between concrete and abstract forms of knowledge 
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Chapter 2: 
SCHEMATIC REPRESENTATIONS 
2.1 Introduction 
Children (and adults) find it difficult, and often fail, to give a "good" definition for 
many concepts in science. According to Mariani (1992), there is a structural sort of 
knowledge about entities in science, with its ultimate origin in "sensorimotor 
experience" of children (seeing, feeling, etc.) and their activity (destroying or moving 
things for example). So, children attempt to explain entities using some of the 
characteristics that come from their concrete knowledge (examples, sensorimotor 
experience, activity). For that reason concrete thinking and reasoning have always 
been regarded as crucial topics in psychology and artificial intelligence (A.I.). 
The focus of the theoretical discussion and of the empirical work in this study will be 
on describing children's commonsense thinking about entities in science, in terms of 
various levels of abstraction in their mental representations, and to relate these levels 
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of abstraction to some fundamental categories of thought as described by Johnson 
(1987, 1988), diSessa (1988, 1993), Johnson-Laird (1983), Ogborn & Bliss (1990). 
Bliss (1994), exploring the differences that appeared in various attempts to describe 
the ways in which knowledge is represented in the human mind, refers to the 
existence of two different approaches in that area. The differences between these two 
approaches arise because of their attempts to give an answer to the following two 
different questions: (a)What does someone use to think? and (b)What does someone 
think? 
The first approach attempts to discover and describe the tools for thought. In this 
respect, the Piagetian (1970) description of schemes and the Johnson-Laird (1983) 
approach of mental models are similar. On the other hand, the second approach 
explores the content of thinking. Gentner and Stevens (1983) can be considered as 
representatives of this field. 
In this research, both these questions will be considered, in order to investigate the 
role of children's mental representations in their reasoning about the real world. Thus, 
both the tools that children use in their reasoning and its content are investigated. 
In the theoretical discussion, mental representations are regarded as a "multilevel -
system" varying from concrete to more abstract forms. It is suggested that a middle 
level of abstraction plays a fundamental role in children's commonsense reasoning. 
Particularly, this Chapter reviews various approaches to describing this basic level 
(i.e. Johnson, diSessa, Johnson-Laird, Ogborn & Bliss) showing the similarities 
between these approaches. 
The exploration of the nature of this basic level could contribute to a deeper 
understanding of children's ideas about the natural world and then could provide us 
with answers to the question, "How could we help them to change their ideas, and 
make them more scientific?" 
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2.2 Hierarchical Structures of Representation 
Mental representations play a central role in thinking and reasoning. The degree to 
which such representational systems correspond to the real world is in debate. A 
reasonable answer to this debate might be the assumption that the representational 
system operates at multiple levels. That is, there are different levels of abstraction and 
of organization of mental representations which people use in their reasoning. 
Researchers have studied mental representations at a variety of levels. Figure 2.1 
summarizes the multiple levels of representations. The vertical axis represents 
possible variation from concrete images to abstract propositional forms of mental 
representation. The schematic level is between these poles. Piaget (1970) has defined 
as "schemes", "whatever is repeatable and generalizable in an action" (Piaget, 1970, 
p.42). The horizontal axis represents possible variation from isolated fragments of 
knowledge to highly organized systems such as theories. 
Figure 2.1: Mental representation system 
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The horizontal axis has at the right hand edge the organization of knowledge in 
theories. McCloskey, Caramazza and Green (1980) proposed that people develop 
through their everyday experience well articulated naive theories. They argue that 
intuitive ideas are theoretical structures. So, for them, everyday reasoning is theory -
like, in the sense that people make use of abstract, causal-explanatory constructs (see 
also McCloskey et.al, 1983; Carey, 1985; Gopnik & Wellman, 1994). 
According to Gopnik and Wellman (1994) children can develop theories of mind; in 
their terms the "theory theory". They distinguish between framework theories and 
specific theories. Framework theories define domains of inquiry, providing an 
ontology which specifies the types of fundamental phenomena to be explained. For 
example Behaviourism provides an ontology for behaviour, external stimuli, overt 
responses etc. In contrast, specific theories (such as the Rescorla-Wagner theory of 
classical conditioning within Behaviourism) accounts for specific phenomena by 
reducing them within the ontology and explanatory structures of the framework 
theory. A framework theory is both general - it includes a large number of phenomena 
- and specific - it defines a domain and it is different from other framework theories 
from other domains (Gopnik and Wellman, 1994). 
Gopnik and Wellman (1994) argue that analogously to framework theories, the 
"theory theory" predicts a combination of specificity and generality in children's 
thinking. So, it is neither so general as "stage theories" - such as that of Piaget -
(children construct different theories for different domains such as biological, 
mathematical, etc.) nor so specific as accounts of development in terms of skills, 
empirical generalizations, scripts and some modularity theories suggest. 
In contrast with the account given by the "theory theory" account, diSessa (1989, 
1993) argues that human knowledge cannot be characterized by organized structures. 
His account of fragmentary knowledge structures (he calls them phenomenological-
primitives or p-prims) tends to be at the left hand end of the horizontal dimension of 
Figure 2.1 while Johnson's (1987) account, that the knowledge consists of patterns 
(he calls them "image schemata") is less close to the left hand end. 
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I am more sympathetic with the view of Ogborn and Bliss (1990) who unlike diSessa, 
regard the minimum knowledge structures in reasoning (primitive schemes) "as 
forming a system and as having a developmental history" (Ogborn & Bliss, 1990, 
p.380). This systematicity of schemes leads me to explore groups or packages of 
schemes because the schemes seem to function as systems or clusters and not as 
isolated pieces. 
The similarity between diSessa's p-prims, Johnson's image schemata and Ogborn & 
Bliss primitive schemata (at least in their nature - all of them have their origins in the 
Piagetian notion of schemes -), forces me to use one term, "empirical schemes" which 
will cover all the above variations in the description of schemes (the variation mainly 
concerns the different degree of organization). 
The hierarchical structure of the vertical axis of the mental representation systems that 
researchers describe, can be seen as an analogical projection of what has been 
proposed by "prototype theory" about the categorization of concepts. According to 
Rosch, (1975, 1978) the majority of everyday concepts can be organized into 
hierarchical classification schemes. She suggests that there are three levels of 
categorization: superordinate, basic and subordinate level. The superordinate level is 
more abstract than the basic, whereas the basic is more abstract than the subordinate. 
Consider for example the superordinate category "furniture", which might have a 
"chair" as basic level and a "kitchen chair" as subordinate level. The general idea is 
that concepts are organized around these basic-level prototypes. One of the crucial 
effects of this prototypical structure is that we are able to classify a case into a 
category without being able to define why. It is extremely difficult to find a definition 
appropriate for all the members of a category. According to the "family resemblance" 
idea proposed by Wittgenstein (1953) and Rosch (1975) a classification of a member 
to a category can be done through the comparison of this member with other members 
of the category but mainly with a basic-level member. 
In an analogous way children can reason about a phenomenon "comparing" it with a 
basic level item of knowledge. That is, they can reason through the use of schemes 
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without using propositions or theories. I will call this middle or basic level of the 
vertical axis (in other words the middle- horizontal line) the "empirical level". 
The exploration of the nature of levels of representation systems could provide us 
with descriptions of the ways that children can use information from their background 
knowledge, in order to construct explanations for a phenomenon. According to 
Johnson (1987) a rich store of concrete images, which is based on our bodily 
experiences, provides a valuable and necessary "background" for the construction of 
cognitive structures. He regards the background as part of the meaning. 
Since there are some transformations that take place during the process of going from 
the background to an explanation, the hypothesis of this research is that there is a 
level of concreteness which facilitates transformations from one concrete example to 
another, induction from an example to a generalization, or deduction from a 
generalization to a concrete example. That is, children use in their reasoning cognitive 
structures - empirical schemes - which are stored at a basic level - empirical level. 
Let us see in greater detail how diSessa's, Johnson's, Johnson-Laird's and Ogborn & 
Bliss's views are related with the dimensions of Fig.1 . diSessa (1993) has been 
influenced by the Prototype theory of categorization and he describes the nature of his 
"cognitive structures", that is - p-prims, in a way similar to the way that concepts 
which are members of a category may be related with other members of the same 
category. He regards p-prims as primitive-prototypical forms of knowledge, and holds 
that representations based merely on words cannot play such a crucial role as 
prototypical forms of knowledge are required to play in human reasoning. 
diSessa argues that the human knowledge system consists of a large number of simple 
elements which are minimal abstractions of phenomena. If we provide someone with 
a range of experience within a domain, we can observe a developmental change in 
these elements. This developmental change in the nature of these existing elements is 
their change from relatively isolated, self-explanatory entities into pieces of a larger 
system. 
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He describes as the most drastic change of these elements a change in their function. 
"They can no longer be self-explanatory but must defer to much more complex 
knowledge structures, such as physics laws, for justification" (diSessa, 1993, p.115). 
Consider for example an element called "Resistance". This element can be a common 
abstraction from several phenomena. It is more abstract than a specific phenomenon 
(subordinate level e.g. a string becomes taut when used to pull an object: the object 
resists motion), but is less abstract than "complex knowledge structures" 
(superordinate level) such as laws. For example, Newton's definition-law of inertia is: 
"... innate force of matter, is a power of resisting by which every body, as much as it 
lies, continues in its present state, whether it be of rest or of moving uniformly 
forwards in a right line" (Cohen & Westfall eds., 1995). 
There are many commonalities between diSessa's and Johnson's thoughts. Johnson 
(1987) argues that image schemata differ from images and propositions. Image 
schemata organize our mental representations at a more general and abstract level than 
that which we use to form mental images, while at the same time being more concrete 
than propositions. 
To understand Johnson's idea, consider for example a man moving into a room. We 
can think about this using one of the following levels in our representation system: 
a. Propositional level ("John is in the room") 
b. Image-schematic level (e.g. The "in" image schema. This arises from the 
abstraction of our bodily experience such as: we move into and out of rooms, we 
manipulate objects placing them in containers (cups, boxes, can etc.). In each of these 
cases there are repeatable spatial and temporal organizations) 
c. Mental image level (e.g. a picture image of a man in a room). 
Image schemata are not propositional because they are not abstract subject-predicate 
structures. Propositional representations can capture some of the important features of 
any given image schema but they cannot capture the analogue nature of images and 
the crucial role of image-schematic transformations. By transformations, Johnson 
means "such cognitive operations as scanning an image, tracing out the probable 
trajectory of a force vector, superimposing one schema upon another, and taking a 
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multiplex cluster of entities and contracting it into a homogenous mass" (Johnson, 
1987, p.3). 
On the other hand, image schemata are different from mental images. This is because 
mental pictures represent one particular thing, which differs from another because 
they do not share all the same features. In contrast, image schemata contain structural 
features that are common to many different objects, events etc. 
Johnson regards image schemata as being at a basic level (they contain structural 
features that are common to many different objects or events), mental images as being 
at a subordinate level, and literal meaning as being at a superordinate level. 
Johnson-Laird (1983) discusses similar issues but in different terms. His central 
notion is that of "mental models". These are more generic than p-prims (see Fig.1). In 
general, he proposes the existence of three types of mental representations: 
"propositional representations which are strings of symbols that correspond to natural 
language, 'mental models' which are structural analogues of the world, and images, 
which are the perceptual correlates of models from a particular point of view". So in 
this case, the representational system can operate at different levels, from the more 
concrete images to the more abstract forms. The intermediate step between the 
propositional form and the images could be mental models. Johnson-Laird argues that 
the process of understanding yields a mental model. His focus is on the crucial role 
that mental models play in reasoning. 
A view with a narrow focus is provided by Ogborn and Bliss (1990) who suggest that 
commonsense reasoning happens through the use of prototypes. The theory that they 
propose about a psychologic of motion, relies on the development of prototypes of 
motion. For example, support and effort are identified by their theory as basic 
categories for thinking about motion. Thus according to them, we organize our 
prototypical thinking, according to some primitive schemes, rules, actions etc. that 
constitute the basic level of thinking. 
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Summarizing, mental representations are described by various researchers as a 
hierarchical structure. These researchers recognize that a basic level ("empirical 
level") for mental representations can be used by a child in order to classify a case 
into an "empirical scheme" and this scheme can be used in his/her reasoning without 
defining it with propositional statements. This level is basic, because it contains 
features that are common to many phenomena. That is, they are common abstractions. 
2.3 Elements of the "Empirical Level" and their Structure 
In the previous section, mental representations were discussed in relation to levels of 
abstraction (exploring mainly the vertical axis of the Figure 2.1). In this section the 
organization (structure) will be considered (exploring the horizontal axis of the Figure 
2.1). The exploration of the "empirical level" could be done through the identification 
and analysis of hypothetical cognitive structures that subjects use when they attempt 
to think and reason at this level of abstraction. 
diSessa (1993) in his program for exploring the human sense of mechanism, puts the 
emphasis on identifying and analyzing specific elements of knowledge. His focus is 
on a hypothetical knowledge structure. He calls it a phenomenological primitive - p-
prim. The genesis of a p-prim is often the abstraction of a phenomenon. 
An example of a p-prim, he proposes, is what he calls "Ohm's p-prim". It consists of 
the following subentities: "an agent that is the locus of an impetus that acts against a 
resistance to produce some sort of result"(diSessa, 1993, p.126) 
diSessa (1993) argues that the knowledge system consists of a large number of 
fragments rather than one or any small number of integrated structures (theories). He 
mentions that although light, radio waves, and even forces like pushes and pulls by 
which objects are moved around, are consequences of Maxwell's equations, these 
phenomena are in some degree understood independently. 
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In contrast with diSessa, there area great number of recent discussions denying that 
children's conceptual system consists of a number of fragments. The "knowledge-
based" approach suggests that children's early conceptions of the mind are implicit 
theories (Carey, 1985; Wellman, 1990; Gopnik and Wellman, 1994). However, in my 
opinion diSessa is not absolute about the existence of fragments. 
Both "small fragments" and "theories" may well be true for certain sorts of knowledge 
at different levels of abstraction (empirical and propositional level respectively). It 
appears to me that it might be possible that through fragmentary knowledge and 
schemes we can describe an empirical level of reasoning, while for the analysis of 
propositional forms of knowledge we need to use more structural forms such as 
theories. 
This research will focus mainly on the empirical level which appears to be the level 
that can explain children's thoughts about phenomena better than propositional level 
theories do. It is notable that the "empirical level" of abstraction refers to a large 
number of different versions of empirical schemes. That happens because of their 
dynamic form. In the empirical work the way that the "content" of an empirical 
scheme depends on, interacts with and is modified by other empirical schemes that 
take part in the same phenomenon, - in agreement with Black's (1979) interactive 
view of metaphor - will be presented. For example, in the specific case of an electric 
circuit children gave analogical examples using the mixed schema `source-container' 
for the battery. In these analogical examples, the entity which played the role of 
battery was not just a 'container'. It was also the 'source' for another entity which 
played the role of the current. Consider for example, a child who used an analogy 
where an orange was used as an analogy for a battery. The orange was a 'container' 
and at the same time was a 'source' which could provide us with another entity (juice) 
such as the current. 
Furthermore, these mixed schemes are very powerful. Consider a 'container' such as a 
cup. It can be "full" or "empty". These two schemes (container, full/empty) are 
strongly related. So the "sea" is not an obvious example of a container because the 
sea does not fulfill the second scheme (it cannot be empty or full). That is, the nature 
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of an empirical scheme depends on the form of the whole "package of elements" 
which constitute a phenomenon. These empirical schemes are like dynamic patterns 
that we use in order to organize our knowledge. 
Johnson (1987) makes clear the dynamic character of these cognitive structures. He 
claims that in order to understand and reason about our experience, we need some 
patterns for organizing our actions, perceptions, and conceptions. He calls these 
patterns "image schemata", and these constitute our background knowledge. "A 
schema is a recurrent pattern, shape and regularity in, or of, these ongoing ordering 
activities". He emphasizes the crucial role of background knowledge and explores the 
way that non-propositional structures (which are there in the background) such as 
image schemata, contribute to the elaboration of meaning. 
These cognitive structures have parts and relations. The parts consist of a set of 
entities such as objects, events, goals etc. The relations include causal relations, part-
whole patterns, relative locations etc. A meaning cannot exist without some form of 
structure which establishes relations. A schema usually contains a small number of 
parts which have simple relations between them (Johnson, 1987). 
Also, image schemata have an internal structure. Because of their definite internal 
structure, they influence the ways according to which we make sense of things and 
they constrain inferences about them. For example, the internal structure of the 
schema "in-out" can have consequences such as "protection from" or "resistance to" 
external forces, limitations on the forces or actions that the contained object can 
produce etc. Lakoff and Johnson (1981) called the consequences of the internal 
structure of image schemata "entailments". They argue that "patterns such as these 
which exist preconceptually in our experience, can give rise to rational entailments 
(which we describe propositionally)" (Johnson, 1987, p.22) 
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2.4 Common Abstractions 
Several phenomena may be related by having a common abstraction. If we provide 
hec- 
someone with a range of experiences within a domain, it may lead him to a systematic 
organization of those experiences. In this case the specific reasoning structures may 
develop a kind of integration. So, a coherent organization of "cognitive structures" 
appears to develop subsystems, that are both relatively integrated within themselves 
and also relatively independent of other subsystems (diSessa, 1993). 
diSessa gives as an example Ohm's p-prim which may be a common abstraction from 
a great range of already competent sensorimotor schemes. That is, it can be a common 
abstraction of a broad number of physical experiences, such as pushing objects. 
diSessa (1993) mentions that Ohm's p-prim may be used to interpret intellectual as 
well as interpersonal relations, such as trying harder and influencing. 
Furthermore, Johnson (1987) claims that we can find the same "cognitive structure" in 
many domains, because the parts that constitute its internal structure can be 
metaphorically understood. The relations which exist between several senses of 
schemata like "balance", "in" etc. can be explained by a metaphorical projection from 
the bodily domain - in which the schema emerges - to the mental epistemic domain. 
Johnson therefore places great emphasis on the material, experiential, action basis of 
metaphor. 
According to this experiential sense of metaphor, understanding is a process in which 
we structure one domain of experience in terms of another one. Metaphors do not 
merely help in understanding, they are part of this process and its structure. 
Metaphorical interpretations, "can properly be called structures of understanding" 
because they are patterns in terms of which we "have a world" which is what is meant 
by "understanding" in its broader sense" (Johnson, 1987, p.83). 
Metaphorical-analogical projections of various phenomena (which are related to 
common abstractions) lead to the production of empirical schemes. Through 
analogical projections we construct a "package of elements" with a new form different 
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from existing patterns since we make some possible connections between elements 
and when/where they are active. That is, "empirical schemes" are dynamic structures. 
So, what is happening in an electric circuit can be analogically projected to what is 
happening to our body. In this case we have another package of elements (heart, 
blood, body) and processes (beat, send). To some extent the empirical schemes in a 
new case could be different, e.g. the `source-container' schema which was "perfect" 
for the battery in an electric circuit, in the case of the heart - and its role in circulation 
of the blood - may have to be enriched with the notion of 'duration'. In the case of 
the heart, the "life" of the source-container scheme is notably bigger. The aspect of 
`living' attributed to the source-container scheme is notably more important. 
2.5 Interaction with the Physical World - Embodied 
Reasoning 
Piaget (1974) distinguished two different aspects of knowing: the "figurative" and the 
"operative". Using figurative activity we merely represent environmental sensory 
inputs while through operative activity we transform these representations into 
"objects of knowing". The operative aspect is based on actions. Thoughts are for 
Piaget internalized actions (see also Bliss, 1994). 
Piaget (1974) argues for the primacy of the operative aspect. He views mental 
operations both as a logico-mathematical activity (reflective abstraction) and as 
physical abstraction, giving primacy to "reflective abstraction". "It is clear that, if 
causality favors the functional exercise of intelligence, the operational construction of 
that intelligence still proceeds by "reflective" and not by physical or simple 
abstractions" (Piaget, 1974, p.21). So, children's operational structure is attributed to 
objects and is not drawn directly from them. These operations seem to derive from 
children's reflection on the nature of general types of actions. 
Although Piaget (1974) mentions the importance of children's physical activity, he 
has paid little attention to physical abstraction, or what Ogborn and Bliss termed 
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"empirical abstraction". In this case, children through their acting on objects and 
physical situations, learn about the size, shape, color etc. of objects. Through 
empirical abstraction, children abstract information from objects. So, empirical 
abstraction leads to knowledge about particulars; children think about particular 
instances-examples. In this research, I try to cast some light on thinking about 
particular instances-examples through empirical abstraction, something that was 
neglected in Piaget's work (see Bliss, 1994). 
Ogborn & Bliss (1990) using their work on commonsense reasoning about motion 
proposed a psycho-logic of motion. In this case prototypical thinking (through the 
development of prototypes of motion) has its origins in very early infancy with 
actions and perceptions of movement. 
Furthermore, action plays a crucial role in the perspective that has been described by 
diSessa (1988) as a Knowledge-in-pieces view, which portrays intuitive knowledge as 
a set of context-dependent schemes. According to diSessa (1993) humans interacting 
with the physical world, gradually acquire a sense of mechanism. At this point 
diSessa relates the sense of mechanism with the ways that things work, and with the 
sorts of events that are necessary, possible, or impossible. His major claim is that the 
intuitive sense of mechanism involves a large number of p-prims. 
P-prims have their roots in human experience. diSessa (1993) gives a great weight to 
direct experience. Particularly he points out the "principle of the body". According to 
this principle "p-prims are likely to be abstracted in internally evident terms, 
especially early in development. Thus, agency, (muscle) tension and so on, are likely 
to be represented in important base vocabulary for p-prims"(diSessa, 1993, p.123). 
Although diSessa describes a very similar representational system and its origins (i.e 
body, action) with schemes, he did not refer to Piaget. It is also notable that nowhere 
in his book does Johnson (1987) refer to Piaget, who also adopted the word "scheme" 
(as Johnson did) from Kant. However, internalization of bodily action is a central 
aspect in the Piagetian theory as in Johnson's. Johnson, in order to illustrate the notion 
of embodied, imaginative structure, mainly considers two types of imaginative 
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structure: image schemata, and metaphorical projections. Through metaphorical 
projections the emergent schemata move from the bodily sense to the mental domain. 
He suggests that thinking may be arranged on a continuum from concrete to more 
abstract forms, and it seems arbitrary where one draws the cut-off line beyond which 
mental constructs are no longer called images. 
2.6 Self Explanatory phenomena- Obviousness 
diSessa (1993) argues that some special phenomena are sometimes treated as self 
explanatory. Reasoning at a basic level through the use of empirical schemes may 
lead to the accumulation of a phenomenology of events rather than the reduction of 
events to fundamental principles. For example, although the phenomenon of balls 
bouncing, can be explained by basic laws such as those of energy and momentum 
conservation, one might not reduce a complex event such as a billiards collision, to 
basic principles. Instead one could accumulate a phenomenology of events like 
bouncing, which do not demand detailed justification at each occurrence. It seems that 
there is a relation between the nature of empirical schemes and the level of what is 
`obvious' in an explanation. 
Ogborn (1994) mentions the crucial role of the "obviousness" principle in scientific 
explanations. According to him, a scientific explanation is a "story" which attempts to 
make the occurrence of a phenomenon seem "obvious". It can be made by arguments 
of natural necessity, not mainly of logical necessity. "It rests in the end on the 
virtuous circle of saying. That happens because that is what those things do... 
'Obviousness' is where explaining stops" (Ogborn, 1994). So a level must exist 
(probably it is the empirical level) in which the story stops going further because the 
story seems to be obvious at all the remaining levels. 
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2.7 Imagination 
Imagination can help us to modify existing patterns in order to generate novel 
meanings. According to Johnson (1987) imagination does not merely play a role in 
discovery, invention and creativity, it is also "essential to the structure of rationality". 
He explores the important role of human imagination - as basic to the structure of 
rationality - in the areas of meaning, understanding and reasoning. Image schemata 
and metaphorical projections are matters of imagination. We use imagination in order 
to achieve new structure in our experience through the process of metaphorical 
projection. So, imagination can help us to modify existing patterns in order to 
generate novel meanings. 
Johnson argues that "the schematizing activity of the imagination, then, mediates 
between images or objects of sensation, on the one hand, and abstract concepts on the 
other"(Johnson, 1987, p.155). So, he sees the imagination as an activity meditating 
between sensation and abstract forms of thought. 
Furthermore, according to Ogborn (1994) the conceptualization of an entity requires 
people to imagine the entity and manipulate it mentally in order to generate meanings. 
Whenever we attempt to imagine an entity, we put it in a "package of elements". 
Suppose we try to imagine water. We have to imagine it in a glass or in a river, 
flowing. That is, we imagine what this entity "does". 
Then, when we try to imagine water in an example of a phenomenon, the exploration 
of the nature of the other things come along with it. For instance, when we try to 
explain the way that a lamp lights because of the electric current in an electric circuit 
we can imagine the current as water. Also, we have to imagine the other parts of the 
"package" that will come along with the water (e.g. a barrier). In this case we have 
also to imagine what another entity "can do". 
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2.8 Are schemes non Propositional? 
Empirical schemes are described as non-propositional cognitive structures. According 
to diSessa p-prims have about the "size" and complexity of words, but in many cases 
they are even smaller and simpler than words. Although lexical items such as words 
often have clusters of meanings (polysemy), p-prims are more comparable to a single 
sense of a word. diSessa compares the meaning of the word "force" with a variety of 
p-prims about force, such as force as a mover, continuous force, force as reflector etc. 
Johnson-Laird argues that inductive reasoning takes place through the processing of 
mental models rather than through the processing of sentences or other linguistic 
elements. 
Johnson (1987, 1988) disagrees with the traditional theories in linguistics which in 
order to answer the question "How can anything (an event, object, word, etc.) be 
meaningful to a person?" exclusively focus on the role of the words in a sentence that 
influence their meaning. He explores how nonpropositional structures like image 
schemata influence meaning. 
Johnson is clear that we cannot treat all meaning as conceptual and propositional. He 
mentions two reasons for this: "1) meaning in natural language begins in figurative, 
multivalent patterns that cannot typically be reduced to a set of literal concepts and 
propositions; and 2) the patterns and their connections are embodied and cannot be 
reduced to a set of literal concepts and propositions. In other words, meaning typically 
involves nonliteral (figurative) cognitive structures." (Johnson, 1987, p.5) 
diSessa claims that p-prims cannot be analyzed through mappings that are judged by 
purely structural criteria, as Gentner (1983) did in analogical reasoning. He uses the 
principle of content over form. That is, p-prims are content-based analyses. "Thus, p-
prims cannot be removed from an analysis in favor of general processes such as 
analogical reasoning" (diSessa, 1993, p.125) 
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The argument that image schemata are not propositional forms does not mean that 
these embodied patterns remain private only to the person that has the relevant 
experience. Image schemata are based on a shared world of bodily experiences. It is 
the shared nature of this experienced world, facilitated by communication, which 
makes shared meanings possible (Johnson, 1987). As Johnson says "They become 
shared cultural modes of experience and help to determine the nature of our 
meaningful, coherent understanding of our world. Moreover, they are conventionally 
encoded in language and are immediately understood by hundreds of millions of other 
people" (Johnson, 1987, p.14). It seems that in this way they can be partly learned by 
talking. 
2.9 A Variety of Reasoning Levels 
The empirical level is neither the same for all people, nor for all contexts. For 
example, according to diSessa, to a physicist, in contrast with intuitive physics, 
phenomena like bouncing must be reduced to the actions of forces. A physicist cannot 
use those phenomena as primitive explanations. We can observe different levels of 
reasoning. So, what is basic level for novices might not be the same for experts. In 
this case the development of these elements is a result of a greater systematicity, or 
more knowledge, or more questions. Furthermore we have to consider the influence of 
action, culture, and imagination. 
Johnson (1987) mentions that what constitutes a basic level in our thoughts depends 
on background knowledge, interests, motivation and previous experience. He gives as 
an example, the case concerning interactions with physical objects, in which what is a 
basic gestalt for a layperson may differ from that of a physicist, who has different 
background knowledge about the nature of the physical world and understands 
differently the interaction with it. "Experiential basicness is a relative matter" 
(Johnson, 1987, p.62) 
Also Johnson recognizes image schemata as dynamic structures that organize our 
experience and comprehension. Even though they have definite internal structures, 
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they are dynamic patterns rather than fixed and static images, and they can lead to 
different levels of reasoning. 
2.10 Problems with the identification of Empirical schemes 
diSessa (1993) mentions as a difficulty in his empirical investigation of p-prims, their 
weak relation to the dictionary lexicon. P-prims have not an explicit propositional 
form. One can make predictions using p-prims, but the prediction is not the p-prim. 
Even in the case where one accepts a form as "In circumstances x, y happens" under 
which we might subsume many p-prims, "the inexplicitness of circumstances and lack 
of other reliability checks makes such attributes as universality, truth value, and 
participation in general reasoning patterns (approximating to logical reasoning) highly 
dubious." (diSessa, 1993, p.197) 
This research attempts to identify these kinds of hypothetical structures in children's 
explanations about phenomena. That is, to find whether there are hidden common 
patterns in their explanations and what are the origins of these patterns. Having in 
mind that these empirical schemes have a weak relation to the dictionary lexicon, I 
attempt to describe what they could be like without it being possible to present an 
accurate picture of them. The description of these entities is as if one wanted to 
present a bridge without a picture. He might describe how it is, but the receiver (and 
the sender) will lose a lot of information. We know that it is impossible to translate 
with absolute success from one mode into another, for example an image into verbal 
form. To translate and describe schemes into a verbal form presents the same 
difficulty. 
2.11 Ontological Dimensions in Concrete Thinking 
Tyson, Venville, Harrison, Treagust (1997) outline a multidimensional framework for 
considering conceptual change events in the classroom and they synthesize a number 
of researches by proposing that children's conceptual change can be viewed from 
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several perspectives: the epistemological (the way that a student perceives his or her 
own knowledge about the thing being studied), the ontological (the way that a student 
perceives the nature of the thing being studied), and the social (examines the 
social/affective conditions such as interest, motivation necessary for conceptual 
change to occur). 
There is a movement in the tradition of the description of thinking in the field of 
mental models. Bliss (1994) exploring different descriptions of thinking from Piaget 
to "mental models tradition" mentions that much of the past work on thinking and 
learning is related closely with epistemology (the study of the grounds of knowledge) 
whereas the mental models view leads to a new direction, since there is now an 
ontological focus on studying "what people take to be the nature of the things around 
them. What is comes before what is the case" (Bliss, 1994, p.30) 
Researchers such as Chi and her colleagues (1992, 1995) have attempted to explore 
the difficulties in the conceptual change of children in science, considering the notion 
of ontologically distinct categories. They argue that conceptual change is difficult 
since naive concepts and scientific ones belong to different ontological categories. But 
what makes the boundaries between different ontological categories so strong, and is 
there any way that we can make possible transformations across ontological 
categories? It seems possible that 'empirical schemes' which in many cases are 
common abstractions from members who belong to different ontological categories 
can make possible such difficult transformations. 
Ogborn and Mariani (1991) propose the existence of a fundamental "ontological 
space". They attempt to find a small number of ontological dimensions along which 
objects and events can be placed, for example, dynamic vs static, cause vs effect, 
place-like vs localized and discrete vs continuous. In an analogous way, this research 
explores fundamental dimensions of thought which children seem to use in their 
attempt to understand the nature of proce - 	 in the physical world, and how 
children use them in order to give an analogical example. It is suggested, that the 
identification of empirical schemes of elements can be done only by exploring their 
interaction in "packages". So, finding "groups" of elements and putting them onto an 
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ontological space, at a later stage we can interpret the fundamental dimensions (e.g. 
cause-effect, dynamic-static etc.) that underlie children's reasoning. 
2.12 Empirical Investigation of children's schemes 
In the previous sections of this Chapter, the discussion shows that the idea of 
"schemes" has been used frequently by researchers. However, most of them identified 
schemes in texts (e.g. Johnson) or analyzing interviews of adults (e.g. diSessa). A 
recent study with young children which attempted to explore schemes and made a 
great contribution to this thesis was conducted in London by Joan Bliss, Jon Ogborn, 
Orla Cronin and Will Reader during the last two years. I followed the work of this 
project very closely from the beginning and towards the end I joined the project team 
(see report in Appendix 2.1). 
The project aimed to investigate empirical abstraction and concrete physical schemes. 
The idea was to construct novel tasks which would show whether schemes exist in 
children's thinking, and if so, how they are used. The project team developed a 
methodological framework for investigating schemes as tools of thinking, and 
constructed a range of novel tasks for the investigation of the schemes. 
The various tasks used can be classified into four mainly generic forms: 
• imaginative transformations. (children were asked to transform objects or events into 
others using their imagination) 
• thinking of something as ... (children tried to think of instances as like a given 
scheme, going from instances to schemes) 
• instances of something like ... (children created or identified instances of schemes, 
going from schemes to instances) 
• thinking metaphorically with physical schemes (children used physical schemes as 
the basis of metaphors to reason about non-physical situations 
This research project gave precise pictures of the nature of schemes. In the various 
tasks it appeared possible that schemes can be shown to exist (e.g. schemes which 
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identified by example and name could be reliably and easily identified by children in 
a variety of physical contexts). Schemes developed with age (and might be used in a 
metaphoric way by children 13-14 years old) and many schemes (particularly those 
which have to do with physical movement) were available and produced even by very 
young children(around 5 years old). 
Summarizing, schemes such as "support", "flow", "container", "rigidity" etc. 
appeared as re-usable building blocks, neither too specific nor too generic. They are 
generic enough to be used in many situations but not so generic to be used 
everywhere. Schemes are used in packages to make models. So, schemes appeared 
with a small set of "potentials" (e.g. the scheme 'support' includes 'something 
underneath', 'above the ground etc.) which provide 'entailments' (e.g. removing 
support will make something fall). 
2.13 An overview of Chapter 2 
A central aspect of the thesis concerns the idea of 'abstraction', which is involved in 
all theories of mental representation, of analogy, and of the role of examples. It will 
be important to regard abstraction not merely in terms of 'more' or 'less' abstract, but 
as involving a middle level - the level of prototypes - which is fundamental. Much of 
the work is addressed to elucidating this notion. In the present research, I treat 
`empirical schemes' as the basic level of mental representations. The term 'empirical 
schemes' is used to cover a wide variety of schemes described by other researchers: 
Piagetian's schemes, diSessa's p-prims, Johnson's image schemata and Johnson-
Laird's mental models. All these schemes appeared to me to be located at the same 
level of abstraction (basic level) but having different location in the axis which 
represent their specifity. Thus, 'empirical schemes' -which are very close to schemes 
as they described by Piaget and earlier by Kant- are less specific than p-prims but 
more specific than mental models. 'Empirical schemes' have their origins in physical 
activity and are common abstractions of various phenomena. That makes them very 
powerful tools in the imaginative transformations that children attempt to make 
between very different objects or events. 
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Chapter 3: 
RATIONALE FOR THE RESEARCH 
3.1 Introduction 
During the last two decades, work on children's ideas has shown how difficult it is to 
change them (Osborne and Freyberg, 1985; Driver, Guesne and Tiberghien 1985). 
The difficulties in changing children's ideas might exist because of the way that 
researchers describe them. It appears to me possible that this happens because we try 
to make this change just at a propositional level (usually adults expect a child to 
understand and make use of sentence meaning in the same way as they do) and not at 
a level closer to children's mental representations which can bring to the surface 
children's deep reasoning patterns about natural phenomena and in particular make 
clear children's basic-prototypical level of schematic representations. So, this research 
suggests a way of looking at children's reasoning from an ontological point of view. 
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The ontological view of concepts can refer either to changes in concepts within or 
across ontological categories, or at a more abstract level to the ontological dimensions 
which organise schemes. As already mentioned in the previous Chapter, Ogborn and 
Mariani (1991) argue that scientific concepts can be placed along dimensions: for 
example, dynamic vs. static, place-like vs. localised, cause vs. effect and discrete vs. 
continuous. 'Empirical schemes' are used in this research as tools to analyze the way 
that children make transformations of objects, construct analogies, and create 
examples from generalizations and vice versa. 
This Chapter includes a literature review of the areas of transformations, analogies 
and examples, and also provides a rationale for the research questions chosen. 
3.2 Transformations of objects 
Keil (1989) argues that when young children attempt to transform an entity of one kind 
into an entity of a different ontological category by manipulating characteristic features, 
they "maintain that the type of kind is not changed even though they readily judge type of 
kind to be changed for entities within the same ontological category" (p.209). Chinn and 
Brewer (1993) describe ontological beliefs as "beliefs about the fundamental categories 
and properties of the world" (p.17). It is very hard to change them because they are used to 
support ideas across domains or subdomains and because the beliefs are remote from 
experience. 
Chi and her colleagues (1992, 1994, 1995) apply the notion of ontologically different 
concepts to the issue of conceptual change in science learning. They argue that learning in 
science involves conceptual change across ontological categories since the scientific 
meaning of many science concepts belongs to different ontological categories than those 
to which their naive intuitive meanings belong. They propose that some science concepts 
are more difficult to learn than others because they require a conceptual transition 
between different ontological categories. 
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Chi et al (1994) argue that concepts belong to different ontological categories such as 
"matter", "process" and "mental states". Students have to stop thinking of concepts like 
heat, light, force and current as material substances since it is very difficult for a student to 
achieve a transformation of an entity which belongs to a "matter" category into a 
"process" category. They refer to this difficult process as radical conceptual change. Chi 
et.al., (1994) document evidence from three experiments in which students were presented 
with physics problems about the scientific entities light, heat and electric current. They 
base their analysis of transcripts on the identification of predicates such as contain, move, 
block etc. which might be regarded as schemes. Results show that novices do not use the 
process predicates for these concepts whereas experts do. 
However, the term "ontological categories" seems to me quite arbitrary because the 
ontological categories do not have such precise homogeneity as Keil argued. Consider for 
example Keil's ontological categories such as11animalsI  and§  artifacts.At a different level it 
can be argued that birds and fish constitute also two different ontological categories, since, 
although they have clusters of similarities, they have also different clusters of properties. 
So, the categories of animals and artifacts are not themselves homogenous groups. 
Also, perhaps nowadays (about ten years after Keil's studies), the boundaries between the 
categories which Keil called ontologically distinct are more flexible. In the most popular 
children's TV films, creatures similar to the monster of Frankenstein appear very 
frequently. Machine-robots have the same characteristics as humans. Do the children 
believe that the artifacts they see on television (i.e. Mr. "Data" in star trek, dinosaurs with 
machines inside, etc.) belong to living things? It seems at least possible. The cultural (i.e. 
TV) influence is great. 
Furthermore, in Keil's studies children were judging the result of a transformation process 
that he had already given to them and it is possible that the changes he suggested to the 
children were not enough for them to accept that the object has been transformed into 
another, changing its identity. So, the question is whether children (who receive a great 
cultural impact about flexible ontological categories) can themselves make 
transformations of objects within and across ontological categories. I decided to ask 
children to make transformations of objects - about ten years after Keil's studies - and to 
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give them the opportunity to make their own changes. I was hoping that if the children had 
any difficulty in accepting the change of the identity of objects which belong to different 
ontological categories, I would be able to observe what those changes that make it difficult 
are. 
In the present research, the hypothesis is that in the transformation tasks, children make 
changes related to their empirical schemes. For example, in transforming a bus into an 
aeroplane they might need to change the shape of the bus, (e.g. putting wings, a tail, 
smaller wheels, screws etc.) but they will not change essential schematic features (e.g. 
seats for the passengers - both are containers -, the need for power, both can 
	 etc.). But 
what are these empirical schemes, how we can detect invariances between them, and can 
they make possible difficult transformations across ontological categories? 
Gelman (1979) claims that children might think about the insides of animals in terms of 
the functions that they serve. On the other hand Simons and Keil (1995) in one of their 
studies concluded that "emphasising the functional role of the insides for each animal or 
artifact had little if any effect on children's patterns of responding"(p157). How important 
is the role of 'functional schemes' (what things can do) in the transformation of one object 
into another? 
In the previous Chapter there is a discussion of the prototypicality of examples or 
members of categories. It appears interesting to me to explore questions such as, given two 
objects A and B, is it easier for a child to transform A -> B, or B -> A, and why? If 
children prefer one specific direction, this might be evidence for an asymmetry between 
the two examples. This asymmetry can be explained as the result of the existence of some 
parts in one thing that are more prototypical than the respective parts in the other. That is, 
this asymmetry could be evidence for the existence of prototypes. So, it is expected that 
children will find it easier to transform a non-prototypical thing into a prototypical one. 
Summarising, schemes by their nature are common abstractions which are cross-
categorical. Schemes such as 'flying' can describe things that belong to different 
ontological categories, for example an aeroplane (artifact) and a bird (natural kind). So, I 
asked children to make transformations using their imagination, of objects that belong to 
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same ontological category and of objects that belong to different ontological categories, to 
see whether these ontological categories exist and constrain the success of 
transformations. In the case with the objects from different ontological categories I chose 
some pairs which have common schemes (i.e. an aeroplane into an eagle, both have 
common schemes such as they fly), and some which have not (i.e. an eagle into a toy car). 
I was interested to identify the schemes that would be used by children and to see whether 
the existence of common schemes can make possible cross-ontological category 
transformations. Also, I decided to ask half of the children in each group to make the 
opposite transformation (i.e a toy car into a bird) to see whether there is evidence about 
any asymmetric character of prototypes. 
In contrast to Keil, who believed that the boundaries of these ontological categories might 
be innate, the hypothesis of this study is that schemes cross the boundaries of ontological 
categories, and that "ontological categories" are context dependent. It does not mean that 
humans represent 'things' merely as a sum of parts, making categories according to clusters 
(at a superficial level) of these parts. The present research is intended to show that function 
- what things or their parts can do -, plays an important role in the construction of weak or 
strong boundaries between categories. 
Venville & Treagust (1996) document evidence for transformations across ontological 
categories with the help of analogies. They describe an analogy as a "transformer" in the 
process of conceptual change since analogy might play a role of transforming the 
ontological category of a concept from the erroneous ontological category to the preferred 
category. They describe how the fluid mosaic model for cell membranes (a membrane 
consists of a double layer of lipids with proteins embedded in it like mosaic tiles) was used 
by a teacher with the purpose of changing students' view from static to dynamic entities. 
The purpose of the analogy was to draw students ideas away from that of a cell membrane 
as a barrier with holes in it, and to emphasise the process attributes such as the 'fluid' 
nature of membranes and the associated functions such as the ability of proteins to move. 
In the particular study the teacher used the analogy as a transformer to change students 
view of cell membranes from a "matter" category to a "process" category. 
43 
3.3 Analogies can be described at a schematic level 
3.3.1 Analogical reasoning 
A recent special issue of the Journal of Research in Science Teaching (1993), is 
dedicated to the role of analogy in science education. It is the result of the great 
interest in the role of analogy in science and science education during the last decade. 
Lawson (1993) introducing this special issue categorised scientific concepts into two 
types: (a) descriptive concepts, and (b) theoretical concepts. In the first category 
belong concepts such as the concept of solid, liquid and gas states of matter, for which 
perceptual exemplars exist in the environment. So, a teacher can help pupils 
understanding by pointing out several examples of these. In contrast, there are 
concepts such as atom, gene, phlogiston that do not have perceptual exemplars. In this 
case, the meaning of such concepts cannot be derived from our perceptions, and a 
teacher might help children's understanding using analogies. 
However, analogy is a difficult term to define. DeJong (1989) calls it a "fuzzy concept 
that means different things to different people". Goswami (1991) gives a review of the 
research that has been done in the area of analogy. She particularly focuses on 
research that has set out to measure the development of analogical ability and points 
out that relevant theories share a common assumption: "the ability to reason about 
relational similarity". This assumption is common both in classical analogies (Piaget's 
structural theory and Stenberg's information processing theory), and in problem 
solving analogies (Gentner's structure mapping theory etc.). 
Classical analogy, taken from IQ tests, is the a:b::c:d task. An example might be 
car:fuel::person:?. Fuel is to car as "what" is to person? In this type of analogy the 
child has first to determine the causal relationship between the B and A entities and 
then to identify the D entity that has a similar causal relationship to the C entity 
(Pierce & Gholson, 1994). 
Research on analogical reasoning has demonstrated that novices who try to solve 
problems in a new domain often think back to an earlier analogous problem that the 
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current problem reminds them of. Success depends to a large extent on whether they 
are reminded of an appropriate problem that has the same principle as the test problem 
(Ross, 1984). 
Gick and Holyoak (1983) emphasize the important role of analogical thinking in the 
transfer of knowledge from one situation to another by a process of mapping which is 
the "finding a set of one-to-one correspondence (often incomplete) between aspects of 
one body of information and aspects of another". 
In the last decade researchers have investigated children's (mainly students') ability to 
reason by analogy in problem solving tasks. Gentner's (1988, 1989) structure-mapping 
theory of analogical reasoning is based on children's solution of problem analogies 
rather than classical analogies (a:b::c:d). The analogy depends on a similarity of 
relational structure between a problem that has already been solved (the base) and a 
new problem (the target). Goswani (1991), recognizing the crucial role of relational 
structure, claims that young children can reason analogically in both classical and 
problem analogy tasks as long as they have knowledge of the relations used in 
analogies. 
Gentner & Gentner (1983) defined an analogy as a mapping from one structure, the 
base or the source, to another, the target. The source domain is the part that is already 
known, whereas the target is the part that has to be inferred. Structure-mapping 
defines as the essential elements that constitute an analogy, objects (with their 
attributes) and relations between them. The goodness of an analogy mainly depends 
on the correspondences between relations, rather than on source and target objects 
having similar attributes (see also Gentner and Toupin, 1986). 
Consider for example the well known analogy between the solar system and an atom. 
In this case the sun corresponds to the nucleus, the planets to the electrons. The size, 
shape, weight etc. of these couples of entities differ greatly. Despite these differences, 
what makes this analogy "good" is the correspondence between relations. The relation 
of attraction and centrifugal force that causes the planets to orbit the sun and the 
electrons to orbit the nucleus are common to both (Gentner 1983). 
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Children use their memory to allow novel experiences to bring to mind relevant prior 
knowledge, even though the constituents of the new situation have never been directly 
associated with those involved in the remembered ones. For example, a child who 
sees a drawing of a simple electric circuit for first time might be reminded of the 
circulation of blood. This example illustrates analogical reminding. Both phenomena 
are analogically connected because they systematically correspond in the relationships 
between their objects, entities and processes. It is this structural consistency of the 
phenomena that makes them analogous, rather than simply that both involve some 
similar objects, entities and processes. 
However, I think that the structure-mapping view has some weakness. It has been 
criticized, mainly, for two reasons: 
a. It does not show the way that objects of the target domain are identified; they are 
simply placed in correspondence. 
b. In a similar way, Gentner (1983) does not point out how and which relations in the 
source domain are selected for mapping onto the target domain. 
Probably, in order to solve the first problem we have to look at the role that object 
attributes play (Keane, 1991). Furthermore, because of the second problem Holyoak 
(1985) proposes that the goals of the person who constructs the analogy constrain 
what is mapped from the base domain. 
The proposed "solutions" by Holyoak and Keane help to account for the way that an 
analogy works. However it seems to me that the main problem with structure mapping 
(Gentner), the pragmatistic (Holyoak), and Keane's view is that they attempt to 
analyze the phenomenon of analogy, while seeing it only at a propositional level. 
In contrast Johnson (1988) makes clear that there is a nonpropositional level that we 
have to consider if we want to explore the way that analogies work. He claims that 
"we don't yet have a fully adequate theory of analogical reasoning, because we 
haven't given sufficient attention to these preconceptual and non-propositional levels 
of cognition" (Johnson, 1988, p.26). 
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Particularly in analogical thinking, the core subprocess is the analogical mapping. It is 
the process that has received the most attention in the literature (Keane, et. al 1994). 
Researchers such as Gentner & Gentner (1983) who have explored this process have 
focused on relational similarity. However, in an analysis of the way that an analogy 
works, there is a stage after the identification of relational similarities. Relational 
similarities might describe the "form" of the analogical projection, while the 
identification of the "empirical schemes" that take part in a specific analogy could 
give a description of the "content" of the analogy. But, what are the common 
empirical schemes that can be identified in the source and target domain? 
Most of the studies mentioned so far investigated the role of well known analogies in 
problem solving contexts. These studies do contribute to a better understanding of 
children's use of given analogies. However, I decided to ask children to give their 
own analogies since in the case of learning science, it seems more important to 
understand how pupils can productively generate their own analogies to advance their 
conceptual understanding of scientific phenomena (see also Kaufman et.al 1996). 
Kaufman et.al. (1996) explore students' and physicians' use of spontaneous analogies 
in reasoning about concepts related to biology. The results show that participants 
produced analogies which facilitated explanations in various ways such as bridging 
gaps in understanding, illustrating and expanding on their explanations. The authors 
suggest that through the analysis of these spontaneous analogies it is possible to 
identify students' misconceptions. 
The investigation of the production of self-generated analogies might give evidence of 
the methods that children use to produce their analogies. Clement (1988) evaluated 
experts' methods of generating their own analogies in scientific problem-solving 
(exploring the stretch in two springs). He documented evidence for three different 
methods of analogy generation: 
a. generation via a principle (1 case) 
b. generation via an association (8 cases) and 
c. generation via transformation (16 cases). 
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The most common method was the last one. Tranformation occurs when participants 
create an analogous situation B by modifying the original situation A. In the case of 
generation via an association, participants are reminded of an analogous case B in 
memory, rather than transforming A into B. Associative analogies tend to be more 
"distant" from the original situation conceptually than those produced by 
transformations. But, what is the method that novices (young children) follow? Do 
they generate novel analogous cases rather than analogous cases which already exist 
in their memory? Do children follow a method based on schemes which lies between 
the second and the third method described by Clement? 
3.3.2 Analogies in the domain of electric circuits 
In the tasks developed in this research for the exploration of analogies, a simple electric 
circuit was used as the target domain of an analogy. The selection of the particular 
domain was not random. The difficulties with its introduction in the early stages of the 
science curriculum (last two years of the primary school in Greece), have led teachers to 
use analogies frequently as a helpful tool in the teaching of this domain. 
Furthermore, research shows that children find it hard to understand scientific ideas 
about electric circuits (Shepardson & Moje, 1994). Osborne (1983) describes what 
children have in their minds and suggests that they think mainly using four mental 
models about the circulation of flow in a simple electric circuit. Also Duit et al. (1985) 
argue that many school students have great problems with the ideas that describe an 
electric circuit. 
Many researchers have proposed as an important way of resolving this difficulty, the use 
of analogical reasoning in the development of children's ideas (Gosgrove 1995, Duit 
1990, Gentner and Gentner 1983). Furthermore, children seem to accept analogies as 
useful tools in the understanding of this topic. For instance in a classroom with 11-year-
olds, many children identified their teacher's analogy for electricity, as the main way of 
making sense of this topic (Gosgrove 1989). 
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Thus the electric circuit is a domain that has been used frequently by many researchers 
to explore the ways that various analogies can contribute to children's learning. Various 
analogies have been proposed as suitable. Stocklmayer and Treagust (1994) describe 
many analogies of electric flows used in textbooks in the last 100 years and mention that 
the water-circuit analogy has received considerable attention (see also Gentner and 
Gentner 1983). It is clear that each of the analogies that are used in textbooks - water, 
gravitational and anthropomorphic analogies - have a different focus and their goal was 
to represent various aspects of the electric flow (see also Dagher, 1995, for a discussion 
of the effectiveness of text-based or teacher-based analogies in learning science 
concepts). 
Goswani (1991) argues that the answer to the question how good children are at 
reasoning by analogy seems to depend on the measure used. In the case of "problem 
solving analogies" the degree of success depends on what a researcher has as a 
standard of a "good" analogy. So, it is notable that researchers in this field have a 
preference to suggest ways for the analysis of analogies in their papers, that are based 
on "good" analogies. 
However, I decided to explore children's own analogies in this research because many 
researchers have pointed out that children's "imperfect" analogies could be very 
useful in the learning processes. Gosgrove (1995) explores ways that students 
generated their own analogies in a series of sessions about electric circuits, and argues 
that it is useful in their understanding. Self-generated analogies are tools by which 
students can generate, evaluate, and modify their own explanations (Wong 1993). I 
decided to ask children to produce their own analogies to see what analogies they could 
give for simple electric circuits and how they could be analysed in terms of schemes. 
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3.4 Examples of ideas 
3.4.1 Introduction 
Examples are concrete instances. They are specific instances of something. There are 
different levels of specification-concreteness. So we can imagine a Table (see Figure 
3.1) with: 
a. a vertical axis in which the top end is the abstract-idea pole and the bottom one is 
the concrete (object/event) pole and, 
b. a horizontal axis which goes from specific (left) to generic (right) pole. 
An example tends to be at the left-bottom corner. For instance when someone says 
"time-distance graph", it could be argued that this is a generic and abstract idea, that 
tends to belong to the upper-right hand quadrant. If we have a graph where y=2x it 
will tend to belong to the upper-left quadrant, being more specific. On the other hand 
a statement like "The speed of an object increases" tends to be in the bottom-right 
quarter when a more concrete-specific example, "this car goes faster now" tends to be 
in the left-bottom quarter. 
Figure 3.1: Different levels of specification-concreteness of Examples 
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Specific 
s-t graph 
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How concrete an example is depends not only on the nature of the example but also 
on the way that the person involved tries to think about it. That is, the level of 
concreteness of mental representations he/she uses to think about an example can 
vary. For example, someone who hears an example about a person that pulls a string, 
might shape in his mind immediately an analogous "real" example, when for example 
he himself pulled a specific string. In this case we have the person that pulls "the" 
string not "a string". 
Furthermore, the concreteness depends on the context. It has to do with the focus that 
someone who gives an example in a particular situation has on that example, and the 
different ways that he/she can understand it. Findings in psychology have shown that 
context influences the role of examples, since varying contexts lead to a better overall 
memory. So, viewing an example in a variety of contexts has as a result a better 
memory of the example. Also, a better performance appears to occur when the context 
at test matches the learning context (Ross 1984). 
It is notable that the majority of the research that has been done in the area of 
"examples", has considered the ways in which examples could be used in learning, 
while not much work has been done on the question "How are earlier examples 
retrieved and used" (Ross, 1984). 
The last question is a key question for this research. It is suggested that children use 
an "empirical level" of their mental representations in order to retrieve examples and 
to give other examples. Working at a level like this, children manipulate and use in 
their reasoning "empirical schemes", in order to construct and modify examples of an 
idea. They use their background, their empirical schemes, in order to construct 
examples, and to clarify abstract ideas. So, the variation of the examples and their 
degree of fit with generalizations depends on their constituents, which are empirical 
schemes. 
The focus of this research is on how children reason about: 
a) a phenomenon in science using a generalization 
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b) a generalization, giving an example of it, and how they describe an example using 
schemes, and 
c) transformations of an example of a phenomenon into another example. The 
important question here is "Which structures and features do they hold constant, 
and which do they change?" 
The description of the above three kinds of transformations in the present study includes 
the presentation of the products of these transformations (children's own analogies, 
examples and generalisations) and an analysis of such products based on the 
identification of their schemes. The purpose of the study is to clarify the process of 
exemplification, describing examples, both those produced by children and those 
provided in science textbooks. 
So, the fundamental role of examples in children's reasoning in science, will be 
explored in this research. The hypothesis is that there is a level of concreteness which 
"allows" someone to construct, modify and in general transform examples easily. That 
is what in the first section was described as the "empirical level". This level is neither 
the same for all people, nor for all contexts. 
Related work on reasoning about a phenomenon (target example), through the direct 
construction of a "connection" with another source example (because of their 
similarity) and so with the package of explanations which are known about the source 
example, can be found mainly in the research areas of analogical reasoning and 
problem solving. It is worthwhile to distinguish between the use of different types of 
examples in these two research areas. So, when I use research from the problem 
solving area I will call them exercises (worked-out examples) since the "examples" 
studied are typically end of Chapter exercises. 
The work on analogies has been close to the present research aims. Interviews with 
science teachers suggest that most teachers used either examples or analogies in their 
teaching and that often they did not differentiate between examples and analogies. 
This lack of differentiation is not surprising given the similar purposes of analogies 
and examples in the learning process to make the unfamiliar familiar (Treagust, Duit, 
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Joslin, Lindauer 1992). Through the construction of analogies humans can reason 
about a new target example using their background knowledge of a source example. 
The connection between source and target example is a result of their similarity which 
can become obvious through the transformation of one example into another one. The 
transformation process relies on noticing and making use of some kind of similarity 
between the empirical schemes that humans use in order to think about examples. 
3.4.2 What are Examples? 
Examples are parts of both commonsense and scientific thinking. The etymology of 
the word tells us that example is a part taken out of some whole. This part stands for 
the whole. Important questions arise from this etymological definition. "What 
whole?" and, "What makes an example so powerful to stand for or represent some 
other entity?" 
The present research attempts to show that the "synthesis" of an example from 
specific empirical schemes is responsible for the fit with the whole, and the "power" 
(how good it is) of the example. For instance, we can have both "a child threw up a 
balloon" and "a child threw up a stone" as examples of the same idea "What goes up 
must come down". Both these examples have many common schemes (i.e. the balloon 
and the stone will "move" for a short period; they are not "decision-makers"- they do 
not have the "power for autonomous action") that makes them good examples of this 
generalization (they are better as an example than a bird flying or than a rocket). 
However, the "stone-example" might appear better for some people because its 
synthesis involves an empirical scheme, the time that the stone takes to come down, 
which is less than that of the balloon. 
The production of examples is very similar to the production of metaphors and 
analogies. Using metaphors we can understand one kind of thing in terms of another. 
Metaphors subtract some features from one conception and focus on some other, in 
order to characterize something in a different way. Metaphors "provide coherent 
structure highlighting some things and hiding others" (Lakoff & Johnson, 1981, p.39) 
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In a similar way examples can be seen as a set of facts or features that are viewed 
through a certain type of lens. As such, examples are "filtered snapshots of the 'world' 
that emphasize some aspects and forget others, and the whole process is done on 
purpose" (Rissland, 1991). This description brings examples, metaphors and analogies 
close together. Thus, I decided to ask children (study 3) to describe objects in two 
different contexts - a non-exemplifying and later in an exemplifying context - to see 
whether examples will highlight or hide any schemes. 
3.4.3 How do children understand and use examples of ideas? 
There are many reasons why researchers need to focus on examples. An important 
reason is that examples seem to be an important tool for those who write textbooks. 
Also teachers Y"-clarifying ideas, make extended use of their own examples and of 
textbook examples in the classroom. The simple idea "almost all solid things expand, 
when they are heated" can be exemplified by "the expansion of electric wires in 
summer" or "the expansion of railway lines in summer". But what are their components 
and what makes the two examples that exemplify the above idea, different? In order to 
explore differences between examples of the same idea, I asked children to describe two 
examples (study 3) or more (study 4) of the same idea. 
The traditional goal of exemplification is the role of an instance as a guide and 
stimulus to practice. Kant goes in a new direction, emphasizing the methodological 
status of reasoning through examples. Particularly he defines the reflective judgment 
as the "necessity of the agreement of all [men] in a judgment that can be considered as 
an example for a general rule that cannot be stated". So, in this case, examples aid 
reason and judgment, and Kant characterizes them as wheelchairs or strollers for the 
judgment (Gelley, 1995). 
"Good" examples, play an important role in learning. Also, one cannot ignore the 
special role of "bad" examples - that is, counter examples - in learning. Keenan 
(1995), argues that the "responsibility begins in the bad example.... there would be no 
experience of difference, no change, and no relation to the other without the adventure 
of the comparison and its failure - precisely because it is not always safe" (Keenan, 
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1995, p.121). This implies that teachers have to take into account not only the "good" 
examples but also the counter examples that children give. Through the analysis and 
comparison of counter examples with other examples, children can judge why, when 
and which examples of an idea are "good". In the present research, I asked children to 
describe textbook counter examples and to produce their own counter examples (study 
3) to see what schemes they use in this case in comparison with the description of 
"good" examples. 
Lyons (1995) claims that example formation deals with two dimensions of integration: 
(a) between statement and instance that can be called vertical integration and (b) among 
instances that can be called horizontal integration. This study deals with both 
dimensions of integration. It aims through the description of: (a) children's examples of 
ideas to identify the results of the radical changes of the transformation from abstract to 
concrete or general to specific, and (b) the constituents of examples to identify 
similarities and differences between examples of the same/different ideas. 
3.4.4 How do children understand and use worked out examples 
(exercises) 
There are findings showing that students often rely on exercises as a learning tool. 
VanLehn (1986) argues that arithmetic is learned by "the generalization and the 
integration of examples". His findings show that a large number (85%) of students' 
errors in arithmetic, arose from some type of learning from exercises. 
Reed and Bolstad (1991) distinguish two alternative approaches in order to teach 
people on a task: either presenting a detailed example or a set of procedures. When 
students attempt to solve problems and receive both procedures and examples they 
seem to prefer examples. 
Also, there are studies in the area of learning computer programming that support the 
important role of recalling examples by students, who use them as an analogical basis. 
Pirolli and Anderson (1985) argued that students in order to write recursive functions 
rely on analogies to examples (see also Pirolli, 1991). 
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LeFevre and Dixon (1986) explored what happens when students attempt to solve 
inductive reasoning problems and these problems are accompanied by an example that 
conflicts with the instructions. The degree of effectiveness of example and 
instructions was measured by looking at which procedure subjects used. They found 
that most of the students used the example and disregarded the procedure described in 
the instructions. 
However, there are limitations in the way that students can use worked-out examples 
and generalize what they learn from them. Frequently, a student who has studied 
exercises cannot solve problems that need a slightly different method of solution from 
that of the exercise. Reed, Dempster, & Ettinger, (1985) found that students often 
have difficulty in solving variations of exercises. They were able to solve only 6% of 
simple algebra word problems (such as mixture problems) that required the use of a 
slight transformation of the original equation. 
Although the exercises have limitations (in the procedure of generalization), their 
frequent use in instructional procedure, makes the question "what do exercises offer to 
instructional procedure?" important. 
In order to answer this question, we have to identify the limitations of exercises in the 
learning process. It seems that a factor which mainly gives learning from 
generalization of exercises a low level of success, is whether the statements that can 
be found in an exercise solution procedure are not explicit about the conditions under 
which the actions apply (VanLehn, 1986; Chi & Bassok 1989). 
Chi and Bassok (1989) argue that students have difficulties in using in other contexts 
what they have already learned in an exercise. Particularly, these problems appear 
when they have learned from this example only a sequence of actions, or in other 
words have acquired only an algorithmic procedure or syntactic rules. In this case 
students have not understood "how the conditions of the rule can be derived from 
other variations of a given equation" (Chi and Bassok, p.263). 
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3.4.5 The movement between examples and generalisations 
It is notable that already in ancient Greek thought examples are described in two 
different ways. In Plato, "paradeigma" means a model, a standard. It is related to the 
abstract theories of ideas, which are the source for the characteristics of objects. So, 
the Platonic model displays a vertical directionality, from primary exemplar down to 
multiple instantiations. This vertical directionality is a common phenomenon in 
science classrooms where teachers give an idea and then try clarify and explain it, 
through examples. 
In contrast to Plato's view, in Aristotle a rhetorically oriented conception of examples 
appears. In this case, "paradeigma" functions inductively: the instance serves as a 
vector pointing to a principle or conclusion. Aristotle describes examples as a 
movement with a horizontal dimension/direction "neither from part to whole nor from 
whole to part but from part to part, like to like, when two things fall under the same 
genus but one is better known than the other" (Gelley, 1995, quoting Aristotle). 
If we apply the current terms in this definition then we can observe that Aristotle 
talks about: 
• examples which are common abstractions and have common "empirical schemes" 
(same genus) 
• examples which are best, prototypical examples (one is better known than the others) 
• a kind of horizontal transformation of one example into another (from part to part, 
like to like). 
In summary, two kinds of exemplification appeared in ancient Greek thought. 
Aristotle's view is oriented towards a pragmatic function, to rhetoric, whereas Plato's 
view is oriented towards a cognitive principle and to ontology. (Gelley, 1995) 
An important use of examples in the learning-teaching process is arriving at a 
generalization through induction from examples. In the last two decades, there are 
mainly two different approaches that attempt to describe the way that generalizations 
are induced from examples: a) the similarity-based and b) the explanation-based 
approach. 
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The similarity-based approach claims that a generalization develops by inducing a 
principle (in other words a set of common features) from multiple examples. So, in 
this procedure of induction more than one example is necessary and there are essential 
features that will be shared by all these examples (Gick & Holyoak, 1983). The 
transfer between problems relies on making use of the similarity between the 
problems (Ross, 1984). 
On the other hand the explanation-based approach proposes that generalizations can 
be induced from a single example. In this case the procedure of induction involves the 
construction of an explanation that justifies why the example is an instance of this 
generalization (Lewis, 1988). Figure 3.2 displays the differences between these two 
approaches. 
Examples play an important role in the creation of abstract knowledge structures. That 
happens because the creation of abstract structures requires the comparison of 
examples of isomorphic problems in order to discover their common structure. 
(Catambone & Holyoak, 1989; Cummins, 1992). 
Catambone & Holyoak (1989) found that when the source and the target analog share 
many salient surface properties, spontaneous transfer can occur even in the absence of 
an externally provided hint (for the application of the source analog). Usually multiple 
examples allow transfer even in the absence of a hint when the context is relatively 
constant, while a single source example typically would not suffice. 
When students use multiple examples, they have the opportunity to induce a category 
based on the structural similarities among them. On the other hand, students who are 
required to analyze problems individually, or simply read the problems tend to 
categorize and describe them on the basis of surface feature similarity (Cummins, 
1992) 
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Figure 3.2: The ways in which generalization can be induced from examples 
Gick and Holyoak (1983) in their research, found no evidence to support the view that 
subjects' ability to abstract from a problem schema can depend on just a single story 
analogue. In contrast, when two prior analogues were given, subjects induced 
successfully an abstract schema as a product of describing the similarities of 
analogues. This schema was "highly predictive of subsequent transfer performance" 
(p.31). These findings support the view that a mapping process cannot lead to a 
schema by operating on only a single prior analogue. On the other hand, a general 
schema can be a result of two analogues which can mapped together. 
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However, Ross & Kennedy (1990) suggest that the similarity-based approach needs to 
address two issues: a) what determines which instances are compared?, and b) what is 
the nature of this comparison? 
According to their reminding view (a case of the explanation-based approach) the use 
of an earlier example to solve a current problem requires the novice to generalize 
some superficial features, and by doing so, the learning of a generalization includes 
more structural information about a problem of the same type. Also, the reminding, 
through these generalizations, affects later problem solving performance. So, in this 
case learning occurs from making the analogy, not from some separate processes 
(Ross & Kennedy, 1990). 
Even though the majority of psychological theories support a similarity-based 
approach to learning, there are findings showing that students can generalize from 
single examples (Elio & Anderson, 1983; Kieras & Bovair, 1986). According to Chi 
& Bassok (1989) a combined similarity-based and explanation-based approach is 
necessary in order to learn from examples. 
Figure 3.3: The induction and transformation of examples 
According to these approaches, examples play an important role in the development 
of abstract knowledge structures. They focus on the way that induction from examples 
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to generalizations takes place. This is one of the things that this research explores. 
Also, another interest of the research is the way that children use examples in order to 
clarify an idea and the alternative ways that children can use in order to go from one 
example to another through the use of their empirical schemes (see Fig. 3.3). 
In human reasoning there is a continuous transformation from: 
• concrete objects and events to abstract entities (generalizations), 
• abstract entities to concrete objects and events (examples) 
• one concrete example to another. 
Humans can give an example for a generalization through the manipulation of some 
prototype schemes. When they produce an example, at the same time they check whether 
it fits or not, to their prototype schemes. Usually, they can say how good an example is by 
transforming it to a prototypical example (it depends on how easy and good this 
transformation is). 
Consider for example: 
"If a leaden ball, projected from the top of a mountain by the force of 
gunpowder, with a given velocity, and in a direction parallel to the horizon, is 
carried in a curved line the distance of two miles before it falls to the ground 
... And by increasing the velocity, we may at pleasure increase the distance to 
which it might projected, ... or even might go quite round the whole earth 
before it falls; or lastly, so that it might never fall to the earth, but go forwards 
into the celestial space ... And after the same manner that a projectile, by the 
force of gravity may be made to revolve in an orbit, and go round the whole 
earth, the moon also, either by the force of gravity, if it is endued with gravity, 
or by any other force, that impels towards the earth, out of the rectilinear way 
which by its innate force it would pursue; and would be made to revolve in the 
orbit which it now describes; nor could the moon without some such force be 
retained in its orbit (Cohen & Westfall ed. quoting Newton, p.229) 
Newton seems to have a prototypical scheme of a centripetal force (bodies tend towards a 
point as to a centre). The moon can be a good example of a body which will go round the 
whole earth and the changes in the force of gravity can lead this body to orbit similar to 
the orbit of the prototypical body-ball. This is, of course, a deeper more complex 
transformation than most of those we make in everyday thinking. 
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The clarification of a generalization usually happens through the use of a variety of 
examples, but not all examples fit (to the same degree) equally well to a generalization. 
But what makes one example better than another? Thus, I decided (study 4) to ask children 
to compare examples (when is one example better than another and why?) because it can 
lead us to identify the prototypical concrete schemes that are required for a specific 
generalization. The basic questions that were explored in the present research are the 
following: 
• How do children move from examples to ideas and vice versa, and 
• What kind of examples work well and why? 
3.5 A summary of the objectives & research questions 
The overall goal of the research was to describe children's transformations of objects, 
events and examples of ideas using schemes as tools, in the context of their engagement 
with scientific ideas. Particularly, this research aims: 
• to give some evidence for the existence of 'empirical schemes' and their structure in 
children's reasoning 
• to contribute to knowledge of children's use of 'empirical schemes', with relevance 
to science education 
• to develop novel tasks based on a methodological framework for investigated 
children's reasoning in the context of some domains in science education: 
- pupils' understanding of textbooks' example of ideas 
- pupils' construction of examples of ideas and of generalizations from various 
examples 
- pupils' generation of analogies 
- pupils' transformation of objects across ontological categories. 
Summarizing the previous section, the following general research question were generated 
from the above objectives: 
• Can the existence of empirical schemes make possible difficult transformations 
across ontological categories? What is the nature of these schemes? 
• What is the structure of schemes? Do they appear together in groups? 
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• Can one document how young children produce spontaneous analogies in relation to 
a scientific concept? 
• Are the analogous cases produced by children always retrieved or are they sometimes 
invented? 
• How can children's self generated analogies be described in terms of schemes? Can 
the presence of one scheme in an analogical example predict the presence of another 
related scheme? 
• How do children construct generalizations from examples and vice versa in terms of 
empirical schemes? 
• What examples of ideas can children of this age construct? 
• How do children describe various examples of different ideas in science using a set 
of empirical schemes? 
• What empirical schemes can make one example of an idea better than another? 
3.6 General Methodological approach 
In the previous section, the research questions were presented. The idea of this 
research was to invent new tasks which could answer the new questions that had 
arisen from a theoretical discussion about the existence of schemes and about how we 
can use the idea of schemes in the analysis of children's reasoning in science. 
This research supports the position that children base their reasoning on schemes, 
giving some more evidence of this, and proposes that schemes can be used as tools for 
the analysis of children's reasoning at various levels. Exploring different 
transformations at various levels (between objects, events, examples and 
generalizations) it was not possible to use the same type of task to explore the 
different levels, and to answer different questions that are relevant at the various 
levels. Thus, I decided to use different stimuli (pictures, written sentences, speech) 
and different elicitation methods (interviews, questionnaires with open and closed 
questions). 
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In order to describe ways that children use schemes, and how the idea of schemes can 
be useful tools in the analysis of these transformations, four groups of tasks were 
used: 
• the imaginative transformation of one object into another (study 1) 
• the imaginative transformation of one event into another, constructing analogies 
(study 2) 
• the imaginative transformation of objects, contrasting contexts which do, and do not, 
• Vasin9i1VetIrtaUiceitingignigf AlY 4)) asn 	 examples and vice versa, looking at 
goodness of fit (study 4). 
The tasks that were used in the various studies of this research were developed in a such 
a way as to fit (to have instances from the various categories) two dimensions described 
by the methodological framework of the research project 'Empirical Abstraction and 
concrete reasoning schemes': (a) the various generic categories of tasks and (b) the 
distinction between tasks which require the production and those which require the 
recognition of schemes (Bliss & Ogborn, 1997). I decided to use tasks which belong to 
the various categories because it helps research to give a whole picture of schemes. 
The first and the second study, can be classified in a group of tasks called 'Imaginative 
transformations'. Another task of the category 'Imaginative transformations' which was 
used to investigate schematic reasoning in the 'Empirical Abstraction' project was the 
"Imaginative denial of rules" task. In this task children were asked to imagine carrying 
out a number of familiar actions (making tea, diving into a swimming pool from a 
spring board etc.) in a world where everything is the opposite so all is `topsy turvy'. In 
these tasks, children were asked to transform one object or event into another, to see 
what sorts of transformations are possible, and then what is held constant and what is 
changed at each stage of the transformation. 
The third study can be classified in the category of tasks called "thinking of 
something as ...". Tasks in this category asked children to think of instances as given 
schemes, going from the instance to the scheme. In the tasks of this thesis, children 
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were asked to give descriptions of objects in contexts which differed by being related, 
or not, to providing an explanation of an idea. 
The fourth study attempts to see whether children are able to establish connections 
between concrete examples and generalizations, and to think that some instances are better 
examples of ideas than others. It can be classified in the category "instances of something 
like...". This category includes tasks in which children create or identify instances of a 
scheme, going now from the scheme to the instance. 
In the research project 'Empirical abstraction and concrete reasoning schemes' the tasks 
distinguished whether they required the production (generation) or the recognition 
(selection) of a scheme (see Bliss & Ogborn, 1997). The transformations of objects 
tasks (study 1) and the tasks where children describe schematically the objects out and 
in the exemplifying contexts (study 3) are in these terms selective, since children just 
had to recognise and match schemes, not produce new instances of them. On the other 
hand, the tasks where children construct their own analogies (study 2), and most of the 
tasks where children transform an idea into an example (study 4) are generative, since 
they require participants to produce a scheme or an instance of one. In this case, 
schemes were not presented explicitly, although being partly implicit in goals settings of 
the task. 
Children participating in this research were from 11 to 12 years old. They were pupils in 
the last two years of the primary school in Greece. It is notable that science in Greece is 
introduced as a separate subject in the last two years of the primary school. So, children 
of this age, could help us to understand: (a) how young children introduced to science 
construct and manipulate examples, analogies and objects, and (b) what these children 
who are nearly finishing the primary school are able to do in terms of transformations 
using schemes. The choice of this age had a practical reason since the distinction 
between ideas and examples (that used in studies 3 & 4), and also the notion of 
analogies (that used in study 2) are introduced in a systematic and explicit way (in 
school textbooks) in these last two classes. 
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Qualitative and quantitative methods were used in the analysis of the data. The most 
common position held by qualitative researchers about the relationship between 
`qualitative' and 'quantitative' approaches is that these represent fundamentally 
different paradigms (considering the Kuhnian notion), which are founded on 
incommensurable philosophical presuppositions. Against this it is argued that 
qualitative and quantitative methods can be seen as complementary and the choice 
should be based on the focus, purposes and circumstances of our research. 
(Hammersley, 1996). 
Douglas (1996) introducing a special issue of the journal 'Science Education' on 
qualitative research, argues that in the last fifteen years the idea that qualitative 
research has a place in science education became popular, and that the use of 
qualitative and quantitative research in science education has to be complementary 
rather than competitive. Quantitative research enables researchers in science education 
to "generate accounts that locate and explain events in terms of space, time, number 
and determinism" and the strength of such accounts is more on the side of precision 
than scope, while qualitative research "allow for explanations based on the qualities 
of events in terms of categories" and it is stronger on the side of scope rather than of 
precision (Douglas, 1996). 
Hammersley (1996) suggests (a form of 'methodological eclecticism) the 
combination of qualitative and quantitative approaches, since that might cancel out 
the respective weaknesses of each method. Niaz (1997) documents the importance of 
integrating qualitative and quantitative research methodologies in science education. 
He is opposed to the view that the relationship between qualitative and quantitative 
research can be described in terms of the 'incommensurability' thesis. He argues that 
a review of the literature in science education research shows that there is a 
competition between divergent approaches (as described by Lakatos), and they are 
more productive than the appearance of only one paradigm. 
Mason (1994) identifies as a key challenge in the case of the integration between 
qualitative and quantitative data, the development of the necessary approaches to deal 
with data that have different logical principles. So, using these two approaches in a 
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research, one cannot say whether one method 'contradicts' the other, since they give 
answers to different questions. According to Hammersley (1996) it is preferable to use 
them in a complementary way, to give respectively answers to questions about 'what 
happens' and 'how often something happens'. The last formulation of Hammersley's 
is not, however, entirely adequate. It is quite possible for quantitative analysis, for 
example of clusters, to produce qualitative information. At several points I have used 
it in this way. Equally, it should be said, though I have not done this, that counts on a 
large scale of qualitative categories derived from data, can be useful. 
In the present thesis, I used a `complementarity' of methodsmostly in the 2nd study. 
Qualitative research is regarded as being better able to produce information about the 
nature of schemes or packages of schemes children used giving their analogies, while 
quantitative research was used to give evidence of how often particular packages of 
schemes appeared in various analogies. Also, in the various studies, qualitative 
analysis is used to provide information and to generate accurate information about a 
small number of cases (pilot tasks), while quantitative methods are used mainly in 
bigger samples to make possible wider generalizations. 
The fourth study mainly used another form of combination of qualitative and 
quantitative techniques, which Hammersley (1996) calls 'facilitation'. Qualitative 
interviewing about children's modification of examples was used as a preliminary 
method, both to generate hypotheses and to develop later a questionnaire which was 
analyzed mainly with quantitative techniques. 
In most of the tasks (see the first and the third studies) open-ended questions are used. 
Thus I decided to carry out the qualitative data analysis using the 'systemic network 
analysis' (Bliss et.al 1983) because this method of analysis is particularly suitable for 
these data. 
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3.7 "Empirical Level" and Science Education 
Science educators recognize that pupils bring to the classroom their own ideas about 
everyday phenomena of interest in science and that these ideas usually differ from 
scientists' current views. Pfund and Duit (1994) catalogued many hundreds of studies 
about the ways that children think about various phenomena of interest to science. 
According to Ogborn (1996), work about children's ideas "in Europe has often tended 
to focus on describing students' conceptions, whereas work in the USA has had a 
stronger focus on changing them". 
This research investigates how the nature of the empirical level of thinking could be 
used in order to analyze the way that children construct their ideas about the physical 
world, and what implications this may have for science education. So, this research 
identifies some of these empirical schemes, and describes how children use them in 
their reasoning about science and considers what the implications are for science 
classrooms. 
Adey (1995) produced a categorization of types (current themes in) science education 
research. His system used for the classification of all research papers appeared in the 
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1992 and 1993 volumes of theiournal of Science Education and the Journal of 
Research in Science Teaching. One of the nine categories that were identified by this 
classification was 'Cognitive schemes as explanations'. That category, in which this 
thesis can be classified includes investigations into the influence on science concept 
formation of various cognitive schemes. Schemes include mental models, 
phenomenological primitives and schemes of concrete and formal operations. The 
research goal of the studies in this category is to provide an explanation for patterns of 
concept formation. Furthermore, they have an educational goal to provide a better 
understanding of deep structures which should help in the design of more effective 
instruction. 
The focus of the present research is on the exploration of the ways that children think 
about particular instances-examples in science. An analysis which has as its tools the 
empirical schemes of children's reasoning is appropriate for the analysis of the value 
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of examples and analogies in science classroom. It is possible that through the "good 
examples" and "analogies" children produce, one can explore their background 
knowledge at deeper level. 
Also teachers, taking account of these spontaneous analogies of children, could better 
correct wrong analogies in order to correct the deeper "wrong-idea". Johnson (1987) 
pointed out: "Metaphors, or analogies, are not merely convenient economies for 
expressing our knowledge; rather they are our knowledge and understanding of the 
particular phenomenon in question."(p112). Also, Iding (1997) suggests that one of 
the possible future directions in research about analogies might involve research such 
as that of Wong (1993) on students' self generated analogies. The creation of guided 
exercises using self-generated analogies which will accompany science texts will be a 
very helpful tool in science teaching. 
3.8 An overview of Chapter 3 
Research on conceptual change has started to focus on describing ontological rather 
than epistemological issues. Relevant work investigates children's imaginative 
transformations of objects or events. They base their analysis more or less on the 
exploration of schemes. In this research it is suggested that if science educators aim to 
go further than a mere identification of children's ideas, for example if they aim to 
change them, they have to consider children's 'empirical schemes'. Science educators 
have to focus on children's thinking about particular instances-examples, viewing 
them through the form and the content of children's empirical schemes. They have to 
describe the appearance of "packages" of schemes, to identify the whole group-
package of elements that constitute an example and then to investigate whether there 
is any relation between the specific package of the elements, and misunderstandings 
held by students. They have to recognise the powerful role of schemes - as common 
abstractions - in children's imaginative transformations of entities which belong to 
different ontological categories. In the thesis, qualitative and quantitative methods of 
analysis of data are used in a complementary way to show a possible way that 
researchers could approach the above issues. 
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Chapter 4: 
TRANSFORMING AN OBJECT INTO ANOTHER 
4.1 Introduction 
Learning involves conceptual change and may include a change in the categorical status of 
concepts. Keil (1989) argues that entities of one ontological category cannot be 
transformed into entities which belong to different categories. The current study explores 
whether children can make transformations of objects within (exploratory study) and 
across (main study) ontological categories. 
Both the exploratory and the main study attempt, through a group of transformation tasks, 
to identify prototypical empirical schemes and detect invariances between them. Children 
are asked to transform one object into another. The hypothesis is that in the transformation 
tasks, they will make changes related to their prototypical empirical schemes. For 
example, in transforming a bus into an aeroplane they might need to change the shape of 
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the bus, (e.g. putting wings, a tail, smaller wheels, propellers etc.) but they will not change 
essential empirical scheme features (e.g. space for the passengers - both are containers -, 
the need for power -both need a "pilot" to give them the power for autonomous action-
etc.). It also appears interesting to me to explore whether there is any asymmetry in the 
transformation of objects that might imply the existence of prototypical objects or parts of 
objects. Such asymmetry could present a greater difficulty for children to transform an 
object B into A, in relation to the transformation of A into B. 
4.2 Exploratory study: Transformations within ontological 
categories 
4.2.1 Methods 
4.2.1.1 	 Design of the tasks and Aims 
The tasks of the exploratory study are designed to examine the way that children make 
transformations, using a method related to Piaget's idea about how the development of 
meaning of physical entities occurs, through understanding of what can be done to them, 
what they can do and what parts they are made of. 
For the design of the tasks the part "What is it made of was considered (see Fig. 4.1), 
since the part of "what can be done to them" was expected to arise from the analysis of the 
results. The aim was to sample objects of very different categories. 
What it is made of 
non material 	 Entities 
[Abstract part] 	 Actions 
d animals person living 
gas 
non  living fluid 
solid 
natural 
artifact 
membership 
of category 	 superordinate 1 
basic 
subordinate 
ecna t eegaot 
category 
i  
Figure 4.1: What is it made of? 
material 
[Concrete part] - Objects 
nature 
1  samediff
different 
71 
The final categories of this network were used in the selection of the objects for the tasks. 
Keeping stable the variation of category membership - same category and subordinate 
level - objects were chosen from the "possible" categories (Artifact-Natural, Living-non 
living, solid-fluid, person-animal) as shown in Table 4.1. 
Table 4.1: Choosing objects from the "possible" categories 
TASKS 	 ONTOLOGICAL CATEG. 
> Aeroplane .(A) 
	 non living 7 solid 	 Artifact 
Duck -> Eagle 	 (B) 	 living - animal Natural 
Gi rl WUniAlt: 1; T - person NatufaI 
Orangina-> Lemonade (D) non living - fluid 	 Artifact 
The tasks explore whether there is any difference in the transformations when we have 
different categories of "material" things. The major dimensions were living versus non 
living, and artifact versus natural kind. 
It was expected that transformation will involve groups of changes such as appearance 
(external change), internal characteristics, entities in science, actions etc. Furthermore, if 
there is a pattern in the order of appearance of specific transformations, this could be an 
indication of the existence of prototypical empirical schemes. It was expected that children 
in their transformations would give priority to features which they think of as important 
for the basic-prototype empirical schemes. 
So, the aims of the exploratory study were mainly to find out how children transform an 
object into another which belongs to the same ontological category and the identification 
of the empirical schemes that children use in their transformations. It also tested the 
methods that were to be used in the main study. 
4.2.1.2 	 Participants 
The participants were 10 children with an average age of 11 years and 5 months old, who 
volunteered to participate in the study. The study contained 4 tasks, which were divided 
72 
into two groups. Each child did 2 tasks on one day and 2 tasks on the next day. Each 
interview took approximately 10 minutes. 
4.2.1.3 
	 Materials and Procedure 
The materials used were four pairs of black and white photographs: a. Bus-Aeroplane, b. 
Duck-Eagle, c. Girl-Woman, d. Orangina-Lemonade. The pictures used are presented in 
Appendix 4.1. 
The children were asked to describe what they could see in one pair of photographs. Then 
they were asked, using their imagination, to try to transform one object (e.g. bus) into the 
other (e.g. aeroplane). I drew each of their changes and asked if they had anything else to 
change. Finally, I asked them "is that an aeroplane now or there is still something wrong 
with it? Why? 
4.2.2 Results 
Almost all of the children said that the object had been successfully transformed into the 
other in all tasks. However, two of them in the case of the transformation of a bus into an 
aeroplane and one in the case of the transformation of a duck into an eagle said initially 
that it was not yet an aeroplane or an eagle respectively. So, they were asked why and they 
described to me some more changes (e.g. put an engine at the back, make the windows 
smaller). After these further changes, the children said that the objects had been 
successfully transformed. 
In their transformations the children kept some things constant such as the windows 
(transforming the bus into the aeroplane), the shape (transforming the duck into the eagle), 
the identity-humans (transforming the girl into woman) and the bottle (transforming the 
lemonade into orangina). It was an unexpected result that the children kept things constant 
since in most of the cases there were differences in the things that the children kept 
constant between the two objects. For instance, the windows of the bus were not exactly 
the same as the windows of the aeroplane, but it seems that in these cases the children had 
a general scheme that fits well to both instances However, the children mainly changed 
things. 
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The children changed both material and non-material things. Material things which were 
transformed were internally visible, such as adding insulating material to transform the 
bus into an aeroplane, or externally visible things such as removing the old wheels from 
the bus. The non-material changes were about: 
a. Physical abilities. The bus needs "high speed" to be an aeroplane, or similarly the 
duck has to "go faster" to be an eagle. Also, we have to "change the age of the girl", 
and "she has to grow up" to be a woman 
b. Quality. The bus needs "more resistant windows", and we have to "change the taste 
of lemonade" to be an orangina. 
c. Emotions. The duck needs the "eagle's glance", and "more aggressive wings" 
d. Cognition. The girl needs "more knowledge" to be a woman 
e. Social such as independence (the girl needs to "change the way of life" or "find a job 
by herself') or qualifications (the girl needs "more experience" or "finish school") 
The changes are related with the existence of some parts or with the modification of some 
parts into new forms. Considering existence, the children preferred to add rather than 
remove things. They added things such as: 
• wings, tail, lights, antenna, appropriate seats, cock-pit, engines, windows, a big 
window at the front, transforming the bus into aeroplane 
• beak or a "sharp nose", wings at the leg, transforming the duck into eagle 
• lemon juice, lemon, sugar, carbonate, transforming the lemonade into orangina 
There are very few cases where the children removed things, such as removing the wheels 
of the bus, or removing the lemonade from the bottle. Also, in the transformation of the 
girl into woman, the children did not add or remove things. Instead they proceeded by 
modifying the form of things. This particular transformation happens in reality, and it 
seems that the children knowing this, just modified the existing parts of the girl. 
In many cases the children modified a part of an object or relations. They modified the 
size of parts: the bus needs "smaller windows" and have to be "lower", the duck needs 
"bigger wings", and in the case of the lemonade the lemon has to be modified into orange, 
the label and other components of lemonade has to be changed. Also, the children 
modified the shape of some parts. The bus has to be made "aerodynamic in front" and in 
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the back , the duck needs a sharp nose or beak and to modify its legs, tail, body and eyes 
into the eagle's parts, and the girl has to modify her clothes into the woman's clothes. 
Furthermore they modified relations of: 
a. position-spatial. The bus needs the engine at the back, and the girl has to change her 
position in the picture. 
b. proportional. The bus needs smaller windows, the duck needs bigger wings and tail, the 
girl has to be taller and have bigger mass, and the lemonade needs more sugar. 
In the various tasks, the emphasis was on the transformation of different groups of 
elements. In both transformation tasks between artifacts, the "bus-aeroplane" and the 
Orangina-Lemonade, the emphasis was first on "add new parts" and then on the 
modification of external or internal parts. However, they made the transformations 
between living things, the duck into an eagle and the girl into woman, mainly by 
modifying already existing parts. Furthermore, in the "duck-eagle" task the emphasis was 
on the modification of the parts considering their "shape", and on some "non material" 
characteristics, which in the "girl-woman" task, emphasised socio-psycho, non-material 
transformations. 
The elements (mainly the material parts) that result from the transformations were 
common to most of the children. Also, it seems that there was an indication of a specific 
order in their appearance. Evidence of the order might be the following: 
• Eight of the children put "wings" at the first stages of their transformations of a bus 
into an aeroplane, while "windows" appeared at the last stages. 
• Four children asked to make the "nose" of the duck sharper and three to modify the 
wings of the duck to be bigger as their first choice 
• Five of the children suggested that the girl has to grow up and to be taller as their 
first choice 
• Five children asked to add lemon juice, and two asked to keep the same bottle as 
their first choice. 
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4.2.3 A summary of the exploratory study 
The children easily made the transformations between objects which belonged to the same 
ontological categories. This fact generated the question for the next step in the main study, 
where the aim was to explore transformations across ontological categories. 
The children changed material (external or internal) or non material things (physical 
abilities, quality, emotions, cognition and social changes) and they made changes related 
to the existence of some parts or with the modification of some parts into new forms. They 
used different sorts of changes to transform objects which belong in different ontological 
categories. So, they preferred to "add" things when they transformed an artifact into 
another while they mainly used "modifications" when they transformed a living thing into 
another. Also, the children preferred to "add" things rather than "remove" them. 
The children kept some things constant when transforming an object into another. It is 
possible that they would have kept more things constant if they had known that they were 
allowed to do so, since at the beginning they were asked to transform an object into 
another and the word transformation is related mainly with changes. As a result, in the 
main study, the term 'transformation' was clarrified by asking them about what changes 
they wanted to make and what they wanted to keep the same. 
Furthermore, the patterns in the order of transformations may indicate the existence of 
prototype empirical schemes. 
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4.3 Main study: Transformations across ontological categories 
4.3.1 Methods 
4.3.1.1 	 Design of the tasks and Aims 
In the main study, the "power" of children's concrete empirical schemes was tested. 
Empirical schemes by their nature are common abstractions which are cross-categorical. 
Does their existence make possible cross-ontological category transformations? Is there 
evidence about any asymmetric character of prototypes? 
It must be made clear that these tasks were very different from Keil's studies (see 
discussion in Chapter 3), considering the methodology and the questions he tried to 
answer. In his studies, children were judging the result of a transformation process that he 
had already given to them and it is possible that the changes he suggested to children were 
not enough for them to accept that the object had transformed into another changing its 
identity. Also, this study is not concerned with how strong the boundaries are between 
different ontological categories (as Keil is), but is interested mainly in the way that 
children can reason about what a thing can do, transforming one thing into another using 
empirical schemes. 
In this main study, four transformation tasks were used. In these tasks the objects did not 
belong to the same category - as in the exploratory study - one of them being a natural 
kind (e.g. an eagle), while the other being artificial (e.g. an aeroplane). In some pairs, the 
parts that constituted the two objects were made of different materials but they could do 
similar things; they had common functional schemes (e.g. fly). In contrast some other 
pairs did not have common functional schemes. Another question which was introduced in 
this task investigated what children kept constant through their transformations. 
The aims of these tasks were to identify variations and changes in children's use of 
concrete empirical schemes and the way that they produce, manipulate and modify these 
concrete empirical schemes. Also, the transformation tasks aim to identify "packages of 
elements"- that children use in their transformations, which may indicate the use of 
prototypical empirical schemes. Also, it seems interesting to look at the order of 
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appearance of changes in the process of transformation. This order can provide an 
indication of the existence of prototypical empirical schemes. 
Furthermore, it appeared interesting to me to explore questions such as, given two things 
A and B, whether children make different transformations when they transform A->B and 
B->A. If we find that children prefer to use different changes for the different directions, 
this might be further evidence for an asymmetry between two examples and for the 
existence of prototypes. 
In summary, the aims of this task were: 
(a) Can children make cross-ontological category transformations? Does the existence of 
common functional schemes help these transformations? 
(b) The identification of "packages of elements" that children use in their transformations, 
and more particularly the order of appearance in the process of transformation. 
(c) What kind of things did they keep constant in their transformations? What kind of 
things are the same for members of different categories? 
(d) Is it easier for someone to transform an object A into an object B rather than the 
other way round? 
	
4.3.1.2 	 Participants 
Thirty eight Greek children, mean age 11 years 8 months, participated in each of the four 
tasks (each child did one task). All the children attended the last class of public primary 
schools. Most of the children came from a predominantly middle class background. 
	
4.3.1.3 	 Materials and Procedure 
The materials used were four sets of two black and white photographs (see Appendix 4.2). 
They consist of objects which belong to different ontological categories, two pairs 
consisting of objects with common functional empirical schemes and two lacking 
common functional empirical schemes (see Table 4.2). 
Each child was tested individually in a room familiar to them (another classroom). The 
particular task took 4 to 5 minutes maximum. All the children were initially questioned to 
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Different Ontological Categories 
Common Functional 	 Not Common Functional 
Empirical schemes 	 Empirical schemes 
Eagle - Aeroplane 
Human - Robot 
Bird - Toy Car 
Human - Rocket 
ensure that they understood the pictures. They were presented with the two pictures (one 
beside the other) and were asked to describe what they could see in those pictures. Then 
they were asked using their imagination to transform an object (x) into another one (y). I 
drew each of their changes and asked if they had anything else to change. Finally I asked 
them "is that a y now or there is still something wrong with it? Why? 
Table 4.2: Choosing objects from different ontological categories 
In each task, there were two groups of children assigned to two different conditions. 
Children who belonged in the first group (Case A) were asked to transform the natural 
kind stimulus into the artifact (e.g. an eagle into an aeroplane), while those who belonged 
to the second group (Case B) were asked to make the opposite transformation (e.g. an 
aeroplane into an eagle). 
4.3.2 Results 
One child made the following changes to transform an eagle into an aeroplane: 
Inter: What you can see in those pictures? 
Child: I can see an eagle. 
Inter: Yes. 
Child: And an aeroplane. 
Inter: Well, now I would like you, using your imagination to change the eagle into an aeroplane. Could 
you tell me what we are going to change and what we will keep the same? 
Child: Yes, we are going to keep the wings. 
Inter: Yes. 
Child: We will put machines, turbines. 
Inter: Yes. 
Child: We will put the back tail. 
Inter: Yes. 
Child:.... 
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Inter: What ? 
Child: I simply believe that we would leave it and we would put a wing standing up. 
Inter: Well. 
Child: In front, instead of an eye, we would put a glass. 
Inter: Yes. 
Child: We would put wheels instead of legs. 
Inter: Well. 
Child: And we would put a pilot in order to fly. 
Inter: Yes. 
Child: And fuel. 
Inter: Well, anything else ? 
Child  • we would put small windows. 
Inter: Yes 
Child: We would fix the wings to be more straight. 
Inter: Right. 
Child: And we would take the beak out, and we would put the "nose" of the aeroplane. 
Inter: Well, anything else ? 
Child: We would put a steering-wheel in order to turn. 
Inter: Yes, anything else ? 
Child  • We will keep the back wing. 
Inter: Yes, anything else ? 
Child: And the shape, we will keep same the shape of his body. 
Inter: Well, something else ? 
Child: We will put wheels. 
Inter: Yes. 
Child: Machines. 
Inter: Yes. 
Child: Let's put a special container in order to put in the fuels. 
Inter: Yes. 
Child: Instead of eye we will put a glass. 
Inter: Yes. 
Child: We would take out the beak (we have already said that) and we would put turbines. 
Inter: Yes, is it now an aeroplane ? 
Child: We would take out his mouth and, and we would make a more aerodynamic shape. 
Inter: Yes. 
Child  • We would make better the shape. 
Inter: Yes, we would make it, anything else 
Child: 	  
Inter: Is there anything else that you would like to change or to keep the same? 
Child• 	 No. 
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Inter: Ok. Is it now an aeroplane ? 
Child: Yes,... I believe that it is an aeroplane. 
Inter: Thank you very much. 
The child made many changes in order to transform the eagle into the aeroplane. He 
kept some things the same such as the wings and the shape of the body. Looking at the 
wings and the shape of the objects as they appeared in the pictures, there are many 
differences between the two objects considering their shape and their size. However, 
what the child kept constant was not the image of wings or of the shape but the 
empirical schemes 'wings' and 'aerodynamic shape'. The instances of the empirical 
schemes 'wings' and 'aerodynamic shape' may vary comparing different types of 
aeroplanes, or comparing an aeroplane with an eagle, or may vary even more comparing 
other objects. But the wings as horizontal surfaces on the two sides and the aerodynamic 
shape of both objects serve a common function, making both objects able to move fast 
and fly. So, the child kept constant 'common functional empirical schemes' 
independently from the differences in their appearance in the various instances. 
Also, he added parts of the aeroplane and removed parts of the eagle. He recognized the 
lack of 'autonomous action' of the aeroplane and he added 'a pilot in order to fly'. Also, 
he added machines to give power to the aeroplane and a back tail to define its direction. 
He made some modifications of parts such as 'instead of the eye we will put a glass' and 
removed things for which he could not find any corresponding part in the aeroplane, 
such as the eagle's beak. At the end the child accepted that the identity of the eagle had 
been changed. 
4.3.2.1 	 Successful Transformations 
The number of children who said after their suggested changes that the object A had 
changed its identity and was now an object B are shown in Figure 4.2, as 'successful' 
transformations. 
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Figure 4.2: Did children regard their transformations as successful? 
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Looking at the pairs which lack common empirical schemes, we see that it is easier for the 
children to move from natural kinds to artifacts than the reverse, and that many children 
did not accept as successful the transformations of an object into another which belong to 
a different ontological category. This implies that these ontological categories exist. So, 
the present findings add to Keil's (1989) findings that when children are presented with 
transformations they resist ones which alter ontological categories. 
However, common functional empirical schemes (e.g. they can fly, move etc.) can make 
the transformation between objects from different ontological categories easier. So, there 
were more children who successfully transformed natural kinds to artifacts when both 
objects have common empirical schemes than when they do not (x2=13.04, df=3, 
p=0.005). Also children found more difficulties when they attempted to transform an 
artifact into a natural kind when there are no common empirical schemes than when there 
are (x2=33.58, df=3, p=0.0000) (see Appendix 4.3). 
The present findings show that most children (12 years-old) using their concrete empirical 
schemes can make "difficult" transformations across ontological categories (i.e., natural 
kind into artifact). In these transformation tasks children used their concrete empirical 
schemes in a specific context, and gave emphasis to functional similarities between the 
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two things and their parts that were used as stimuli, though it must be conceded that the 
design of the task led them in this direction. 
4.3.2.2What sort of transformations did the children use? 
Table 4.3 presents changes used by the children with frequency more than 25% (up to 5 
children). Both the children who attempted to transform a natural kind into an artifact and 
those who attempted to make the opposite transformation of the artifact into the natural 
kind, used mainly the same or reverse (i.e add wings instead remove wings) sorts of 
transformations in different order and some different sorts of transformations. 
Let's consider for example the transformation of an eagle into an aeroplane and vice versa. 
Most of the children kept the wings constant (15). Also, they added a propeller (12) in 
order to make movement possible. "Thus children know that animals are capable of self 
generated motion but artifacts typically are not" (Keil, 1989, p139). An aeroplane needs 
wings and propeller. Also, half of them modified the shape of the eagle's tail (9) putting a 
vertical wing on it. On the other hand, most of the children, when transforming the 
aeroplane into the eagle, modified the tail of the aeroplane (13) pulling out the vertical 
wing. Also, it seems that they worry about the state of the material. So, they modified the 
wings to be non-rigid (10) giving the eagle the ability to fly, as well as transforming the 
material into a non-metal (10). They also modified the front part (10), mentioning 
especially the beak) and they kept the wings constant (9), removing the propeller. 
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Table 4.3: The most fre quent transformations the children used 
Eagle -> Aeroplane Number of • Aeroplane -> Eagle Number of 
TRANSFORMATIONS children TRANSFORMATIONS children 
Constant wings 15 Modify tail 13 
Add propellers 12 Modify non-stable wings 10 
Modify tail 9 Modify front part 10 
Add windows 9 Modify non-metal 9 
Add wheels 6 Constant wings 9 
Add engines 7 Remove propellers 8 
Modify stable-wings 6 Remove windows 7 
Add various things 6 Constant shape 6 
Constant body 6 Add legs 5 
Add seats 5 Modify smaller 5 
Modify bigger 5 Modify wheels 5 
Modify front 5 Remove engines 5 
Modify legs 5 Constant front 4 
Humaii -Robot Number of Robot -> Human Number of 
TRANSFORMATIONS children TRANSFORMATIONS children 
Modify body 10 Modify foot  12 
Modify hand 10 Modify hand 11 
Modify foot 8 Modify head 9 
Modify head 8 Constant foot 8 
Modify metal 6 Constant hand 8 
Constant hand 6 Constant movement 5 
Constant foot 5 Modify body 5 
ird -> Toy Carr 	 Number of Toy Car -,Bird 	 Number of 
fRANSFORMATION 
	 children TRANSFORMATIONS 
	 children 
Modify wings Add wings 	 11 
Modify legs 	 8 Add beak 	 11 
Add engine 	 5 Add legs 	 9 
Remove legs 5 Modify wheels 
	 8 
Remove wings 5 
Human -> Rocket 	 Numb 	 of Rocket -> Humag Number of 
TRANSFORMATIONS 	 children  TRANSFORMATIONS children 
Modify foot 	 12 Add hand 11 
Modify hands 12 Modify turbine 10 
Modify head 11 Add foot 9 
Add turbine 7 Add head 8 
Add wings 6 Modify front part 8 
Modify body 6 Modify body 5 
Add front part 5 
The transformations the children made can be grouped into kinds which are similar in 
nature. They mainly used four different sorts of transformations: "Keeping constant", 
"add", "modify" and "remove". In Table 4.4 and Figure 4.3, the total numbers (actual 
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numbers and percentages respectively) for each sort of transformation that the children 
made in each case is shown: 
Table 4.3: The actual number of children who made each sort of transformation 
Constant Add Modify Remove 
Al. Eagle 	 -> Aeroplane 30 63 41 12 
A2. Aeroplane -> Eagle 22 21 62 34 
Bl. Human 	 -> Robot 26 34 47 8 
B2. Robot 	 -> Human 28 16 57 19 
Cl. Bird 	 -> Toy Car 4 18 34 27 
C2. Toy Car 	 -> Bird 2 42 37 10 
Dl. Human 	 -> Rocket 1 27 49 11 
D2. Rocket 	 -> Human 3 50 34 9 
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Figure 4.4: The percentages of children who made each sort of transformation 
a. Keeping constant 
In these tasks, the children used concrete empirical schemes to make a cross ontological 
shift. One important indication for the existence of these empirical schemes (considering 
mainly functional empirical schemes) is what children keep constant through their 
transformations. In the transformation of the pairs without common functional empirical 
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schemes, only one or two children in each task kept constant things such as the shape of 
the body (oval) and the movement. 
Children mainly kept constant in the transformations of objects which had common 
functional empirical schemes, and they kept constant things such as: 
• wings, shape of the body, front part, tail, fly (transforming the eagle into aeroplane or 
vice versa), 
• foot, hand, eye, face, shape of the body, head, movement (transforming the human 
into robot or vice versa), 
In other words, they kept constant the following things: 
a. actions (or functions), that is what both objects can do (fly, movement) 
b. the parts (wings, foot) that are responsible for the particular (similar) sort of 
movement (fly, walk), that is which have the same function. Also other parts with the 
same function (eyes and hands in the case of the human and the robot) 
c. features of the objects that are needed for or make easier their (similar) actions (shape 
of the body, aerodynamic for eagle and aeroplane and vertical orientation for human 
and robot) 
d. parts of the objects which have similar positions (front part, tail) 
In both pairs, the objects had many differences since they belonged to different ontological 
categories. For instance, the eagle and the aeroplane are very different at a surface 
perceptual level, mainly because of the material that they are made of and their size. 
However, their similar function (they fly) has as result that they consist of similar things 
which are appropriate for this function (e.g. wings, aerodynamic shape, a tail at the back 
etc.). So, it is notable that in many cases the children ignored the difference, and kept 
constant some things which had a common schematic representation like the wings. The 
relation is based on what they can do rather on what they are made of. 
The 'keep constant' category was used by children in the two tasks with common 
functional empirical schemes at around 20%. In contrast in the two tasks with no common 
functional empirical schemes, the 'keep constant' category appeared with a frequency less 
than 5%. 
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In general, there were no big differences in what they kept constant between the cases 
where the children transformed a natural kind into an artifact and those where they 
transformed an artifact into a natural kind. 
However, one notable difference is that 15 of the children who transformed an eagle into 
an aeroplane kept the wings constant whereas only 9 of the children kept the wings 
constant when they transformed an aeroplane into an eagle. This difference may have 
happened because an eagle's wings are more prototypical examples of the scheme 'wings' 
than are an aeroplane's wings. Also, there is a difference in what these two things need in 
order to be able to fly (their common function). What an eagle needs is just wings, while 
the aeroplane, although it has wings, needs also propellers in order to fly. So, what may 
have caused the difference in this category is the difference in movement. Also the 
children in their transformations preferred to keep something constant and add another 
part to it, than to keep something constant when it is necessary to remove something from 
it. 
Furthermore a similar tendency - more children keeping constant some particular things 
when they transformed a natural kind to animals rather the other way - appeared in the 
other pair with the transformations between human and robot. More children asked to keep 
the hand, head, foot and movement constant when they transformed a human into a robot 
than in the other direction. These results suggest that children's prototypical empirical 
schemes are based on the natural kinds rather than on artifacts. 
b. Add and Remove 
The children "added" propellers, windows, wheels, engines, seats, steering-wheel, front 
part, wings at the back, cockpit, persons etc. and "removed" the beak, inside organs, life, 
tail, mind, eyes, to transform the eagle into the aeroplane. Furthermore the children who 
transformed the aeroplane into the eagle, "added" legs, eyes, beak, heart, mouth, organs 
and "removed" propellers, windows, engines, people, seats, wheels, cockpit, oil. The 
things of the two objects that more than 20% of children asked to be added or removed, 
were for the aeroplane the propellers, the windows, the engines, the seats, and the steering 
wheel, while for the eagle they were the legs and the eyes. 
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Very few children (less than 20% in all cases), used the categories "add" and "remove" 
to transform a human into robot and vice versa. They transformed a human into a robot by 
adding metal, battery, buttons and removing heart, hair, clothes. Also, the children 
transformed a robot into a human by adding hair, heart, mind, organs and removing wires, 
head, metal, light. 
In the case of transformation of a human into a rocket, children "added" a turbine, wings, 
a front part, metal and "removed" the foot, the hand, the head, organs. They added the 
hand, the foot, the head, clothes, organs, mind, the nose, the body, the eyes, the face and 
removed the front part, to transform a rocket into a human. 
The children transformed a bird into a car, by adding an engine, metal, wheels, seats, 
lights, windows, wires and removing wings, legs, the beak, eyes, the skin, the head, 
insides, the neck. They transformed a car into a bird by adding wings, the beak, legs, the 
head, organs, the heart and removing the battery. 
In general, the categories "add" and "remove" were used by the children, for difficult 
transformations. In other words, the children added or removed something when they 
could not keep constant a thing or they could not change or modify it. Most of the children 
added or removed the following: 
• a source of movement (e.g. propellers, engine, battery), 
• things that are responsible for a particular sort of movement (wheels, wings, legs, 
foot, hand) 
• the material that an object is made of (metal ) 
• things that make an object a living thing (heart, inside organs, mind) 
Adding and removing was used by children for things which are not easily 'converted' 
between natural kinds and artifacts. 
In the tasks with common functional empirical schemes, the children preferred to use the 
"add" category when they attempted to transform a natural kind into an artifact rather than 
to use the "remove" category, while the category "remove" was more popular when they 
transformed an artifact into a natural kind (see Table 7). So, 13 children added propellers 
when they transformed the eagle into the aeroplane, while only 8 of them removed the 
88 
propellers when they attempted to transform the aeroplane into eagle (see also similar 
differences for windows 9-7, engines 7-5, seats 5-4). 
This unexpected result could be interpreted in two ways: 
a. The artifacts (aeroplane, robot) by their nature have a greater variety of more salient 
parts 
b. Children distinguish more easily the parts of an artifact than those of a natural kind. 
The second explanation seems to be more plausible, because for the first there is no 
substantial evidence. The second explanation can arise because: 
A. In natural kinds the groups of elements are designed and determined by nature. So the 
existence of these specific packages is obvious. In contrast people have to select and put 
elements together for a specific artifact. So, a child might mention that an aeroplane has 
windows and wings (this strange combination happens only in aeroplanes) while he might 
not mention that an eagle has wings and legs, because the latter is obvious (all birds have 
the same). 
B. Children probably learn and know more about the parts of artifacts than about the parts 
of animals. An analogous explanation is given by Simons and Keil (1995) about the 
knowledge of young children about the insides of machines and animals. In one of their 
tasks children were shown computer-drawn animals and machines with a combination of 
"animal insides" and "machine insides". They found that many of the children responded 
correctly to the machine photographs but not to the animal ones. A reason for this 
difference could be that children probably "learn about the insides of machines before 
they learn about the insides of animals; they are likely to have more experience with the 
insides of toys and machines than they do with the insides of animals"(Simons & Keil, 
1995, p153) 
It is notable that the above pattern for the pairs with common functional empirical 
schemes did not appear in the pairs without common empirical schemes. In these cases the 
objects did not have also a surface similarity and it is possible that the specific natural 
kinds consisted of more parts than the artifacts. So, more children used the "add" category 
89 
when they transformed an artifact into a natural kind than in reverse, and more children 
used the "remove" category when they transformed a natural kind into an artifact. 
c. Modify category 
Children modified the back (tail), the rigidity of wings (rigid or non rigid), the size (bigger 
or smaller), the front part, the legs or wheels, the body, the eyes, the material it is made of 
(metal or non metal), the existence of life, and the engines, to transform the eagle into the 
aeroplane and vice versa. 
It is notable that only 2 children transforming the eagle into an aeroplane modified the 
non-metal state of the eagle into a metal while in the reverse transformation 10 children 
modified the metal state of the aeroplane into a non metal state. In a similar way 6 children 
asked to modify the non rigid wings into rigid ones when transforming the eagle into the 
aeroplane, while 10 children asked to modify the rigid wings of the aeroplane into non 
rigid ones in the reverse transformation. It seems that it was more difficult for children to 
make a "Frankenstein's" transformation in which they had to make alive and flexible a 
metal thing (most of them mentioned that particular transformation), rather than the other 
way round (to modify a living thing into a non living). 
Also, they modified the foot, the hand, the head, the body, the metal, the face, the belly, 
the colour, the eye, the mouth, the shape, the size, the buttons etc., to transform a human 
into a robot and vice versa. 
In the transformations of objects with common functional empirical schemes, the 
"modify" category was more popular when the children transformed an artifact into a 
natural kind than the reverse. It might be argued (see also add and remove categories) that 
the aeroplane/robot consists of a greater number of parts than an eagle/human. But this 
reason cannot explain the greater number of modifications that children used in their 
transformations. That is, this asymmetry can be a result of an asymmetry or in other words 
prototypicality in children's mental representations-empirical schemes rather than of an 
asymmetry in the natural world. It seems to me that the children had a clearer distinction 
between the parts that constitute the aeroplane or robot rather than the parts of the Eagle or 
the human (see also previous comments about the add and remove category). 
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The children modified the following things to transform a human into a rocket and vice 
versa: 
a. the parts considering their position 
- the upper part (the head and the front part of the rocket), and some specific parts of 
them (face and eyes of the human) 
- the middle part of the body 
- the edges of the body in a horizontal axis (hands and wings) 
- the bottom part which is responsible for the particular sort of movement (foot and 
turbines), 
b. the shape and the size 
c. the source of movement (organs and fuels) 
d. the material that they are made of (metal and non metal) 
Also, they modified the following things to transform a bird into a toy car and the reverse: 
a. the parts considering their position 
- the bottom part (legs and wheels) 
- the front part (beak or head and front part of the car) and some specific parts of 
it (lights into eyes) 
- the middle body 
- the edges in a horizontal axis (wings into doors or windows and vice versa) 
- the part at the back (the tail and the back part of the car) 
b. the shape and the size 
c. the source of the movement (organs and engine) 
d. the ontological kind of thing (not living into living) 
e. the position (from the air down to the earth) 
In the above transformations of objects without common functional empirical schemes 
there is a similarity. In both the children modified mainly parts considering their position 
while in the transformations between objects with common functional empirical schemes 
they modified mainly what parts can do (rigid or non rigid wings) and the material that the 
objects are made of. It seems that they have used mainly empirical schemes relevant to 
position-space (up, bottom, front, back parts) rather than those relevant to functions. Also, 
in contrast with the transformations between objects with common functional empirical 
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schemes, in these cases more children used modifications when they transformed an 
artifact into a natural kind rather than the reverse. 
4.3.2.3 	 Sequence of change 
Figure 4.4 shows the number of children that used each of the four sorts of transformation 
in each stage. In the case of objects without common empirical schemes, there is no 
pattern in the order of the transformations. However, the existence of patterns in the order 
of sorts of transformation for pairs who have common empirical schemes, is clear. 
Thus, the children transformed the eagle into an aeroplane firstly by keeping constant 
things such as the wings, the shape of the body or the front part. In stage 2 the modify 
category is the most popular, when they then modify the state of the eagle, making the 
wings rigid, the size bigger etc. After the third stage the numbers of "modify" and 
particularly of "add" transformations increased, since the children stopped keeping things 
constant and started to add external characteristics such as propeller, wheels, windows and 
internal parts such as engines, seats. It is notable that the number of children who used the 
category "remove" was very low at all stages. 
A different pattern of the order of sorts of transformations appeared when the children 
attempted the reverse transformation of the aeroplane into the eagle. In this case the 
category modify was the most popular category at least for the first five stages. In the first 
stage the category 'constant' appeared as the second choice. After the second stage we 
observe a tendency of "remove" and "add" categories to increase their numbers. In 
general the category "remove" is more popular than the category "add". 
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Patterns very similar to the above appeared in the transformation of a human into a robot 
and vice versa. In summary the pattern of order of sorts of transformations was as follows: 
a. transformation of a natural kind into an artifact. Firstly the children kept something 
constant. Secondly they started to modify things continuing to keep some things 
constant. Then for the next steps they modified things and added some other things. 
b. transformation of an artifact into a natural kind. The children mainly modified things 
at all stages. In the beginning also they preferred to keep things constant. Also, after 
the second stage they started to remove things. 
4.4 Overview of the first study 
Children can make succesful transformations within and across ontological categories. 
Their response, should not however be interpreted as showing that children do not 
understand important (ontological) differences between animals and artifacts. Ontological 
categories exist but their boundaries may become weaker through the use of empirical 
schemes acting across them. 
The children used four sorts of transformations: "keeping constant", "add", "remove" and 
"modify". In the transformations of objects which have common functional empirical 
schemes, they kept constant empirical schemes of actions (or functions), the parts of the 
object which are responsible for a particular function, some features which make this 
function easier, and some parts which have a similar position. Also, the children used the 
add and remove categories for difficult transformations in the case of the transformation of 
an animal into an artifact and vice versa. Difficult transformations were those of empirical 
schemes of a source of movement, of things that are responsible for the particular 
movement, the material that an object is made of, and things that make an object a living 
thing. Futhermore, in the transformations between objects with common functional 
empirical schemes, the children modified empirical schemes of what parts can do and of 
the material that objects are made of. However, in the transformations between objects 
without common functional empirical schemes the children modified mainly parts 
considering their position in the space rather than those relevant to functions. 
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In some pairs of objects, it appeared easier for the children to transform A->B rather than 
B->A. This may happen because the schemes are more prototypical in object A, and the 
children kept these prototypical shemes constant while in the opposite transformation they 
had to change some schemes into their prototypical ones (see in the previous section the 
discussion about `wings'). Asymmetries between the transformations of an animal into an 
artifact and of an artifact into an animal, in the sort of transformations and the sequence of 
changes are indications for the existence of prototypical examples of objects, their parts or 
actions. 
In general, empirical schemes are 'bridges' which make possible transformations even 
between categories that have strong boundaries between them. This study is exploratory in 
nature, but it suggests that empirical schemes in their more powerful versions can be seen 
as "Functional bridges" between categories. That is, when a child thinks about two objects 
which belong to different ontological categories it is possible that he will resist making a 
transformation of one object to another if his focus is on "what are they?" or "what are 
they made of?". However, it is easier to do the transformation if the focus is on the 
function of the objects and their parts. So, functional empirical schemes appear in this case 
as "bridges" which make possible the "connections" between the two objects through a 
transformation process. The results of this study suggest that learning in science - which 
involve difficult conceptual transitions - can be based on the imaginative transformation of 
concrete examples of the concepts that belong to different ontological categories. These 
transformations will be easier for children if the focus is on common functions of 
examples. 
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Chapter 5: 
EXPLORING ANALOGIES USING SCHEMES 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter reports on studies related to children's analogical reasoning. In a 
preliminary exploratory study, children manipulated an analogy that had been used in 
their (previous year) science textbooks, its purpose being to help in the understanding of 
the role that the switch plays in the function of simple electric circuits (open and closeA. 
In the main study, a larger number of children looking at the same pictures of an 
open/closed electric circuit generated analogies (focusing again on the role of the 
switch). 
In both studies children were asked to transform an event into an analogical one, and a 
simple electric circuit was used as a target domain of an analogy. The selection of the 
particular domain was not random. The difficulty with its introduction in the early 
stages of the science curriculum (last two years of the primary school in Greece) make 
teachers frequently use analogies as a helpful tool in the teaching of this domain. 
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5.2 Exploratory study: Transforming analogical events 
5.2.1 Aims 
The aims of the exploratory study were to explore: 
(a) the components of an event that children transform, to match this event with an 
analogical one 
(b) the schemes that children keep constant, when transforming an event-example into 
an analogical one 
(c) the level of these transformations (do children transform whole objects, whole events 
or parts of them?) 
5.2.2 Methods 
	
5.2.2.1 	 Participants - Procedure 
The subjects were 10 children with a mean age of 11 years and 5 months old. Children 
were asked to describe and compare a pair of analogical picture examples and then 
using their imagination to choose and transform one into the other. 
	
5.2.2.2 	 Materials 
Two pairs of black and white drawings were used. On the left side of the first, a bridge 
was open while on the right side it was closed. In an analogous way, on the left side of 
the second picture, a switch in a simple electric circuit was open while on the right side 
it was closed. The pictures used are presented in Appendix 5.1. 
5.2.3 Results 
	
5.2.3.1 	 Common schemes 
Children's descriptions of both events (the pictures of the electric circuit and of the 
bridge) comprise three elements: (a) objects such as switch, battery, lamp, wires, bridge, 
cars, river, road, ship etc., (b) processes such as open/close, can/cannot pass, turn 
on/off, movement/stop movement, go up/down etc., and (c) relations between objects 
such as one object being next to another, being bigger than another, etc. Also in the case 
of the electric circuit, another kind of element can be identified, namely scientific 
entities (concepts) such as the flow, the electricity, the light. 
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Almost all the children comparing the two pictures, easily recognised that the picture 
with the bridge had some "common things" with the picture with the switch: 
"...when the bridge is open and the switch is open, we have neither circulation of 
the cars nor of the flow. Meanwhile, in the other picture we see that the bridge is 
closed and so the cars can go and pass it, and in the electric circuit the flow can 
circulate and so the lamp turns on." 
They tended to keep constant in their transformations the way that the switch and the 
bridge open and close the circuit, describing it as an action: 
"We will keep the same that in both of them, the same action happens but in the one 
it happens through the flow and in the other through the cars" 
and "We will keep that the switch opens and closes as the bridge does" 
Five of the children kept constant the action 'open and close' or 'go up and down' while 
one child kept constant the energy that the battery and the river (which the child thought 
analogous to the battery) both have. The battery has power - essential to its nature. So, 
the child looked for something in the other picture which 'has power'. A possible choice 
for such an object is the river. But the river does not make the car move. However, there 
isn't any one thing corresponding to the battery which makes the cars move. Thus, the 
child chose the river as analogue to the battery. 
In general, the children made transformations keeping constant some of the processes, 
and changing mainly the objects and in very few cases the scientific entities. The 
relations between objects were used very implicitly, not mentioned explicitly. Processes 
are connected closely with actions, and their meaning derives from actions. They are 
embodied patterns - empirical schemes - which are used for organizing our actions, 
perceptions and conceptions. Processes contain structural features that are common to 
many different objects, entities. So, although a human, a lion, a car and an electron 
move in a different way, we describe their change of position in space with the common 
scheme of movement. Such common features of empirical schemes lead children to 
keep constant some processes. 
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5.2.3.2 	 Finding the one to one correspondence of the objects 
Four children chose to transform the picture with the bridge into the picture with the 
switch and six of them to make the opposite transformation. Almost all of them (nine) 
transformed the switch into the bridge (or the opposite), since both are responsible for 
stopping the circulation of the flow or the cars and their function is very similar. One 
child transformed the switch into the ship because this was identified as the responsible 
factor for stopping the circulation of the cars, since "when the ship, when it passes, the 
bridge is raised and the cars cannot pass, and if the switch is not down, this (the lamp) 
does not light". So, the child identified a correspondence between the action of a person 
on the switch and the effect of the ship on the bridge. 
Apart from this popular transformation (between switch and bridge) the children gave a 
variety of further transformations. The lamp was transformed into a car and the 
opposite (four children) both being seen as the location of an effect. This transformation 
was based on the fact that both objects 'function' under the same condition. When the 
circuit is closed, they do something (cars move or the lamp lights). Another child 
following a similar line of thought transformed the lamp into the ship, seeing the ship as 
an object which moves, again the location of an effect. Three children more abstractly 
transformed the light (or the flow) into the movement of the car or vice versa, seeing the 
analogy as between not the objects but the processes. 
Also there were transformations between wires and road (three children) since both are 
used as 'paths' and the movement of the current or of the cars takes place in/on them. 
However, one child transformed the wire into a car and another one the road into the 
battery. 
It was hard for the children to find an object to correspond to the battery of the electric 
circuit. Only a few of the children (four) used it in their transformations. Two of them 
made transformations between the battery and the river (or the water), seeing the battery 
as an object which can make other things move. One of them transformed the battery 
into the ship and one the lights (next to bridge) into the battery. Both objects of these 
pairs can make other things move, they are a 'source of movement'. 
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It seems that the children identified a similarity between the two analogical examples 
having their focus on similar actions (open-close or go up/down), the elements that have 
similar functions (e.g. switch-bridge) and which can be described by common schemes 
(barriers, links, paths, source of movement), rather than on the surface similarity of the 
parts and the relations between them. So, the transformations are based on the similarity 
of schemes describing actions and functions rather than on the surface similarity 
between the objects. As with the transformations between objects, functional schemes 
played an important role in the transformations between events. 
5.2.3.3 	 Transforming objects not parts of them 
In this task the children were asked to transform events rather than objects into one 
another (see chapter 4 about the transformations of objects). In contrast with the way 
that the children transformed objects, when they attempted to transform events they 
usually made direct transformations from an object into another without middle stages. 
So, the switch was transformed directly to a bridge without any intermediate change 
(make it two parts, make it bigger, make it from cement etc.). 
Transformations seem to be possible at different levels. In each case, the level is defined 
by the focus and the goals of the person who makes the transformation. So, when the 
children attempted to make transformations of objects, they made many transformations 
of the parts of an object and their relations. In transforming events they used whole 
objects as units. It seems to me that they were more interested in finding an analogous 
object which had a similar function, than to construct an analogous object with similar 
parts. 
5.2.4 A summary of the exploratory study 
It is clear that when the children attempted to make transformations between analogical 
examples their focus was on actions (using 'functional schemes') and schemes that 
describe them rather than on parts and relations. Most of the children made their 
transformations in these "perfect analogical" examples (they are found in the school text 
books) giving a great variety of transformation-matching. They did not worry about the 
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transformation of all parts and relations but their focus was on keeping similar actions 
or functions and common schemes stable. 
However, in the exploratory study, the use of a 'perfect analogy' may lead children to 
these responses. That is, the two analogical events had been selected by the author (of 
the science textbook) in a way that the focus of the analogy was on common actions and 
schemes and not on surface similarities. So, the main study was designed to explore the 
way that children produce by themselves spontaneous analogies, which can be "partial 
analogies". 
5.3 Main Study: Children generate their own analogies 
5.3.1 Aims 
The aims of the task were: 
(a) to explore the way that children produce spontaneous analogical examples 
(b) to identify what common schemes are used in analogies, and how 
(c) to explore the importance of actions and processes (rather than of parts and relations) 
in analogical projection, 
(d) to identify groups of schemes that come together in the construction of an analogy 
(e) to analyse the schemes that take part in an example, considering the interaction that 
exists between one scheme and other schemes of the group 
(f) to put these groups of schemes in a dimensional space. 
5.3.2 Methods 
	
5.3.2.1 	 Participants 
Forty two children of mean age 11 years, 7 months, (range 11;3 to 11;8) participated in 
this study. All the children attended the last class of public primary schools in Greece. 
In general, the children came from a predominantly lower middle class background. 
	
5.3.2.2 	 Materials 
The materials used for this task were two pictures. The pictures were black and white 
line drawings. The first picture presented an open simple electric circuit consisting of 
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the following elements: a battery, a lamp, a switch (open), a wire. The other picture 
involved the same elements but the switch was closed and the lamp alight (see 
Appendix 5.2). 
5.3.2.3 
	
Procedure 
The children were tested individually in a room familiar to them (another classroom). 
The task took 4 to 5 minutes. All the children were initially questioned to ensure that 
they understood the pictures. I presented them with the two pictures (one beside the 
other) and asked them to describe to me what they could see in these pictures. 
After this description, I asked the children to imagine that they were teachers of the year 
six classroom and that their pupils could not understand what all these things were. I 
suggested that in order to help them understand the teacher (child) might say: "it is 
like 	 " Then I asked them what they were going to say? All the children were required 
to justify their suggestions, to explain the correspondence of the elements of their 
analogical example with the elements of the source example (electric circuit). 
5.3.3 Results 
Only three out of the forty two children did not give me any example. For the purpose 
of the analysis, the sample was divided into two groups. Twenty examples constituted 
the group named "literal similarity". It includes the examples that are very close to the 
example with the simple electric circuit. For example: 
Pupil: It is like the light in our house 
Inter.: Yes 
Pupil: I would tell them, that when we press the button, the light turns on, 
while it is closed when we press the button again." 
The children in this group mainly kept constant in their target domain many elements 
from the source domain, changing only a few elements. This 'conservative' strategy 
lead them to the production of an analogy very close to the source example. 
The remaining nineteen examples, constitute the second group named "analogies". It 
includes examples that are very different from the electric circuit, at least at the level of 
surface similarities. Consider for example the following analogy (straws connecting 
basins), which appears to be pure invention on the part of this child: 
Pupil: It is like when we have a wash-basin with water 
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Int.: Yes 
Pupil: And ... we want to empty this into another wash basin that has also a 
drinking straw 
Int.: Yes 
Pupil: And the straws are not connected, so the water will not manage to 
pass 
Int.: Right 
Pupil: While if we connect the straws, the water will pass. 
In this case, the child constructing his analogy using straws instead of a wire as a path 
where the water (which plays a similar role with the flow in the case of the electric 
circuit) will be able to move. As a source container the child used a full wash-basin 
instead of a battery. The focus of this child is on the straws (wire) and the water (flow). 
In the second group of children, the target domains were very different from the source 
domain and that difference makes the analogy an 'interesting' one. That is, one has to 
think about the various objects, processes and relations that are described by that 
analogy while in the case of 'literal similarity' instances are mostly common to the 
source and target domain. In the case of the analogy, with the 'turning on of the light in 
the house' we have similar constituents such as the simple electric circuit which is used 
as a source domain. In this analogy, the child did not need to say anything about the 
`flow' or the 'wires' since their existence is 'obvious', being common in both source 
and target domain. So, fewer words, explanations and interpretations are provided by 
the analogy. 
5.3.3.1 	 Coding Data 
A child gave for the simple electric circuit the following analogy: 
Child:...It is like an orange 
Inter.: Yes 
Child: Suppose that there is juice inside, and suppose that this is the flow, and 
when we squeeze it, it provides energy 
Inter.: Mmm 
Child: And we drink the orange juice. 
Inter.: Right 
Child: Like we take vitamins from the orange, something similar happens with the 
battery which has a flow and the lamp takes the flow and alight. 
Inter.: Yes, what about the switch? 
Child: The switch, is like... when we squeeze the orange it is like when the switch 
closes. 
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In this analogy the target domain is very different from the source domain. The child is 
constructing his analogy using elements mainly from three general categories: objects, 
entities, processes. He chose an orange to play the role of battery (an object), and the 
juice as similar to the flow (a scientific entity) of the electric circuit. Finally, he 
described the squeezing of the orange to be similar to the closing ( a process) of the 
switch. So, the orange produces juice, and more interestingly it produces energy in 
juice. 
In general children constructed their own analogies using some elements of the 
following general categories: 
(a). Objects (0): Switch (s), Battery (b), Lamp (L) and Wires (w) 
(b). Scientific entities (E): Flow (0 and Light (1) 
(c). Processes (P): Open/Close (o), Pass through the switch (p) and Turn on/off (t) 
Considering this classification system, Table 5.1 shows the instances of elements which 
appeared in children's analogies. Relations between the things (e.g. next to) were, if 
presented at all, very implicit and the children did not refer to them when they judged 
correspondences. 
The analysis of analogies was based on the semantic and pragmatic use of the elements 
in the child's argument. It was necessary to look at how the child saw all the elements 
working together, to justify assigning elements to broader categories (e.g. 'barrier', 
`switch'). This research thus attempts to describe the 'content' of analogies using 
schemes. It would be very tricky to "pick out" each of the elements that are involved in 
an analogy and describe separately their nature. It is notable that these "elements" do not 
just come together in an example, but that the existence of one of them modifies the 
nature of the others, and might predict the existence of some others that constitute 
together a group of elements. 
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A. can/can't pass 
B. allow/doesn't allow 
C. flow/doesn't flow 
D. drink it 
E. come out 
A. battery 
B. heart 
C. orange 
D. wash basin 
E. water face 
F. liquid gas 
G. plastic glass 
H. terminal 
A. wires 
B. pipes 
C. straws 
D. chain 
A. light 
B. move around 
C. vitamins 
D. work 
E. fire 
Table 5.1: The appearance of elements in analogical examples 
Thus it is necessary to describe which are the elements' attributes and how they appear 
in their "interactions" with the other things of the target example. So, because of the 
interest of this research in how the elements "interact" (the presence of one predicting 
the presence of another), they have to be analyzed at least in pairs. So, firstly pairs of 
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0 - 0 
0 - E 
0 - P 
E E 
E - P 
P - P 
Battery - Lamp (p=0.013) 
Battery - Wire (p=0.028) 
Lamp - Light (p=0.002) 
Switch - Pass (p=0.017) 
Battery - Turn (p=0.002) 
Lamp - Turn (p=0.013) 
Light - Op/Cl (p=0.067) 
Flow - Pass 
Light - Pass 
Op/Cl - Turn 
(p=0.011) 
(p=0.061) 
p=0.033) 
Battery - Lamp 
Battery - Switch 
Battery - Flow 
Lamp - Flow 
Lamp - Light 
Battery - Pass 
Lamp - Pass 
(p=0.07) 
(p=0.013) 
(p=0.023) 
(p=0.019) 
(p=0.002) 
(p=0.067) 
(p=0.046) 
Flow - Open/Close (p=0.07) 
elements that appear together in examples are identified and then the nature of the 
schemes that appear in the interaction between the elements are explored. 
Later, the analysis attempts to identify clusters (groups that constitute more than two 
elements) of elements. Finally, the fundamental dimensions that lead children's 
reasoning to specific analogical examples will be identified, putting all these elements in 
an ontological space. That is, there are different levels of analysis, from a low level 
(pairs) to high levels (groups and the whole system). 
5.3.3.2 	 Identifying pairs of elements 
In order to find whether there is any correlation in the appearance between pairs of these 
'elements', the correlations between all the possible pairs of elements which could 
appear together in children's examples were calculated, using chi-square. The 
statistically significant pairs for each of the sample groups are shown in the following 
Table where 0 means Objects, E means Entities and P means Processes (see Table 5.2) 
Table 5.2: Statistically significant pairs for each of the sample groups 
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0 - 0 2 2 6 
0 - E 
0 - P 3 2 12 
E - E 
E - P 1 3 6 
P - P 
Taking into account that there were 36 possible pairs that could appear in children's 
examples then if p=0.05 only about 2 of the observed pairs would be expected to occur 
by chance. So, the numbers of significant pairs 7 for Group A and 11 for Group B 
indicate that the appearance of many pairs is not random, and that there are patterns in 
children's examples. 
In Table 5.3 we can see the number of appearances of statistically significant pairs in 
each of the element's groups . Also the last column shows the number of possible pairs 
of analogized elements. 
Table 5.3: The number of appearances of statistically significant pairs 
Table 5.4 is constructed using Table 5.3 and shows the total number of appearances of 
each element in statistically significant pairs, and their number in possible non-
significant pairs. 
Table 5.4: Number of appearances of elements in statistically significant pairs 
TYPE 
GROUP A 	 (Lit.Sim) GROUP B 	 (analog) 
Significant pairs Non 
Significant 
Significant pairs Non Significant 
Objects 6 20 7 19 
Entities 2 13 6 9 
Process 4 17 6 15 
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In Tables 5.3 and 5.4 we can observe the preference of the children who gave an 
"analogy" (Group B) to use more often in their pairs elements that come from the group 
of Entities and Processes. On the other hand, Group A (Literal similarity) more often 
used elements from the group Objects. 
It seems that in Group A the children just transformed objects (from the source 
example) into other objects (target example) which were very alike without thinking 
about the way that the source example works. In contrast the children from Group B 
who were not interested in the surface similarities (mainly between objects in source 
and target examples), attempted through their empirical schemes to give a target 
example whose structure would be the same as the source example. That is, their focus 
was on scientific entities and processes, and not just on observable objects. 
5.3.3.3 	 'Prediction logic' correlations of the pairs of elements 
The correlations between the elements used by children were calculated using the chi-
square test. However, the chi-square test does not show how one can interpret the 
correlation in terms of the appearance of one element as a result of the presence of the 
other. So, the "prediction logic" method was used, in order to interpret in a "logic 
language" what the significant correlations in a two way Table (identified by the chi-
square method) could mean. An introduction to the prediction logic method follows 
since this method is not used very frequently in the literature. 
The Prediction logic method 
The prediction logic method can be defined by analogy to elementary logic: "just as a proposition in 
elementary logic may be stated unambiguously by identifying its domain and truth table, a prediction 
logic proposition may be stated precisely by specifying its domain and the set of error events it identifies" 
(Hildebrand, Laing, Rosenthal, 1977, p.30). 
We can use formal logic to evaluate and classify propositions, e.g. the form "if x then y". In the 
prediction logic we use the connective ----> (read "predicts" or "tends to be sufficient for") as the 
analogue to formal implication (—f) and <---> (read "tends to be necessary and sufficient for") in the 
place of the formal connective (<-->). These statement-forms in formal prediction assert that exceptions 
(falsifying events) should never happen. In contrast, prediction logic statements predicts that deviant or 
error events seldom happen. 
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Using prediction logic we can construct propositions for RxC cross classification tables. Particularly, we 
will use it for 2x2 tables. In the simple 2x2 case there are 24=16 logically distinct "types"of tables. Of 
these, 14 contain one or more error cells (frequencies in these cells expected to be very small when 
compared with the other cells of the same contingency table). The tables expecting only 'full' or 'empty' 
cells are not amenable to analysis, that is, we exclude tautology and contradiction. In each of the 
remaining contingency tables, any error cell is shaded. Negation is indicated symbolically by writing, for 
example "not x" as x. All the tables which are shown in Figure 5.1 are accompanied by one or two 
equivalent propositions (in prediction logic language). Each proposition in these pairs is equivalent with 
the other, because they have equivalent error structures. That is, they identify the same error cells in the 
same contingency table. 
Consider for example the case 4 (see Figure 5.1). The two following prediction logic propositions can be 
interpreted: 
a) x ----> y "x predicts y" 
"x tends to be sufficient for y" 
"y tends to be necessary for x" 
b) x 	 y "not y predict x" 
"The absence of y tends to be sufficient for x" 
Similarly in case 7 we can interpret the proposition as: 
"x 	 y" "x tends to be necessary and sufficient for y" 
"predict y if and only x" 
The "prediction logic" method can help us to interpret in a "logic language" what a significant correlation 
in a 2x2 table could mean. We can measure the prediction success in the 2x2 tables by calculating the Vp 
value. 
This value for predictions when we have 
(a) a single error cell is: (consider for example case 3) 
P21 
3 X 	 y — 1 	  
P2.P.1 
(b) two error cells is: (consider for example case 7) 
P12 + P21 
3 1 	  
Pi.P.2+ 
(c) three error cells is: (consider for example case 15) 
P12 + P21 ± P22 
3 x 	 y — 1 
Pi.P.2 P2.P.1 P2.P.2 
Successful prediction is indicated when this value Vp is big, and perfect prediction is indicated when it is 
1. 
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Figure 5.1: Error cells in prediction logic 
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1. FULL 
Tautology 
2. x --> y 
y --> x 
3. y 
x y 
4. x --> y 
y --> x 
	
5. x --> y 	 6. x 	 y 	 7.x 	 y 	 8.x 	 y 
	
y --> x 	 y 	 x 	 y ±----> x 	 x.--> y 
	
9. x --> y 	 10. y ---> x 	 11. y ---> x 	 12. x 	 y 
	
x --> y 	 y ---> x 	 y --> x 
13. x 	 y 	 14. x 	 y 	 15. x 	 y 16. EMPTY 
Contradiction 
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Using the "prediction logic" method for the statistically significant pairs we have the 
following statements: 
LITERAL SIMILARITY Group (1-20) 
If Battery predict Lamp 
Light tends to be necessary and 
sufficient for not-Lamp 
If Pass predict Switch 
Turn tends to be necessary and 
sufficient for not-Battery 
If not-Turn predict Lamp 
If not-Op/Cl predict light 
If not-Lamp predict not Battery(Vp=1) 
Lamp tends to be necessary and 
sufficient for not-Light (vp=1) 
If not-Switch predict not-Pass (Vp=1) 
Battery tends to be necessary and 
sufficient for not-Turn (Vp=1) 
If not-Lamp predict Turn (Vp=1) 
If not-Light predict Op/Cl (Vp=1) 
ANALOGIES Group (21-39) 
If Battery predict not-Switch 
If Lamp predict not-Battery 
If Battery predict Flow 
If Flow predict not-Lamp 
If Lamp predict Light 
If Pass predict Not-Lamp 
If Flow predict Op/Cl 
If Pass predict Flow 
If Pass predict not-Light 
If Switch predict not-Battery (Vp=0.64) 
If Battery predict not-Lamp (vp=i) 
If not-Flow predict not-Battery (Vp=1) 
If Lamp predict not Flow (Vp=0.71) 
If not-Light predict not Lamp (Vp=i) 
If Lamp predict not-Pass (Vp=1) 
If not-Op/Cl predict not-Flow (Vp=0.71) 
If not-Flow predict not-Pass (Vp=1) 
If Light predict not-Pass (Vp=0.64) 
All the above statements can be seen in Figure 5.2 
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Figure 5.2: The prediction logic statements in a figure 
Figure 	 The prediction logic statements in a figure 
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b. Interpretation of the propositions for the "Literal Similarity" group 
The focus of this section is on the analysis of the prediction logic propositions which 
provide "positive" relations between pairs of elements (such as the form x ----> y). That 
is because the study attempts to identify pairs of elements, and not to explore the 
propositions which show whether the presence of an element predicts the absence of 
another element. From the prediction logic analysis we can draw the following 
conclusions for the literal similarity group: 
-"Cause" is a sufficient condition for "effect" or "If BATTERY predict LAMP" 
The observed pairs are (the numbers shown are cases' numbers): 
Battery -sLamp (38, 10, 6) 
Battery -Pierce (Compass) (35) 
In the particular examples the focus is on a direct relation between the battery and the 
lamp. The children are not interested in what a battery is, or what it contains. The 
"battery gives the power"(38) or "they are just all connected"(35,6,10). In all these cases 
children describe the battery as cause and the change of the lamp as the effect. "Cause" 
is a sufficient condition for "effect". In other words we cannot construct examples 
which will constitute a "cause" (battery) without there being present an "effect" (lamp) . 
So when children in their examples used a sort of "battery", at the same time they used a 
sort of "lamp" (see Figure 5.3) . This causal relationship (Cause-effect) connects the 
elements battery and lamp. 
Figure 5.3: Interaction between Battery and Lamp 
CAUSE 	 EFFECT 
(Battery) 	 (Lamp)  
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-"A forward movement through links" is a sufficient condition for a "dynamic 
link" or "If PASS predict SWITCH" 
The observed pairs are: 
Can/cannot pass 	 Switch (11, 15, 24, 25, 27) 
Allow/doesn't allow Switch (17) 
The presence of one of the processes, that is 'Pass' (...the flow can pass...) predicts the 
presence of the object switch. The flow passes through a conduit. 'Pass' is a forward 
movement through "links". Links are the wires, the lamp, the battery, the switch. Except 
for the switch which is a "dynamic" link, all the others are static. For example the wire 
is a link that allows a flow to pass from a place A to a place B, without having any 
change of its position. 
On the other hand someone has to move or change the position of the "dynamic link" 
switch in order to allow the flow to pass through it. It seems that when children say 
"pass" their focus is on the area near the switch (see Figure 5.4). This strong relation 
between "pass" and "switch" led them to use a sort of pass element only in the case 
where they had used a sort of switch as well. So, "a forward movement through links" 
(pass) was a sufficient condition for a "dynamic link" (switch). 
Figure 5.4: Interaction between Pass and Switch 
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c. Interpretation of the propositions for the "Analogy" group 
By contrast with the examples of "literal similarity group" in the case of the "analogical 
group" we can observe strong negative correlations between various objects. 
Particularly in both of the pairs switch-battery and battery-lamp the presence of the one 
component predicts the absence of the other. Also, the presence of an entity (flow) 
predicts the absence of an object (lamp). It seems that in this case the children have 
moved their focus from the surface similarities (between the source and the target 
example) where they use mainly objects, to the structural similarities that arise from 
entities and processes. Objects cannot themselves present what they "need" and so they 
predict the presence of an entity (e.g. battery-flow). It is notable that when the children 
in their examples did not use or refer to one of the processes (open/close) they had to 
use another. From the prediction logic analysis we can draw the following conclusions: 
- The "source-container" is a sufficient condition for the "content of the container" 
or "If BATTERY predict FLOW" 
Particularly the observed pairs are: 
Heart ----) Blood (7) 
Orange -Juice (13) 
Wash basin Water (18) 
Water face —) Water (20) 
Liquid gas Gas (23) 
Plastic glass 	 Water (30) 
All the variations of "batteries" are containers. This scheme consists of a boundary 
distinguishing an interior from an exterior. In the examples, they contain mainly fluids 
(water, juice, blood) and gas, but not solids. This happens because it underlies their role 
as a source scheme. The battery in an electric circuit is the cause of the electrons' 
movement. It is difficult for someone to imagine as an analogy, a type of battery which 
contains a solid thing. In this case the solid thing would have to move all at once, or to 
be made of moving particles. 
Because of its role as container the "battery" predicts the presence of its content, that is 
the "flow". Children didn't give any example with a 'battery' without giving some type 
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of flow. So, the "source container" is a sufficient condition for its content (see Figure 
5.5). 
Figure 5.5: Interaction between Battery and Flow 
A. One active terminal container (2,4,5,6) 
B. Double container (3) 
C. Two active terminal containers (1) 
We can identify three ways that the scheme source-container works (see Figure 5.5). By 
their nature, the main difference between them is whether there is a possible return path 
for the flow. In the first case, the "source container" provides us with flow without any 
returning while in the second case there is a possible returning path for the flow. The 
first case does not tell us what happens to the flow when it goes out of its container 
(battery). Some children solved this by constructing examples with two containers. In 
this case, the content of the one container goes to the other. 
- A "continuous movement" is a sufficient condition for an "action on a dynamic 
link" or "If FLOW predict OPEN/CLOSE" 
Particularly the observed pairs are: 
Water Open/close (1) 
Water Exist/doesn't exist (4) 
Heat 	 Exist/Leave (5,6) 
Blood Beat (7) 
Water Open/close (8) 
Flow -p Press the button (9) 
Juice —) Squeeze (13) 
Water -p Connect (18) 
Water Squeeze (20) 
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A. Flow-> Open/Close (1,8,30) 
B. Flow->Exist/doesn't exist 
(4) 
C. Flow->Exist/leave (6) 
D. Flow->Squeeze (7,13,20) 
E. Flow->Connect (18) 
n 1•1n111n 
Flow 	 Connect (22) 
Water —) Pierce (30) 
gas Open/Close 
So, if we have a sort of "flow" then it can predict a way of opening/closing a "switch". 
A "continuous movement" is a sufficient condition for an "action on a dynamic link". 
This happens because the flow has to stop somewhere, so it predicts an action in order 
to move. Again, the schema "action on a dynamic link" is obvious for the switch, 
whereas a schema of a "continuous movement" seems to fit to flow. The flow cannot be 
static, so its presence predicts a link in order to keep it in a continuous movement. The 
relation between flow and switch, as it appears in children's examples can be classified 
in 5 models (see Figure 5.6). 
Figure 5.6: Interaction between Flow and Open/Close 
In the second picture presented to the children the switch of the electric circuit is closed 
and the flow passes through it. In the first of the children's models (A)(Figure 5.6), the 
'barrier' is closed, so - in order to allow the water to move - we have to open it. It is 
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notable that in this model there is an opposite action to the source example. "Open a 
barrier" is analogous to "close the switch". This might happen because these actions 
have the same effect, that is, the flow or the water can move. 
In the second model (B), the children suggested that the flow started to move when the 
barrier was disappearing. A similar case is the third model (C). In this model, the 
children suggested that clouds which do not let sunlight in to be seen, just leave. 
In the fifth model (E), the presence of the flow predicts an action - connect the straws -
that can give to the flow the ability of "continuous movement" 
There are cases where the action (open/close) happens to a "switch" (A, B, C, E) and 
some others (D) where the actions happen to a "battery" when we have a modification 
(squeeze). In this case the "battery" is the "source container". The presence of flow 
predicts an action (squeeze) that can 'give' to a flow the property of continuous 
movement. 
- A "forward movement" is a sufficient condition for "flow" or "If PASS predict 
FLOW" 
The observed pairs are: 
Can/cannot pass —› Water (1) 
Allow/doesn't allow Water (4) 
Flow/doesn't flow —> Water (8) 
Allow/doesn't allow-->Water (18) 
Come out -p Water (20) 
Come out —) Gas (23) 
Come out —> Water (30) 
The flow passes through the wires. In the children's examples, if the flow is able (or 
something allows it) to pass through the area of the switch then we will have flow. The 
"forward movement through the switch" is a sufficient condition for flow. It seems that 
`pass' is mainly located in the area of the switch. The presence of the forward 
movement (pass) from one edge of the switch predicts the presence of the flow (see 
Figure 5.7). 
118 
Figure 5.7: Interaction between Pass and Flow 
A.  
B. --.÷ Pass 
C. > > 
	
P ass 
FLOW 
-"Material is a sufficient condition for a change" or "If LAMP predict LIGHT" 
The observed pairs are: 
Lamp Light (27) 
Appliance Work (19) 
Electric bell -Ring (22) 
Wheel - move around (29) 
Match Fire (37) 
The role of the "Lamp" in the examples is to provide evidence for a change. We cannot 
have this object in an example without seeing an effect or change in it. The effect is a 
result of a change in the state of an object or material. The "material" predicts that there 
will be a change. The lamp as material needs and so predicts the presence of an entity 
(light). 
5.3.3.4 
	 Analysis of elements in groups using multivariate statistical 
analysis 
a. Cluster analysis 
The next step, after the analysis of elements in pairs, is to analyze them in bigger 
groups. That is, to explore the elements that appear together in the children's target 
examples. So, in this section the aim is to group the elements into homogeneous classes 
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or clusters (the members of a cluster are close to each other but differ considerably from 
those members of another cluster), through the method of cluster analysis. 
Cluster analysis can generate unknown groupings which suggest relationships between 
the members of each group, to be investigated. One of the reasons for the use of cluster 
analysis is that it classifies the elements into "true" groups (Manly, 1986). 
Elements (Switch, battery, light etc.) have been chosen as the variables of cluster 
analysis, and their appearance or not in target examples provides the measure for 
"distances" between them. 
In this research "Hierarchical clustering" is used. In this, the elements are first separated 
into a few groups, each of which is further divided into smaller groups, and so on until 
terminal groups are generated which are not further subdivided (Everitt, 1980). 
Particularly, the Nearest Neighbor or Single Link Method is used. In this method, the 
distance between the groups is defined as the distance between their closest members. 
Cluster analysis used for the analysis of the "analogies" and not of the "literal 
similarities" since the focus of this chapter is on the analogies, and on whether the 
analogical examples (which are very different from the source example) have a structure 
that brings their elements together in groups. Using the nearest neighbor technique we 
obtain the following dendrogram (see Fig.5.8) for the "analogy" group (Cases 21-39): 
Figure 5.8: Dedrogram 
Dendrogram using Single Linkage 
	 (nearest neigh.21-39) 
Rescaled Distance Cluster 
ombine 
CASE 	 0 
Label 	 Num + 	  
10 	 15 	 20 
  
        
LAMP 	 3 
LIGHT 	 4 
TURN ON/OFF 8 
FLOW 	 2 
PASS 	 6 
OPEN/CLOSE 5 
BATTERY 	 1 
WIRE 	 9 
SWITCH 	 7 
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
The dendrogram indicates that there are small distances between 
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(a). Lamp-Light and 
(b). Flow-Pass-Open/Close-Battery 
suggesting that the appearance (in the target example) of each of the members of a 
group has its origins in a common scheme. In other words, there is one or a number of 
schemes that demand the simultaneous existence of a "package" of elements. It is 
notable that the above groups are constituted from the elements that in the "logic 
prediction" analysis were in "pairs" with relationships. 
The first group (Light-Lamp) has already been discussed (see previous section with 
prediction logic). It is interesting to attempt to explore the nature of schemes for the 
elements that constitute the second group (Flow, Open/Close, Pass, Battery) taking their 
interaction, not just at the level of pairs, but as a whole group. 
It seems that in this group or package of four elements there is a central one (see 
Fig.5.2) which is Flow. According to this package an entity such as "Flow" cannot 
appear alone in an example. Its scheme (continuous movement) comes into an 
integration with other schemes that can give answers to the following questions that 
"bring" with its appearance the specific entity: 
a. Where does it comes from? A "source container" (Battery) is needed. 
b. What does it can do? It can Pass (with a "forward movement" from one edge to 
another one) 
c. What has to be done to it? An "action on a dynamic link" can admit Flow to Pass. 
One child, for example, described in his example a plastic glass as a 'source container' 
full with water. The water can 'pass' outside the glass if we 'act' on the glass, making a 
hole at the bottom: 
Pupil: Yes, for example, we full a plastic glass with water 
Intern: Right 
Pupil: If we do not make a hole at the bottom of the glass with a pin, then the water 
will not pass, but if we make a hole then the water will pass. 
It seems that all these elements that constitute this group ("cause") can give rise to a 
phenomenon (effect). This group will be discussed in more detail later in the analysis. 
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b. Multidimensional Scaling 
The usefulness of Multidimensional scaling (MDS) comes from the fact that it can 
provide us with a "map" of n points in Euclidean space using information about the 
distances between the n objects (Mardia, et.al 1979). Using the distances between the 
"elements" it determines the best arrangement of their points in the space, while the 
relation between them is not known. The computer program ALSCAL was used and the 
Euclidean distances were calculated for the configuration of the points (see Fig.5.9). 
Figure 5.9: Euclidean distance model 
It is not easy to define the dimensions of the above "map". Firstly, meaningful clusters 
in the space have to be identified, using information from the cluster analysis. 
In Figure 5.9 there are two big clusters which separate the space into two areas left and 
right. The elements that constitute the left cluster seem to be the "Cause" of a 
phenomenon (see previous analysis) while on the right there is a group that we can call 
"Effect". 
In other words, the cause-effect relation consists of the following elements: 
- We need a "source container" (battery) and an "action on a dynamic link" (open-close) 
that will allow to "flow" to "pass". 
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- These four elements have as an effect the making of "light" in the "lamp". It is notable 
that the "Switch" is at the middle between these two groups of Elements. Its 'movement' 
provides a connection to those groups. So, the horizontal dimension can be called a 
Cause-Effect dimension. 
Furthermore, the vertical dimension can be interpreted as a static-dynamic dimension 
since at the bottom there are "static" elements such as Battery ("container"), Wire, Lamp 
("static objects") etc. while at the top there are "Dynamic" elements such as Switch 
("dynamic link"), Open/Close ("action on a dynamic link"), Flow ("continuous 
movement"). 
5.4 Overview of the second study 
In the exploratory study, the children transformed an event into an analogical one 
focusing on actions (keeping their schemes stable) rather than on parts or relations. 
These results were tested in the main study where the children generated their own 
analogies. The children generated their analogies, generally drawing on schemes. 
Schemes which were commonly evoked are the following: flow, path, container, 
open/close, barrier, link, forward and continuous movement. The analysis of the 
components of children's analogies shows that their thinking is well structured and 
based on groups of schemes. The presence of some elements of analogies predicts the 
presence or absence of others. Types of structure can be identified at the level of pairs 
(e.g. a "source container" is a sufficient condition for the "flow") and of groups of 
schemes (e.g. "flow" comes from a "source container" and an "action on a dynamic 
link" can admit flow to pass with a "forward movement" from one edge to another one). 
Also, at the level of the "whole analogy" dimensions 'cause vs. effect' and 'dynamic vs. 
static' were identified. 
These results are supported by the findings of the research project 'Empirical abstraction 
and concrete reasoning schemes'. Results from the "imaginative denial of rules task" 
show that a scheme is a basic re-usable component in children's reasoning about 
familiar events. Schemes combine with one another to form packages. Possibly, one of 
the most basic schemes identified - as also in the current research - was the "up and 
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down" (e.g. a kettle, a teapot and a cup were things which were turned upside down), 
and this was associated with the support, fall and containment schemes. So, a simple 
package of schemes appeared in reasoning: The "containers" (cup, teapot) are on a table 
and so "down", and they need to be "up". However, it was problematic since they had 
nothing to "support" them. So the children suggested that the objects could "float" in a 
topsy-turvy world to avoid the scheme "falling". 
However, it is notable that the task of the current study and the "denial of rules task" 
identify packages of schemes at different levels. In the current research the greatest 
emphasis was on packages of various schemes while in the denial of rules task, the 
analysis emphasised packages of components of schemes. In the last case, schemes are 
built of packages or sets of possibilities (called "potentials"). So, the scheme 'support' 
can be seen as a package of 'something underneath', 'preventing from falling', 'above 
the ground'(Bliss and Ogborn 1997). 
The current research explores the focus of the person who constructs the analogy. When 
the children were asked to construct an analogy, they mostly constructed "partial 
analogies". They focused their attention on a part of the source domain (some of the 
objects, or entities, or processes), and then they gave an example - the target example -
which is analogous with that specific part of the source domain. The limitation of this 
study is that children's major focus on actions and common schemes could be to some 
extent explained as the result of the content of the particular event (open/close the 
switch of the electric circuit), suggesting that more events of different kinds should be 
explored. 
Children's analogies can be a helpful tool in the exploration of their thinking and their 
focus. In the case of simple electric circuits the interaction of children with scientific 
knowledge appears to result in half of the children in this study thinking about an 
electric circuit focusing on a number of analogous processes, not simply on surface 
facts. 
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Chapter 6: 
RESPONDING TO AND GENERATING 
EXAMPLES OF IDEAS 
6.1 Introduction 
Teachers and science text books frequently use various examples to clarify ideas. The 
use of examples in science teaching is routine but is at the same time very varied. The 
etymology of the Greek word "paradeigma" (Lat. exemplar) tells us that it is a part of a 
whole ("deigma" means sample), a part that can stand for the whole. Various examples 
as parts of the same whole can stand for that whole. But, what makes two examples that 
exemplify a given idea, both be about the same idea, but yet be different? Is there a 
sense in which one example is 'better' than another? 
This research explores children's transformations of elements at various levels. Study 1 
(chapter 4) focused on the transformations of objects while study 2 (chapter 5) focused 
on the transformations of an example-event into an analogical example-event. Both 
studies describe the role that schemes play in these transformations, which are between 
elements that both belong to the same level of the dimension abstract-concrete. Study 3, 
reported here, explores the transformations of abstract ideas into concrete examples. 
The description of such transformations in the present study includes the presentation of 
the products of these transformations and an analysis of such products based on the 
identification of their underlying schemes. In this study, the products are themselves 
examples as seen by children. So, the purpose of the study is to clarify the process of 
exemplification, describing examples as they are used by children and as they appear in 
science textbooks. 
6.1.1 Children's examples of ideas 
A working definition of examples - proposed by Montaigne - might be that an example 
is a link between a concept and a unit of experience that can be subsumed under that 
concept. However, Montaigne mentions the problem of the "fit" of an example to its 
generalisation. He argues that attempts to abstract from experience to a general law are 
as difficult as the attempt to move from a general law to specific instances. General laws 
have to be read "by some round-about, forced, and biased" method in order to be 
applicable to various cases (Lyons 1995). So, ideas do not work in the same way for all 
of us. 
Karlheitz Stierle claims another kind of linkage between example and generalisation: 
the need to think of a generalisation which is not given in order to be capable of 
speaking of the particular example at all (Gelley, 1995). The effectiveness of an 
example of a generalisation depends on how the person will imagine the relevant 
generalisation. 
Children construct links or connections between an abstract idea and examples from 
their own perspective. What do children understand looking at some simple science 
ideas that they have already being taught about? How do they transform an abstract idea 
into a concrete instance? A way that we can look at this is to see how they exemplify 
these ideas. What are the components of their examples? 
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In classrooms, teachers - sensing a gap between their own and their pupils' 
understanding - use examples. They frequently say: let me explain this idea to you. 
For example...'. However, in this part of the study the principle can be expressed as let 
children explain to us what they understand about an idea by giving examples'. Do 
children use the examples provided in their textbooks? Are there patterns in the 
components of examples they give? 
6.1.2 Children's understanding of various examples used in science 
textbooks 
Various entities take part in examples of ideas. In order to analyse and compare different 
examples we need to be able to refer to some common or different features that appear 
in them. However, since different entities usually take part in different examples, we 
need a more general 'point of reference' (which appears across all examples) to make 
comparisons or analysis of examples. 
This study suggests a novel way of analysing examples of ideas. In this analysis we 
explore how children describe the various entities that take part in an example, using in 
the analysis a definite number of schemes (common for all examples). In each example 
the schemes which describe the features of the entities that take part in an example were 
identified. So, the focus of this part of the study is on the analysis of: Examples of ideas 
in terms of objects which can be seen schematically.  
Objects can be described by some schemes such as barrier, support, rigidity, 
autonomous action etc. For instance "a child" can present autonomy or can support 
other things, while "a tree" or "the ground" can support other things but does not present 
autonomous action. What are the schemes that can cover a wide range of objects 
(thinking about them in every possible case)? A given example consists of some objects 
behaving in particular way -for instance a child up a tree as an example of potential 
energy. In that example "objects" such as the child, the tree, the ground take part. What 
schemes has one to select to describe objects that take part in an example of such an 
idea? 
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The process of using examples, is a picking out of the features to which the 
exemplification will refer. A tailor's swatch exemplifies its colour, weave and thickness, 
but not the size and shape of the garment. Exemplification does not run in a direction 
from label to what the label applies to, but in the opposite direction. Exemplification is 
not just a mere possession of a feature but requires also reference to that feature 
(Goodman 1981). This study aims to explore the way that examples of ideas constrain 
(define to some extent) the schemes which are used in the description of the entities that 
take part in the example. An event can constitute an example of an idea only if it can 
define clearly the role of the elements taking part in it. So, in an example of an idea such 
as "when things are raised they have potential energy" an entity like the "air" should 
appear to lose its dynamic features (e.g. motion) since this plays no role in the example. 
Which schemes of entities are suppressed and which are highlighted by particular 
examples? 
Similarity and dissimilarity play an important role in the formation of examples. The 
similarity which makes different examples all part of the same idea cannot be identified 
and explained at the level of objects, since different objects take part in them. However, 
similar schemes could be identified across the examples. Is there any indication of the 
structure of such schemes in groups or packages? An idea of potential energy might 
need a simple package of schemes that consists of a 'moveable object' which is 'high 
up' and (often) supported. If, there is a structure like this, does a particular example 
define a configuration of its entities at that more abstract level? Which groups of 
schemes can be described by more abstract dimensions or factors? Can similar 
dimensions or factors be identified for different ideas? 
There are various objects which play a similar role in different examples (e.g. their 
behaviour can be influenced by a certain scientific concept such as potential energy) or 
they have a similar nature (e.g. they are abstract entities). Schemes or their packages can 
also be used for the description and comparison of the entities which take part in an 
example at the levels of the role that these entities play or at the level of their nature. 
Are there any differences between the entities that take part in examples concerning 
their nature and the specific role that they play in examples? Are there any 
similarities/differences between the entities that play a similar role in examples? 
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The method of investigation used here is to present situations (possible examples), first 
isolated and without reference to an idea they might exemplify, and then with reference 
to such an idea. That is, first cases such as 'a child' a tree' were given, and then the 
same cases in a new form 'a child up a tree as an example of potential energy'. We 
predict that general features (schemes) applicable to the objects 'child' and 'tree' will 
alter in their importance in the two cases, some becoming more important and some 
less. 
An indication of 'badness' of an example would be its inability to constrain in an 
appropriate way the entities in it. Which examples are unable to some extent to 
constrain the schemes that describe the entities taking part in it? 
6.2 Methods 
6.2.1 Design of the questionnaire and Procedure 
The idea of the study was to choose some general ideas in science (e.g. potential 
energy), and ask children to give their own examples of these ideas. Then, presenting to 
the children the same ideas together with examples of each idea (e.g. a flower pot on a 
balcony) used in science textbooks, to investigate the way in which the examples from 
the science textbooks worked (or not). The method used was intended to make it 
possible to analyse children's examples of these general ideas, and to compare the 
working of examples (from textbooks), for different examples of the same idea, for 
examples of different ideas, and for counter examples. 
The fundamental idea behind the design was that the elements of an example (e.g. 
flower pot, balcony, air, ground) given in a science textbook, will be thought about 
differently when used as an example of (say) potential energy, than when not used as an 
example. This idea led to the following steps in the construction of the research design 
(instrument): 
(1) choose several general ideas in science, 
(2) for each, choose more than one textbook example, 
(3) distinguish for each example, its component elements (e.g. child, tree), 
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(4) present children with various ideas and ask them to give their own examples of 
these ideas (see Figure 6.1) 
(5) present children first with the elements, but not yet presented as an example of 
anything (see Figure 6.2). Then present them with the elements again, but now as an 
example of a given idea (e.g. potential energy, see figures 6.3 and 6.4), 
(6) in both cases (see step 5), find out how children think about the elements of the 
example, in terms of a set of schemes common to all the examples. 
So, five scientific ideas, all of which appear in the school text-book, were selected. For 
each, two examples were chosen, again from those in the textbook. Ten questionnaires, 
identical except for the idea chosen and the example selected for each idea, were 
constructed. A further two questionnaires, making 12 in all, had the same structure but 
now each asked about one counter-example of each of two further ideas. Thus the 
twelve questionnaires were all essentially the same, but different in the idea used, and 
the example or counter example of it given. Each child was asked to fill out one of the 
12 questionnaires. The children were first asked to give their own example and to 
describe examples from their textbooks of the same idea. The children who participated 
in this study had used the science text book, from which the examples were taken 
(0.E.A.B., 1982), in their previous year in the school (at least twelve months before). 
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Figure 6.1 The first page of the questionnaire 
EXAMPLES OF IDEAS 
This questionnaire is about the various examples that someone can use, in 
order to understand or explain an idea in Science. It is important to 
remember that you can explain the same idea with different examples. 
There are no right or wrong answers, just say what you think. 
The idea 
We found the following idea in your science textbook: 
"When things are raised, they have energy, that we call 
Potential Energy" 
In this questionnnaire all the questions are about this idea. 
Your example  
Think an example of this idea. Write your example in a few words. 
TURN BACK To THIS PAGE IF You NEED To REMEMBER 
YOUR EXAMPLE OF THIS IDEA. 
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Figure 6.2: The second page of the questionnaire 
On the right part, we have written some 
elements-things (air, boy,.). Thinking 
about our everyday life we meet these 
things many times. In order to answer the 
questions on this page you have to thing 
what these things  can do. 
Can each of the five things 	 POTENTIAL 
do something .... _4, 	 AIR 	 Boy ENERGY  GROUND 	 TREE 
like a barrier, or a wall 
can? 
like a support for other things, 
like a table can? 
like a container can do, 
have something else inside it? 
like a rigid thing can do, 
to resist a change of its shape? 
like being contained 
in something else? 
like making 
other things move? 
like moving or stopping 
moving when it wants? 
be really there, even though 
we can not see it or touch it? 
O 0000 
O 0000 
O 0000 
O 0000 
O 0000 
O 0000 
O 0000 
00000 
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The child high up the tree, 
has Potential Energy  
Figure 6.3 The third page of the questionnaire 
DESCRIBING EXAMPLES OF IDEAS 
It is important to remember that you can explain the same idea with 
different examples. Some of these examples are better than others and 
some are worse. What we want to find here is the way that you understand 
some examples from your science textbook. There are no right or wrong 
answers, just say what you think. 
The idea  
We found the following idea in your science textbook: 
"When things are raised, they have energy, that we call 
Potential Energy" 
In this questionnnaire all the questions are about this idea. 
An example  
We found the following example of the above idea, in your Science 
textbook. 
TURN BACK TO THIS PAGE IF You NEED To REMEMBER 
THIS EXAMPLE OF THE ABOVE IDEA. 
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Figure 6.4 The fourth page of the questionnaire 
Look at the the example a boy up a tree of 
the idea When things are raised they have 
pottential Energy. Think which is the role 
of each element-thing (air, boy,...) in this 
example. 
Put a tick in those that you think 
they do a similar thing ....  AIR BOY 
POTENTIAL 
ENERGY GROUND 	 TREE 
like a barrier, or a wall 
can? 
like a support for other things, 
like a table can? 
like a container can do, 
have something else inside it? 
like a rigid thing can do, 
to resist a change of its shape? 
like being contained 
in something else? 
like making 
other things move? 
like moving or stopping 
moving when it wants? 
be really there, even though 
we can not see it or touch it? 
O 0000 
O 0000 
O 0000 
O 0000 
O 0000 
O 0000 
O 0000 
O 0000 
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For the selection of the ideas a simple network was constructed at the beginning, which 
described some major categories of ideas (which were found in the book) starting from 
their cause-effect relations (see Figure 6.5). This study (study 3) aims to explore the 
differences and similarities of examples of ideas, including categories that differ in 
respect of processes based on the classification of processes (cause-effect processes) and 
not on the classification of things (this criterion was used in the study 1 where the 
classification of things in categories such as natural and artefacts were explored). One 
idea for each of these categories was selected. 
Figure 6.5 Categories of ideas 
Position (Potential Energy) 
-Within causal 
object Acted on (Upthrust) 
- Equilibriate -- (Thermic Equilibrium) 
CAUSE 
EFFECT 
RELATIONS -External to cause-
Acted on 
Change (Expand-Contract) 
Block/ 
Resistance (Inertia) 
Regular— 
Exceptional 
Counter Examples 
Ideas frequently used in science textbooks for the development of science vocabulary 
use technical terms which describe abstract concepts (e.g. upthrust) or name phenomena 
(e.g. expansion). But how are the technical terms related to the abstract concepts? The 
relationship is generated in two ways: 
(a) Introducing a technical term. This mayrdone through naming and through definition 
(Wignell, Martin, Eggins 1993). In this research three of the ideas used introduce an 
abstract concept through naming. A technical name is attached to some already known 
abstract term or to the whole phenomenon. The ideas of potential energy and upthrust 
introduce a technical term for naming a sort of energy and force respectively, and the 
idea of expansion introduces a technical term for naming a phenomenon. Potential 
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energy, upthrust and expansion are introduced in the ideas by a projecting verbal 
process, "we call x, y". 
(b) Manipulating a technical term. In two further cases - thermal equilibrium and inertia 
- these terms had been introduced in the textbook in the previous paragraph from that 
which was used in the questionnaire. In these cases the term itself was to be understood 
through examples. 
To make the results from different examples and different ideas as comparable as 
possible, two further steps were taken: 
(1) assign elements to a common set of schemes, 
(2) assign elements to a common set of categories. 
In order for the schemes to be used as a reference point for the comparison between 
various examples, a fixed set of general schemes for all examples had to be selected. 
Children were asked to answer whether the entities involved in the example can be 
described by one or more of the following eight schemes: barrier, support, container, 
rigidity, contained thing, force, autonomy, invisible entity. The questions (see figures 
6.2 & 6.4, and Appendix 6.1) which were influenced by the work of Mariani and 
Ogborn (1991) were as follows: 
Can each of the five things do something.... 
(a) like a barrier, or a wall can? 
(b) like a support for the other things, like a table can? 
(c) like a container can do, have something else inside it? 
(d) like a rigid thing can do, to resist a change of its shape? 
(e) like being contained in something else? 
(f) like making other things move? 
(g) like moving or stopping moving when it wants? 
(h) be really there, even though we can not see it or touch it? 
Furthermore the choice of elements for each example was not random. The elements 
which were chosen fell into one of the following five broad categories (see Table 6.1): 
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(a) Scientific concepts. This category includes scientific concepts such as potential 
energy. 
(b) Protagonist (object A).The object which has or shows the behavior of the scientific 
concept. 
(c) Structure related objects (object B). The existence (or modification) of the concept 
based on the relations (e.g. distance, size) between object A and object B. The 
protagonist and object B are connected by structural relations 
(d) Surface related objects (object C). Object A is in contact with object C. The 
protagonist and object B are connected by surface relations. 
(e) Unrelated objects (object D). Object D does not play any role in the example. Its 
possible absence does not make any difference to the example. 
Table 6.1 The classification of the elements that were used in each example 
IDEA Example Scientific 
concepts 
Protago 
nist 
Structure 
Related obj 
Surface 
related obj 
Unrelated 
Potential 
Energy 
"pot" Pot.energy Pot Ground Balcony Air 
"child" Pot.energy Child Ground Tree Air 
Expansion "railway" Expansion Railway Sun Train Ground 
"wires" Expansion Wires Sun Pylons Ground 
Thermal 
Equilibr. 
"contact" Heat Hot water Cold water Containers Air 
"inside" Heat Hot water Cold water Containers Air 
Inertia "lorry" Inertia Lorry Car Ground Air 
"elephant Inertia Elephant Toy Elepha Ground Child 
Upthrust "ball" Upthrust Ball Water Child Plastic ba 
"stone" Upthrust Stone Sea Child Ground 
Counter 
examples 
"rocket" Gravity Rocket Ground People Air 
"glass" Heat Glass stove gas hand Air 
The examples in the second column, are described more fully below. 
6.2.2 Participants in each type of questionnaire 
Data were collected from 23 classrooms (with 12 year old children who were in the last 
class in primary school in Greece) in an urban school district. Questionnaires were given 
to all children who attended the sixth class, in 12 out of 15 primary schools in the city of 
Karditsa (the remaining 3 schools did not want to participate in the research). Thus, 407 
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children participated in the study ranging in age from 11 to 12;3 years old with a mean 
of 11;6 years old. 
a. Potential Energy 
Seventy two children responded to the two questionnaires about the idea "When things 
are raised, they have energy, that we call Potential Energy". The first (A) was answered 
by 38 children (on average 11.59 years old), and asked them about the example of the 
idea "a child up a tree has potential energy". The second (B), answered by 34 children 
(11.54 years old), asked them about the example "a pot on a balcony has potential 
energy". 
b. Expansion 
73 children participated in this task. 33 of them with a mean age of 11.51 years filled 
out the questionnaire (A) and 40 with a mean age of 11.48 years old filled out the 
questionnaire (B). The idea in this task was the following: "Almost all solid things, 
expand when they are heated. This phenomenon is called expansion". The example used 
in questionnaire (A) was: "In the summer the electric wires of the P.C.E (Public 
Company of Electricity) are expanded between two pylons because of the high 
temperature, so they are loose", while the example that was used in B was: "In the 
summer the railways lines, expand because of the high temperature, so it makes the line 
bend up in an arc". 
c. Thermal Equilibrium 
In two questionnaires the following idea was explored: "When things come in contact, 
heat is transmitted always from the warmer to the colder." In questionnaire (A), 40 
children with a mean age of 11.52 years were presented with the example: "We put two 
pots with water (one containing hot and the other cold water) in contact. The heat is 
transmitted from the hot to the cold thing." while in (B), 30 children with a mean age of 
11.62 years were presented with the example "we put one metal pot with hot water 
inside another bigger pot that contains cold water. The heat is transmitted from the hot 
to the cold thing". 
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d. Inertia 
Two questionnaires explored the idea of inertia: "The bigger the mass things have, the 
more difficulty they have to move, because they present big inertia". In the 
questionnaire (A), 38 children with a mean age of 11.52 years old were presented with 
the example "A lorry that has bigger mass than a car will move with greater difficulty 
and move slower than the car", while 23 children with a mean age of 11.53 years old 
were presented with the second questionnaire in which the example used was "A child 
can easily move a small toy-elephant, but it is much more difficult to make a big 
elephant move". 
e. Upthrust 
57 children were asked about the idea of upthrust: "on a thing that is in a liquid there is 
a force acting upwards from the liquid. This force is called upthrust". 36 of them with a 
mean age of 11.60 years were presented with questionnaire (A) in which the example 
used was "it is very difficult to push down a ball into the water, if you let it free it will 
come out, because of the upthrust that it gets from the water". 21 of them with a mean 
age of 11.50 years were presented with questionnaire (B) which was based on the 
example "A thing seems lighter in water than out of it, because of the upthrust from the 
water". 
f. counter examples 
The idea used in questionnaire A was "When things go up, they must come down (to the 
ground), because of the gravity" and the example used as counter example was "A 
rocket launched from the earth with speed more than 40,000 Km per hour. So it beats 
the earth's attraction and doesn't come back". 38 children with a mean age of 11.62 
years were presented with this questionnaire. 
In the second questionnaire the following idea was used "A lot of things allow heat to 
pass through them easily". In this case the counter example was "We can touch the edge 
of a glass tube without getting burnt, because the glass tube doesn't let the heat pass 
easily through it. 36 children with a mean age of 11.64 years old took part in this task. 
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6.2.3 Method of analysis 
Children's own examples were analysed mainly qualitatively, using systemic networks. 
A systemic network was produced and is discussed with reference to children's own 
examples of each of the ideas. 
In the case of the examples from the textbooks, in order to look at the relations of 
patterns between the schemes that children used to describe various objects, factor 
analysis was used. Using factor analysis we are looking for factors (dimensions which 
organise children's knowledge at a more abstract level than schemes) which can 
represent a group or package of schemes. So, it was expected that factor analysis would 
give an indication that there is a factor structure. Using this structure and the factor 
scores for each element we can describe any change or transformation from before and 
after seeing an example, in the use of specific schemes or in the way schemes are 
grouped together. 
In factor analyses for each of the ideas, the eight schemes were used as variables while 
the various objects were used as cases. The cases were twenty in each factor analysis 
since in each type of questionnaire children were asked to describe five objects before 
and after seeing the example and there were two questionnaires for each idea (see Figure 
6.6). The data consists of frequency counts of children's 'yes' responses for the objects 
that take part in the various examples in each of the eight schemes (variables). Factor 
analyses were conducted together for the pairs of groups presented with the two 
questionnaires, using different examples of an idea, to reduce the number of variables 
into smaller sets of more broadly conceptualised variables. Thus the factor analysis 
looks at the correlation between y-e,-170v,,,e,, using the percentages of the total number of 
children who identified one of the eight schemes for a particular object. 
Factors scree plots were graphed to help decide on the number of factors. A criterion of 
an eigenvalue greater than one, was mainly used for selecting the number of factors for 
oblique rotation from a principal component analysis of the data. Oblique rotation was 
used when factors were correlated. The method for oblique rotation which is available in 
SPSS is called oblimin. The value zero (0) was given to the parameter delta (8) which 
controls the extent of obliqueness, which permits the maximum obliqueness. 
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Cases schemel scheme2 scheme3 scheme4 scheme5 scheme6 scheme? scheme8 
A 
Questionnaire 
B 
Questionnaire 
5 objects 
before 
the same 
objects after 
5 objects 
before 
the same 
objects after 
Figure 6.6 Pattern of factor analysis 
Also, the McNemar test was used to test the significance of any observed changes in 
children's responses before and after seeing the example ("the McNemar test for the 
significance of changes is particularly applicable to 'before and after' designs" 
(Siegler)). When the expected frequencies for the McNemar test were very small the 
binomial test was used. 
In the analysis of the results for each idea, three types of figures are used to represent 
the data. These figures are representations of tables with numbers which were the 
outputs of factor analysis and McNemar analysis. I used figures instead tables with 
numbers because the enormous amount of data from this study makes the presentation 
and the understanding of the results in the form of numbers very compicated. The 
figures that were produced for the discussion of the results precisely represent the 
numbers of the analysis using dashes, arrows, arithmetic symbols (+ and -) and some 
symbols for the objects. The tables with the numbers that are used as a basis for the 
construction of these figures are presented in the Appendixes. 
The first of the three figures in each case shows the schemes that have high positive or 
negative loadings for each factor. The bold symbols + or - represent a loading between 
0.75 and 1 while the symbols + or - represent a loading between 0.50 and 0.74. 
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The second Figure shows the 'movement' of the objects' factor scores for all factors in 
relation to the context. I chose to use a cube as a representation of the factor structure 
because my aim is to discuss any movement of the objects related to all factors and for 
most of the ideas (except the counter examples) three factors were extracted from the 
factor analysis. There are two symbols in the cube for each object. The one of them 
represents the factor scores (for all three factors) of the particular object when it was 
described by children without having to see it as part of an example, while the other 
represents the factor scores of the same object when it was described by childen as part 
of an example of an idea. The arrows point to the factor scores in the exemplifying 
context. 
The third Figure shows the percentages of children who used the various schemes to 
describe the objects as an example of an idea. The arrows represent the cases with 
statistically significant differences (decreases or increases) between the non-
exemplifying and the exemplifying context. This Figure is used to explore and identify 
the schemes that are responsible for the movement of objects' factor scores. 
In the interpretation of results the following expressions are used instead of numerical 
values: If the number of children that said 'yes' was bigger than 80% the expression 
"almost all" is used. In the cases 60-80% "many children", 40-60% "around half', 20-
40% "quite a few", and if the number of children that said 'yes' was smaller than 20% 
the expression "a minority" is used. 
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6.3 Results 
6.3.1 Potential Energy 
6.3.1.1 	 Children's own examples of potential energy 
At the beginning of the questionnaire, children were asked to give an example of the 
idea "when things are raised, they have energy, that we call Potential Energy". All 
children (72) gave some example. However, four of them gave as example an object 
which was in contact with the ground. Furthermore, no children gave an example which 
was in their last year's text book. Figure 6.7 shows a network that was constructed from 
the analysis of children's examples. 
In general, children's examples of potential energy have as components the following: 
(a) a protagonist, 
(b) the object that supports the protagonist away from the earth (surface related object), 
(c) a description of the position of the protagonist, in many cases in comparison with the 
ground (structure related object) 
(d) a technical term, the name of the energy that the protagonist has (scientific concept) 
All children's examples of potential energy include Protagonists, objects which have 
potential energy because of their position. The most popular object used as protagonist 
was an aeroplane, and then the sun and birds. The sun is actually a complicated 
example. The sun and earth have a mutual potential energy because of the attraction, but 
the sun is not 'above' the ground. In general, it seems that children preferred objects 
which are very far away from the earth. Also, very few children used as protagonist a 
living thing. Only one child used a person (who falls with a parachute) and seven used 
birds as protagonists. Almost all children used as protagonists non-living things such an 
artefact (e.g. aeroplane), an object (e.g. ball), 
Protagonists could be supported mainly by themselves or by something else. In the last 
case, protagonists were supported by surface related objects, such as (i) a person 
(something held) or (ii) another object. The vast majority of the children gave examples 
without surface related objects although the examples in their textbooks used them (a 
child up a 'tree' or a flower-pot on a `balcony'). The surface related objects which 
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support the protagonists could be horizontal surfaces (e.g. flat roof) or vertical surfaces 
(wall), or containers such as the human hand which can grasp and hold other things. 
A description of the position of the protagonist was given by 55 of the children (17 did 
not). In their examples, children used the ground as the structure related object, directly 
or indirectly. Many of them said that the protagonist was high above the ground or over 
the ground; even more of them said just high. However, other children followed an 
indirect way (they did not mention the ground), saying that the protagonist was in or on 
another thing such as the air, the sky, or a desk. They did not mention the distance 
between the protagonist and the ground, probably because the existence of a distance 
was obvious when they mentioned a place such as the sky which is far from the ground. 
Many children named the abstract concept as potential energy in their examples (52 of 
them named the potential energy while 20 did not). Most of them used the verbal form 
"x (the protagonist) has potential energy". Also some of them following a similar verbal 
form with that of the idea said "has energy that is called potential energy". The vast 
majority of children did not mention in their example the existence of energy (general 
term) mentioning the specific sort of energy involved, namely potential energy. 
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did not name the concept (20) 
potential energy - ..[ 
named the concept i 
oncept 	 has energy (1) 
Figure 6.7 Children's examples of potential energy _ vase (1) 
- rubber (1) 
- ball (1) 
We 	 — chair (1) 
- flower-pot (1) 
ballon (1) 
- pen (1) 
- nail (1) 
clock (1) 
- wall - picture (2) 
board (4) 
- An object -_ flat roof -solar heater (1) 
- self - vass (1) 
- desk - pen (1) 
  
   
- aeroplane (14) 
- helicopter (3) 
- spaceship (3) 
- sun (9) 
moon (2) 
by itself 	 stars (1) 
clouds (3) 
birds (7) 
person- parachute (1) 
- toy-aeroplane (1) 
- ball (3) 
we throw - bottle (1) 
- stone (1) 
What 
supports it 
—are not in 
contact with 
the ground 
could be 
things -
which 
are in 
contact with 
the ground 
(wrong ex.) 
_1  in air (3) high in air (1) 
in sky (8) 
going to 
- other planets (1) 
on something (11) 
above_r over the ground (6) 
Lhigh from the ground (7) 
high (13) 
up (2) 
take off (1) 
fall (2) 
-not justified (17) 
_plain 	 1- desk (1) 
surface L table (1) 
_1- rock (1) 
L bottle (1) 
-justified 
Where - 
-mountain 
it 
 "
has P.E (43) 
will have (1) 
produces P.E (1) 
there is P.E. (1) 
we say that it has P.E (3) 
has energy that is called P.E (12) 
Examples of 
Potential energy 
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6.3.1.2 	 Schemes for entities, with and without an idea exemplified 
Children were asked to describe first five entities (see below) out of any exemplifying 
context. Then, they were presented with the following idea and one of the two following 
examples and were asked to describe the same entities but now in the exemplifying 
context: 
"When things are raised, they have energy, that we call 
Potential Energy" 
A child up a tree 
has potential energy. 
----- 
A pot on a balcony 
has potential energy. 
Children were asked to describe in one questionnaire the following five objects : 
Scientific Entity 
›E Protagonist 
Structure related object 
0 Surface related object 
X Unrelated object 
(A) example  
potential energy 
pot 
ground 
balcony 
air 
(B) example  
potential energy 
child 
ground 
tree 
air 
	J 
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6.3.1.2.1 	 Interpretation of the Factors 
According to the factor scree plot, 3 out of 8 factors have eigenvalues bigger than 0.9. 
Finally three factors were extracted. The three factors jointly explain 88% of the 
variance. Factors which are presented in Appendix 6.2 and which are identified in the 
followings paragraph, are listed in the order of magnitude of percentage of variance 
contributed by the particular factor in Table 6.2. 
Table 6.2 The factors for potential energy 
Factor 1 
	
Factor 2 	 Factor 3  
Autonomy 	
_ 
Force 	
_ 
Container 	 + 
Contained thing 	 - 	 + 
Rigidity 	 + 
Barrier 	 + 
Support 	 + 
Invisible 
Factor 1 has very high negative loading for "autonomy" and "force" variables. So, 
factor 1 can be labelled "static" and appears to describe a static object vs. autonomous 
action dimension. Factor 2 has very high positive loading for "container" and 
"contained thing". It also has positive loading for "rigidity". It can be labelled 
"containment" and appears to describe a containment vs. surroundings dimension. 
Factor 3 has very high positive loading for "barrier" and "support" variables. This 
factor can be labelled "blocking" and seem to describe a blocked vs. opened (or linked 
dimension). Appendix 6.3 and 6.4 show plots of factors and the percentages of yes 
responses for each scheme. 
6.3.1.2.2 	 Analysis of the Potential Energy examples 
The movements of the objects' factor scores and percentages of children who used 
various schemes to describe each object are shown in the following two Figures, Figure 
6.8 & 6.9 (see also for the description of the figures that follow, the account given 
earlier, pages 140 to 142). 
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Block 1.0 0 
-1.0 
Vs 
Open 
Containment 
Vs 
Surroundings 
pot 
0 
-1. 
Static Vs Autdnomous 
Containment 
Vs 
Surroundings 
child 
0 
0. 
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Open 
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Figure 6.8 Factor scores and their 'movements' for the examples with the pot (top) 
and the child (bottom) 
(A) example 	 (B) example 
(Top Figure) 	 (Bottom Figure) 
Scientific Entity 	 potential energy 	 potential energy 
X Protagonist 	 pot 	 child 
• Structure related object 
	 ground 	 ground 
0 Surface related object 	 balcony 	 tree 
X Unrelated object 	 air 	 air 
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POTENT. 
ENERGY 
C 
FACTOR 1 FACTOR 2 FACTOR 3 
Auton Force Contain Con. in 	 Rigid Invisib Barrier Support 
Figure 6.9 The percentages of children who used each scheme to describe objects in 
the examples of potential energy 
The factor which explained most of the variance was labelled static/object vs 
autonomous action. The focus in the idea of potential energy is the description of 
relations (the distance) between static objects. The second factor describes the 
containment of the potential energy in some objects while the third factor mentions the 
existence of some blockers, so as to make it possible to have a distance between some 
objects and the ground. The objects are described below in terms of schemes, using the 
factor scores on the above factors to characterize them. The patterns of movements of 
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objects' the factor scores in relation to the three factors seem to be different for the two 
examples of the particular idea particularly for the protagonists and the surface related 
objects. 
The concept (potential energy) in the examples of this idea is seen as an invisible entity 
which can make other things move. It is an invisible source of potential movement. 
There was a bigger tendency in the exemplifying context than in the non-exemplifying 
context, for the potential energy to be a link and not a blocker. It is notable that although 
out of context of use in an example, around one fourth of the children said that potential 
energy can stop other things moving, by contrast, both exemplifying contexts resulted in 
even fewer children seeing this entity as a barrier or a support. Particularly, in the 
example with the 'child up a tree', there is a movement of the potential energy, towards 
`containment' since more children described the entity as contained in something else. 
Possibly, this increase happens only for the case of 'a child up a tree' and not for the 
`flower-pot on a balcony' because the 'child' is more easily imagined as a source of 
potential movement. The flower-pot on a balcony is not intended to fall, nor expected 
to. It should just 'stay there'. It's a decoration, rather than an object. 
The protagonists which are used in the two types of questionnaire were very different. 
The child appeared as 'dynamic' and to 'block' other things while the flower-pot is seen 
as a 'static' object which is not able to 'block' other things. Both protagonists were 
described as containment. The examples constrained mainly different aspects of the 
protagonists which interestingly has as a result to reduce the differences between these 
two entities. In the exemplifying contexts with the pot, there was a substantial decrease 
in the number of children who said that the protagonist is a rigid thing, and that it is 
contained in something. So, there were fewer differences between pot and child on the 
containment factor. Neither protagonists are seen as contained in other things since they 
contain the potential energy. Also, they appeared less as blockers in the exemplifying 
contexts. They do not support anything in the examples and this becomes more obvious 
since they need something else to support them. However, in the case of a 'child up a 
tree', about three fourths of the children continued to say after seeing it as an example 
that the protagonist can present autonomy (even though there was a statistically 
significant decrease comparing the "yes" responses prior to and in the exemplifying 
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context). The particular example could not constrain and successfully reduce the 
appearance of the autonomy scheme, which appears to be too strong to be "suppressed". 
The Structure-related object in both exemplifying contexts was the 'ground'. Mainly, it 
was described as a blocker (mainly supporter), and containment (mainly as a container). 
It is not clearly either a containment or a barrier since it can support something but 
cannot prevent horizontal movement and has not rigidity (the other schemes that had 
positive loadings for these factors). In both exemplifying contexts there was a 
substantial decrease of the number of children who said that it is a support and a 
container. However, in the case of a 'child up a tree' more than half of the children said 
in the exemplifying context that it is a support. It seems that the tree which supports the 
child needs to be supported by the ground while the balcony needs to be supported by 
the building. The building does not play such a crucial role in the example as the tree. 
This may be why they did not mention the support of the ground to the building. 
The objects which are in contact with the Protagonist are the 'balcony' in questionnaire 
A and the 'tree' in questionnaire B. The Surface related objects in both examples, turned 
out to be blockers again becoming more similar than they were out of the exemplifying 
contexts. 'Balcony' and 'tree' were described mainly as supporters. Going from the non-
exemplifying context to the exemplifying context, the tree, starting high as a barrier, 
decreased in this respect. The balcony started (non-exemplifying context) lower as a 
barrier, but increased. In fact, these changes brought the two, very close together as 
barriers. Also, in the case of a 'child up a tree' there was an increase in the number of 
children who said that the tree can make other things move. It seems that the branch is 
thought of as able to break and make the child move whereas the balcony can not. 
Both exemplifying contexts constrain the schemes for the description of the unrelated 
object (air) to some extent. However the air, in the exemplifying context, continues to 
be a dynamic invisible entity with the ability to present autonomous action as in the 
non-exemplifying context. It is notable that while objects related to the example have 
their associated schemes constrained when the example is presented, the unrelated 
object does not to any great extent. 
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In summary, with the special exemption of the scheme 'force' (in the case of the 
structure-related objects) discussed above, objects in the two examples either stayed 
close together or moved closer together (mainly the protagonists and the surface related 
objects which appeared very different out of the exemplifying context), on all factors, 
when going to the exemplifying context. Both examples constrain successfully most of 
the irrelevant schemes for this examples. However, the scheme of autonomy appeared 
too strong to be "suppressed". In some cases the examples constrained different aspects 
of two objects, reducing the difference between these entities at the level of their factor 
description. 
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6.3.2 Expansion 
6.3.2.1 	 Children's own examples of expansion 
All children (73) gave some example of the idea: "Almost all solid things, expand when 
they are heated. This phenomenon is called expansion". However, two of them 
gave the following counter examples of this idea: "When a brick is warmed up, it does 
not expand because it is not made from aluminium, copper, iron etc.", "Concrete does 
not expand because it is not made of iron". About one fourth of the children gave 
examples similar to those that are used in their textbooks (8 children had an example 
with 'railways' and 11 of them with `cables'). That might happen because children do 
not see expansion normally, so they only know it through text-book examples. 
The components of children's examples of expansion fall into the broad categories: (a) a 
protagonist, (b) the cause of expansion, and (c) the effects of expansion. The network 
that was constructed from the analysis of children's examples of expansion is shown in 
Figure 6.10. 
All children used a protagonist and only two do not specify a category of things (they 
just say "things"). The idea that children were given, specifies a category of things as 
protagonists, "almost all solid things". So, children used as protagonists mainly solid 
things such as metal, wooden, concrete and plastic objects. However one child used a 
fluid, water. The most popular protagonists were metals (objects or kinds of metals) and 
particularly iron objects. 
Children's examples of expansion include causes of expansion. Only 6 of the children 
did not give any cause. The cause of expansion could be a structural related object 
(mainly the sun), or a particular time characteristic (summer). They used in many cases 
the description of a process/phenomenon as causes of expansion. Most of the children 
used heat, or high temperature as the cause of expansion. 
Furthermore, almost all the children stated effects of expansion in their examples of the 
idea (only three did not write any effects). Most of the children named the concept of 
expansion. They mainly used the expression that "x (the protagonist) expands" or that 
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"the phenomenon is called expansion" or both. Children who did not name the concept 
used expressions that describe the expansion such as: "the volume became bigger", "it 
became bigger". However only one or two wrote about other effects such as melting or 
evaporating. 
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Figure 6.10 Children's examples of expansion 
-barrels (1) 
-cylinder (1) 
_ objects -
-pressing iron (1) 
_cables (11) 
table (2) 
railway (8) 
little ball (3) 
- box (1) 
_ iron 	 train-wheels (1) 
rod (1) 
frying pan (1) 
_ Kinds of _ 	 coffee pot (1) 
metals 	 - wires (1) 
copper (4) 
- steel (1) 
desk (1) 
table (1) 
chair (3) 
door ( 1) 
r bridge (2) 
concrete I- road (2) 
plastic - ball (1) 
- metal (3) - 
wood (1) 
- specified 
Protagonists _ 
expand 
solid 
things - 
(1) 
fluids - water (1) 
not specified (2) 
r heat up (42) 
I- high temperature (7) 
- justified 
	 -summer (13) 
{
4-gas-stove (2) 
a warm object (1) 
sun (16) 
 
electric socket (1) 
- 	 not justified (6) 
Cause of _ 
Expansion 
expands (40) 
{This phenomenon is 
- name the scientific 	 called expansion (2) 
concept 
Both (8) 
- justified _ 
the volume became bigger (8) 
-related to 
it became bigger (8) 
do not name the expansion loose (3) 
Effects - 	
- scientific concept - 
not justified (3) 
_ other 
effects 
r melt (2) 
-L water vapour (1) 
Examples of 
Expansion 
consists of 
155 
} In the summer the railways lines, expand because of the high 
temperature, so they make the line bend up in an arc. 
6.3.2.2 	 Schemes for entities, with and without an idea exemplified 
Children were presented with the following idea and one of the two following examples: 
I "Almost all solid things expand when they are heated. 
This phenomenon is called expansion" 
In the summer the electric wires of the P.C.E are expanded between two 
pylons because of the high temperature, so they are loose. 
• 
Children were asked to describe in one of the two questionnaires the following five 
objects: 
(A) example 	 (B) example 
40" Scientific Entity 	 expansion 	 expansion 
X Protagonist 	 railway lines 
	
wires 
• Structure related object 	 sun 	 sun 
0 Surface related object 	 trains 	 pylons 
X Unrelated object 	 ground 	 ground 
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6.3.2.2.1 	 Interpretation of the Factors 
The factor scree plot shows that 3 out of 8 factors have eigenvalues bigger than 1. The 
three factors were retained, and subjected to oblique rotation. The three factors explain 
71.7% of the variance. Table 6.3 and Appendix 6.5 presents the results of the analysis, 
after oblique rotation. 
Table 6.3 The factors for expansion 
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 
Support + 
Invisible 
_ 
Barrier + 
Contained thing + + 
Autonomy + 
Container + 
Rigidity + 
Force 
Factor 1 has very high positive loadings for "support" and "barrier". Also, it has very 
high negative loadings for "invisible entity". Factor 1 can perhaps be labelled 
"Blocking" and appears to be a blocked vs. opened dimension. Factor 2 has the highest 
positive loading for "autonomy". It also has high positive loadings for "container", and 
positive loadings for "force" and "contained thing". It may possibly be labelled 
"Dynamic containment". Factor 3 has very high positive loading for "rigidity" and high 
negative loading for "force". It might be labelled "Stability" and it may describe a 
Stability (hardness) vs. flexible dimension. Appendices 6.6 and 6.7 show plots of factors 
and the percentages of yes responses for each scheme. 
6.3.2.2.2 	 Analysis of the Expansion examples 
Figure 6.11 shows the factor scores of each object going from the non-exemplifying 
context to the exemplifying context. Figure 6.12 show how many (in percentages) 
children described the various objects with each scheme in the exemplifying context and 
where we had statistical significant differences going from the non-exemplifying 
context to the exemplifying context. 
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Figure 6.11 Factor scores and their 'movements' for the examples with the rail 
(top) and the wires (bottom) 
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• Structure related object 	 sun 	 sun 
0 Surface related object 	 trains 	 pylons 
X Unrelated object 	 ground 	 ground 
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FACTOR 3 FACTOR 1 
	
FACTOR 2 
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Figure 6.12 The percentages of children using each scheme to describe objects in 
the examples of expansion 
Both examples appeared to contsrain most of the objects in similar ways. However, in 
the case of the surface related objects (train and pylons respectively) the patterns of 
movement of these objects in relation to the factors are very different. 
The concept here, 'expansion' is not seen as able to block things, and appeared neutral 
on the dimension of dynamic containment. Also it has not stability. Giving 'expansion' 
in an exemplifying or non-exemplifying context does not seem to make big differences 
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to this entity. It appeared to be an invisible entity mainly prior to using it in an example 
and to some extent in the exemplifying context. Children seemed to use pragmatic 
reasoning, since they cannot easily observe the results of expansion in their everyday 
life. The number of children who said that expansion is an invisible entity in the 
example with the 'railway' (in which the picture presents a "big" expansion of the 
railway lines) decreased more than in the other exemplifying context. 
The role of protagonist in the two questionnaires was played by the 'railway lines' and 
by the 'wires' respectively. Both protagonists were seen as good instances of blockers 
(supporters rather than barriers) out of the exemplifying contexts. In the example with 
the 'railways', many children continued to say that railways are a support while in the 
other exemplification context with the 'wires', there was a great decrease in the "yes" 
responses for the previous scheme, which may be because children think that a part of 
the railways still support the train which is coming (in the image of the example) while 
the wires do not support anything in the particular example. Furthermore both 
protagonists are seen in the examples as less 'stable' things than out of the exemplifying 
contexts, but for different reasons (decreases happened in different schemes). Children 
described railways mainly less as rigid things (they can move upwards because of the 
expansion) and wires as objects that cannot make other things (possibly the electricity) 
move. 
The Structure related objects (sun) appeared as a 'rigid' entity. When it is used in the 
example with the wires only (not in the other example) the sun appeared as something 
that can make other things move, presumably because it was the cause of the expansion 
of wires and so the change of their position. 
The Surface related objects which were used in the two exemplifying contexts were very 
different. The train is a dynamic containment (it is a container and can move when it 
wants), while pylons are stable blockers. The example with the railway could not 
constrain to any extent the autonomy of the train. So, in the exemplifying context three 
fifths of the children said that the train can move when it wants even though they could 
see in the picture that the railway lines had expanded. In the example with the 'wires' 
more children described pylons as a support (than out of the exemplifying context) since 
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in this example they supports the wires. A rarely appearing sort of support is when the 
thing that support other things has a smaller size of surface than the thing that is 
supported by it. An example of this sort of support appears to be the pylons which 
support the electric wires. So, pylons in the example with the wires appeared more as 
supporters in the exemplifying context than in the non-exemplifying context, perhaps 
because the wires, having expanded, had become more salient and so their need of 
support is more obvious. 
The unrelated object was the ground for both examples. It is mainly a support, a 
container. In the exemplifying contexts it lost these features. It did not play any role in 
the examples, and only a very few children described it after the example with some 
schemes. 
So, both examples constrained the schemes that children used in the description of 
objects - going from the non-exemplifying context to the exemplifying - in a way that 
made different objects which played similar roles (e.g. protagonists) very similar. 
However, in the case of the surface related objects, the train and the pylon became more 
different in the exemplifying context concerning the support scheme. It seems to be a 
result of the different relations that these objects had with the protagonists. The pylons 
support the wires in the example while the train is supported by the railways. The 
appearance of some increases in the exemplifying context show that the examples 
highlighted some aspects of objects which are well hidden. 
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6.3.3 Thermal Equilibrium 
6.3.3.1 	 Children's own examples of thermal equilibrium 
Almost all of the children gave some example (69 out of 72) of the following idea: 
"When things come in contact, heat is transmitted always from the warmer to the 
colder" (see Fig. 6.13). In their examples 16 of them used water as a protagonist which 
was used as protagonist in the examples of their textbooks. These children described an 
example similar to the textbook example where we bring into contact two containers 
with hot and cold water. However, none of them described an example similar to the 
other example in their textbook where we put a container with cold water inside a bigger 
container with hot water . 
Children used two objects in their examples to show the transmission of heat from the 
protagonist (hot object) to the structural related object (cold one). The two objects were 
the same or different. When they were same, fluids were mainly used such as water and 
milk. However when they were different, solids were mainly used as protagonists as 
well as structure related objects. Protagonists (hot things) were objects such as a radiator 
or a category of objects such as a piece of iron. In the case of cold things (structure 
related things) ice cubes were mainly used. 
Thirty nine of the children did not use any container (surface related object) for their 
protagonist or the structure related object as the examples in their book do. Around half 
of the children described in their examples some containers of one or both of the 
protagonists and the structure related object. Few described one of these two objects in a 
container while the vast majority of them described both objects to be in two similar 
containers or in the same container. So, most of the children who used surface related 
objects, described the two objects in containers or a specific kind of container, e.g. 
glasses. 
Almost all described the protagonist as being kept away from the structure related 
object. So, something had been done to them to allow the transmission of the heat from 
the hot to the cold one. Children suggested mainly the following three things: thirty 
wrote that we have to put the containers in contact, fifteen of them wrote that we have to 
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put the substances (water) together and ten argued that we have to put the one container 
beside the other. 
Bringing the hot and the cold things into contact produces an effect. 55 out of 69 
children described an effect. In their examples, they described effects which referred to 
objects or to the process (the transmission of heat). 31 of the children said that heat is 
transmitted from the hot thing to the cold. When the effect referred to objects children 
described changes for both objects or just changes referred to the structure related object 
(it will warm up or it will melt in the case of ice cubes). 
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Figure 6.13 Children's own examples of thermal equilibrium 
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6.3.3.2 
	
Schemes for entities, with and without an idea exemplified 
Children were presented with the following idea and one of the two following examples: 
`When things come in contact, heat is transmitted always 
from the warmer to the colder" 
I- 
\.. We put two pots with water (one containing hot and the other cold water) 
in contact. The heat is transmitted from the hot to the cold thing.  
...... We put one metal pot with hot water inside another bigger pot that 
contains cold water. The heat is transmitted from the 
hot to the cold thing. 
Children were asked to describe in one of the two questionnaires the following five 
objects: 
(A) example 	 (B) example 
Scientific Entity 	 heat 	 heat 
X Protagonist 	 hot water 	 hot water 
Structure related object 	 cold water 	 cold water 
0 Surface related object 	 containers 	 containers 
X Unrelated object 	 air 	 air 
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6.3.3.2.1 	 Interpretation of factors 
The results of the factor analysis indicate that children's responses can be represented by 
three important factors (see Table 6.4 below, & Appendix 6.8) which explain 94.7% of 
the variance, one of which -factor 1- is very prominent (explains 60.6% of variance) and 
the other two factors -factor 2 & factor 3- are minor factors (explain 20.5% and 13.6% 
of the variance respectively). 
Table 6.4 The factors for expansion 
Factor 1 
	
Factor 2 	 Factor 3 
Support 
Rigidity 
Container 
Barrier 
Contained thing 
Autonomy 
Force 
Invisible 
Factor 1 has very high positive loadings on "support", "rigidity", "container", and 
"barrier". This factor can be labelled "Blocker-Container". Factor 2 has very high 
negative loadings for Contained thing and it has negative loading for "force". Also it 
has high positive loading for invisible entity and positive loading for barrier. Factor 2 
can be labelled "Invisible-Container". Factor 3 has very high positive loadings on 
"autonomy", "force" and high positive loading on "invisible entity". It can be labelled 
"Autonomous action by Invisible entities". Appendix 6.9 and 6.10 show plots of factors 
and the percentages of yes responses for each scheme. 
6.3.3.2.2 	 Analysis of the equilibrium examples 
Figure 6.14 shows that the structure of the factor scores for the entities that have a 
similar role in the two examples of equilibrium was very similar (see also for the 
description of the figures that follow at the method of analysis section in the 
introduction). The focus of this study is on the description whether and how examples 
constrain the way that children view various entities. So the changes in factor scores 
rather than their values will be described from Figure 6.15. 
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Figure 6.14 Factor scores and their 'movements' for the examples with the pots in 
contact (top) and the one pot inside the other (bottom) 
(A) example 	 (B) example 
Top Figure 	 Bottom Figure 
Scientific Entity 	 heat 	 heat 
X Protagonist 	 hot water 	 hot water 
• Structure related object 	 cold water 	 cold water 
0 Surface related object 	 containers 	 containers 
X Unrelated object 	 air 	 air 
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Figure 6.15 The percentages of children using each scheme to describe objects in 
the examples of thermal equilibrium 
Heat, out of the exemplifying context, appeared as an Invisible-Container, it became 
neutral as an Invisible-Container when it was used in the context of an example. It 
happens for different reasons in the two exemplification contexts. On the one hand, 
more children looking at the 'contact example' described heat as an entity contained in 
other entities (water), as well as one that can present autonomous action. On the other 
hand, in the 'inside example' the number of children who said that it can make other 
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things move was increased even more than in the other example. Both increases in 
`contained thing' and 'force' variables respectively had as result the decrease of heat's 
factor score for the Invisible-Container factor since it had negative loadings for these 
variables. 
"Hot water" is not seen as an Invisible-container. Also it is neutral as a Container 
blocker and as an invisible entity which presents autonomous action. In both example-
contexts it lost even more its feature as a container-blocker. In the example with the one 
container inside another, it lost even more its feature as invisible-container, but in the 
example with the containers alongside this feature increased. That difference happened 
because in the exemplifying context with the two pots in contact, the number of children 
who said that the 'hot water' has a feature of force was more or less the same as prior to 
its use in an example, while in the other exemplifying context there was an increase in 
the number of children who attributed the force scheme to the 'hot water'. This increase 
had as a result the decrease of the factor score for the invisible-container (it has negative 
loadings for the scheme `force'). In the exemplifying context with the smaller pot 
inside the bigger one, the 'hot water' lost significantly its features as support. 
Cold water is seen as neutral as a Container-blocker and as an invisible entity which can 
present autonomous action. The number of the children who said that the "cold water" is 
a container decreased a lot in the case of the two pots in contact but did not change at all 
in the exemplifying context with the smaller pot inside a bigger pot. These decreases 
resulted in the cold water appearing less as a Container-blocker in the examples. 
The 'containers' used for liquids (water) are Container-blockers and Surroundings. Also 
they are not invisible entities which can provide Autonomous action. In the 
exemplifying context with one pot inside a bigger one, there was a decrease in the 
number of children who said that the "containers for liquids" are barriers, and rigid 
things. In the exemplifying context with the two pots in contact, containers for liquid 
lost even more their features as something that can support other things, as contained 
things and their rigidity. That had as a result a decrease in the factor scores of the 
`containers for liquids' as blocker-containers. 
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"Air" cannot block other things, but it constitutes a very good example of invisible-
container and of an invisible entity which can produce autonomous action. In the 
exemplifying contexts, there is a decrease in "autonomous action by an invisible entity", 
but an increase in it as an invisible container. In the exemplifying contexts, almost none 
of the children said that air is a support or a barrier. Nor did it constitute an example of a 
contained thing or of a container. Also, a substantial decrease left only a minority of 
children saying that "air" has autonomy which can move other things or that it is an 
invisible entity. 
The concept heat appeared in both exemplifying contexts more as an entity that can 
make other things move. The heat and the hot water to some extent became in the 
exemplifying contexts dynamic entities from being static entities. It seems that before 
the examples, the children saw heat as an invisible-container that is around beings on 
the earth. In both exemplifying contexts, they saw it more as a contained thing in 
another entity such as the water. It is worth mentioning that similar changes occuring in 
the two examples at the level of factors can be explained in different ways at the level of 
schemes as discussed above in the case of heat. So, different examples might constrain 
the schemes that one can use to describe objects making the entities (that play the same 
role) similar, but also two examples might constrain different schemes of an entity to 
make its appearence in the exemplifying context similar at the level of factors. 
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6.3.4 Inertia 
6.3.4.1 	 Children's own examples of inertia 
All the children (61) gave some example of the idea: "The bigger the mass things have, 
the more difficulty they have to move, because they present big inertia" (see Figure 
6.16). Five of them described an example similar to one of those used in their textbooks 
(a lorry will move with greater difficulty and move slower than a car). 
The children's examples consist of a protagonist which can or cannot move in a certain 
way (effect) and a cause that justifies that effect. Almost half the children used in their 
examples two protagonists describing a comparison between two objects; slightly more 
used one protagonist. All the children (except one) specified particular objects as 
protagonists. The children preferred to use inanimate than animate things as 
protagonists. 
In the examples with one protagonist many of the children used as protagonist a rock or 
a stone. The cause that they are big (24 children) had as effect that they are not easily 
moved mainly by another object, by us (persons) or by themselves. Very few of the 
children (5) described inertia itself as a cause, or named it as a concept. 
In the examples with two protagonists, the comparisons were between similar or 
different objects. In the case of similar objects a big and a small object of the same kind 
was used. In the case of different objects, the children mainly compared a lorry with a 
car or a moped. Making a comparison between the two objects they said that the big 
thing can move with a greater difficulty or less speed while the small thing can move 
more easily or faster, or that the big thing cannot move while the small thing can. There 
were some children who compared an elephant with smaller animals such as a cat or a 
hare. As above they also used as the cause of the difference in movement the difference 
in their size (big-small). Some (more than in the examples with one protagonist) 
mentioned inertia as a cause and named difference in inertia of these objects. 
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"The bigger the mass things have, the more difficult they 
have to move, because they present big inertia" 
A lorry that has bigger mass than a car will move with greater difficulty 
and move slower than the car. 
6.3.4.2 	 Schemes for entities, with and without an idea exemplified 
Children were presented with the following idea and one of the two following examples: 
A child can easily move a small toy-elephant, but it is much more 
difficult to make a big elephant move. 
Children were asked to describe in one of the two questionnaires the following five 
entities before and after they were presented with one of the pictures showing the 
entities together with the idea they exemplify: 
(A) example 	 (B) example  
Scientific Entity 	 inertia 	 inertia 
X Protagonist 	 lorry 	 elephant 
Structure related object 	 car 	 toy elephant 
CO Surface related object 	 ground 	 ground 
X Unrelated object 	 air 	 child 
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6.3.4.2.1 	 Interpretation of the Factors 
The factor scree plot shows that 3 out of eight factors have eigenvalues bigger than 1. 
The three factors explain 80.6% of the variance. The rotated factor matrices for the 
oblique solution are provided in Table 6.5 and in Appendix 6.11. 
Table 6.5 The factors for inertia 
Factor 1 
	
Factor 2 	 Factor 3 
Invisible 
Rigidity 
Support 
Container 
Force 
Autonomy 
Contained thing 
Barrier 
Factor 1 has very high positive loadings on "rigidity", "support" and very high 
negative loadings on "invisible entity". It also has a high positive loading on 
"container". It can be labelled "Container-Supporter". Factor 2 has very high positive 
loadings for "force" and "autonomy". It can be labelled "Autonomous action". Factor 
3 has very high positive loading for "barrier" and very high negative loading for 
"contained thing". It can be labelled "horizontal blocker" . Appendix 6.12 and 6.13 
show plots of factors and the percentages of yes responses for each scheme. 
6.3.4.2.2 	 Analysis of the inertia examples 
The following figures, (Fig. 6.17 & 6.18) show how the factor scores for each object 
and the percentages of children who used various shemes to describe objects changed 
going from the non exemplifying to exemplifying context. 
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Figure 6.18 The percentages of children using each scheme to describe objects in 
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In this task "inertia" was the scientific concept. It is seen neither as a Container-
Supporter nor as able to present autonomous action. It appeared to some extent as a 
horizontal blocker. Comparing the exemplifying with the non-exemplifying contexts, 
there were no big changes in factor scores on inertia for each factor, although in the 
exemplifying context with the lorry, inertia tended to have a bigger factor score as a 
horizontal blocker than prior to using it in an example, while in the exemplifying 
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context with the elephant its factor score on this becomes smaller. Also, around half of 
the children said that inertia is an invisible entity in the non-exemplifying context, with 
a small increase in this number in the exemplifying context with the lorry. However in 
the group which had the elephant as an example, most of the children said that inertia is 
an invisible entity. So, inertia had different behaviour in the two exemplifying contexts 
mainly in respect of the schemes barrier and invisible entity. 
There were two different protagonists in the two exemplifying contexts. The 'lorry' 
which attempts to move by itself (or by a human who was inside the system) and the 
elephant which a child attempted to move. The lorry is mainly seen as a container which 
can support other things (high factor score for the factor container-supporter) while the 
elephant is seen as something that has autonomy and can make other things move (high 
factor score for the factor autonomous action). In the contexts of use in examples, the 
elephant became mainly a horizontal rigid blocker while the lorry lost a lot of all its 
features. 
Both examples from the text book were based mainly on comparisons (between lorry 
and car, and between elephant and toy-elephant). The 'car' and the 'toy-elephant' were 
the Structure related objects. The car is seen as a container which can support other 
things while the toy elephant is seen as a contained thing rather than a container. In the 
exemplifying context, the car was neutral concerning the factors of Container-Supporter 
and autonomous action, and had a big decrease as a horizontal barrier, whilst the toy-
elephant became more negative as a Container blocker. In the contexts of use in 
examples, the difference between the elephant and the toy-elephant for the schemes of 
barrier and rigidity is clear, there was a substantial increase in the number of children 
who described the elephant as a rigid barrier while only some children used the same 
schemes for the toy-elephant. In contrast, there is no big difference in the schemes that 
were used for the description of the car and the lorry 
The Surface related object (ground) is mainly a support, a container (container-support). 
In both exemplifying contexts it appeared less as a container. In the exemplifying 
context with the lorry, it became less a support and more a barrier. However, in the 
exemplifying context with the elephant, it became somewhat more a support and less a 
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barrier. The idea used for the concept of inertia focused on the difficulty of making any 
change in the position of things. Something therefore had to appear as a blocker. In the 
exemplifying contexts of this idea children describe the elephant (the protagonist) as the 
horizontal blocker while in the lorry-example inertia (the concept) and to some extent 
the ground (the Surface related objects) played the role of horizontal blockers. 
The unrelated objects for this idea were the air and the child (it is not clear that the child 
is a good choice as 'unrelated' object. However, it turned out that the behavior of its 
factor scores shows a pattern very similar to those of other unrelated objects). Both the 
air and the child are seen as something that can present autonomous action. The air is 
seen neither as a Container blocker or a horizontal barrier while the child is seen as a 
container blocker rather than a horizontal barrier. In the context of using them in an 
example, both lost some of their autonomous action feature. Also the air kept constant 
its negative factor score as a container blocker and became neutral as horizontal barrier 
while the child became a horizontal barrier rather than a container blocker. The 'air' and 
the 'child' lost their features in the examples, presumambly because they were unrelated 
to the idea. 
Both exemplifying contexts do not make children see inertia very differently. The 
examples constrain most of the schemes that describe objects which play a similar role 
in the two examples, to make them more similar than they were out of an exemplifying 
context. The main exemption in that rule is the case with the protagonists: in contrast 
with the lorry, the elephant is seen more as a rigid thing, going from the non-
exemplifying to the exemplifying context. However, these two objects became more 
similar at the level of the factor scores (and for the factor 1 which includes the scheme 
of rigidity) going from the non-exemplifying to exemplifying context. 
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6.3.5 Upthrust 
6.3.5.1 	 Children's own examples of upthrust 
Most of the children (57 out of 63) gave some example of the idea "on a thing that it is 
in a liquid there is a force acting upwards from the liquid. This force is called upthrust". 
Twenty of them used in their examples a ball as a protagonist and gave examples similar 
to (but not the same as) the textbook example where a child attempts to sink a ball in a 
washbasin with water. However, just one child gave an example similar to the other 
example in their textbooks where a child can more easily lift a stone in the sea than out 
of it. Figure 6.19 shows the network that was constructed from the analysis of children's 
examples of upthrust. 
Almost all children gave an example using a specified protagonist. Protagonists were 
mainly objects or in some cases substances. Objects were made mainly of plastic or 
wood. These materials can float at the surface of the water and make the existence of the 
upthrust obvious. Many children used a plastic ball as protagonist. 
All children used a liquid, mainly water as a structure related object. The three major 
categories that were used are the following: thirteen children said that the protagonist is 
in water, eleven said that it is in a wash basin with water, and fourteen of them that the 
protagonist is in the sea. 
Most of the children justified what the protagonist does in/on the structure related 
object. It floats or goes up (again) at the surface or the structure related object keeps it 
up at the surface. So, most of the children defined the position of the protagonist since it 
was the evidence for the force that the structure related object exerts on it. In contrast 
with the examples of their text books which used persons as surface related objects, very 
few children's examples included any surface related object. Only four of them said that 
we sink the protagonist, two of them that we push it down, and just one that we raise it 
up more easily. Around half of the children named the scientific concept upthrust in 
their examples. Most of the children who did not use the name upthrust gave a 
description of what the structure related object does to the protagonist, that is, it exerts a 
force from down to up. 
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Figure 6.19 Children's own examples of upthrust 
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6.3.5.2 	 Schemes for entities, with and without an idea exemplified 
Children were presented with the following idea and one of the two following examples: 
"On a thing that is in a liquid there is a force acting 
upwards from the liquid" 
	1 
---: -- - 
4 It is very difficult to push down a ball into the water, if you let it free it 
will come out, because of the upthrust that it gets from the water. 
 
 
A thing seems lighter in water than out of it, because of 
the upthrust from the water. 
 
Children were asked to describe in one of the two questionnaires the following five 
entities before and after they were presented with one of the pictures showing the 
entities together with the idea they exemplify: 
(A) example 
	
(B) example 
Scientific Entity 	 upthrust 	 upthrust 
X Protagonist 	 ball 	 stone 
Structure related object 	 water 	 sea 
Surface related object 	 child 	 child 
X Unrelated object 	 plastic basin 	 ground 
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6.3.5.2.1 	 Interpretation of the Factors 
The factor scree plot shows that 3 out of 8 factors have eigenvalues bigger than 1. 
Oblique rotation extracted three factors (see Figure 6.10 below and Appendix 6.14) that 
accounted for 70.1% of the variance. 
Table 6.6 The factors for upthrust 
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 
Force + 
Autonomy + 
Invisible 
Rigidity + 
Contained thing + 
Support + + 
Barrier + 
Container + 
Factor 1 has very high positive loadings for "force" and "autonomy". It can be labelled 
"Autonomous action". Factor 2 has very high positive loadings for "rigidity" and high 
positive loading for "contained thing". Also it has high negative loadings for "invisible 
entity". It can be labelled "Stable Contained thing". Factor 3 has high positive loadings 
for "support" and "barrier" and positive loading for "container". It can be labelled 
"Container-blocker". Appendices 6.15 and 6.16 show plots of factors and the 
percentages of yes responses for each scheme. 
6.3.5.2.2 	 Analysis of the Upthrust examples 
Figure 6.20 shows that the factor scores for the entities which have a similar role in the 
two examples of upthrust were different for many of them: protagonist, structure related 
objects and unrelated objects (see also for the description of the figures that follow at 
the method of analysis section in the introduction). However the changes that happened 
going from the non-exemplifying to exemplifying context and represented in the Figure 
with the arrows for these entities were similar. Figure 6.21 shows the changes going 
from the non-exemplifying to exemplifying contexts, in the percentages of children who 
described the objects using various schemes. 
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Figure 6.21 The percentages of children using each scheme to describe objects in 
the examples of upthrust 
Upthrust is neither a stable contained thing nor a container-blocker and it is negative to 
some extent for autonomous action. It is seen as an invisible entity. In the exemplifying 
context with the ball, 'upthrust' appeared as container-blocker (it was described as a 
barrier) but not in the other context. This perhaps happens because the child in the 
exemplifying context with the ball attempted to push the ball and something like a 
barrier rejected this movement, while in the exemplifying context with the stone, the 
upthrust helps the child to lift the stone up. More children in both exemplifying contexts 
described it as something that can make other things move and support other things than 
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than they did prior to using it in an example. Upthrust appeared as a container blocker in 
the example with the ball (substantial increases in the number of children who said that 
upthrust is a barrier and support). 
The protagonists were the ball and the stone respectively. The ball is seen as a stable 
object contained in other things which is not a container blocker and does not have 
autonomous action. In the context of use in an example, the ball appeared less as a 
stable contained in thing. The stone is a stable contained thing and a container blocker 
but does not have autonomous actions. In the exemplifying context, it appeared less as a 
stable contained thing and was no longer a container blocker. In the exemplifying 
contexts the differences between the ball and the stone are described by the schemes 
contained thing, and container. The stone is described by children as a contained thing 
(in the sea) while the ball rather than the stone is described by them as a container (full 
of air). 
Water is seen as being able to present autonomous action to some extent but it is neutral 
with respect to the other factors. In the exemplifying context, the children thought of it 
more as a container-blocker (more children said that the water is a barrier) and even 
more as a stable contained thing; it then appeared no longer as having autonomous 
action. The sea is seen to some extent as a container-blocker which is neutral in 
autonomous action and is not a stable contained thing. In the examples, more children 
said that the sea rather than the water was the container. This may happen because in the 
picture some part of the ball was not in the water, and it did not appear as a good 
instance of a container. 
The child is seen as something contained in other things and a support in the case of the 
example with the sea . In both exemplifying contexts it can make other things move and 
it has autonomy. 
Unrelated objects appeared as container-blockers. They were described out of the 
context of using them as examples, as rigid things, which can support or block things. 
However in the context of examples, they lost a lot of these features. 
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Both examples appeared to constrain schemes of objects in a similar way. However, in 
the case of the surface related objects, more children described in the example with the 
stone the 'child' as a supporter and a contained thing (in the sea) while fewer children in 
the example with the ball described it using these schemes. It is worth mentioning that 
some big increases occurred in the number of children going from the non-exemplifying 
to exemplifying context. In the example with the ball more children described upthrust 
as support and barrier. The particular example highlighted these schemes of upthrust 
that are well hidden . 
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6.3.6 Counter Example-Heat 
6.3.6.1 	 Children's own examples of transmission of heat 
30 out of 38 gave a counter example of the idea "a lot of things allow heat to pass 
through their mass easily". Six of them used as counter example a protagonist similar to 
the example that is used in their textbook (a glass rod). Five gave as protagonist a thing 
that does allow heat to pass through their mass such as iron or water. 
Most of the children wrote as an example just a protagonist without any other 
component. Children mainly used as protagonists the following: 
(a) wood (9) or wooden objects (3) such as a window or a fence, 
(b) glass (1) or a glass rod (6), and 
(c) plastic (5) or a plastic object such as a ball (1). 
However, a small minority of children described the place where we have to put the 
protagonist to see that it did not allow the heat to pass through it. They suggested 
putting them on a radiator (2), a fire (3), a fireplace (1) or in the sun (2). 
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6.3.6.2 	 Schemes for entities, with and without an idea exemplified 
Children were presented with the following idea and example: 
"A lot of things allow heat to pass through them easily" 
	J 
We an touch the edge of a glass tube without getting burnt, because the 
	 ' 
....„ 
glass tube doesn't let the heat pass easily through it. 
Children were asked to describe in a questionnaire the following five objects: 
Scientific Entity 	 heat 
X Protagonist 	 glass 
• Structure related object 	 gas stove 
0 Surface related object 	 hand 
X Unrelated object 	 air 
6. 3. 6. 2. 1 	 Interpretation of the Factors 
The Factor scree plot shows that 2 out of eight factors have eigenvalues bigger than 1. 
The two factors explain 78.9% of the variance. The rotated factor matrix for the varimax 
solution are provided in Table 6.7 and in Appendix 6.17. 
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Table 6.7 The factors for the transmission of heat 
Factor 1 Factor 2 
Autonomy + 
Force + 
Barrier + 
Contained thing + 
Invisible 
Support + 
Container + 
Rigidity + 
Factor 1, has very high positive loadings for 'barrier', 'force', 'autonomy' and high 
positive loading for 'support'. It can be labelled 'dynamic blocker'. Factor 2, has very 
high positive loading for 'container', 'rigidity' and very high negative loading for 
`invisible entity'. It can be labelled 'rigid container'. 
6.3.6.2.2 
	 Analysis of the counter example about the transmission of heat 
Figure 6.22 shows that the structure of the factor scores for the entities as they were 
described both in an non-exemplifying and in an exemplifying contexts by children (see 
also for the description of the figures that follow at the method of analysis section in the 
introduction). Figure 6.23 shows how many children used the various schemes to 
describe each entity and which schemes were preferred more or less (only statistically 
significant difference are represented) by children going from the non-exemplifying to 
exemplifying context. 
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Figure 6.23 The percentages of children using each scheme to describe objects in 
the counter-example of transmission of heat 
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`Heat' is neither a 'dynamic blocker' nor a 'rigid container' in all contexts. Children 
used mainly just one scheme to describe 'heat', invisible entity. There were no big 
changes in children's responses between the non-exemplifying and the exemplifying 
context. 
The protagonist was the glass. 'Glass' is not seen as a 'dynamic blocker' but it is seen to 
some extent as a 'rigid container'. In the context of use in an example it became more a 
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`rigid container' since there was an increase of the number of the children who 
described the 'glass' as a 'rigid' thing. 
`Gas-stove' is seen as a 'rigid container'. In the exemplifying context the 'gas-stove' 
became even more a `rigid-container'. Many of the children described it as a container, 
around half described it as a 'rigid' thing, and there was a statistically significant 
increase in the number of the children who said that the gas-stove is a support. 
The person's hand that keeps the glass above the gas-stove is the surface related object. 
The 'hand' is described as a 'dynamic blocker' and to some extent as a 'rigid container'. 
In the exemplifying context it appeared more as 'rigid container' (more children 
described it as a 'container') and lost most of its features as 'dynamic blocker'. 
`Air' is to some extent a 'dynamic blocker' and it is not a 'rigid container'. In the 
exemplifying context it appeared as not a 'dynamic blocker'. It lost its features as a 
thing that can make other things move, a contained thing and as a thing that has 
autonomy. 
The counter example did not very much constrain the scientific entity, the protagonist 
and the structure related object. More changes appeared in the case of the surface related 
and unrelated objects. 
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6.3.7 Counter example-Gravity 
6.3.7.1 	 Children's own examples of gravity 
32 out of 38 children wrote a counter example of the particular idea "when things go up 
they must come down (on the ground), because of gravity" (see Fig. 6.20). Most of 
them thought of the word 'must' as meaning 'immediately' and gave as a counter 
example a thing that will come down only after some time. Furthermore, only four 
children gave a counter example similar with that used in their textbooks (a rocket or a 
satellite). 
Children's examples consists mainly of three components: (a) a protagonist, (b) the 
position of the protagonist, and (c) the position of the protagonist after some time. 
Protagonists were mainly artefacts or natural kinds. The most popular protagonists were 
a balloon with helium and the aeroplane. Protagonists in most cases were imagined to be 
on the ground. Most of the children's counter examples describe an event in which the 
protagonist has or takes a (new) position far away from the earth. 
Quite few children said in their examples that the protagonist does not come down 
except it wants to, or if we want it to come down. 
However, most children gave as an example a thing that will come back to the earth 
after some time. So, the counter example was related to the time that the protagonist 
needs to come back. Children used mainly three (quite similar) expressions to describe 
what the protagonist will do when it is far away from the earth: (a) 'It takes a long time 
for the protagonist to fall to the ground, or (b) 'it will come back after some time (or 
hours)', or (c) 'it can stay in the sky or in the air for some time'. A minority of children 
gave conditions about when the protagonist will come back, such as 'till it reaches its 
destination', or 'only when it breaks', or 'while its fuels lasts'. 
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Figure 6.24 Children's own examples of gravity 
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6.3.7.2 	 Schemes for entities, with and without an idea exemplified 
Children were presented with the following idea and example: 
C 
 
"When things go up, they must come down (on the 
ground) because of the gravity" 
A rocket launched from the earth with speed more than 40,000 Km per 
hour. So it beats the earth's attraction and doesn't come back. 
Children were asked to describe in a questionnaire the following five objects: 
Scientific Entity 	 gravity 
X Protagonist 	 rocket 
Structure related object 	 ground 
Surface related object 	 people 
X Unrelated object 	 air 
6.3.7.2.1 	 Interpretation of factors 
The results of the factor analysis indicate that responses can be represented by two 
important factors (see Table 6.8 below and Appendix 6.18) . The two factors jointly 
explain 76% of the variance. 
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Table 6.8 The factors for gravity 
Invisible 
Factor 1 Factor 2 
_ 
Container 4* 
Support 4" 
Barrier + 
Rigidity + 
Autonomy + 
Contained thing + 
Force + 
Factor 1 has very high positive loadings for "barrier", "support", "container" variables, 
and very high negative loading for "invisible entity" variable. Also it has high positive 
loading for "rigidity" variable. It can be labelled "Container-Blocker". Factor 2 has very 
high positive loadings for "autonomy", "contained thing" and "force" variable. It can 
be labelled "Active contained thing". 
6.3.7.2.2 	 Analysis of the counter example about the gravity 
Figure 6.25 shows that the structure of the factor scores for the entities as they are 
described both in an non-exemplifying and in an exemplifying contexts by children. The 
next Figure (Fig. 6.26), shows how many children used the various schemes to describe 
each entity and which schemes were preferred more or less (only statistically significant 
differences are represented) by children going from the non-exemplifying to 
exemplifying context. 
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Figure 6.26 The percentages of children using each scheme to describe objects in 
the counter-example of gravity 
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"Gravity" is neither a 'container-blocker' nor an 'active contained thing'. The scientific 
concept (gravity) was described by students as an invisible entity which is a potential 
cause of movement. There was no difference in children's responses about 'gravity' 
between the exemplifying and non-exemplifying context. 
The 'Rocket' was used as the protagonist. It appeared as a container-blocker (`container' 
and 'rigid' thing) which was neutral on the 'active contained thing' factor. In the 
exemplifying context it appeared even more as a `container-blocker' (more children 
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described it as a `barrier'). There were no other big differences in responses dependent 
on context. 
The ground is a 'container blocker' and not an 'active contained thing'. In the 
exemplifying context it appeared less frequently as `container-blocker'. The ground 
appeared in the exemplifying context to lose its features as container, support and 
barrier. 
The surface related objects, 'people' in the rocket, were seen as 'container-blockers' and 
at the same time as 'active contained things', but in the exemplifying context they were 
imagined as not 'container-blockers' since they lost their features as barriers, supports 
and containers. However, they appeared more as contained things probably because they 
were in the rocket. 
The 'air' is seen as an 'active contained thing' and not a `container-blocker' appearing 
less frequently as 'an active contained thing' in the exemplifying context. 
This counter example (as the previous one) did not make a big change to how children 
saw the scientific entity and the protagonist in an exemplifying vs non-exemplifying 
context. It seems that it constrains mainly the surface related and the struture related 
object. 
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6.3.8 Analysis of all examples 
Factor analysis of the eight variables was performed using a principal components 
extraction and varimax rotation. Three factors were extracted accounting for 74.6% of 
the total variance. The factor solution based on the total group is presented in Appendix 
6.19. 
Factor 1 accounted for 38.1 % of the variance and has very high positive loadings for 
support, high positive loadings for container and rigidity and very high negative loading 
for invisible entity. Also it has positive loading for barrier. Factor 2 has very high 
positive loadings for the force and autonomy variables. Factor 3 has very high positive 
loadings for contained thing and high negative loading for barrier. Therefore, the first 
factor was interpreted as "Blocker-Container", the second factor as "Autonomous 
action" and the third factor as "Contained things". 
A multivariate analysis of variance was then used to explore the causes of the changes 
from the exemplifying to non-exemplifying context. Dependent variables were the 
factor scores of each of 120 objects in the three factors that were extracted from the 
factor analysis. The independent variables were: (a) the role of each object in the 
exemplifying context, (b) participation or not in an exemplifying context, (c) the various 
ideas, (d) the various examples. 
The MANOVA resulted in a higly significant effect of the roles of objects and the 
exemplifying context, on all the dependent measures (the synthesis of the factors). The 
various roles of an object had an effect on the score on factor 1 (F=41.48, p=0.000), 
factor 2 (F=5.38, p=0.001) and factor 3 (F=9.33, p=0.000). The participation of objects 
in an exemplifying or non-exemplifying context had an effect on factor 1 (F=14.8, 
p=0.000) and factor 2 (F=7.21, p=0.008) but not on factor 3. There was no interaction 
between these two independent variables. 
Also, the ten objects that were described by children in each questionnaire (five objects 
in and out of exemplifying context) had a significant effect on factor 3. 
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6.4 Discussion 
6.4.1 Children are able to give examples of ideas 
A previous study (Wilson, 1986) with elementary school students suggested that their 
examples were inconsistent with conventional mathematics definitions. In the current 
study children were asked to give an example of an idea that was to be found in their 
science textbooks. The children's responses can be classified into three subcategories 
which are used frequently in the literature on exemplification: positive examples, 
negative examples and non-examples (Byrd et.al., 1992) 
Almost all of the children were able to give an example of an idea, and the basic 
example itself was often a positive example. Particularly in the case of the ideas of 
potential energy and inertia all children gave an example. 
For the other ideas, there were still very few children who did not give any example or 
gave a non-example (that is an example which shows things that are not part of the 
given idea. 2, 3 and 6 children did not gave an example of the ideas of expansion, 
thermal equilibrium, and upthrust respectively). 
More problems appeared with the children who were asked to give a counter example of 
an idea. Six (out of 38) did not give a counter example of the idea of gravity while eight 
(out of 36) did not give a counter example of the idea of transmission of heat (five of 
them gave an example instead of a counter example). Constructing (or using) counter 
examples requires an understanding of ideas, recognition of the inconsistency between 
the idea and the counter example, and deductive reasoning, and this is relatively difficult 
for students (Lakatos, 1976). 
All the ideas that were given to the children were about a scientific concept. Asking 
children to exemplify the idea we can explore how the concepts are used. Wittgenstein 
(1953) argues in 'Philosophical Investigations' that concept meaning is closely related 
to how the concepts are used. The fact that children are able to give examples of ideas is 
evidence that they have some meaning for the relevant concepts. Furthermore, the 
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variation of children's examples is evidence for the various kinds of uses that a concept 
can have for them. 
Children can make the transformations from abstract ideas to concrete examples and 
they can establish connections between abstract and various concrete examples. But, 
ideas do not work in the same way for all children, and through the analysis of 
children's examples it is possible to identify their different meanings for various 
concepts. 
6.4.2 Children's examples are different from their textbook examples 
For some of the ideas the children's examples were very different from their textbook 
examples, whilst for others, some of the children gave examples similar to these used in 
their textbooks. 
In the case of the idea of potential energy, no child gave an example the same as the 
examples used in their books. Only five gave an example of the inertia idea similar to 
those in their textbooks. Furthermore, in the case of the counter examples of two ideas 
(gravity and transmission of heat) only four of the children gave an example using as 
protagonist a rocket or a satellite and only six of the children gave an example using as a 
protagonist a glass (which were the protagonists in the textbook examples). 
However, for the other ideas some children did give examples similar to those in their 
textbooks: (a) one fourth of the children gave one of the two examples that are used for 
the idea of expansion, (b) one fifth of the children gave an example of thermal 
equilibrium similar to their textbook example where two containers are in contact, and 
(c) one third of the children gave as an example of upthrust a ball that floats on the 
surface of a fluid, which was similar to an example that was used in their textbooks. 
The reasons for the existence of a difference in the number of children who gave an 
example similar to those in their textbooks may have been that: 
(a) the children did not want to use textbook examples. Children can use a range of 
examples for an idea. Textbook examples were not perceived as the best examples of 
202 
the particular idea by the children. In this case the children use another example 
which they believe is better than their textbook example. So, they used "an aeroplane 
high up in the air" as an example of potential energy rather than "a child up a tree" 
because the aeroplane has more potential energy, and the more potential energy the 
better the example. 
(b) the children could not use textbook examples. It is possible that the children did not 
remember all the examples well. So, in some cases many of them had to construct 
their own example. 
6.4.3 The roles of objects vary among examples of different ideas 
The children gave examples of ideas which almost all had a protagonist. However, there 
were big variations in the existence of objects which play other roles in the examples, as 
shown in Table 6.9 (how many children used objects that play each of the four roles in 
their examples) 
Table 6.9 The percentanges of children using objects that play each of the four 
roles in their examples 
Examples Protagonist Surf.Re1.0b Stru.Rel.Ob Sci.Concept No of childr 
Pot. Energy 100% 25% 18% 85% 72 
Expansion 97% 0% 22% 68% 73 
Equilibrium 96% 42% 96% 43% 72 
Inertia 100% 0% 43% 21% 61 
Upthrust 90% 11% 90% 48% 63 
Counter Ex. 
Heat 79% 0% 21% 0% 38 
Gravity 84% 0% 60% 0% 38 
In the case of structure-related objects the children seem to think that the ideas of 
potential energy, expansion and inertia referred to properties which are associated with 
one object and they usually did not include another structure-related object in their 
examples. However, the children thought that ideas of thermal equilibrium and upthrust 
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referred to more relational features and added to their examples a structure-related 
object to focus on a comparison between the features of this object and the protagonist. 
Surface-related objects were used in quite few examples of ideas. It seems that objects 
which can play this role in an example are not so important for children although in all 
the textbook examples surface related objects could be identified. Surface related 
objects were identified mainly in the children's examples of the idea about thermal 
equilibrium (containers for liquids are used) and in their examples of potential energy 
(some used a blocker to support an object away from the earth). 
For most ideas, many children used in their example the name of the scientific concept, 
particularly with the concepts of potential energy and expansion, and to some extent 
with inertia. In the last case, they preferred to say that the cause of the fact that an object 
can be harder to move than another is that it is bigger, without using the name of inertia. 
It seems that inertia is a hard concept for children. 
It is obvious in the previous discussion of the results, that the children gave as a counter-
example an object (protagonist) while other entites like surface or structure related 
objects were not used. It seems that when the children were asked to give a counter-
example they suggested objects that might behave in a different way from the particular 
one that the idea was describing rather than a counter event. So, most of the children 
used only a protagonist as a counter-example in both questionnaires. Particularly in the 
first counter example only a very small minority of the children used a structure related 
object while in the case of the idea with the gravity most of them used a protagonist and 
focused on its position and on the time that it will takes for the protagonist to come 
down to the earth. 
6.4.4 Comparing the factors for different ideas - Packages of schemes 
The children's responses were subjected to factor analyses, together for both groups. 
Factor analyses were based on the correlations between questions using the percentages 
of the total number of children who identified one of the eight schemes for a particular 
object in non-exemplifying and in exemplifying contexts. 
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Factor analyses were used to identify the underlying (hypothetical) constructs that could 
explain the covariation among responses in the items of the questionnaire. Factor 
analyses were used to explore structures of schemes: (a) within each idea, and (b) 
among the 120 items across all ideas. 
The factors that have been extracted for each group of children who took part in the 
questionnaire for each idea and the proportion of variance explained by them, are shown 
in Table 6.10. 
Table 6.10 The factors extracted for each idea 
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 
Potential 
Energy 
Static Object 
54.5% 
Containment 
22.4% 
Blocking 
11.8% 
Expansion Blocking 
39% 
Dynamic Containment 
19.4% 
Stability 
13.3% 
Thermal 
Equilibrium 
Blocker- 
Container 
60.6% 
Invisible-Container 
20.5% 
Autonomous 
action 
13.6% 
Inertia Container- 
Supporter 
39.4% 
Autonomous action 
23.2% 
Horizontal 
Blocker 
18% 
Upthrust Autonomous 
action 
28.9% 
Stable Contained 
thing 
25.5% 
Container 
Blocker 
15.7% 
Counter (heat) 
Counter 
(gravity) 
Dynamic 
Blocker 
42.4% 
Container 
Blocker 
45.5 
Rigid Container 
36.5% 
Active Contained 
thing 
30.3% 
All examples Blocker 
Container 
37.9% 
Autonomous action 
22.7% 
Contained 
things 
13.8% 
The factor structures which emerged for each idea were remarkably similar. There are 
schemes which appeared together, as a group or package in various factors: 
(a) Barrier and support were moderately correlated for most of the ideas and constitute a 
blocking factor, or a more complicated but related factor. So, in the case of upthrust they 
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appeared together with Container constituting the factor Container-blocker and in the 
idea of equilibrium they came together with container and rigidity constituing the factor 
Container-blocker. Also, rigidity was a scheme which usually appeared with support 
and Barrier and never with force, autonomy and invisible entity. It seems that almost all 
of the things which are barriers can support other things at the same time and vice versa, 
eventhorizontal sticks' such as pylons was seen by the children as supporters of wires. 
However in the examples about inertia they belong to two different factors. In this case 
the concept of inertia appeared in this idea just as a barrier without being at the same 
time a support. It is clear the difference between the concept of inertia and any object 
with mass which even in the cases of 'thin' horizontal barriers can be imagined as 
support. 
(b) Autonomy and Force appeared together in all of the ideas and constitute the factor 
Autonomous action. A thing that can move or stop when it wants, and can also make 
other things move and vice versa. Invisible Entities usually appeared in the same factor 
as autonomous action. 
It might have been expected that container and contained thing would constitute a group 
of schemes since almost all of the things which can be imagined as containers can be 
imagined as contained things, in yet a bigger container. However Container and 
Contained things appeared together in the same factor only for one idea. It seems that in 
all examples, things were clearly distinguished into containers and contained things. 
In general, the factor structures were very similar across the seven separate analyses, 
except that the ordinal position of a given factor for the data of one group may not 
necessarily correspond to its relative position in the data for the other groups. Also, 
there are some group differences in the factor correlations. For example, container and 
contained thing variables were moderately correlated for the idea of potential energy but 
were not correlated for the idea of equilibrium. It seems that when examples highlight 
one of the two above schemes because of the role the objects have in an example - the 
pots which were containers in the exemplifying contexts of the idea about thermal 
equilibrium - it was very difficult for the children to imagine the same objects at the 
same time as something different -contained for example in our galaxy. Although - from 
my point of view - one could expect that the schemes container and contained thing to 
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co-exist in exemplifying contexts, it is difficult for children to imagine and describe an 
object using both schemes, as in the case of horizontal and vertical barriers. 
It seems that the factors emerging were: (a) Blocking; an object belongs to this factor 
only if it can stop other things (horizontally or vertically) and is rigid, (b) Autonomous 
actions; things that can make other things move and they can move whenever they want 
are constituents of this factor, and (c) Containment; things classified mainly as 
containers and not as contained substances or things. 
6.4.5 The nature of entities and their behaviour in examples 
Appendic•/% A shows in detail the changes which were observed for each object, 
k_.  between being considered in the context of an example (not counter examples), and 
previously not in that context. 
A decrease in frequency of a scheme for an object, when considered in an exemplifying 
context, means that this possible aspect of the object has been suppressed or constrained 
by the use in an example. The examples serve to focus only on some schemes. 
Similarly, an increase in the frequency of a scheme for an object means that this scheme 
has become more salient, because of the use in an example. With very few exceptions, 
the entities that played similar roles in the two examples of the same idea, either stayed 
close together or moved close together, on all factors, going from the non-exemplifying 
to exemplifying context. 
Most of the decreases (36) were observed in 'unrelated' things, for which there were no 
increases. 'Unrelated' objects did not have any special role in the particular examples. 
So it was expected that they would have more and bigger decreases. In contrast, the 
smallest number of decreases (5 decreases) happened in the case of scientific concepts. 
It is possible that these abstract entities are very difficult to describe by the particular 
eight schemes, which referred mainly to concrete things. However, the category of 
scientific concepts had the biggest number of increases (7 increases). 
Broadly we predict that for objects relevant to a given example, the frequencies of 
schemes of objects which play different roles will become more differentiated when the 
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example is given. It becomes clear in the following descriptions that the examples 
constrain the schemes that one can use to describe an entity in a way that particular 
schemes can describe objects which play a particular role in an example. For instance, 
surface related objects are containers or the scientific concepts are contained things on 
going to an exemplifying context. 
In general the entities were described more as supports than as barriers. Barriers and 
supports were mainly the 'surface related objects'. It is notable that in this category 
there were three cases with increases on going to an exemplifying context. The balcony 
in the example "a pot on a balcony" and the ground in the "lorry-example" increased as 
barriers while the pylons increased as supports. Furthermore in the exemplifying 
context, only about half of the children (of those who said 'yes' prior to use in an 
example) said that the protagonists, the structural related objects, and the unrelated ones 
are supporters, and for almost all of the objects that belong to these categories there was 
a substantial decrease. 
The structure related, the surface related objects and the protagonists were generally 
seen as 'containers'. Given an example, the children chose more often the surface 
related objects rather than the structure related objects and the protagonists as 
containers. The last two categories were described more as contained things. Thus, 
contained things were mainly the protagonists, the structure related objects, and in 
exemplifying contexts, the scientific concepts. 
Rigid things were mainly the protagonists and surface related objects. In the 
exemplifying contexts there was a big difference between them since the objects that 
were classified as protagonists (the second in frequency category) had a substantial 
decrease as rigid things. 
Out of the context of use in examples, the 'unrelated' objects could mainly make other 
things move and had autonomy. However in the exemplifying contexts, scientific 
concepts mainly make other things move, with protagonists and unrelated things to 
follow. Furthermore concerning autonomy, the unrelated objects appeared very close to 
208 
the surface related objects, the protagonists and the concepts, in the exemplifying 
contexts. 
The scientific concepts appeared mainly as invisible entities. They were not so well 
known and the example helped children to identify more schemes for the description of 
these abstract entities. Particularly in the category of concepts, decreases appeared for 
Potential energy as barrier and support (in both exemplifying contexts), while increases 
appeared in these schemes for upthrust (ball -example). There was an increase of 
potential energy (child-example) and heat (inside-example) as contained things. Heat 
appeared in both exemplifying contexts, mainly as force. Expansion appeared less as 
invisible entity in the rail-example. 
6.4.6 Similarity and dissimilarity in examples 
An entity can take part in different examples. In each, the entity plays a particular role. 
This role is responsible for the schemes that the example will highlight or hide. Looking 
across the various examples that a particular entity can take part in, there are some 
schemes which show a similarity and some which show a dissimilarity between the 
various instances of an entity. 
Lets consider the entity "children". If they were not similar then they would not be 
described by the same schemes across different examples. However, if they were not 
dissimilar then the child who takes part in the example of potential energy would be the 
same as the child who takes part in the example of upthrust. 
In this study the following three objects were used in more than one example: air, 
ground, child. Particularly, the ground was used in seven, air in five, and the child in 
four different questionnaires. The role that each of these objects had in each example 
has been described previously. In this section a comparison of the use of these objects 
across the various examples is given. Are there any differences in the patterns of the 
schemes that describe these objects? 
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The air played the role of 'unrelated object' in every example. Results from seven 
groups of children are consistent. The patterns in all the cases in which it appeared did 
not differ since air did not play any special role. 
The ground mainly appeared as a support, and as a container with the ability to make 
other things move. In four of the exemplifying contexts even fewer children said that it 
is a barrier, while in the exemplifying contexts with the child up a tree, and the lorry, 
more children tended to say that it was a barrier. Furthermore, in the case of the railway 
example there was a statistically significant increase of the ground as a barrier. That 
may have been because the children thought that the ground continues to be in contact 
with and give support to the railway lines which bend up in an arc, and so acts as a 
horizontal barrier. 
The "child" was described in the exemplifying contexts by fewer children as a support. 
However after the upthrust example with a child lifting a stone in water, more children 
tended to describe the child as a support. Furthermore, although the general pattern was 
that in the exemplifying contexts, fewer children described the child as a contained 
thing, there was a statistically significant increase in the number of children who 
described the 'child' as a contained thing in the sea in the exemplifying context with the 
stone. Furthermore, most of the examples appeared unable to suppress the scheme of 
autonomous action that many children used to describe the entity 'child'. 
The appearance of similarity and dissimilarity for objects which took part in an example 
can also be considered at the level of the examples. For instance, both examples, the 
example with the pot on the balcony and the example with the child up a tree have a 
similarity, as they are examples of the same idea. In both there were decreases of 
potential energy as a barrier or support. However they have dissimilarities such as that 
in the example with the child up a tree, there was an increase in the number of children 
who said that the potential energy is a contained thing while in the example with the pot 
there was a decrease. 
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6.4.7 Constraining schemes 
Comparing the children's responses, in and out of the context of use of objects in 
examples, it appears that examples constrain the schemes children use to describe 
entities. This is in accordance with Sirridge (1980) who suggests that the meaning of an 
example can change from one context to another. For example a specific context 
determines that a tailor's swatch exemplifies a colour and texture and not its size 
properties. 
A way to look at how a context constrains schemes, is to see which objects were 
identified by most of the children as good instances, before and after using them in an 
example, and the number of decreases and increases that happened after the children had 
seen an example. 
In Table 6.11 the first two columns show the number of things from all five ideas that 
were good instances (identified by more than 60% of the children as instances of the 
particular scheme) for each scheme before and after they had seen the example. The 
third and the fourth columns show the total number of statistically significant decreases 
and increases in frequencies of attribution to each scheme, taking all objects and ideas 
together. 
Table 6.11 Number of Decreases and Increases 
Number of 
Good Instances 
Before example 
Number of 
Good Instances 
After example 
Number of Number of 
Decreases 	 Increases 
Barrier 3 3 8 7 
Support 21 9 25 4 
Container 20 6 22 1 
Rigidity 9 7 7 2 
Con.Subs 11 8 20 4 
Force 18 14 21 5 
Autono 13 9 10 0 
Invis.Ent 15 12 6 1 
Most of the sixty things that the children were asked about prior to using them in 
examples were identified as supports, as containers and as things that can make other 
things move. In the exemplifying context, there were many decreases of attribution to 
the above three schemes. Furthermore, in the exemplifying contexts, most of the good 
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instances had to do with the schemes of force (an object makes other things move) and 
of invisible entities. 
Most of the increases occurred for the barrier scheme. Particularly for this scheme in the 
examples of inertia and upthrust there were no statistically significant decreases for the 
objects taking part in the four examples. 
The great number of decreases show that the examples constrain the entities in a 
particular way and each of them exemplifies particular aspects of entities and not all of 
them. The examples of the ideas that were used in the various questionnaires seem to 
have highlighted schemes with a dynamic nature such as force and autonomy rather than 
static ones such as support and container. The preference for the use of dynamic 
schemes instead static ones in the children's descripions on going to exemplifying 
context appeared also in the cases of increases. The existence of increases is an 
indication that exemplifying contexts can highlight schemes which are well hidden. The 
fact that more children used the scheme barrier in the exemplifying context shows that 
they used it as a scheme which does not allow other objects to continue their 
movements. 'Barrier' appeared as a more dynamic scheme than 'support' which keeps 
things in a position. 
6.4.8 The effectiveness of examples 
Despite the broad uniformity and consistency of the above results, the examples did not 
work in the same way for all of the children. In some cases, even though examples 
constrain the number of the children who described an entity with a particular scheme, 
there was a substantial number of them who continued to describe this entity with the 
particular scheme. So, some examples work more effectively than others to constrain 
schemes. 
For instance, in the exemplifying contexts of potential energy, fewer children said that 
the flower-pot is a support and more children said that the balcony is a barrier and that 
the potential energy is a source of potential movement. However, the particular 
examples did not work in the same way for all of the children. Although in the 
exemplifying contexts, the air lost substantially the ability to make other things move, 
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around half of the children still continued to say that air has autonomy and can move 
other things. Also, even though the air did not play any role in these examples, almost 
all of the children continued to say that air was an invisible entity, in both exemplifying 
contexts. 
Also, there were cases where children described the various elements in different ways. 
So, for half of the children the ground is a rigid thing while for half of them it is not. It 
can make things move (potential energy and expansion ideas). Some children gave the 
example of earthquakes which can move things and some others said that if one lets go 
of something which he/she keeps in his/her hands it would drop to the earth so the earth 
can move things. In these cases different children imagined in different ways the various 
elements that take part in examples. The constraining effect of an example will depend 
on how close children's previous descriptions of entities are with those which the 
example highlights. 
Furthermore there were differences between examples. For instance in the examples of 
the upthrust idea, in the exemplifying context with the stone in the sea, fewer children 
said that the upthrust is a barrier while in the exemplifying context with the ball more 
children said that upthrust is a barrier. So, the examples in these cases might work in 
two opposite directions highlighting very different schemes of an entity. 
6.4.9 "Unexpected" increases 
Generally, we might expect decreases in the extent to which elements of an example are 
seen as related to various schemes, when they are used in an example of a given idea. 
When presented in relation to no particular idea, it is likely that children can often think 
of some way in which any element could fit a scheme. Used as an example of an idea, 
we expect the nature of that idea to constrain (or focus) the perception of elements. 
There are however, a number (though not large) of cases in which the number of 
children who identified an entity as an instance of a particular scheme increased 
significantly on going to an exemplifying context. These increases are 'unexpected' 
since prior to the use of objects as an example, the children attempted to describe the 
same entities with schemes in every possible example. That means that the particular 
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examples highlighted some schemes of entities which were previously to some extent 
hidden or not important. Table 6.12 shows the entities which presented such 
'unexpected" increases for some schemes. 
Table 6.12 Increases 
Idea Example with Increases for 
Entities Schemes 
Potential energy 
pot 
child 
child 
balcony 
potential energy 
tree 
barrier 
contained thing 
force 
Expansion wires 
wires 
pylons 
sun 
support 
force 
Equilibrium 
contact 
contact 
inside 
inside 
heat 
heat 
heat 
hot water 
contained thing 
force 
force 
force 
Inertia 
lorry 
elephant 
elephant 
elephant 
ground 
elephant 
elephant 
inertia 
barrier 
barrier 
rigidity 
invisible entity 
Upthrust 
ball 
ball 
ball 
stone 
water 
upthrust 
upthrust 
child 
barrier 
barrier 
support 
contained thing 
Tranmission of heat 
glass 
glass 
glass 
glass 
stove gas 
hand 
rigidity 
support 
container 
Gravity 
rocket 
rocket 
rocket 
rocket 
rocket 
ground 
people 
air 
barrier 
barrier 
contained things 
support 
A description of these increases has been given in the previous parts of discussions for 
each idea. In summary, increases occurred mainly for the schemes barrier, force and 
contained things. 
A horizontal barrier and a support appear to differ not only as horizontal vs vertical 
barriers but also considering the objects whose movement they resist. Some entities 
(balcony, ground, water) that were described as supporters in the non-exemplifying 
context, were described also as barriers in the exemplifying context. It seems difficult to 
explain these increases as a result of the children seeing these objects in the example to 
be a horizontal barrier like a wall. Barriers seem to describe objects which resist 
movement and make moving things stop, while supporters are mainly objects which 
keep in position other objects eg. a glass on a table. So, the description of an object with 
both schemes support and barrier does not mean that the children described an object 
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both as horizontal and vertical barrier but that the children used both schemes to show 
that these objects in the particular examples not only keep objects in position but can 
also stop other things that move such as the ground in the case of inertia or the idea with 
gravity (counter example with rocket). 
The children used the scheme 'force' (make other things move) to describe mainly the 
change in the position of an object when another object pushes it or pulls it. In the 
exemplifying contexts, objects such as sun, heat, tree appeared to be able to make other 
things move without pushing or pulling them. The energy from the sun, the energy of 
the particles because of the heat, the lack of support is seen by the children as causes for 
the movement of some objects. Examples lead the children to see the scheme 'force' 
with a broader view. 
More children described scientific entities such as potential energy and heat as 
contained things, when going from the non-exemplifying to exemplifying contexts. The 
scheme of contained things was used by the children in a broader sense in the 
exemplifing contexts, including cases of invisible or abstract things. Also, 'people' can 
be contained things in big containers such as the sea or a rocket. 
The appearance of all these increases is an indication that examples do not merely 
constrain the schemes that can be used in the description of entities but that they may in 
some cases play another role, extending children's views about the schemes that can be 
used in the description of particular entities. Examples appeared to work in many ways, 
as do metaphors or analogies. They highlight or hide some features of entities, and they 
may suggest new ways of seeing entities. 
6.4.10 	 Good instances of schemes 
Some objects were described by more than 60% of the children in the non-exemplifying 
or/and in the exemplifying context as instances of particular schemes. In this section I 
will discuss these objects that I call 'good' instances of schemes. This discussion will 
offer us more broad categories of entities which are good instances of the particular 
schemes. 
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The children described objects that resist the horizontal movement of other objects as 
barriers. Barriers might be inanimate high vertical objects such as a tree or a pylon or 
animate big objects such as the elephant in the example of inertia which resists the 
movement of the child. The containers (metallic pots), with the water, are seen as 
barriers. They resist the movement of the water out of them. Also, a scientific concept, 
inertia, resists the horizontal movement of the lorry or the elephant and is seen as a 
barrier. 
A thing, in order to be a support, should have a horizontal surface. These surfaces can be 
the ground or a median between the ground and the thing that is supported. In the last 
case it might be (a) a solid-rectangular surface such as a balcony, a railway, a hand, the 
ground (b) the bottom part of a container (e.g. car, lorry, plastic pot, metallic pot), or (c) 
a horizontal barrier which uses some "branches" to support things (tree, pylons, child, 
rocket) 
Objects that can have other objects inside them can be containers. Containers are 
animate (child) or inanimate entities. Inanimate entities can be small artificial pots (e.g. 
the flower pot in the example of potential energy, the metallic and plastic pots that 
contain water in the examples of thermal equilibrium and upthrust respectively, and the 
ball in the example of upthrust) or machines (train, car, lorry, rocket) or big natural 
spaces (sea, ground) 
Animate static (elephant) and inanimate static (stone,rocket) things can be rigid. Also, 
rigid things can be horizontal surfaces (balcony, railway), or containers (pot), or vertical 
barriers (pylon). 
Contained thing can be fluids (cold water, hot water), gases (air) or solid things. Solid 
things can be in air (child, ball) or in water (stone) or in a big solid container (people in 
a rocket). 
Things which can make other things move can be scientific concepts (potential energy, 
heat) and animate (child, elephant) or inanimate objects. Inanimate objects such as gases 
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(air) or fluids (cold water, hot water, sea) or machines (train) can make other things 
move. 
Autonomy is possesed by animate entities, humans (child) and animals (elephant). Also 
inanimate objects such as machines (train, rocket) and gases (air) can move when they 
want. 
Invisible entities are scientific concepts (pot energy, heat, inertia , upthrust, expansion, 
gravity) or objects (air). 
6.5 Conclusions 
Children of 11-12 years old can transform abstract concepts and ideas to concrete 
examples and are able to suggest examples often different from those in their textbooks, 
which are consistent with simple ideas that are found in their science textbooks. This 
has a significant implication for teachers, who by analysing children's examples can 
identify through the way that children use abstract concepts and ideas the meaning that 
they have for ideas. However, ideas do not work in the same way for all children. 
Children's examples can be classified in three subcategories: positive examples, 
negative examples and non examples. 
The way examples work can be understood as related to the schematic way their 
components are perceived by children. A common set of schemes can be used to 
understand the working of a variety of examples. The results show that: 
(a) there are shifts in the way objects are seen (schematically) when they are used as 
examples of an idea, that is, the use of an instance as an example of an idea 
constrains the way its elements are understood, 
(b) these shifts are intelligible in terms of the nature of the idea being exemplified, 
(c) components of examples function in different ways, 
(d) unexpected increases can arise when the idea exemplified makes a given schematic 
understanding especially salient. 
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There are important implications from the results that show a shift in the way that 
entities are seen in different contexts. It has considerable significance for teachers and 
materials designers, since an example can not stand on its own, without a commentary 
which helps readers to clarify its purpose (Byrd et. al. 1992). Also the analysis of 
children's examples and their views about textbook examples can give information on 
the functioning of an idea. That is, the use of a concept or idea can be seen in the 
exemplifying process. 
Furthermore, the various exemplifying contexts did not have the same effect for all 
children. Some examples work more effectively than others. This implies that textbooks 
should present many examples for an idea. 
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Chapter 7: 
WHAT MAKES AN INSTANCE A GOOD 
EXAMPLE OF AN IDEA? 
7.1 Introduction 
This final study (Study 4) consists of an exploratory study, and a main study. The 
exploratory study attempts to detect whether children 11-12 years old: (a) are able to 
establish connections between concrete examples and generalisations, (b) think that some 
instances are better examples of ideas than others, and (c) can give reasons for their 
preferences of an instance as a better example than others. 
The main study had two phases. Phase 1 (following the exploratory study) which is called 
"comparing examples" had similar aims and tasks as the exploratory study with some 
additions: (a) a larger number of children were interviewed, (b) the categories of reasons 
and empirical schemes that children used in their justifications (mainly comparing 
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examples) were identified in more detail than in the exploratory study, (c) the fit between 
examples and ideas was explored for various types of these elements (e.g. best examples, 
counter examples, middle level generalizations etc.). 
In Phase 2, which is called "making examples of ideas better or worse" the empirical 
schemes that appeared in the exploratory study and Phase 1 as more important for a better 
fit between examples and ideas were tested against a larger variety of ideas and examples 
and using an even larger number of children. Thus, children were asked whether they 
could change any of the empirical schemes to make an example better. Also, children were 
asked whether some changes of these empirical schemes could make an example worse 
(into a non-example). 
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7.2 Exploratory study 
7.2.1 Aims 
The exploratory study consisted of two groups of tasks. The aim of these tasks was to 
explore whether children 11-12 years old were able to make transformations from concrete 
examples to ideas and vice versa and to identify children's concrete prototypical empirical 
schemes, which might emerge through the comparison of different examples of the same 
idea. Furthermore, the study explored whether some instances are better examples than 
others and what empirical schemes make an example the "best"- that make it prototypical 
of an idea? The examples and the ideas used in the exploratory study were found in 
children's science textbooks which had been used in their previous school year. 
7.2.2 Participants 
The subjects were 14 children with an average range of age 11 years and 3 months, who 
volunteered to participate in the study. The study contained 8 tasks, which were divided 
into two groups (A & B). Eight of the children did one group on the first day and the other 
group on the next day. A further six children answered only one group of tasks. Each 
interview took approximately 15 minutes. 
7.2.3 From examples to generalization 
7.2.3.1 Materials 
This group (A) consists of four tasks. In the tasks a piece of paper was used, on which a 
generalization was written. The generalisations were about the following scientific 
entities: expansion, inertia, hydrostatic pressure and elastic deformity. For each of the 
generalisations black and white drawings were also used. These drawings were examples 
of the generalisations (pylons with loose cables, a child who attempts to move an elephant 
and a child who carries a toy elephant, a barrier which keeps the water in a river, and a 
spring which a hand pulls and then comes back to its initial state). The generalisations and 
the drawings were taken from the Greek science textbook. The pictures and the ideas used 
are presented in Figures 7.1 and 7.2. 
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Figure 7.1 Exploratory study: From examples to generalizations (pictures and ideas for 
the 1st and the 2nd task) 
V 
We have already observed during the summer that the electric wires between the two 
props are loose. Do you think that during the winter the electric wires will still be loose? 
Solid things through an increase of temperature expand (increase their volume), 
meanwhile they contract (decrease their volume) through a decrease of temperature. 
The bigger the mass of the things, the more difficult it is to move them because they 
present big inertia. 
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Figure 7.2 Exploratory study: From examples to generalizations (pictures and ideas for 
the 3rd and the 4th task) 
Fluids because hydrostatic pressure produce forces on the surfaces with which they come 
into contact. The bigger the depth of the fluids the bigger the forces become. 
Many solid things undergo deformities because of the influence of forces. Those 
deformities disappear as soon as the forces stop acting and they are called elastic. 
223 
7.2.3.2 Procedure 
In these tasks an example-picture (eg. a boy attempts to push an elephant) was given to the 
children who were asked what this could be an example of. Then the text that was beside 
the picture in the science text book (eg. The bigger the mass of things, the more difficult it 
is to move then because they present big inertia) was read and the children were asked 
whether the picture fitted the text. If there was something wrong (not a good fit) the 
children were asked to change the picture. Also, they were asked to give another example 
that they thought fitted better with the generalization and then to compare their example 
with that of the picture. 
7.2.3.3 Results 
When the children were asked what the picture was an example of they attempted to give a 
generalization, looking at the differences between the elements which took part in the 
story of the specific picture. Therefore, in the picture where a boy tries to push an 
elephant, the children attempted to give a generalization which could take into account the 
differences between the different parts of this picture, 
"maybe it is from the mass that different things have" 
The differences between various things in the textbook examples were usually mentioned 
by the children when they attempted to create another example of the generalisation. Some 
children gave as their own example an analogous example through "surface 
transformation" of the science textbook example that was given to them. In these cases, 
they kept most of the relations constant, changing only specific parts. Thus, instead of the 
picture of a boy that tries to push an elephant we have: 
"the child tries to push a big car, and a child holds a small car in his hand and is able 
to move it" 
The children based their justifications of the better fit of their examples on the differences 
between the two examples. So, comparing two, "a child that tries to push an elephant" 
with his own example, "a child that tries to push a big car" a child said: 
"the differences are in the different parts of the elephant and the car. The car instead 
of legs has wheels. Also the car has an engine instead of elephants' belly and things 
that the elephant has inside in order to move" 
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An example was judged better than another because of the more salient differences 
between parts. An elephant was better for the idea of inertia than a car because: 
"it is more bulky... So, this is the reason that the elephant is better, because it is more 
bulky. 
It seems that children prefer examples that show big observable features related to what is 
exemplified. The electric wires are better examples of the expansion and contraction of 
solid things than "a bullet over a small gas flame..." (child's own example) because: 
"it is more clear that the wires are different during the summer and during the 
winter... We could see that there too (in the second case) but with a smaller 
difference...This example (wires) is more illuminating. 
Also a barrier is a better example of hydrostatic pressure than "a glass of water" (child's 
own example) because: 
"at the barrier it seems in a more clear way that it becomes bigger at the bottom... it 
happens the same (in the glass) but the tilting is smaller comparing to that the barrier 
makes. Also, there is much more water in the barriers than in the glass" 
Although in this case the children mentioned that both of the parts which interact (barrier, 
water) make one example better than another, they usually focused only on one of the 
parts and suggested the change of one part make a better example. 
In the above cases, "salience" leads to an important difference in ease of "reading" the 
example but it does not make a difference to it as an example. That is, both cases can be 
used as examples of the same idea, but one is more salient. 
One of the reasons that children chose an example as better than another had to do with 
daily real life experiences (whether the instance is a part of their everyday life). Also, 
children often used spatial "empirical schemes" such as down-up, fat-thin from everyday 
reasoning in their justifications and examples. 
In some cases children preferred to use non-living things rather than living things. So, "a 
child that tries to push a load" would be a better example of inertia than a child that tries to 
push an elephant because: 
"The load would be a bit easier for children to understand, because with the elephant 
we cannot understand who pushes the other thing" 
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A 'better' example is one which has stronger or more stable characteristics of the relevant 
empirical schemes. For example, a barrier is 'better' if it is harder to break: 
"the oil is lighter than water and it would be more difficult for it to break the barrier" 
7.2.4 From generalizations to examples 
7.2.4.1 Materials 
The second group of tasks (B) consisted of four tasks. A piece of paper on which a 
generalization had been written (eg. "Everything that moves has got energy, and this 
energy is called kinetic") and one black and white picture (eg. a man who runs) were used 
for each task. The generalisations that were used in these tasks were about the following 
scientific entitites: thermal equilibrium, kinetic energy, gravity and potential energy. The 
pictures that were used as examples of the generalisations were found in the Greek science 
textbook for 11 year old children (a pan on a cooker, a child who runs, a ball in the air, and 
a boy up a tree, respectively). The pictures and the ideas used are presented in the Figures 
7.3, 7.4 and 7.5. 
7.2.4.2 Procedure 
In these tasks the order of presentation was reversed, compared with the tasks (A). The 
children were initially presented with a generalization and were asked to give an example 
of the generalisation, and explain why they believed that it is a good example. Then, they 
were presented with a further example (taken from a science textbook) of that 
generalization and were asked to compare the two examples. 
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Figure 7.3 Exploratory study: From generalizations to examples (ideas and pictures for 
the 1st and the 2nd task) 
When two things are in contact heat is transmitted always from the warmer thing to the 
colder one. After some time the temperature of the things is the same and we say that they 
are in thermal equilibrium. 
c===> 
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	 llif 
0 0 0 
Everything that moves has got energy, and this energy is called kinetic. 
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Figure 7.4 Exploratory study: From generalizations to examples (ideas and pictures for 
the 3rd task) 
"What goes up must come down". 
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Figure 7.5 Exploratory study: From generalizations to examples (ideas and pictures for 
4th task) 
When things are raised they have got energy, that we call potential energy. 
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7.2.4.3 Results 
The children were able to compare their own example of a generalization with the 
textbook example for that generalization, focusing on the differences or the similarities of 
the parts that constituted these examples. 
For the children, an example is different from another one, when it is constituted from 
different parts and subparts. A child that runs is a different example of kinetic energy from 
"a car that moves" because: 
"the child has got a heart instead of an engine that the car has..., the child's body is 
different from that of the car and instead of legs it has wheels" 
Also, it is notable that the children differentiated examples in which a part is able to do 
something by itself from examples in which a part needs a contribution from something 
else. So, a child who runs - has the power of autonomous action - is a different example 
from "a car that moves" because: 
"the child has its own energy while this does not happen for the car" 
On the other hand, an example is the same (it is not better) another one, if its parts are 
made of the same material. Therefore, an example of thermal equilibrium could be "if we 
put two iron plates, where one is hot and the other is cold, and we link them" as well as "if 
we put a cold pan on the hot-plate of an electric cooker" because: 
"that pan and the hot plate are the same things, we have the same temperature 
transmission, because we have this material that the hot-plate is made of something 
like iron..." 
An example is mainly judged better than another one because : 
a. it is a usual phenomenon of everyday life. 
"we see-know (in our everyday life) what happens in this... So, this is why we explain 
the phenomenon with that example " 
b. it shows big differences. An "aeroplane" is a better example of potential energy than 
a child up on a tree. 
"because the higher it is from the earth the bigger potential energy it has" 
c. the nature of its parts. A "car that moves" is better example of kinetic energy than "a 
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child that runs" because: 
"it is difficult for someone to believe that there is energy in a boy" 
Also, children seem to prefer examples which include stable (mainly solid) things. A 
child up on a tree, is a better example of potential energy than "a cloud" because: 
"the tree cannot disappear but the cloud can disappear when it is raining" 
d. the parts are "enough" for the whole process that the example describes. A cold 
pan over a cooker is a better example of thermal equilibrium than "to warm a metal 
with a gas-stove and put it in touch with a cold metal" because: 
"the heat is transmitted from the cooker while in the second case we should have the 
gas-stove and many other things" 
7.2.5 Overview of the Exploratory study 
In the exploratory study, the children constructed generalisations, examples and made 
comparisons between examples which were based mainly on the differences in what the 
things that take part in them are made of. Results show that the children identified some 
instances as better examples of ideas than others. In summary, "good" examples are the 
ones where the relevant features are salient (often large), are more easily noticed, are 
stable, have autonomy, and are not too complex. Also an example is "better" if it is 
familiar. 
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7.3 Main study, phase 1: Comparing examples 
7.3.1 Introduction 
Empirical schemes are common abstractions of events. A scheme can represent more than 
one concrete thing. Empirical schemes are not these concrete things. They have the form 
of "bridges" that connect some concrete things (see study 1 in chapter 4). Through these 
bridges people are able to reason about one event using their knowledge about another. 
These bridges have a form and a content. In reasoning, people manipulate these imagined 
things - mental representations - not the concrete things themselves. 
An example is not a good example of a generalization when it does not fit with the 
empirical schemes associated with the generalization. The nature of fitting can be 
described by a definite number of empirical schemes, and the addition or removal of some 
empirical schemes can lead to a higher or a lower generalization. The principle is that the 
fit is good when several anticipated empirical schemes are satisfied and poor when some 
are and others are not. 
In this research, ideas (generalizations) and examples are considered at different levels of 
abstraction and specification (see theoretical discussion in chapter 2, and fig. 2.1). In order 
to make ideas (eg. things which are in thermal contact come to the same temperature) 
more concrete, so as to clarify or interpret them, an example may be used. The example 
might be the "best" example of the specific generalization (eg. two metal plates - one cold 
and one cold - that we bring into contact). On the other hand, people also use an example 
and hypothesize about it to produce a generalization. 
Furthermore, comparing a best (prototypical) example with "parallel" examples (eg. the 
sun makes stones hot) one might modify the generalization to a "higher" one (eg. hot 
things often make things hot) in which both the best and the parallel example fit well (see 
figure 7.6). On the other hand, comparing the best example with a counter example (eg. 
two wooden plates - one hot and one cold - that we bring in contact) one may re-interpret 
the generalization as a "lower" one (eg. some things only allow transmission of the heat 
from one thing to another with difficulty). This analysis was used to classify the tasks, 
using generalizations, examples and counter examples. 
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Figure 7.6 A variation of examples and generalizations 
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The aims of the analysis of the tasks in phase 1 were: 
a) to show that there is a variation of examples and generalisations that might follow the 
proposed schema in figure 21 (A generalization has a best example. The addition of 
parallel examples can lead to "higher" more general generalizations, while the 
addition of counter examples can lead to "Lower" generalizations). 
b) to identify empirical schemes that are "responsible" for this variation. 
The above diagram in relation to the aims led to the construction of three tasks: 
(A) Fitting a generalization to examples 
(B) Matching generalizations to examples and production of examples 
(C) Constructing a generalization from examples 
7.3.2 Participants 
Forty children of mean age 11 years and 4 months participated in these tasks. All the 
children attended the last class of a public primary school in Athens. The children came 
from a middle class background. 
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7.3.3 Fitting a generalization to examples 
7.3.3.1 Aims 
In this task the children were presented with a generalization (middle level) and three 
examples (best, parallel and counter example). The aim of this task was to explore the way 
that children: 
(a) think of an instance as a better example of an idea than another instance 
(b) modify a generalization into a higher generalization or lower generalization in order 
to fit with the "parallel" and "counter" example. 
(c) interpret the differences that they observe in various examples at the level of 
generalizations. 
7.3.3.2 Materials 
The materials used for this example were a piece of paper where a (more or less) scientific 
idea was written (e.g. what goes up must come down) and three pictures to serve as 
examples of each idea. In one of these pictures, some children played football and the ball 
was in the air; in the other a bird was flying, and in the last, a rocket was being launched 
(see figure 7.7) 
7.3.3.3 Procedure 
Firstly, I told the children that I was going to read them an idea that I had found in a 
science text book. The idea was "What goes up must come down". After hearing the idea, 
the children were asked to describe what they could see in the three pictures, and to decide 
and explain, which picture was the best example of the idea. At the end, they were asked 
to modify the idea in order to make it fit with the other two examples. 
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Figure 7.7 Phase 1: Fitting a generalisation to examples (pictures) 
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7.3.3.4 Results 
7.3.3.4.1 Which is the best example? 
All the children (40) suggested that the example with the ball was the best example of the 
initial idea "What goes up must come down". The analysis that follows, is based on 
children's arguments to support their judgments that the eagle example and the rocket 
example do not fit so well with the generalization. Thirteen of the children argued that a 
rocket does not come down, while only four of the children argued that an eagle does not 
come down. Particularly, the empirical schemes which were responsible for the poor fit of 
the examples with the idea could be classified into the categories discussed below. 
7.3.3.4.2 Which empirical schemes are responsible for a good fit between 
examples and ideas? 
1. Rapidity of change 
An eagle can fly for a long time (6 children, 15%). That is, it can stay up without coming 
down for a longer time - "for many hours"(C.25) - than a ball. "Some things when they go 
up they can stay there, flying for a long time" (C.14). The smaller time a thing needs to 
come down the better an example of the initial idea it is. Also, the rocket "can stay up for a 
longer time" (8 children, 20%). That happens because "the rockets have fuel and they can 
stay more time up in the air" (C.22). Furthermore, the rocket "cannot come down 
immediately" because it has to reach its destination" (C.13). 
The initial idea includes two actions (go up and come down) which are connected with an 
implication of the form: If the first action happens then the second action must happen as 
well. In that case the particular task shows that the less time needed between these two 
actions, the better the example will be. 
Considering the role of the time, I hypothesized that the example of a stone thrown in the 
air would be better than that of a ball thrown in the air. I tested this hypothesis with 13 of 
these children. Eight (8) of them argued that the stone-example is better because the stone 
will come down more quickly than the ball. Two of them said that the two examples are 
the same, while 3 of them argued that the ball-example is better because a stone thrown up 
can hit somebody. 
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2. Autonomy of action 
The most popular justification that the children used to explain why they chose the ball as 
more prototypical example than the eagle, was that the eagle is a living thing while the ball 
is not (14 children, 35%). This difference suggests that the eagle as a living thing can be 
viewed as an autonomous actor. Thus, it can do things that are in contrast with the initial 
idea. The rocket which is controlled by humans is treated in a similar way (but not so 
frequently) as the eagle (8 children, 20%). The justification is based on the power of 
autonomous action. In addition to autonomy of action living things have the power to 
decide, to want and act accordingly; that is they have autonomy "control". 
Eleven of the children (27.5%) argued that the eagle example does not fit so well with the 
idea "whatever goes up must come down" because the eagle can come down whenever it 
wants. That is the eagle has the power of autonomous action. It can control its actions. The 
presence of the scheme of autonomous action makes the particular example not fit with the 
idea well. 
So, "when the eagle goes up it can stay up as much time as it wants"(C.21). Furthermore, 
because of its ability to fly, "it can go everywhere it wants"(C.33). Six of these children 
(15%) reasoned that the eagle can do anything it wants because it has the ability to fly. In a 
similar way a rocket can come down whenever it wants because it has engines (3 
children). 
"When the bird goes up, it can decide whether to stay there or to come down"(C.39). In 
some cases the children reffered to animals' consciousness. That is, "the eagle is a living 
thing and understands that it can go up without coming down". Also, "the eagle is not a 
non living thing that you can control, it can do anything it wants, it can go up or come 
down without any help"(C.35). That is, the consciousness dimension is based on the 
autonomy of the bird. There is a conscious control of its power for autonomous actions. 
The above examples suggest that the eagle's desires (wants) have their origins not in 
unconscious processes (e.g. being hungry, tired etc.) but in conscious processes (e.g. 
understanding). The whole idea of making decisions and particularly the extreme case of 
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consciousness of living things gives an indication of how the empirical schemes of two 
examples can differ in abstract qualities. 
Also, "the rocket is a non-living thing but people make decisions for it"(C.28). "In order 
for a rocket to come down, people who are there must decide," (C.18) (5 children). One of 
the decisions can be that "the pilot stops the engines"(C.27) 
3. Necessity 
The eagle-example and rocket-example do not fit so well with the initial generalization, 
because of the inherent natures of the eagle and the rocket. The necessity category can be 
described in three forms: 
(a) General reference to nature of the object 
"The eagle because of its nature can fly"(C.4) 
"A rocket when it has passed a specific distance can not come down" (C.3) 
"When the rocket goes up, only some parts of it fall down. It has been designed in 
this way" (C.35) 
(b) Specific elements that are responsible for this nature 
"Birds have wings and they can fly without falling down"(C.1) 
"It (the rocket) has engines and come down whenever it wants" 
(c) Specification of the nature of object and its implications 
Consciousness, is controlled by humans or other animals (see in the previous category for 
examples). 
4. Support 
A bird can be temporarily supported by its wings and so it does not come down. "The bird 
flies when moves its wings, but when it stops moving them, it will fall down" (C.3) 
An eagle does not fit so well with the initial idea because of a temporary (movement of 
wings) or more permanent support. In the last case "When the eagle goes up it can stay 
continuously up a tree"(C.34) or in "a nest" (C.11). Also, a rocket does not come down 
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because it "can stay up, on the moon"(C.11) or on another "planet" (C.32). Furthermore, it 
can "get into an orbit around the earth" (C.15) or "around the moon"(C.21). 
5. Features of the route (actual time and space-location) 
This category includes the particular features of the route. It is notable that an 
"asymmetry" between the routes of different examples make them different. Assymetries 
appeared in the actual time that the eagle or the rocket needs to go up and come down: 
"the eagle goes slowly up and come slowly down" (C.31) while "the rocket goes quickly 
up and comes slowly down"(C.31). These asymmetries can make one example a better 
example than the others. Thus the example with the ball is better than the one with the 
eagle "because the eagle cannot go up-down so quickly"(C.17). 
7.3.4 Matching generalizations to examples and production of 
examples 
7.3.4.1 Aims 
The aims of this task were to: 
(a) explore whether children using their empirical schemes could match a "best" 
example with a middle level generalization 
(b) see whether children are able to produce examples which fitted well with various 
levels of specification of a generalization 
(c) identify the boundaries that exist between different levels of generalization and how 
they could be seen through the different empirical schemes that children used, in the 
production of different examples. 
7.3.4.2 Materials 
The materials used for this task were a pair of pictures and one piece of paper with three 
ideas of science. In the one picture the children could see two metal plates, one cold and 
one hot. In the other picture these plates were in contact (see figure 7.8). The ideas written 
on the paper were: 
a. Hot things frequently make things hot. 
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b. Things which are in contact reach the same temperature. 
c. Some things in contact allow with great difficulty the transportation of heat from one 
thing to another. 
All the above three ideas are about the transmission of heat. The first one is more general 
than the second because it includes cases where there is no contact between things (e.g. the 
sun makes hot the sea). The example with the plates fits better with the second 
generalization. The third one includes only these things that are in contact but do allow 
with difficulty the transmission of heat (e.g. glass). It is a "low-level" generalization while 
the first one is a "high-level" generalization in relation to the second generalization (see 
above for figure 7.7). 
7.3.4.3 Procedure 
The children were presented with the pair of pictures and were asked which of the three 
ideas fitted best with the example (pictures). They were then asked to give other examples 
that fitted with the other two ideas. 
Figure 7.8 Phase 1:Matching generalisations to examples and production of examples 
(picture) 
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7.3.4.4 Results 
7.3.4.4.1 Which is the best-fitting generalization? 
Most of the children (32 out of 40) suggested that the example with the two metal plates in 
contact, fitted better with the (middle level) idea "things that are in contact reach the same 
temperature". They chose this idea as better for the interpretation of the example, instead 
of the higher generalization "warm things frequently make the other things warm", and the 
lower generalization "some things allow, with great difficulty, the transportation of heat 
from one thing to another". 
Some of them justified their choice saying that the example did not fit well with the higher 
generalization because this idea "does not mention that the two things must be in contact 
(C.36) or "if (these things) were not in touch the heat is not transported" (C.18). 
Furthermore the example did not fit well with the lower generalization because in the 
particular example "the heat will be transmitted easily" (C.18). 
In these cases, the children recognized the expected specific properties (contact, easy 
transportation) of the example, and looked for them in the text of the generalization. The 
analysis that follows is based on the children's justifications. It attempts to identify the 
various empirical schemes that appeared in the children's justifications. 
7.3.4.4.2 When might an example be "bad" for a generalization? 
1. Interaction 
(a) The "leader" of the interaction 
A high level generalization has to be modified, specialized, and interpreted so as to fit well 
with the example. The example does not fit well with the higher generalization because 
"cold things can make other things cold" (C.12, 22, 24). In the particular example, two 
opposite states or properties of things - hot, cold - interact and produce a new state. The 
principle which might be responsible for this answer is the following: When two things 
appear to have two opposite states or properties which can interact and modify their states 
or produce a new state, it is expected that both of them will "lead" to this new state. As 
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warm things have heat and can make other things warm, in the same way, cold things have 
something that can make other things cold. 
(b) Quantity 
Furthermore, the example did not fit well with the higher generalization because "the other 
thing - the cold one - could be very cold, so the heat of the other thing could be not enough 
to make it (the cold one) hot" (C.13). 
Therefore, the new state of things depends on how big or small are the properties of these 
things. 
(c) Initial state 
The higher generalization distinguishes the state between "hot things" and "other things". 
Thus, the example did not fit well with this idea because in the particular example "both of 
these things have temperature" (C.23) or because both of them are warm things" (C.39). 
The initial state of the things that interacted was considered by the children. In the 
particular task the problem appeared because the correspondence between terms such as 
hot, cold and the values of the temperature were not clear. 
2. Rapidity of change 
The example did not fit well with the lower generalization because in this example "the 
temperature changes immediately" (C.12), and "the heat passes quickly" (C.13), so "in 
some time the heat becomes the same" (C.22). So, the small amounts of time that is 
needed for the transmission of heat means that this transmission happens more easily, that 
is "quicker means easier". 
7.3.4.4.3 How can an instance be a "good" example of an idea? 
1. Higher generalization 
A good example for this generalization is an example in which a source of heat makes 
other things which are not in contact with the hot thing, warm. This example can mention 
(a) in general the things that become warm: 
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"The radiator became hot then all the class will become hot" (C.2) 
"the sun makes other things warm" (C.13) 
"the stove makes the other things hot" (C.17,31) 
"if we light the lighter it will heat" (C.11) 
(b) specific things: 
"The sun makes people feel warm" (C.3), 
"The sun makes the windows warm" (C.18) 
In the above examples, we can distinguish two different groups of things, the source pole 
and the receiver pole. These two poles are at a distance from one another and the things 
that are between them (mainly the air) allow the source pole to cause an effect on the 
receiver pole. The higher generalization can be interpreted as "things act on other things". 
The above examples strongly specify the source pole, copy the act (make warm), and 
weakly specify the receiver pole (other things). So, the important thing here is the 
identification of the "actor". Finally the "actor" acts on "patients" which in many cases 
might be so numerous that it is not important to specify them. 
Another variation of this scheme which connects causes and effects can be seen in the 
following examples : 
"Hot lake, (or sea, C.8) then it makes the fish hot" (C.4) 
"Hot weather, then our bodies become hot" (C.23) 
"the cooker make the food hot" (C.27) 
In these examples the receiver pole is inside the source pole. In general, the properties of a 
thing that belongs (is inside) in a system, are the same as those of the system. 
Furthermore, the mixing of two things with the same nature is different from their contact. 
so in this higher idea good examples can be: 
"a casserole with hot food 	 "(C28) 
"a bowl with hot water .... " (C.39) 
2. Lower generalization 
What makes transmission of heat difficult can be described by the following categories of 
empirical schemes: 
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(a) "Barrier" 
"When the sun drops behind a wall, it is difficult to make the bed which is behind the 
wall hot" (C.6) 
"when we put something into the freezer, it becomes ice while the freezer does not 
allow the heat from outside to come inside easily" (C.4). 
The transmission of heat is difficult when there is a "barrier" between source and receiver 
such as a wall. In some cases the receiver pole can be used as a "border" or a container. 
(b) Quality - the nature of the material 
"The freezer inside is made of plastic in order not to allow the cold temperature to go 
out" (C.9) 
The children suggested as receiver poles various materials such as aluminum, wood, 
cement, plastic which do not allow the transmission of heat easily. So a good example for 
the lower generalization is one in which the nature of the material that constitutes the 
receiver pole or the material of the barrier has the special ability to "stop" the 
transmission. All of the children believed that glass belongs in this category. 
(c) Distance 
"when our body is cold and we are far from the radiator it is difficult to become hot" 
(C.23) 
"Two glass bowls far away one from the other" (C.25). 
Another reason that can "cut" the easy connection between source and receiver pole is a 
distance between them. It appears to me that there is a strong relation between space 
(distance) time and goals. The construction of many empirical schemes is based on this 
relation between the above empirical schemes. 
7.3.5 Constructing a generalization from examples 
7.3.5.1 Aims 
In this task, the children were presented with three pictures of examples and were asked to 
construct a generalization which could describe what they observe in all these pictures. I 
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attempted to see whether the variation of the generalizations that the children produced 
could be described as belonging to high, middle, or low levels of generalization. In other 
words, to see if the variation of the level of the generalization that they constructed 
depended on the picture-examples which they would focus on in order to construct the 
generalization. I was also interested in what changes are required for different types of 
examples (parallel, counter), to fit well with each of the three levels of generalizations. 
The aims of this task were: 
(a) to identify common empirical schemes in various examples 
(b) to see how children interpret (and include) these empirical schemes in producing a 
generalization 
(c) to identify which of the concrete empirical schemes were common in these examples 
(d) to explore the modifications that these distinct empirical schemes in various 
examples underwent, in order for all the examples to become good examples of the 
same generalization. 
7.3.5.2 Materials 
The materials used for this task were three pictures and a blank piece of paper. In one 
picture, they could see a car at night with its lights on, in the second a torch that makes a 
child's shadow, and in the third a magnifying glass (see figure 7.9). 
7.3.5.3 Procedure 
The children were presented with the three pictures and asked to describe what they could 
see in the pictures. Then, they were asked which science idea these picture could be 
examples of. Having obtained such an idea I asked if all these pictures fitted equally well 
with that idea. If they thought that there were some problems in the fitting of examples to 
idea, I asked them to tell me how to change the pictures in order to fit them better to the 
generalization. 
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Figure 7.9 Phase 1: Constructing a generalization from examples (pictures) 
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7.3.5.4 Results 
7.3.5.4.1 What sort of generalizations did children construct? 
The children constructed their own generalizations at various levels. These 
generalizations indicate counter examples (lower generalizations), match with one 
example only out of the three pictures (middle level generalizations) or can stand as 
generalizations for more than one example (higher generalizations). 
1. Lower generalization 
"Light can pass through some things" (C.12). In this generalization the word "some" 
indicates the existence of counter examples, that is, this lower generalization allows the 
existence of counter examples. Light cannot pass through all things. 
2. Middle level generalization 
This type of generalization arose from just one (out of three) picture example. "With the 
light we can see during the night, with electricity" (C.13). In this case the child had as best 
example (and at the same time it was the example from which this generalization had 
arisen) the car-picture. Therefore, big changes were required in order for the other two 
examples to fit with this generalization. For example, in the case of the magnifyng glass 
he kept the sun, and asked to put a cardboard in a window with a small hole. Thus, we can 
see in this dark room because of the light. 
3. Higher generalization 
a. Include all (the three) picture-examples 
"The light comes from a specific source " (C.12). 
In this case the child tried to recognize the existence of sources of the light in each 
example, although in two of them the sources were not observable. The existence of a 
source seems necessary for the presence of the effects (existence of light). 
b. Include two parallel examples 
"The rays of light are refracted, become bigger" (the parallel beam) (C.25) 
The child said that this generalization fits with the examples with the torch and the car but 
does not fit with the example with the magnifying glass. He said that the magnifying glass 
concentrates light on to the ground while the torch and the car headlamps refract light in a 
bigger area. 
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7.3.5.4.2 What is responsible for the variation of generalisations? 
1. Negative versus Positive Generalizations 
Consider for example: 
"Artificial light helps us much in our life" (C.20) 
versus "Without light we cannot live" (C.22) and 
"With light we can see in the night, with electric" (C.13) 
versus "Without light we cannot see" (C.14) 
Children gave the above generalizations. In these the first in each case is a positive 
statements and refers to the contribution that the presence of an entity has in our life. The 
second in each case refers to a hypothetical absence of an entity (light) which is related 
with the absence of an effect (cannot live/see). This case of negative generalizations is 
very interesting, because the absence of something is not easily shown in examples. There 
are many more entities that could be hypothesized as absent in an example from this than 
those that are present. 
2. Powerful empirical schemes 
The producer of the generalization "light can pass through some things" (C.18) chose as 
the best example the magnifying glass picture. He recognized as "problematic" the picture 
with the shadow and asked to change it, putting a glass instead of the boy in front of the 
wall. Although the picture with the shadow could fit well with the above generalization, 
(considering that "some" means "not all"), the child did not accept the good fit of this 
example with the generalization because he thought of the scheme 'pass' as more 
important-powerful. 
3. Explicit use of empirical schemes 
Also, in the case of the car, the child recognized that it was a good example of the 
generalization. However, the child said that we have to put a man into the car (it is not 
explicit) and then we can say that the light passes through the front glass to the man. 
Another example of this dimension is the child who constructed the following 
generalization, "The light comes from a particular source"(C.18). He suggested as a better 
example for this idea the picture with the magnifying glass and the sun. The other two 
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examples fitted well with the idea but they were not so good because "the sun can light 
itself while the car and the torch need batteries (which are also explicit). 
7.3.5.4.3 What are the origins of generalisations? 
The generalizations that are constructed by children have their roots in (a) commonsense 
knowledge and in (b) scientific knowledge. The presentation of some major dimensions 
which lead to the construction of empirical schemes in the above categories follows. 
1. Commonsense Knowledge 
(a) Social Aspects 
There were many children who based the construction of their generalization on social 
aspects. 
"Without light we cannot live" (C.22). 
This child used social aspects also when he tried to change the other two examples. In the 
case with the magnifying glass he suggested removing the magnifying glass and putting a 
factory instead. 
"...It means that without the sun we could not have any energy.... the factory using 
some particular machines will take the energy from the sun, and it will provide it to 
us" (C.22) 
Also, in the other example he suggested putting a child who needed the light. 
"A child who had gone to his house and cut off his electricity supply,... he did not 
know what he should do and he might have started shouting help,... so some 
neighbors would help him" (C.22) 
(b) Goals 
"With light we can see" (C.33) 
"We use light for a particular aim" (C.32) 
In this case, the child following an emphasis on goals, was asked to modify the pictures 
with the magnifying glass (in order to fit better with the above generalization) adding a 
firebrand (torch). "We can kindle the firebrand and use it for the Olympic games"(C.32) 
Furthermore, the picture with the child was rather forcibly adapted to fit well: because "we 
use it to see the child's shadow"(C.32) 
(c) Necessity 
"Without light we cannot see" (C.14). Light has a strong relation with some of our 
abilities. This relation which indicates for example that the action "see" cannot appear 
249 
without "light" is known to the children from their experience and they state this relation 
even though they do not know why it happens. 
2. Scientific views 
"In these two pictures the light passes through diverging lenses" (C.34) 
"The rays of light are refracted, become bigger" (the parallel beam) (C.25) 
In the above cases the children with their generalization identify different effects on the 
light when it passes through different objects. Probably it is an indication of the existence 
of different lenses. 
7.3.6 Overview of Phase 1 
The results demonstrated that there is a variation of examples and generalisations that 
can be described by the following principles: A generalization has best examples. The 
addition of parallel examples can lead to "higher" more general generalizations, while 
the addition of counter examples can lead to "Lower" generalizations. 
Some examples have a better fit than other examples with an idea. The presence (or 
absence) of particular empirical schemes influences the fit between examples and 
generalisations. Some of the main reasons which were identified (in children's 
justifications) as responsible for a good fit between examples and ideas, are the 
following: 
- Speed (rapidity of change). The principle is, the less time needed between two actions, 
the better the example is. 
- Autonomous action. Some objects can control their actions, that is they are able to 
present autonomous actions. In the particular idea 'When things go up they must 
come down', examples which consists of an object which can be described by the 
scheme of autonomous actions are not good examples of this idea. 
- Necessity. The fit between examples and ideas is influenced by the inherent nature of 
the objects. So, the nature of an object is to some extent responsible for the way that 
it appears in the example. 
- Support-Barrier. Objects which can be supported by themselves or by another object 
can 'reject' the movement that they would have because of gravity. Also, 
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movement in a horizontal axis can be prevented by a barrier or a container. The 
scheme of support in the vertical or horizontal axes plays an important role in the fit 
between examples and ideas. 
- Space-location. The position of an object in space and its relations (e.g. the distance 
between two objects) with other objects that take part in an example of an idea play 
an important role in the fit between examples and ideas. 
- Quantity. The size (big-small) and the weight (heavy-light) of objects that take part in 
an example influence the fit between examples and ideas. 
- Shape. Each object has a shape and it can influence the particular movement of an 
object. Thus, the shape can be responsible for a contrary movement to the vertical 
movement which an object tend to have because of the the gravity. 
- Existence. The presence (or absence) of an object in an instance can have as result a 
better (or worse) fit between this example and an idea. 
The above reasons emerged from children's justifications and were used in the 
construction of the questionnaire used in phase 2. In phase 2 the aim was to explore the 
role that changes of these categories of reasons have on the fit between various 
examples and ideas. 
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7.4 Main study, phase 2: Making examples of ideas better or 
worse 
7.4.1 Introduction 
Examples of ideas consist of specific objects which have particular relations. In this 
study I explored how changes in the dimensions of the existence of objects, their 
attributes (such as shape, size, weight) and their relations (such as time, space) can 
highlight or hide features which make them better or worse examples. 
7.4.2 Methods 
7.4.2.1 Participants & Materials 
The participants were the same children that participated in study 3. Thus, 407 children 
ranging in age from 11 to 12.28 years with a mean of 11.56 years old participated in the 
study. Twelve questionnaires were used (see the previous chapter for the description of 
these questionnaires). 
7.4.2.2 Procedure 
In this part of the questionnaire (see Figure 7.10 and Appendix 7.1) the focus was now 
on what makes an example better or worse. To do this the children were presented with 
an idea and an example of the idea. They were asked to choose some changes that can 
be made to five objects (they were components of the example and played particular 
roles such as protagonists, structure related objects etc. - see previous chapter for a 
detailed presentation of their roles) in order to make the example better or worse. The 
changes referred to dimensions of time, space, existence, weight, shape and size (they 
could make each object act more quickly, be away, not exist, be heavier, change its 
shape, be bigger). 
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Figure 7.10 The questionnaire 
An example for the idea "When things are raised, they have energy, that 
we call Potential Energy" is a boy up a tree (see picture on the previous 
page). The child, the tree, the ground, and the potential energy take part in 
this example. How could you change t hem to make the above example a 
better example? 
Make it...' 
	
to do 
bigger 	 not to exist 	 heavier 	 something 	 to change its 	 to be 
quicker 	 shape 	 further away 
the child 
the tree 
the air 
the ground 
the P.energy 
0 CI 0 CI 0 
CI 0 CI 0 0 
C:i CI 0 0 0 
0 0 0 Ci 0 
0 0 0 0 0 
How could you change them to make it a worse example? 
Make it...' 
	
to do 
bigger 	 not to exist 	 heavier 	 something 	 to change its 	 to be 
quicker 	 shape 	 further away 
the child 
the tree 
the air 
the ground 
the P.energy 
0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 C) 
0 0 0 CI 0 
0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 C:i 0 
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7.4.2.3 Method of analysis 
The research questions of this study and the way the data were analysed are presented 
below: 
(a) Are there differences in the frequency of choice of each feature for the five objects? 
In this case whether the differences among the five objects influenced the number of 
"yes" responses given to a particular change of feature by the children could be tested. If 
there are differences, this means that for a given feature, objects differ in whether they 
need to be changed to make the example better (or worse). The Cochran Q Test for k 
related subjects was used. It provides a method for testing whether the frequencies of 
each feature (e.g. make it bigger) differ significantly among the five objects. 
(b) Are there differences in the frequency of choice of features for each object? The 
Cochran Q Test for k related subjects was used to test whether for a given object, the 
features differ among themselves with respect to how often they are chosen. 
These two questions are obviously related: a high frequency for a feature and a given 
object will re-appear as a high frequency for an object and a given feature. Therefore, 
the results are presented together as a matrix (see figures in the analysis of each idea), 
identifying combinations of features and objects which are salient in both analyses. 
(c) Are there differences in frequencies of choices of features for the objects with the 
same role (e.g. scientific concept, protagonist) in different examples of the same idea? 
The chi-square test was used to determine the significance of differences between the 
two independent groups of children who gave answers for the two different examples of 
the same idea. 
At the beginning, the results of the analyses of the above questions will be discussed for 
each idea (both examples) separately. Then there will be a summary discussion of the 
common and different things that appeared across the different ideas. At the end, issues 
about the importance and the information that an analysis like this can give to 
researchers will be discussed. 
254 
The presence or the absence of significant differences will be shown in tables such as 
Tables 7.1 & 7.2 (which apply to the case of potential energy) while the actual level of 
significance can be seen in the tables in Appendices. In these tables (such as Table 7.1 
& 7.2) there are symbols * against all the features (e.g. bigger etc) for each object (e.g. 
`air') for which the frequencies -"Fe"- were unusually high. Thus the * symbols should 
be read horizontally (e.g. for pot, first example, the features bigger, heavier and further 
away are frequent in table 1). Also, there are symbols + resulting from looking at the 
same data the other way, asking which objects -"Ob"- are chosen frequently for a given 
feature. Thus, these should be read downwards. For example, for the feature 'bigger' the 
objects pot, child, tree and potential energy were frequently chosen (see table 7.1). 
Furthermore, the box around two (*) and two (+) symbols means that in both examples 
of the particular idea there was a high frequency of children who chose the particular 
feature among the other features for a given object and the particular object among the 
other objects for a given feature. In contrast, the shaded boxes mean that there was a 
difference between the two examples in the number of children who chose the particular 
feature for the given object. 
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7.4.3 Results 
7.4.3.1 Potential energy 
Idea: 'When things are raised, they have energy, that we call potential energy' 
Examples: 
(a) 'a child up a tree has potential energy', and 
(b) 'a pot on a balcony has potential energy' 
There are differences in the frequency of 'yes' responses according to: (a) the type of 
object and (b) the sort of feature since the significance level of the Cochran Q test is less 
than 0.05 in almost all cases ( 37 out of 44, see Appendix 7.2). 
The cases of non-significant differences are worth discussing briefly: 
(a) The feature of existence, being chosen hardly ever for any object, could show no 
difference when children attempted to make better the example with the child up a tree. 
(b) When the children suggested changes to make the example worse there were no 
differences for the feature 'quicker' in both examples, the features 'heavier' and 'shape' in 
the pot example, and the feature 'further away' in the child example. In the last three 
features there were no statistically significant differences among the five objects since 
all of them appeared with a similar frequency (about a quarter of the children chose 
them, with a range of 10%). 
(c) Differences in frequency of choice of feature for each object were absent only in two 
cases, when the children suggested changes in features of the air and the ground to make 
the example worse. 
The presentation of results in tables 7.1 & 7.2 (see in method of analysis for the 
interpretation of symbols in these tables) is based on the features for each object that a 
different number of children appeared to chose them in relation to other features, and the 
objects for each feature that their frequency in children's 'yes' responses differ 
significantly from other objects. It seems that in both examples the children follow the 
principle "more is better" which in the particular example translates "bigger is better" or 
"the more potential energy the better the example". 
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Irrelev. 	 air 
air 
Protag. pot 
child 
Surfac. balcony 
tree 
Struct. 	 ground 
ground 
S.Conc. pot.ener 
pot. ener 
* 
	
+ 
* 
	
+ 
* 	 + 
* 	 + 
* 	 + 
* 	 + 
* 
	
+ 
* 
	
+ + 
* 	 + 
+ 
Bigger 
Fe 	 Ob 
Irrelev. 
Protag. 
air 
air 
pot 
child 
+ 
Surfac. balcony * + 
tree * + 
Struct. 
S.Conc. 
ground 
ground 
pot.ener 
pot.ener 
+ 
N. Exist Heavier Quicker Shape 	 Away 
Fe Ob Fe Ob Fe Ob Fe Ob Fe Ob 
* 
* + 
* 
* + 
* 
* 
+ 
+ 
* 
+ 
* + 
* + 
Table 7.1 Making the examples of Potential Energy better 
Bigger N. Exist Heavier Quicker Shape 	 Away 
Fe Ob Fe Ob Fe Ob Fe Ob Fe Ob Fe Ob 
Table 7.2 Making the examples of Potential Energy worse 
Key to abbreviations 
Fe : Feature 	 * : statistically significant features 
Ob : Object 	 + : statistically significant objects 
: high frequency for features and objects in both examples 
: differences between the two examples 
There are different ways to use the principle "more is better". To make something bigger 
is one dominant way to make both text-book examples better. The quantity of the 
scientific concept should increase. Potential energy has to be 'bigger'. The increase of 
potential energy could be the result of some other increases. So, the surface related 
objects (balcony and tree) and the protagonists (pot & child) have to be bigger. Making 
bigger in a vertical axis the surface related objects (mainly the tree), has as a result the 
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removal of the protagonists 'further away' and that could lead to increase the quantity 
of potential energy. It seems that children think that making bigger the store of potential 
energy - the protagonists - has as a result the increase of the scientific concept (potential 
energy). Also, the protagonist (pot & child) should be heavier. 
Furthermore, removing some objects 'further away' from other objects would have as a 
result the increase of potential energy. So, if the protagonists and the structural related 
objects are 'further away' from each other the example will be better. 
A different approach to make the example (with the pot) better was the following: 
children saw potential energy as a potential source of movement, and a better example 
should show this movement. The irrelevant object could make something quicker (to 
make the protagonist fall down from the surface related object). In this case the quicker 
(less time) the better. 
There were some statistically significant differences in the changes between the two 
examples. More children in the case of the example 'a pot up a balcony' said that the 
scientific concept has to make something quicker than in the case with the child up a 
tree. The potential energy as a source of potential movement seems to be able to make 
the pot (inanimate) move quicker than the child (animate). More children said that the 
tree should be bigger than said the balcony should be bigger. A bigger tree equals a 
higher tree with more potential energy for the child while a bigger balcony equals a 
wider balcony which does not make any change in the potential energy. In addition the 
structure related object has to be further away in the case of the example with the child 
rather than the example with the pot. The tree can more easily be imagined to become 
bigger-higher than can the balcony. Also the distance between the child up a tree and the 
ground is not shown in the picture as big as the distance between the balcony and the 
ground. So, more children asked to move the ground 'further away' in the case of the 
example with the child than that with the pot, even though they only saw one of the two 
cases. 
Both examples could be made worse if various objects, mainly the protagonists, did not 
exist. An example will be worse when its essential components do not exist, because the 
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example does not then exist. Also, the example could be made worse by changing the 
shape of protagonists, structure and surface related objects. That happens because after 
changing the appearance of these objects their identity is not so recognisable. In other 
words, the example loses again its components, they do not exist, and the example 
become worse. 
There is evidence that the children sometimes chose the same features but for different 
reasons. So, some children said that by making the child in the picture heavier the 
example could be made worse since the tree branch will break and the child will fall 
down and then there will be no example. In this case, the example becomes dynamic 
(with the addition of movement) and loses the 'duration' that it had as a static 
phenomenon. Also, the balcony and the tree could be bigger, to make the example 
worse (as well as better, as above). One or two of the children justified this choice 
saying that a bigger tree will have stronger branches which will not break to provide as 
evidence of the existence of potential energy the fall of the child. In a similar way, if the 
balcony is bigger-wider the pot will not fall and so we would not have any evidence for 
the existence of potential energy. 
There were some differences in the frequencies of the changes between the children of 
the two different groups. More children in the case of the example 'a child up a tree' 
suggested making the tree and the child not to exist than did this for the balcony and the 
pot in the example with the 'pot on a balcony'. Also, more children said that the child 
had to be heavier, than said the pot had to be. By making the child heavier, they would 
expect to break the tree branch. However, a heavy pot cannot break the balcony. More 
children said that the balcony has to be removed 'further away' than the tree. 
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* 
* 
* * + 
+ 
+ 
Bigger 	 N. Exist 	 Heavier 
Fe 	 Ob 	 Fe 	 Ob 	 Fe 	 Ob 
Protag. 
Irrelev. 
Struct. 
rail 
wires 
ground 
ground 
sun 
sun 
* 
* 
+ 
+ 
* 
+ 
+ 
Surfac. train 
pylons 
* + 
* 
S.Conc. expansi. 
expansi. 
* 
* 
+ 
+ 
Quicker Shape Away 
Fe Ob Fe Ob Fe Ob 
7.4.3.2 Expansion 
Idea: 'Almost all solid things, expand when they are heated. This phenomenon is called expansion' 
Examples: 
(a) 'In the summer the electric wires of the A.E.H (Public Company of Electricity) are expanded 
between two pylons because of the high temperature, so they are loose' and 
(b) 'in the summer the railways lines expand because of the high temperature, so the lines bend up in 
an arc' 
The Cochran Q test showed that there are statistically significant differences in the 
frequency of 'yes' responses considering the type of object and the sort of feature (34 
out of 44, see Appendix 7.3) 
Tables 7.3 & 7.4 show the symbol (*) for a given feature the objects with significantly 
bigger frequencies among others, and the symbol (+) for an object the features with 
significant bigger frequencies among other features. 
In both examples of this idea the bigger the protagonists, the structure related objects, 
and the scientific concepts are, the better the example is. Making the expansion bigger 
the example becomes better. A way to make the expansion bigger is to make the sun 
bigger. A bigger effect needs a bigger cause. Also, by making the rail or the wires 
bigger they will not fit in a straight horizontal line. The curve due to the expansion will 
be bigger and the example will be better. So, the shape of the protagonists has to change 
more. 
Table 7.3 Making the examples of Expansion better 
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* * + 
* * + 
Table 7.4 Making the examples of Expansion worse 
Bigger N. Exist Heavier Quicker Shape 	 Away 
Fe Ob Fe Ob Fe Ob Fe Ob Fe Ob Fe Ob 
Protag. rail 	 * + 	 + 
wires 	 + 	 + 
Irrelev. ground 
ground 
Struct. 	 sun 
sun 
Surfac. train 
pylons 
S.Conc. expansi. 
expansi. 
Key for abbreviations see page 257. 
The train has to be quicker to cover in less time its distance from the curve, because then 
the 'size-power' of the expansion to stop the train, will be more observable. The train 
also should be heavier, possibly in order to stop at the front of the curve and not (having 
the ability as a light thing) to pass over the curve. In agreement with that, very few 
children asked to make things 'heavier' when they attempted to make both examples 
worse. 
Very few of the children who attempted to make better or worse the example with the 
electric wires in summer, asked to make any object 'heavier' making it better. In the 
example with the wires, children made the example better suggesting that the sun has to 
make something happen more quickly. It could make the wires expand quicker. There is 
a statistically significant difference between the two examples. Children did not suggest 
the same thing in the example with the railway lines because the railway lines were seen 
as more rigid things that could not change so easily. However, in the example with the 
train children said that the sun should be 'further away'. Possibly that happened because 
in the picture, the sun was very close to the ground, and this may have been seen as 
conflicting with reality. Very few children asked to remove things (`not exist') when 
they attempted to make both examples better. 
In contrast, both examples could be worse if some of the objects did not exist or they 
were further away or they changed their shape. The protagonists, the structure related 
objects and the scientific concept which had to be bigger in order for the example to be 
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better, had to be removed in order for the example to be worse. Furthermore, the 
protagonists and the structure related objects should be removed further away or change 
their shape, to make the examples worse since there would not be any indication of 
expansion. Changing the shape of the sun by making it smaller, or removing the cause, 
the sun, (`further away' ) the effect would be smaller and the example worse. 
The children suggested making the train do something quicker. This was used both to 
make the example not only better but also worse. In this case the example becomes 
worse because it loses its duration. 
The feature 'further away', was chosen for all objects by many of the children when 
they attempted to make the example with the wires worse, but there were no statistically 
significant differences among the objects. Particularly, in the example with the wires 
more children said that the ground and the surface related objects had not to exist or be 
removed than did so in the example with the railway. This difference was statistically 
significant. In contrast only a very small minority of children suggested making any 
object 'bigger' and 'quicker'. The train did not play an important role in the example 
like the pylons which keep the wires, so its removal is not so important. In a similar 
way, it seems that the ground is not so important in the example with the railways. 
More children said that the pylons rather than the train should be moved further away. 
The children did not think that moving the train far away would make so important a 
change to the example as would the movement of pylons which held the wires. 
7.4.3.3 Equilibrium 
Idea: 'When things come in contact, the heat is transmitted always from the warmer to the colder' 
Examples: 
(a) 'We put two pots with water (the one containing hot and the other cold water) in contact. The heat 
is transmitted from the hot to the cold thing' and 
(b) 'we put one metal pot with hot water inside another bigger pot that contains cold water. The heat is 
transmitted from the hot to the cold one' 
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In 34 out of 44 sets of data (see Appendix 7.4) the probabilities of 'yes' responses differ 
according to the type of the object or feature. The cases that had no significant 
differences are worth discussing briefly. 
The children said that one can make the examples better, by making the transmission of 
heat happen 'quicker'. So, as expected 'quicker' was a feature which was chosen hardly 
ever for any object by the children when they attempted to make both examples worse. 
A feature that can help to make both examples worse is moving the containers which are 
in contact (or a container inside a bigger one) 'further away'or to remove (`not exist') 
them. In agreement with that, in both examples very few children asked to put any 
object 'further away' or remove them (in the example with the smaller pot inside a 
bigger one), when they attempted to make the examples better. Only a small minority of 
children asked to make any object 'heavier' in order to make the example with the 
smaller pot inside a bigger one, worse. 
In some cases the children hardly ever chose any of the features for a given object. So, 
very few of the children asked to make any change to the 'air' when they attempted to 
make both examples better, and to make any change to the cold water in order to make 
the example with the smaller pot inside a bigger one, better or worse. 
Tables 7.5 & 7.6 show the features which presented significantly bigger frequencies 
among others and the objects which presented significantly bigger frequencies among 
other objects. 
Table 7.5 Making the examples of Equilibrium better 
Bigger N. Exist Heavier Quicker Shape 	 Away 
Fe Ob Fe Ob Fe Ob Fe Ob Fe Ob Fe Ob 
Irrelev. 	 air 
air 
Struct. 	 cold w. 
cold w. 
Surfac. m.pot 
m.pot 
Protag. 	 hot wa. 
hot wa. 
S.Conc. heat 
heat 
* 
Key for abbreviations see page 257. 
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Table 7.6 Making the examples of Equilibrium worse 
Bigger 	 N. Exist 	 Heavier 	 Quicker 	 Shape 	 Away 
Fe 	 Ob 	 Fe 	 Ob 	 Fe 	 Ob 	 Fe 	 Ob 	 Fe 	 Ob 	 Fe 	 Ob 
Irrelev. 
Struct. 
air 
cold w. 
cold w. 
air  
* 	 + 
+ 
* 
* + 
Surfac. m.pot * + * + * + 
m.pot * + * + * + 
Protag. hot wa. * + * + 
hot wa. * + * + 
S.Conc. heat 
heat 
* 
* 
+ 
+ 
* 
Key for abbreviations see page 257. 
Both examples are seen as better if the protagonist, the scientific concept and the surface 
related objects become bigger. The more heat the better the example is. Other ways for 
having more heat are to have more hot water or to make the pots bigger. It is possible 
that the change 'more hot water' is described by children as making hot water heavier, 
or make it bigger. Also, pots should change their shape if they have to be bigger. It 
seems that another way for children to make the example better is to make the 
proportion hot water: cold water bigger. In this case some children suggested the 
extreme view that the cold water should 'not exist'. 
The hot water and particularly the heat should increase the temperature of the cold water 
quicker, to make the example better. So, the less the time needed for a cause to produce 
an effect, the better the example is. There were no statistically significant differences in 
changes for making the example better, between the two examples. 
Examples could be made worse if something happens that will prevent contact between 
the hot and the cold thing. It could happen if some objects do not exist or are moved 
`further away'. So, children made the examples worse choosing the feature 'not exist' 
for various objects and particularly the protagonist, scientific concept and surface 
related objects (which children asked to made bigger to make better the examples). Also 
the protagonists and the surface related objects should move 'further away' since 
without contact the example will be worse. 
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In contrast with the children's attempts to make the example better, they tried to make it 
worse by making the proportion hot water: cold water smaller. So, in the contact-
example the cold water should be bigger and heavier. The children made these changes 
in one of the two examples (significant differences in the case of feature heavier) 
probably because in the case of the example putting the smaller pot inside the bigger 
one, the cold water (in the bigger pot) seemed more than the hot water. 
7.4.3.4 Inertia 
Idea: The bigger the mass things have, the more difficultit is to move them, because they present big 
inertia' 
Examples: 
(a) 'a lorry that has bigger mass than a car will move with greater difficulty and move slower than the 
car' and 
(b) 'a child can easily move a small toy-elephant, but it is much more difficult to make a big elephant 
move' 
In most cases there were significant differences in the frequency of 'yes' responses 
considering the type of object and the sort of feature ( 33 out of 44, see Appendix 7.5) 
However, there are some cases where the differences among objects for a given feature 
were not significant because only a very small number of children chose the particular 
feature in any object. This happens when they attempted to make both examples better 
or worse choosing the feature 'not exist' or the feature 'shape' in the example with the 
elephant. For the feature 'bigger' there were no significant differences among the 
objects when the children attempted to make the example better since many asked to 
make all the objects bigger. 
There were some cases where there were no differences in the various features that were 
chosen for a given object. So, very few children asked to make any changes to the 
objects 'toy elephant', 'inertia' and to the 'child', 'elephant' when they attempted to 
make the example with the elephant better or worse respectively. Also only a small 
minority of children asked to make any changes to the 'air' in order to make the 
example with the lorry better. 
265 
Tables 7.7 & 7.8 show the features and the objects which presented significantly bigger 
frequencies among other features or objects respectively. 
Table 7.7 Making the examples of Inertia better 
Bigger 	 N. Exist 	 Heavier 
Fe 	 Ob 	 Fe 	 Ob 	 Fe 	 Ob 
Quicker 
Fe 	 Ob 
Shape 
Fe 	 Ob 
Away 
Fe 	 Ob 
Struct. 	 car 
toy el. 
Irrelev. 	 air 
child 
* + + * 	 + 
+ 
Protag. 	 lorry 
elepha 
* + + + 
+ 
* 	 + 
* 	 + 
* 	 + 
* 	 + 
Surfac. 	 ground 
ground 
* 	 + 
* 
* 
S.Conc. 	 inertia 	 * 
inertia 
Key for abbreviations see page 257. 
Table 7.8 Making the examples of Inertia worse 
Bigger 	 N. Exist 	 Heavier Quicker Shape Away 
Fe 	 Ob 	 Fe 	 Ob 	 Fe 	 Ob Fe Ob Fe 	 Ob Fe 	 Ob 
Struct. 
Irrelev. 
car 
toy el. 
air 
child 
* 
* 
+ 
+ 
* 
* 
+ 
+ 
* 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ + 
Protag. 
Surfac. 
S.Conc. 
lorry 
elepha 
ground 
ground 
inertia 
inertia 
+ 
* 
* 
+ 	 + * + 
+ 
* 
* 
+ 
+ 
Key for abbreviations see page 257. 
It is notable that in both examples, children did not choose any change in the scientific 
concept (inertia) to make the example better. Children thought that both examples of 
inertia could be better if they made the protagonists (lorry and elephant) bigger and 
heavier. The bigger (and heavier) protagonist the more inertia (and the better the 
example). 
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Another way children used to make the example better was the creation of bigger 
differences in the comparison between the protagonists and the structure related objects. 
So, in the example with the lorry, the car should be quicker, to have bigger differences 
in the time that it needed to move from the lorry. The children wanted to make the 
differences bigger sufficiently that some of them chose the extreme change to put the 
structure related objects 'further away'. 
Some children attempted to make the example with the lorry better by choosing the 
lorry and the car to be quicker. Also, the child in the example with the elephant can be 
bigger and make something quicker. 
In this idea, only very few children attempted to make the example worse by choosing 
the feature 'not exist' for any object. Children attempted to make the examples worse, 
by making the difference between the structure related objects and the protagonists 
smaller. Children chose the car or the toy elephant to be bigger and heavier. Then the 
comparison will not present any differences and the example will be worse. 
Children thought that the example could be better or worse, making the lorry quicker in 
the example with the lorry. It would be worse because the lorry will be moved in the 
same time with the car and there will not be differences between the lorry and the car. 
Also, in both examples changing the shape of the ground would have as a result the 
examples to be worse. 
There were some significant differences between the examples. More children said that 
the lorry should be quicker and further away than said the elephant should be. Also 
more children said that the car rather than the toy-elephant should change its shape. 
7.4.3.5 Upthrust 
Idea: 'On a thing that it is a liquid there is a force acting upwards from the liquid. This force is called 
upthrust' 
Examples: 
(a) 'It is very difficult to push down a ball into the water, if you let it free it will come out, because of 
the upthrust that it gets from the water' and 
(b) 'a thing seems lighter in water than out of it, because of the upthrust the things gets from the water. 
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Protag. ball 
stone 
Surfac. child 
child 
Struct. 	 water 
sea 
Irrelev. 
	
wash basin 	 * 
ground 
S.Conc. upthrust 
upthrust 
* 
* 
There are significant differences in the frequency of yes responses considering the sort 
of object or feature (33 out of 44, see Appendix 7.6). Tables 7.9 & 7.10 show the 
features and objects with significantly bigger frequencies among other features or 
objects respectively 
Table 7.9 Making the examples of Upthrust better 
Bigger N. Exist Heavier Quicker Shape 	 Away 
Fe Ob Fe Ob Fe Ob Fe Ob Fe Ob Fe Ob 
Key for abbreviations see page 257. 
Table 7.10 Making the examples of Upthrust worse 
Bigger 
Fe 	 Ob 
N. Exist 	 Heavier 	 Quicker 	 Shape 
Fe 	 Ob 	 Fe 	 Ob 	 Fe 	 Ob 	 Fe 	 Ob 
Away 
Fe 	 Ob 
Protag. 
Surfac. 
Struct. 
Irrelev. 
S.Conc. 
ball 
stone 
child 
child 
water 
sea 
wash basin 
ground 
upthrust 
upthrust 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
+ 
+ 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
+ 
Key for abbreviations see page 257. 
The children used the feature of the rapidity of change (`quicker') when they attempted 
to make the examples better rather than worse. Both examples could be better if the 
surface related objects (child in both cases) moved the protagonists in less time. The 
children suggested that 'child' should be quicker and to make it quicker it needs to be 
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bigger. They thought that the upthrust could be a sort of force that resisted the 
movement of the protagonist (ball in the water) or helped it (stone in the sea) but they 
suggested more 'powerful' surface related objects to show better that this force exists 
(this is the reason that bigger children are needed). Also the ball should be heavier to 
`win' more easily against the resistance of upthrust while the stone should change its 
shape (significant difference with the ball) and be smaller to make its movement to the 
surface of the sea easier. Furthermore, the wash basin should change its shape and 
should be bigger, since a bigger bowl is needed to put the whole ball inside the water. In 
summary, the examples could be better if the effect happens in less time. 
For the objects 'water' and 'sea' there were no significant differences in frequency of 
choice of features for each object when the children attempted to make both examples 
better. A very small minority of the children asked to move any object 'further away' or 
remove (`not exist') it, making both examples better. 
In contrast, examples could be worse if some of the objects did not exist. Many children 
attempted to make the example with the stone worse, choosing the feature 'not exist' for 
the various objects. In this case, there were no differences among the objects. Also, the 
`child' should he further away. Also the shape of the wash basin should change and be 
small enough, so the ball could not be inside the water. Making the ball and the stone 
heavier the upthrust will not be obvious as before. 
The features 'bigger' and 'changing shape' were hardly ever chosen for any object by 
children when they attempted to make the example with the stone better or worse 
respectively. 
7.4.3.6 Counter examples 
7.4.3.6.1 Gravity 
Idea: 'When things go up, they must come down (to the ground) because of gravity' 
Counter example: 'A rocket was launched from the earth with speed more than 40.000 Km/h. So it 
beats the earth's attraction and doesn't come back' 
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* 
Protag. rocket 
Irrelev. 	 air 
Struct. 	 ground 
Surfac. people 
S. Conc gravity 
* + 
* 
* + 
* * 
* 
* 
The Cochran Q test showed that there are statistically significant differences in the 
frequency of 'yes' responses considering the type of object and the sort of feature (18 
out of 22, see Appendix 7.7). Table 7.11 & 7.12 show for a given feature the objects 
with significantly bigger features among others, and for an object the features with 
significant bigger features among other features. 
The cases of non-significant differences appeared only when the children attempted to 
make the example worse: 
- There were no significant differences in frequency of choice of feature for each object 
only in two cases, when they suggested changes in features of the 'gravity' and 
`people', to make the example worse. 
- In some cases the children very rarely chose any of the objects for a given feature. So, 
they did not choose any object for the features 'quicker' and 'away', when they 
attempted to make the example worse. 
Table 7.11 Making the example with the rocket better 
Bigger N. Exist Heavier Quicker Shape 	 Away 
Fe Ob Fe Ob Fe Ob Fe Ob Fe Ob Fe Ob 
Protag. rocket 
Irrelev. 	 air 
Struct. 	 ground 
Surfac. people 
S. Conc gravity 
Key for abbreviations see page 257. 
Table 7.12 Making the example with the rocket worse 
Bigger N. Exist Heavier Quicker Shape 	 Away 
Fe Ob Fe Ob Fe Ob Fe Ob Fe Ob Fe Ob 
Key for abbreviations see page 257. 
The counter example could be better if some object such as the unrelated object (air) and 
the scientific concept (gravity) were removed. Also the example could be worse if the 
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protagonist (rocket) and the structure related object (ground) were removed. So, the 
scientific concept which should be made bigger in the positive examples to make them 
better, in counter examples should not exist. 
The counter example could be made better, by changing most of the features of the 
protagonist. It should be bigger and go up quicker since the less time needed to go up 
the better the example, 
Also, the rocket should be more away from the ground. If it is further away it has more 
possibilities not (or to delay) to come down. In this case, many children said that the 
ground should also be away. 
Furthermore, the children sometimes chose the same features for making the example 
better or worse. So, by changing the shape of the rocket the example could be made 
worse since a rocket with a rectangular shape cannot go up. However, by changing the 
shape of the rocket the example could also be made better if the rocket had a more 
aerodynamic shape. 
The counter example could be made worse by changing the rest of the features of the 
protagonist. So, by making the rocket heavier it will be more difficult for it to go up. 
Also many children said that it should not exist. 
7.4.3.6.2 Transmission of heat 
Idea: 'A lot of things allow heat to pass through their mass easily' 
Counter example: 'We can touch the edge of a glass tube without getting burnt, because the glass tube 
doesn't let the heat pass easily through its mass' 
In 14 out of 22 sets of data (see Appendix 7.8) the probabilities of 'yes' responses differ 
according to the type of the object or the feature. Table 7.13 & 7.14 show the features 
and the objects which presented significantly bigger frequencies among other features or 
objects respectively.The rapidity of change seems not to play any important role for 
children in this particular example.Very few children asked to make any object do 
something 'quicker' when they attempted to make the example better or worse. 
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* 
	
+ 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
Table 7.13 Making the example with the glass better 
Bigger N. Exist Heavier Quicker Shape 	 Away 
Fe Ob Fe Ob Fe Ob Fe Ob Fe Ob Fe Ob 
Protag. glass 	 + + 	 + 
Irrelev. air 	 + 
Struct. 	 gasstove 
Surfac. hand 
S. Conc heat 
Key for abbreviations see page 257. 
* 	 + 
Table 7.14 Making the example with the glass worse 
Bigger N. Exist Heavier Quicker Shape 	 Away 
Fe Ob Fe Ob Fe Ob Fe Ob Fe Ob Fe Ob 
+ * 
± 
± 
	 ± 	 ± 
* 
Protag. glass 
Irrelev. 	 air 
Struct. 	 gasstove 
Surfac. hand 
S. Conc heat 
 
* + * + 
   
Key for abbreviations see page 257. 
The counter example could be made better if we changed the shape of the glass and 
made it bigger. If the glass becomes bigger the transmission of heat from one edge to 
the other will need more time. Also we have to change the shape of the gas stove to 
make the heat 'bigger'. The feature 'further away' was hardly ever chosen for any object 
by children when they attempted to make the example better. On the other hand, the 
example will be worse if we put the glass, the hand and the gas stove further away. Also 
we have to change the shape of the glass (by making it smaller). The result will be that 
there will be no transmission of heat and so no counter example of the idea. 
7.4.4 Overview of Phase 2 
In both examples of all ideas, when the children attempted to make them better or 
worse, there were significant differences in the frequency of 'yes' responses given to a 
particular change of feature of an object considering the type of object and feature. 
Thus, the differences among the various objects influenced the number of 'yes' 
responses given to a particular change of feature by the children, and the differences 
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among the various features influenced the number of 'yes' responses given to a 
particular object. 
In all examples, change of existence was hardly ever chosen for any object, when 
children attempted to make the examples better. The children made the examples better, 
following mainly the principle "more is better". They used this principle in various 
ways: 
(a) The more (bigger) the scientific concept the better the example (ideas of potential 
energy, expansion, equilibrium). The increase of scientific concept could be the 
result of some other increases: 
- The bigger or heavier the protagonists the bigger the concept is (in all ideas) 
- The bigger the surface related objects the bigger the concept is (ideas of potential 
energy, equilibrium, upthrust) 
- The bigger the structure related objects the bigger the concept is (idea of 
expansion) 
(b) The greater the distance the better the example is (idea of potential energy). 
(c) Changing the shape (e.g. bigger) of objects the example could be better (ideas of 
expansion, equilibrium. 
In the case of time, it seems that in most cases "quicker is better". The smaller the time 
needed by the cause to produce the effect the better the example (ideas of potential 
energy, equilibrium, upthrust). 
Generally, to make examples worse, the things that play an important role in the 
example were removed. An example can be worse if : 
- 
certain objects do not exist (the same objects -ones playing important roles in the 
example - which children made bigger when they attempted to make a better 
example) 
- the objects are moved further away 
- objects change their shape, and we cannot recognise them 
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- the cause is changed so as to have smaller effects (see sun in expansion). The smaller 
the effects the worse the example is 
- the example loses its 'duration', changing a static phenomenon to dynamic 
In some examples particular changes can have as a result either making the example 
better or making it worse (e.g. make the child heavier in the example with the child up a 
tree, make the train go quicker in the example of expansion). 
There were some differences in the frequencies of the changes between the two 
examples of an idea. This happens mainly for three reasons: the nature of the objects, 
the importance of their role in the example, the constraints of reality. 
In some cases, two objects which had a similar role in the examples, had such big 
differences in their nature that the particular role they played in the example could not 
constrain them in a specific way. For instance, the tree and the balcony are surface 
related objects in the two different examples of potential energy. Although these objects 
play a similar role in two examples of the same idea (they support the protagonist) they 
have differences in their nature. That is, the tree can be bigger vertically while the 
balcony cannot, which do not allow the examples to constrain the schemes of these 
objects in the same way. Also, even though two objects could have the same role in two 
examples, the importance of their role was not the same (the train and the pylons were 
the surface related objects in the examples of expansion, but they had different 
functions). Furthermore, reality often defines limits to the changes that are suggested by 
the children (e.g. the child should be heavier since it could break the branch of the tree 
while the pot did not need to be heavier since it could not break the balcony). 
7.5 General conclusions of the study 
Children 11-12 years old are able to establish connections between concrete examples 
and generalisations. Examples do not fit equally well to a generalisation. Children think 
of some instances as better examples of ideas than others. A generalisation can have a 
best example. The addition of parallel examples can lead to 'higher' more broad 
274 
generalisations, while the addition of counter examples can lead to 'lower' less broad 
generalisations. 
Children in their comparisons between examples referred mainly to: 
(a) Objects' attributes such as quantities (size, weight, shape), qualities (e.g.having or 
not autonomous action) and necessity (the inherent nature of the objects) 
(b) Objects' relations such as the time between two actions, the space location of 
various objects (distance and the empirical schemes of support and border) 
(c) Objects' existence 
The fit between examples and ideas is good when empirical schemes such as 'support', 
`border', 'autonomous action', or several such anticipated empirical schemes are 
satisfied, and poor when some are and others are not. Also, an instance is a 'good' 
example when its relevant features are salient, familiar, stable and it is not too complex. 
Children asked for similar changes for objects which played similar roles in examples. 
But some of the objects which had a similar role to the examples, had big differences in 
their nature that appeared very different in examples. 
There is consistency in children's responses when they attempted to make the examples 
better or worse. Children made the examples better, following mainly the principle 
"more is better". They used this principle in various ways. However, in the case of time, 
it seems that in most cases "quicker is better". The smaller the time needed by the cause 
to produce the effect the better the example is. It is possibly the same principle as 'more 
is better' if we interpret this as 'rapidity' and not as 'duration'. In order to make the 
examples worse, the things that play an important role in the example were mainly 
removed, or moved further away, or changed their shape. On the other hand the feature 
`not exist' was rarely used by children when they attempted to make the counter-
examples better. 
275 
Chapter 8: 
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
8.1 Introduction 
The broad conclusions that may be drawn from this research are summarized in this 
final chapter of the thesis. The chapter includes: a summary of the most important 
findings, implications of the unifying framework of the description of schemes for 
science education, an indication of where future work should be done and the main 
limitations of the current thesis. 
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8.2 Summary of the findings 
Researchers in different fields have had various goals behind their accounts of what 
mental representations are used in human reasoning. Philosophers attempt to describe 
the fundamental relation between knowledge and reality, and the origins of knowledge. 
The goal of psychologists is to explain how mental representations are responsible for 
observed aspects of human thinking. Artificial intelligence researchers describe human 
mental representations in a way that will enable computers to perform tasks which 
require the use of intelligence. 
I respect all these goals, but in the current thesis my major aim is to describe the mental 
representations that children use in response to various tasks related to science 
education. The current research drew on two main traditions (originated by Piaget and 
Johnson-Laird respectively) in the area of mental representations, describing the tools 
for thought (`empirical schemes') and exploring the content of thinking. A way of 
describing many of the studies which belong to both traditions is that they all suggest 
reasoning as based on schemes which are repeatable patterns in action. The current 
thesis includes a series of studies that are based on the previous claim to describe 
various areas of children's reasoning such as analogy, exemplification and 
transformation. Thus, the general starting point of the current thesis is that children, in 
understanding the physical world, make imaginative transformations using empirical 
schemes. A brief presentation of the main findings follows. 
Children's reasoning is based on empirical schemes 
In the second chapter of this thesis, I argued that an approach to children's reasoning as 
a multi-leveled system is essential in charting a balanced view of their mental 
representations. Children can use various levels of mental representations to make 
imaginative transformations. To understand these levels consider, for example, ways 
that a child can think when trying to transform a feature of an aeroplane such as the 
"aerodynamic shape": 
a. Propositional level (the transformation can be based on the proposition "the 
aerodynamic shape") 
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b. Empirical level (using the "aerodynamic" empirical schema which is a common 
abstraction of our bodily experience and observations such as the posture - 
AVM tp..)Udi 	 Vk 	 c\ 	 l,` A 	 or the movement of fast cars 
versus lorries) 
c. Mental image level (the transformation based on picture images of a particular bird 
and a particular aeroplane) 
It is suggested here that the differences which appeared in various attempts to describe 
the mental representations system can be seen as a result of two dimensions: (a) 
abstraction, (b) organization. This research does not argue that children do not use one 
or more of these levels. However, it gives evidence that in the tasks of the particular 
research children mainly use the empirical level, which may be the basic level of 
thinking. 
Empirical schemes that the children appeared to use in their transformations lie at a 
middle level, - the empirical level - between the two ends of the continuum concrete to 
abstract. Empirical schemes organize children's mental representations at a more 
abstract level than that which they use to form mental images. On the other hand they 
are more concrete than verbal propositions. The empirical scheme 'aerodynamic shape' 
that the children kept constant while transforming the eagle into an aeroplane and vice 
versa cannot be an image that fits perfectly with both objects since there are differences 
between them (e.g. size, width, even the shape). 
The empirical scheme is not so concrete as a picture of an F-16 aeroplane because then 
it would fit only to this particular type of aeroplane and the children could not keep it 
constant when they attempted to transform it into another object. On the other hand, it 
is not so abstract as the verbal proposition 'aerodynamic shape' which suppresses and 
represents visual and enactment features in another mode (verbal). Propositions can 
capture some of the features of empirical schemes since they can also show an 
abstraction, but they cannot capture the analog nature of images and they cannot 
describe schematic transformations. The empirical schemes are the result of "empirical 
abstraction". That is, children abstract information from objects and events. This leads 
to knowledge about particulars; children think about and with particular instances- 
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examples. These findings are consistent with the results of the project "Empirical 
Abstraction" (Bliss & Ogborn 1997) which described schemes as re-usable building 
blocks being neither too generic nor too specific. The final report of this project, in 
which I participated, is included here as Appendix 2.1. 
Empirical schemes are organised in packages 
The children's transformations can be explained by the use of schemes in a continuum 
between the poles specific-generic. Schemes appear to be neither too specific nor too 
generic. Empirical schemes such as "aerodynamic", "wings", "fly", "movement" were 
used by children. The children used the following general operations on them: add, 
remove, modify, and keep constant. 
In contrast with diSessa (1988) this research shows that children's knowledge can be 
characterized to some extent by organized structures. That was evident in various ways: 
a. the children used generic schemes in their transformations; 
b. identification of groups of schemes in the Analogy task; 
c. groups of schemes which varied together in the schematic description of examples. 
All the above suggest that children's knowledge consists of patterns such as those 
described by Johnson (`image schemata') rather than being fragmentary. 
The analysis of the children's analogies for a simple electric circuit provides evidence 
for the existence of at least a partially organised system of schemes. The children 
generated their own analogies, generally drawing on groups of schemes. Schemes which 
were commonly evoked are the following: flow, path, container, open/close, barrier, 
link, forward and continuous movement. The presence of some elements of analogies 
predict the presence or absence of others. Types of structure were identified at the level 
of pairs (e.g. a "source container" is a sufficient condition for the "flow") and of groups 
of schemes (e.g. "flow" comes from a "source container" and an "action on a dynamic 
link" can admit flow to pass with a "forward movement" from one edge to another one). 
Also, types of structure were identified at the level of the "whole analogy" dimensions 
`cause vs. effect' and 'dynamic vs. static'. 
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Clusters of schemes that vary together could be identified, going from non-exemplified 
context to an exemplified one (study 3). Different packages appeared. For example, 
`blocking' which contains the schemes barrier, support, rigidity, container or the 
package of 'autonomous action' which contains the schemes autonomy, force, invisible 
entities. In general, the packages (factor structures) which emerged, were very similar 
across the analyses of different examples. 
Empirical schemes are matters of imagination 
The children used their imagination to modify existing knowledge patterns. They used 
the empirical schemes to generate novel meanings and transformations. The first study 
with the transformation tasks gave evidence for the children's use - and for the 
importance of this role- of empirical schemes in their reasoning. The children easily 
made the imaginative transformations between objects which belong to the same 
ontological category. However, they faced serious problems when they attempted to 
transform objects which belong to different ontological categories. 
These difficult cross-ontological transformations became easier when the objects had 
common functional schemes. The children kept constant in their transformations the 
empirical schemes which contain structural features that are common to many different 
objects, events, etc. That is, empirical schemes are common abstractions of a broad 
number of physical experiences or phenomena, such as the movement of objects, the 
ability of some objects to fly, and the aerodynamic shape. The children based their 
transformations on this feature of common abstraction and used empirical schemes as 
`bridges' even between different ontological categories. 
In a similar way, the children based the transformations between analogical examples 
(or events) on functional schemes. The children attempted to make transformations in 
analogical examples by focusing on actions (using 'functional schemes') and on 
schemes that describe them, rather than on parts and relations. Most of the children 
made their transformations between analogical examples which are found in school text 
books, giving a variation of transformation-matching. They did not worry about the 
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transformation of all parts and relations, but their focus was on keeping the similar 
actions or functions and common schemes stable. 
Thus, in transformation tasks there were indications that children can transform one 
entity into another using schemes. They distinguished essential features of a scheme 
which they kept constant during transformation, from "accidental" features, which they 
changed. The children's transformations can be classified in the following categories: 
"keeping constant", "add", "modify", "remove". They kept constant (mainly in the case 
of objects with common fuctional schemes) mainly schemes that are related with similar 
functions of objects rather than with surface similarity (e.g. similar position). So, they 
kept constant functions of objects, the parts of objects that are responsible for the 
particular function and features of objects that are needed for or facilitate their 
functions. 
The children used schemes that belonged to the categories 'add' or 'remove' for difficult 
transformations such as: the source of movement, things that are responsible for a 
particular sort of movement, the material that an object is made of, things that make an 
object a living thing. In the case of pairs which lack common functional schemes, 
children modified mainly parts considering their position, while in the transformations 
between objects with common functional schemes they modified mainly what parts can 
do and the material the objects are made of. 
In the case of the generation of their own analogies, the children's selection of the target 
analogy highlighted one of the most important features of their thinking, the matching 
between prior and new knowledge. That is, they showed a capacity to use relevant prior 
knowledge in reasoning even though objects or events in the new situation had never 
been directly associated with those in the remembered ones. Consider for example the 
child who gave as an analogy for a simple electric circuit, a squeezed orange. He used 
his imagination to create an analogy and possibly reorganise his existing knowledge 
patterns of the electric circuit in a new way. 
In summary, the children used their imagination in order to achieve new structure in 
their "background" knowledge, through the processes of transformation and analogical- 
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metaphorical projection. The children whenever they attempted to modify existing 
patterns in order to generate novel meanings imagined an entity as another entity. It has 
been suggested that powerful empirical schemes counteract children's resistance to 
some kind of transformations, making it easier to imagine things which it is difficult to 
imagine. 
Analogical mapping is constructed between empirical schemes 
Children have some mental representations for external reality. For example, their 
knowledge of the nature of water provides them with a scheme of how it moves. Also, 
their knowledge of electricity provides them with a scheme of how the electric flow 
moves. When a child considers an analogy between 'water movement through drinking 
straws' and 'flow movement through wires', he/she is trying to build a relation between 
those two schemes. The analogical projection is not between an internal mental model 
and the external world. It is between two internal mental models (Holyoak & Thagard, 
1996). A researcher who attempts to make an analysis of analogies has to describe these 
mental representations, that is, the schemes which are the components of the analogical 
mapping. 
Holyoak & Thagard (1996) point out that the construction of analogy is based on some 
`schemas'. They mention as an example, the formation of the concepts sound waves and 
light waves as analogies from water waves. These analogies are based on the 
commonalities between the instances of the complex concept 'wave' which "convey 
patterns of relations among constituent elements, as schemas" (p.24). The concept (or 
better, scheme) 'wave' has been developed from a specific analogy, tied to a particular 
kind of example (water waves), to a more abstract entity that can be applied to a vast 
range of situations. Analogical thinking sets as a requirement that the person needs to be 
able to look at specific situations and somehow to pull out abstract common patterns 
even though the situations may be substantially different. 
Analogies have in the past been mainly studied at a "propositional" level. In this 
research I attempted to investigate them at a nonpropositional level, identifying the 
nature of the empirical schemes that take part. Progress in our understanding of 
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children's reasoning in the construction of analogies, may depend on studying 
children's "empirical schemes" as well as their structuring, that is, their synthesis into 
packages. Results show that there is structure in empirical schemes. Schemes are not 
just small fragments of knowledge, they are organised in packages., elements of which 
invoke each other. 
Causal relationships in analogies 
The analogies of the simple electric circuit that the children constructed are based on the 
relationship of causes to effects (an interpretation of a dimension identified through 
multidimensional scaling). Actions of some objects (causes) change the state of the 
world (effects). It seems that what often matters in an analogy is the set of causal 
relationships it evokes (Holyoak & Thagard, 1996). In explanatory uses of analogy such 
as in the tasks of the second study, what matters is the causal relationships in the source 
analogue that can suggest causes for what is to be explained in the target. Thus, in the 
analogy with the orange, the squeezing of the orange is the cause of the production of 
the juice, and that explains a similar cause the 'closing of the switch in the electric 
circuit' which has as effect, the production of an entity (flow). 
When the children gave their analogical example having as source example an electric 
circuit, their reasoning tended to follow a linear causal relationship. They postulated a 
group of elements as a "cause" which produced some "effects" (described by another 
group of elements). Furthermore, the second dimension played an important role in the 
construction of analogy is the "dynamic-static" dimension. The group with "dynamic" 
elements was clearly distinguished from that with the "static" ones. 
Examples constrain empirical schemes 
A theme which runs through a number of sections is the interaction between entities. 
That is, the way in which the empirical schemes - that describe an entity - are 
constrained, interact and are modified by other entities that take part in the same 
phenomenon. Children in classrooms are often asked to imagine entites as components 
of various phenomena. The way that various exemplified contexts work is related to the 
schematic way their components are perceived by children. 
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In the current thesis sets of entities (in a picture) were investigated (a) prior to being 
used as an example of an idea, and (b) when used as such an example. The meaning of 
entities changes from one case to the other. Thus, the use of an object in an example of 
an idea constrains the way children imagine the objects, highlighting or hiding some of 
its features. However, many examples can not constrain and succesfully reduce the 
appearance of the 'autonomous action' scheme, which appears to be too strong to be 
suppressed. 
In general, with the special exemption of very few schemes, the objects in the the two 
examples of an idea, either stayed close together or moved closer together on all factors, 
when going to the exemplifying context. However, in some cases the examples of an 
idea might work in two opposite directions highlighting very different schemes of an 
entity. For instance in the example with the child who attempts to raise a stone in the 
sea, fewer children said that that the upthrust is a 'barrier' while in the example with the 
child who attempts to push down a ball into water more children said that upthrust is a 
`barrier'.These shifts are related with the nature of the idea being exemplified and with 
the particular role that entities play in the example (e.g. protagonists, scientific entities, 
structure related objects). For example, the scientific entities (eg. potential energy, 
inertia, uptrust) appeared mainly as invisible entities out of an exemplifying context. 
They were not so well known and the example helps children to identify more schemes 
for the description of these abstract entities. 
Broadly, we predict that for objects relevant to a given example, the frequencies of 
schemes will become more differentiated when the example is given. Examples 
appeared to work in a similar way as metaphors: they highlight or hide some features of 
entities, suggesting new ways of seeing entities. 
Examples do not fit equally well to an idea 
The children saw differences in how well examples fitted general ideas. 'Good' 
examples are the ones where the relevant features are salient (large), familiar, have the 
ability of autonomous action and are not too complex. It seems that there is a guiding 
structure of mental and external representations which follow the scheme: A 
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generalization can have a best example. The addition of parallel examples can lead to 
"higher" more general generalizations, while the addition of counter examples can lead 
to "Lower" generalizations. The fit between example and an idea is good when 
empirical schemes such as 'support', 'barrier', 'autonomous action', are satisfied, and is 
poor when some are not. 
The presence (or absence) of particular empirical schemes influences the fit between 
examples and ideas. The children in their comparisons between examples referred 
mainly to objects attributes such as quantities, qualities and necessity, objects relations 
such as spatiotemporal relations and objects existence. Considering the quantities of 
objects such as their size, weight and quantity, the children suggested changes that could 
make an example be 'better' following mainly the principle 'more is better' in various 
ways. For example, the bigger or heavier the protagonists of examples the bigger the 
scientific concept is, and the bigger the scientific entity the better the example. 
Particularly, in the examples of expansion, the children suggested changes in the shape 
of objects to make the examples better. Considering the idea of potential energy, the 
children argued that an example consisting of an object (eg. a child) which can be 
described by the scheme of autonomous action, is not a good example of the idea. In 
some cases the fit between examples and ideas is influenced by the inherent nature of 
the objects. Thus, an eagle does not fit so well with the idea "What goes up must come 
down" because "the eagle because of its nature can fly". Furthermore the spatiotemporal 
relations of objects influences the fit of examples with ideas. For example, for the idea 
"What goes up must come down", a stone rather a ball thrown in the air is a better 
example of the idea, because the "stone will come down more quickly than the ball". 
Also the position of objects in space and their relations with other objects that take part 
in an example of an idea play a crucial role in the fit between example and idea. For 
example, an aeroplane appeared as a better example of the idea of potential energy in 
comparison with a child up a tree, because of its greater distance from the ground. 
The results were confirmed by the fact that the children suggested removing the things 
that played an important role in an example, when asked what would make the example 
worse. 
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8.3 Implications for science education 
The thesis shows how the idea of schemes can be applied to the various kinds of 
thinking investigated. Some important implication of this research for science education 
follow. 
Some 'barriers' to imagining scientific entities 
At many points my dissatisfaction with the traditional approach to ontological 
categories should have been apparent. This research adds to the ontological perspective 
of conceptual change, the fact that the notion of ontologically distinct categories needs 
to be explored in terms of schemes. It has implications for science education because the 
transformation of everyday phenomena into scientific concepts may be based on 
common functional schemes. 
Chi and her colleagues (1992, 1995) applied the notion of ontologically different 
concepts to the issue of conceptual change in science learning. She argues that learning 
in science involves conceptual change across ontological categories since the scientific 
meaning of many science concepts belongs to different ontological categories form the 
naive intuitive meaning held by students. Also, she proposed that some science concepts 
are more difficult to learn than others because they require a conceptual transition 
between different ontological categories. She based her analysis on the identification of 
predicates such as contain, move, block etc. which might be regarded as schemes. 
The transformations which are explored in the present thesis are closely related with 
imagination. The earlier chapters of the thesis discuss a wide range of ways of using 
imagination. Here, I will make a few speculative points about imagination in science 
education. The starting point should be that imagination constructs knowledge even 
when it transforms knowledge into something unreal and impossible, and that this is the 
main path for creativity. Teachers should give children opportunities to make 
imaginative transformations: a. of objects (e.g. a human into a robot), b. events (e.g. a 
simple electric circuit into a bridge that opens and closes), (c) examples of ideas (e.g. 
make the example with a child up a tree of the idea 'what is raised has potential energy' 
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a better one). Also children could use their imagination to generate their own analogies 
and examples of ideas. 
Using examples of ideas in classrooms 
All the world around us is full of abstract ideas. One can see such abstract ideas in the 
form of big headlines on the TV news, in newspapers, books, magazines etc. Concrete 
examples of these ideas help people to understand them. Something similar happens in 
science classrooms. A teacher often gives a general idea such as "When things are raised 
they have potential energy" and attempts to clarify it through the use of some concrete 
examples such as a boy up a tree or an aeroplane high up etc. Thus, the use of examples 
seems to be an important feature of the science classroom. 
There are important implications from the results of the third study that show a shift in 
the way that entities are seen in different contexts. An example can not stand on its own 
without the commentary which helps readers to clarify its purpose. Exercises with the 
explicit description of examples by children can help teachers to see what for children 
the focus of the example. Teachers should know that examples do not work in the same 
way for all children. The presentation of more than one example seems appropriate. 
Implications for science curriculum development 
One important implication for science curriculum development is the construction of 
analogies by pupils. Holyoak and Thagard (1997) have suggested that one useful 
strategy for correcting pupils misconceptions may be to have pupils generate analogies 
themselves. In the present study, one could argue that many children knew the electric 
circuits well and only in this case could they create 'interesting' and useful analogies. In 
the case where students have little knowledge of the domain of instruction, it is expected 
that their analogies will be bad ones; however, Holyoak and Thagard (1997) argue that 
using the generation of analogies to point out children's misunderstandings would be a 
useful way of correcting their misconceptions. Children's analogies such as the analogy 
of an electric circuit with a squeezed orange, can be a helpful tool in the exploration of 
children's thinking, can illuminate the children's focus (e.g. in the current study 
schemes of processes seem to play a protagonist role), and can be a motivating factor in 
learning. Most of the children showed clear signs of excitement as they constructed their 
287 
analogies, as I worked with them. As Holyoak and Thagard pointed out 'a good analogy 
is not only understood; it is also felt'. 
A second implication for science curriculum development is the use of exercises in 
textbooks, asking children to give examples of ideas. Pupils seem to me to be able to 
give examples of ideas and a teacher could use these examples to learn more about their 
understanding. Particularly, exercises which compare examples of the same idea, and 
which consider positive and negative examples, can show what are the most important 
features of an idea for pupils. 
Finally, imaginative transformations of objects and scientific entities can help children 
to understand the differences and the sameness between objects or between everyday 
and scientific use of entities. It seems to me that transformations such as a robot into 
human can help children to understand some metaphors (e.g. human as machine). 
8.4 Limitations of the study 
The limitations of the current research have to do with: 
(a) the inclusion of many areas in the research 
(b) the nature of the prompts used for the interviews 
(c) the order of questions 
The attempt to find common tools for analysing and understanding children's reasoning 
about the physical world seems to me to be important. Each of the studies 
(transformation, analogy, examples, examples and generalizations) could be the topic of 
a whole thesis. The idea in the current thesis is to use a common conceptual tool, that is 
empirical schemes, to describe all these various areas. Equally the exploration of these 
various areas gives a better picture of the nature of schemes. Briefly the advantages of 
an approach through a variety of linked studies are: 
- to see and describe various kinds of thinking as imaginative transformations 
- to use the same tool to explore the nature of various kinds of thinking 
- to have a clearer picture of the nature of empirical schemes 
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One limitation of the studies presented in this thesis and particularly of the second 
study, is that children's focus on actions and common schemes (when they described an 
analogy or generated their own analogy) could be explained as the result of the content 
of the particular event (open/close the switch of the electric circuit). In the exploratory 
study, the use of a 'perfect analogy' may lead children to these responses. That is, the 
two analogical events had been selected by the author (of the science textbook) in a way 
that the focus in the analogy was to be on common actions and schemes and not on 
surface similarities. I tried to solve this problem in the main study where I explored the 
way that children produce by themselves spontaneous analogies although they can be 
"partial analogies". However, more events and analogies should be explored. 
The order of questions in the questionnaire (study 3) was important. Firstly, the children 
were asked to give their own examples of an idea, then to reply to questions about 
objects without reference to any idea and finally to reply to questions about the same 
objects but now as a part of an example of a given idea. The children were asked to 
give their examples before they were presented with the textbook examples because I 
wanted to avoid any effect from the textbook examples chosen for the questionnaire in 
the construction of their own examples. Also, I did not put the questions about what the 
objects can do in general before the construction of examples, because I did not want the 
children to try to make their examples using the objects that they had described just 
before. In the questionnaire, the questions about objects without reference to any 
example came before those in which the objects were components of an example. I did 
not follow the opposite order because I thought that the children might focus on one 
example (the one that to be given to them) to give answers for what objects can do in 
general. 
One could argue that the order of questions sets a particular context for the answer and 
to some extent influences children's responses. Unfortunately, any order would have 
limitations. The main limitation one could expect from the order followed, is that the 
children constructing their examples of a given idea at the beginning, might be 
influenced by the example of the given idea in the description for the objects out of any 
exemplifying context they made later. However, the changes that were observed in the 
children's responses for the objects between the non-exemplifying and exemplifying 
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contexts show that any such effects were not sufficient to 'wipe out' differences 
between perception of entities used in exemplifying and non-exemplifying contexts. 
8.5 Further research 
The development of schemes with age could be followed up in longitudinal studies. 
Interviews and questionaires used in this research would need to be complemented by 
detailed case studies because one needs to be able to identify developmental factors the 
importance of which is revealed in questionnaires and interviews. 
To see the extent to which not only pupils but also teachers construct, use analogies, 
examples, and ideas in a science classroom other detailed research is needed. 
Exemplification, analogical thinking and manipulation (transformation) of objects are 
everyday practices in science classrooms. However, there is no guide to suggest when 
an example or an analogy work well and the choice of examples or analogies is 
intutitive or a result of the teacher's experience. Research on how teachers use analogies 
and examples in school practice to shape pupils' view of the natural world and on how 
pupils transform and extend analogies and examples to construct a new entity is needed. 
8.6 Concluding remarks 
In writing this thesis I have become aware that there are gaps in past and present 
research into the analysis of the nature and the way that repeatable patterns are used in 
children's reasoning. The framework for the analysis of children's reasoning proposed 
in the current research offers a principle, that is the use of empirical schemes, which, not 
in itself novel, is applied here with the new aim of unifying a variety of studies in this 
way. This framework unifies the research on imaginative transformations (e.g. 
analogies, transformation of objects, transformation of examples into ideas and vice 
versa). It seems to me that this framework is a promising one in which research on 
imaginative transformation might be brought together. A number of features of 
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children's reasoning were evident in the studies reported in the current thesis. Here, I 
will draw out what appear to me to be some of the general isssues: 
• Mental representations can be described as a multi-leveled system. 
• These levels include a middle, basic level neither very abstract nor very concrete. 
The 'empirical level' is the basic level in thinking. 
• Empirical schemes are knowledge structures about particulars. 
• Children use imagination in transforming objects and events. 
• A package of elements is transformed into another through analogies. 
• Empirical schemes interact. 
• Examples can be described using empirical schemes. 
• Examples constrain empirical schemes. 
In the minds of the readers of this thesis, questions such as the following are likely to 
have arisen: how do we know that children use schemes in their reasoning? It seems to 
me now after having seen the various repeatable patterns in children's reasoning which I 
identified in this thesis, that if it is difficult to persuade someone that they exist, it is 
equally, or more, difficult to ignore the existence of these patterns and to hold that 
reasoning is not based on empirical schemes. 
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Appendix 2.1 The final report to ESRC of the research project 'Empirical 
Abstraction'. 
Empirical Abstraction and 
Concrete Physical Reasoning Schemes 
Final Report 
Background 
Some such notion as 'scheme' is present in a wide range of work on cognitive 
development and reasoning. It is already there in Bartlett, and it essential to the thought 
of Piaget (Bliss 1995, Piaget and Garcia 1987). The nature of reasoning schemes has been 
debated in the writings of, amongst others, Carey (1985), Keil (1979, 1981, 1990, 1992), 
Gelman (1990), Carey and Gelman (1991), Hirschfield and Gelman (1994), and diSessa 
(1988, 1993). The notion is implicit in much early work in cognitive science on 'naive 
physics' (e.g. Hayes 1979, 1985), and is implicated in much work on mental models (e.g. 
Gentner and Stevens, 1983). A similar notion is involved in work on categorisation (e.g. 
Rosch and Lloyd 1978). There is however, very little agreement in detail about what 
constitutes a scheme, beyond it being some internalised patterned complex of activity or 
expectations. Some authors have a broad-brush approach, e.g. Keil's notion of modes of 
construal of the world, or the idea of large ontological categories such as physical event 
or object (Carey 1985, Chi 1992). Others (e.g. diSessa) hold that units of thought are 
many, varied and fragmentary. Some (e.g. Johnson-Laird 1983) use a notion like mental 
model or scheme to indicate tools used for thought; others (e.g. Gentner and Stevens) use 
a similarly-named notion to describe patterns in what people think. Some (e.g. Spelke 
1990, Medin et al 1990) see certain schemes as innate; others look for developmental 
mechanisms. It is this lack of agreement about a crucial idea which motivated us to 
investigate methods for identifying and characterising schemes. 
Here, we restrict our focus to schemes originating in reasoning about the physical world, 
in making sense of physical objects and events, but even so the variety of views sketched 
in above can be found. Our essential starting point is Piaget's notion of 'empirical 
abstraction', an outcome of the child's physical interaction with the world, leading to 
internalised schemes representing the physical nature of things. However, having had the 
idea, Piaget neglected it, being more interested in logical and mathematical schemes. 
Indeed he saw the dependence of physical reasoning schemes on the behaviour of 
physical objects themselves as a difficulty for his theorising. We, by contrast, see such 
schemes as 'effort' and 'support', derived from the activity of making and experiencing 
movements, not only as basic elements in everyday reasoning about force and motion 
(Ogborn 1985, Bliss and Ogborn 1990, 1992, 1993, 1994), but also as potential building 
blocks for reasoning - often metaphorically - about many other domains. And we find 
support (note the metaphor!) in such work as that of Lakoff and Johnson (Lakoff and 
Johnson 1981, Lakoff 1987, Johnson 1987) grounding semantics in bodily action. 
If the notion of 'scheme' has any value, it must be the case that one can identify 'the same.  
scheme being used in different contexts. It must also be possible to name and characterise 
a number of schemes of rather general use; it would be desirable to have some analysis of 
or typology of schemes. And it would be very helpful to have a variety of empirical 
methods adapted to the further investigation of the existence, use and nature of schemes. 
Our guiding hypothesis was that these goals might be achievable, in the limited case of 
physical reasoning schemes deriving from empirical abstraction. 
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Objectives 
The overall goal of the research was a preliminary and limited investigation of empirical 
abstraction and concrete physical reasoning schemes, to pave the way for further 
research, in the context of pupils' engagement with scientific ideas; more specifically: 
• to contribute to the theory of everyday common-sense thinking and reasoning through 
the development of an analytic framework for the classification of concrete physical 
reasoning schemes and the development of a typology of concrete physical schemes as 
tools for thinking. 
• to contribute to knowledge of the development and use of children's concrete physical 
reasoning schemes, with relevance to the learning of science. 
• to contribute to the development of research tools in two ways: 
-by the development of a methodological framework for investigating concrete 
physical schemes as tools for thinking. 
-by the construction and testing of a novel set of generic tasks for the 
investigation of concrete physical reasoning schemes. 
These objectives were translated into nine more specific research questions, of three 
kinds: analytical, empirical and methodological. These questions are reproduced and 
addressed in the Results section later. 
We have addressed all the specific research questions. The analytical questions were 
addressed through the process of identifying putative schemes for investigation, and of 
attempting to identify schemes in use in data obtained. We now see more clearly the 
nature of schemes as articulated packages of potential, and recognise more sharply the 
inter-connectedness of many schemes. 
The empirical and methodological questions were addressed jointly through the 
construction of, piloting, and analysis of data from, a planned set of elicitation tasks. The 
intended relationship to learning of science, though present, played a more minor role 
than expected, in part because of the need for tasks to be suitable for both 6-7 and 13-14 
year-olds. 
The strongest results are an analytic framework for thinking about the nature of schemes, 
with new features informed by our results, the construction of a number of generally 
applicable (generic) tasks designed to investigate different aspects of schemes, and the 
evidence we can present of the stable existence from an early age of a fairly small number 
of physical reasoning schemes which inform much reasoning, physical and non-physical. 
The main weakness in the results derives from the fact that, being committed to 
developing a range of generic tasks, the timetable did not allow enough for the full 
revision and re-trial of tasks, so that some have had to be piloted with rather small 
numbers of subjects. We accepted this rather than restricting the number of tasks 
developed, because we found that the different tasks all gave usefully different 
perspectives on the issues involved in defining, eliciting and characterising schemes. 
The project benefited greatly (at no cost) from the work of an associated doctoral student, 
Mr C A Tsatsarelis, who independently conducted several relevant studies (and later 
joined the project team). Where these studies are mentioned, they are credited explicitly 
to him. 
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Methods: 1 Overview and Design 
A central objective was to develop a methodological framework, producing generic tasks 
available across different types of schemes. A theoretical typology of schemes was 
originally intended to be one axis of the framework. It quickly became clear that the way 
schemes relate to one another is more complex and more interesting than anticipated, so 
that the theoretical analysis needed to be informed by data from tasks to be devised. 
In its place we conducted a content analysis of a range of texts, including science texts 
but also newspapers and journals, looking for metaphorical uses of physical reasoning 
schemes. It was striking how frequent these were, and how many were based on very 
simple physical processes: forcing, pressing, containing, blocking, flowing, moving, 
hitting, balancing, breaking, bending. Others (e.g. reflection, combustion) were present, 
but it was these mechanical processes which seemed most often to be invoked. We 
decided to focus attention on these schemes, with a reasonable range of them in the 
various tasks to be developed. 
A first dimension of our methodological framework was four categories of tasks (see 
proposal): 
• imaginative transformations 
• thinking of something as... 
• instances of something like... 
• thinking metaphorically with physical schemes 
Another dimension distinguished whether tasks required the production or recognition of 
a 'scheme' or an instance of one (generative or selective tasks). In both, counter-
suggestions probe the strength of commitment to ideas. We also varied the extent to 
which the schemes under investigation were explicit or not. 
A third dimension was the need to adapt tasks to a wide age range (from 6 years old). 
Tasks relying too much on language were not suitable for very young children. In 
piloting we paid attention to whether tasks seemed authentic and produced a good flow of 
spontaneous thought. 
The tasks themselves used a range of stimuli, non-linguistic as well as linguistic: pictures, 
objects, metaphors, stories, etc. They used a range of elicitation techniques, from open 
invitations to speculate, through interviews about specific stimuli, to 'yes/no' responses. 
They was designed to have possible generic forms, that is to be able to be adapted to 
different domains. 
Our previous work suggests that many physical reasoning schemes originate through 
children's actions on and experience of the physical world early in their development. 
These actions are internalised by the age of 5 or 6, acting as tools for thinking and 
generating knowledge about the world which becomes highly tacit. Devising tasks to 
explore such tacit thinking is difficult. Subjects may be asked to make explicit things 
which are so obvious and taken-for-granted that they normally remain unsaid. In the 
various tasks we adopted a range of strategies to help to make such thinking explicit, for 
example by presenting objects whose behaviour is surprising, by creating unusual 
scenarios, by inviting participants to imagine the world behaving oppositely to how it 
should, by asking questions appropriate to one ontological category about entities 
belonging to another (e.g. can the mind move by itself?). Throughout, therefore, everyday 
thinking was challenged. 
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Task categories 
Ten studies were conducted. One analysed texts for the metaphorical use of schemes. 
Nine (three conducted by Mr Tsatsarelis) involved scheme-elicitation tasks, and fall into 
four groups according to the methodological framework above. 
Imaginative transformations... asking for entities or events to be transformed in 
imagination. These tasks investigate schemes through seeing what is held invariant in 
transformations. Difficulties of transformation suggest boundaries between incompatible 
schemes. Four such tasks were devised: 
Imaginative denial of rules (Topsy Turvy World), 
Imaginative constructions (Lonely Giant); 
Transforming an object into another (Object transformation) [Tsatsarelis]; 
Transforming an event into another (Event analogies) [Tsatsarelis] 
Thinking of something as... trying to think of instances as like a given scheme (e.g. is a 
gale like the flow of something?). Something concrete is to be imagined or explained in 
one or more general ways, going from the instance to the scheme. Two such tasks were 
devised: 
Fitting schemes to counter-expectations (Anomalies) 
Dimensions of schemes (Ontologies) 
Instances of something like.. creating or identifying instances of a scheme (e.g. what 
counts as a 'container'?), going now from the scheme to the instance. Two such tasks 
were devised: 
Application of Schemes (Prototypes) 
Fit of examples to (scientific) ideas (Examples) [Tsatsarelis] 
Thinking metaphorically with physical schemes: using physical schemes as the basis of 
metaphors to reason about non-physical situations. One such task was devised, given that 
data about metaphorical uses was also available from the text analysis and from several 
other tasks: 
Schemes as metaphors (Metaphors) 
Methods: 2 Task development and specific results 
In this section we summarise the various tasks developed, and outline specific results 
from each. Fuller details are in Appendix 2. 
Imaginative Transformations 
Imaginative denial of rules (Topsy Turvy World) 
Task design: 
Generative. Schemes not presented explicitly (implicit in goals set). 
Focus on constraints on changing schemes. 
Setting: common knowledge. 
Schemes commonly evoked: up-down, fall, support, contain, rigidity, flow. 
Children: 
6-7 years 	 19 
13-14 years 
	
6 
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Children were asked to imagine what familiar actions (e.g. making tea) would be like in a 
world in which everything is 'topsy turvy'. 
'Inverting' one scheme affects others (e.g. if things fall upwards, support is changed). 
Thus schemes are related in packages; inversion of everything leads to contradiction. 
Very fundamental ('Kantian') schemes (inside-outside, bounded space, time sequence, 
cause-effect) are conserved and not inverted. Up and down, support, falling, rigidity, 
fluidity can be changed. 
Imaginative constructions (Lonely Giant) 
Task design: 
Generative. Schemes not presented explicitly (implicit in goals set). 
Focus on schemes through unusual uses of materials and resources. Mainly functional 
schemes invoked. 
Setting: common knowledge. 
Schemes commonly evoked: container, motion, force, rigidity, cause-effect. 
Children: 
6-7 years 	 5 
13-14 years 7 
Children were asked to imagine constructing a car from more or less unsuitable materials 
(e.g. bricks, paper, boxes, trees) so that materials had to be transformed in imagination. 
The results bear upon theories of abstraction. Older children had a generic notion of 'car', 
with explicit broad functional units; materials were shaped to fit these functions. Younger 
children started from available materials, letting their nature or appearance suggest a use. 
But these uses were still organised around functional schemes, though implicitly (e.g. a 
paper bag for a seat because both are containers). Younger children's thinking was 
transductive; older children thought functionally. 
Transforming an object into another (object transformation) [Tsatsarelis] 
Task design: 
Generative. Schemes not presented explicitly (implicit in goals set). 
Focus on invariances of schemes through making 'impossible' imaginative 
transformations. Special attention to transformation across ontological categories, and on 
functional schemes. 
Setting: common knowledge. 
Schemes commonly evoked: functions such as move by itself, fly, contain. 
Children: 
11-12 years 38 (Greek) 
Children were asked to transform one object of a pair into the other. Pairs could belong to 
the same ontological category or not (natural living kinds or artefacts). Artefacts did or 
did not share common functional schemes. 
Transformations between objects of the same ontological kind were easy. 
Transformations from one kind to another were harder; hardest in the direction from 
artefact to living thing. Shared functional schemes made cross-category transformations 
easier. Shared schemes can bridge ontological differences. 
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Transformational steps used four devices: adding, modifying, removing and keeping 
constant particular features. Shared functional schemes led to use of 'keeping constant'. 
Lack of common schemes led to use of 'modify' or 'remove'. 
Transforming one event into another (event analogies) [Tsatsarelis] 
Task design: 
Generative. Schemes not presented explicitly (implicit in goals set). 
Focus on the schematic nature of school science processes, through construction of 
analogies. 
Setting: school science knowledge. 
Schemes commonly evoked: flow, action, path, barrier. 
Children: 
11-12 years 39 (Greek) 
Given pictures taken from school science text books of processes of scientific interest 
(e.g. current in a circuit) children were asked to construct analogies for these processes. 
They could find analogies, generally drawing on schemes from everyday knowledge. 
Detailed statistical analysis of the co-occurrence of elements in analogies (objects, 
scientific entities, processes) shows that the underlying thinking is regular and well-
structured. Dimensions 'dynamic vs. static' and 'cause vs. effect' can be seen. Types of 
structure were such as 'a source/container provides something which can flow, if acted on 
dynamically'. Interaction with scientific knowledge appears to have left children with 
broad pictures of the nature of a number of processes, not simply with surface facts. 
Thinking of something as... 
Fitting schemes to counter-expectations (Anomalies) 
Task design: 
Generative. Schemes not presented explicitly (implicit in goals set). 
Focus on the use or adaptation of schemes to predict and account for the behaviour of 
objects which appear to violate common knowledge schemes. 
Setting: common knowledge (unusual devices). 
Schemes commonly evoked: support, balance, motion, force, rigidity, fluidity. 
Children: 
13-14 years 7 
Children were asked to account for the behaviour of objects ('potty putty', a gyroscope, an 
executive 'perpetual motion' toy) which behaved in ways violating their expectations. 
A given object evokes a package of schemes, e.g. movement, rigidity and support. The 
behaviour of these anomalous objects violated such schemes, allowing us to see how they 
interact. Schemes were not abandoned but rather imagined as realised or combined in 
novel ways (e.g. motion lends support). We observed a dynamic process of scheme fitting 
and revision. Action on the objects was crucial to produce revision of scheme fitting. 
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Dimensions of schemes (Ontologies) 
Task design: 
Selective. Schemes pre-selected, implicit in diagnostic questions. 
Focus on detecting the consistent presence of schemes in thinking about a wide variety of 
objects, some unpredictable in their scheme-formation. 
Setting: common knowledge. 
Schemes: object in motion, source of motion, support, container, carrier, fluid flow. 
Participants: 
13-14 years 58 (one group of 28; one group of 30) 
adults 	 22 
This task, using a questionnaire format with simple yes/no answers, was designed to 
complement small scale interview tasks. 
Hypothesised schemes could be recovered from patterns of responses to simple 
ontological questions (e.g. "Does it hold something up?"; "Does it stop something 
falling?" for 'support'), showing how a variety of physical entities were understood in 
terms of such schemes. Of 22 objects asked about, some were 'unproblematic' in terms of 
schemes (e:g. a car); others were chosen to be problematic (e.g. the mind). 
Factor and cluster analysis extracted schematic groupings which were closely related to 
those built into the design. With some variations, these were applicable as much to 
problematic objects as to unproblematic ones, and were similar across age differences. 
An unanticipated rather abstract scheme, 'fillable space', appeared to emerge. The 
'problematic' exemplars all had intelligible (but not a priori predictable) descriptions in 
terms of these schemes (e.g. the mind as a container and carrier) 
It appears that something like such schemes can be taken to 'exist' in participant's thinking 
about the physical world. 
Instances of something like... 
Application of Schemes (Prototypes) 
Task design: 
Selection. Schemes presented explicitly. 
Focus on recognising instances of schemes in a variety of different physical contexts. 
Setting: common knowledge. 
Schemes: support, containment, flow, floating. 
Children: 
6-7 years 	 29 
13-14 years 	 6 
Children first agreed about a target-scheme shown in a picture. They then had to identify 
other examples of the scheme in each of nine different contexts, shown as drawings of 
scenes (e.g. a waiter serving customers wine; a bath overflowing). Finally they chose the 
best example from all the pictures. 
Younger and older children showed a similar underlying pattern of difference in their use 
of all four schemes. Each scheme was used in a local and specific way by 6-7 year olds 
but more generically and across more contexts by the older ones. 
For example, for 'support' younger children's examples are obvious (waiter-tray) or local 
(bath-legs); older children choose less obvious examples (e.g. chairs tightropes and 
trampolines supporting people). Young children used 'containment' only in a local sense 
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(cups-containing-drinks) - spaces did not 'contain', as they did for older children. 'Flow' 
was similar. 'Float' showed the same tendency, but older children had not yet extended its 
range of convenience very much. 
Fit of examples to scientific ideas (Examples) [Tsatsarelis] 
Task design: 
Selective. Schemes implicit in choice of examples and questions. 
Focus: Examples and generalisations. How particular cases function as examples or 
counter examples of general 'scientific' ideas. How seeing a case as an example constrains 
its schematisation. 
Setting: school science knowledge. 
Children: 
11-12 years six groups of about 40 (Greek) 
Firstly, children were given a 'scientific' idea (e.g. light travels in straight lines), and an 
example, a parallel example and a possible counter-example. They were asked whether 
the examples were good or not, and whether the example changed the idea for them. 
Examples tended to be judged good on grounds of salience or immediacy (size or speed). 
Counter examples produced specialisations of ideas, or over-ride principles. Parallel 
examples sometimes lead to a wider generalisation. 
Secondly, a questionnaire presented first a picture of a scene (e.g. a boy up a tree) and 
then the same scene but now described as an example of a scientific idea (e.g. potential 
energy). Six such ideas were used, each with two different picture-examples. Both before 
and after revealing the idea, children were asked whether elements of the picture might fit 
a number of schemes (e.g. block something, force something, contain something). 
Interpretable factors could be extracted (e.g. autonomous action, static barrier/support, 
particular or generic location). Factor scores provide a characterisation of the elements of 
the examples in terms of these schemes. 
After presenting the idea, assignment to schemes became more differentiated and 
selective. Seeing something as an example constrains how it is imagined. 
Thinking metaphorically with physical schemes 
Schemes as metaphors (Metaphors) 
Task design: 
Selective. Schemes presented explicitly. 
Focus: use of physical reasoning schemes in thinking metaphorically about non-physical 
situations. 
Setting: common knowledge. 
Schemes: support, flow, containment, barrier, floating, balance. 
Children: 
13-14 years 6 
For each of the above schemes, we constructed a pair of scenarios predicted to be one 
plausible and one implausible example of the scheme used metaphorically (e.g. 
containing feelings, supporting a person's activities). The non-examples each violated 
what we took to be one criterial aspect of the scheme (e.g. proximity for support). 
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Children were asked whether such scenarios were or were not good instances of a scheme 
used metaphorically (in the form of questions about the scenario of the type, "Would you 
say that Peter contained his feelings?"), and to explain why or why not. 
Agreement with predictions was generally good. Disagreements arose mainly with 'flow' 
and 'floating'. Metaphors were taken not to apply on grounds relating to broad schematic 
features: e.g. that 'flow' should be continuous and not too rapid - discrete or rapid changes 
were disqualified. 'Floating' metaphors were often required to be rather literal to qualify. 
Children could argue for or against the validity of these metaphors, invoking physical 
features of the schemes to do so. 
Results: Overall 
We originally posed the following three analytical research questions: 
(1) What would be a plausible set of concrete physical reasoning schemes usable in a 
wide range of contexts of thinking about physical reality, and so in learning science? 
(2) How can the differences between and the relationships between such schemes be 
characterised analytically? Can any claim that an analysis of types of schemes is in 
some sense comprehensive be sustained? 
(3) What is the appropriate granularity at which to define schemes, from the highly 
general (e.g. space, object) to the more particular (e.g. running river, falling ball)? 
To respond to them we have to be clearer about the nature of schemes. Using the 
language of complex adaptive systems (e.g. Holland 1995) we regard schemes as tagged 
(labelled) re-usable building blocks used in packages to make models. Take the scheme 
'support', for example. It has acquired a name (tag) which people recognise instances of 
very early. It is widely re-usable (sitting on a chair, holding a cup, lending moral 
support). It is a building block used in combination with others such as fall, effort, 
solidity. The combined package of schemes constitutes a model allowing one to predict 
or account for events (that one will fall if the chair breaks; that morale has sagged). 
A scheme has a small set of potentials (to adopt a linguistic term) which provide 
entailments and link it to other schemes. The potentials of 'support' include 'something 
underneath', 'prevented from falling', 'above the ground'. If a potential is not satisfied 
something must substitute for it (a bird has nothing underneath, so must support itself 'by 
its own effort'). Notice the intimate links to other schemes (falling and effort). 
Entailments are direct one-step inferences from 'how things are'. That removing support 
will make something fall is such an entailment. 
Schemes need to be neither too specific nor too generic. The more generic, the greater the 
possible range of convenience. But the more specific, the greater the number of 
entailments. Effective thought requires a compromise. Thus support is less specific than 
'resting on something solid', but more specific than 'being there'. Its re-usability derives 
from this: it is generic enough to be used in many situations but not so generic as to apply 
almost everywhere. This makes it recognisable, able to carry a usable tag-label. 
The 'right' level of specificity is relative to the domain of thought (for experts, highly 
generic things become specific). This makes answers to questions about granularity and 
completeness into empirical questions for given domains. But it does seem (empirically) 
that the schemes appropriate to thinking about the movement (or not) of physical objects, 
established early in life, prove to be re-usable in many other domains, including social 
life. A quite small set of a dozen or so such schemes accounts for a good proportion of 
metaphors found in texts (movement, action/force/effort, container, carrier, support, fall, 
barrier, space, flow, break/not break, stretch/squash, balance). 
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This discussion leaves open the question whether 'schemes' are a linguistic or 
psychological phenomenon. We think the question ill posed. Were they not taggedand so 
used in communication, they would not acquire their (growing) power. But they would 
not become essential metaphoric components of meaning (Lakoff 1987, Johnson 1987) if 
they were ill-fitted to making effective and predictive mental models. Such over-
determination makes schemes very stable. 
Evidence to sustain this analysis comes from a number of tasks. No task ran into 
difficulty over tagging schemes, even with very young children. The Prototypes task 
shows directly that tagged schemes are readily recognisable. In generative tasks, similar 
scheme tags were produced by children. Re-usability in different physical contexts is 
shown by the Prototypes task; re-usability in non-physical contexts by the Metaphors task 
and the Ontologies task, and is further shown by the spontaneous use of metaphor in 
other tasks. Generative tasks all showed schemes being spontaneously re-used. The 
Topsy Turvy and Anomalies tasks were good at showing how schemes are linked to 
others in packages, making models. This packaging helps account for the difficulty in 
bridging ontological categories in the Object Transformation task. The Examples task 
shows how being part of a model constrains the choice of schemes. The existence of 
entailments deriving from potentials is brought out by the Ontologies task, showing how 
sets of possibilities cohere into schemes. The Lonely Giant and Prototypes tasks showed 
change in generic levels with age. Many tasks illustrated how children could use schemes 
to attempt to model a variety of new - even peculiar - situations, with the Event Analogies 
task illustrating that models (analogies) are made up of coherently organised schemes. 
The evidence (e.g. from the Topsy Turvy task) that schematic thinking tends to be 
conservative, avoiding contradicting very basic pre-suppositions, lends further support to 
the idea that schemes are rather stable, also found elsewhere (e.g. Ontologies task). 
Our proposal put the following empirical research questions: 
(4) Given a plausible selection of schemes covering the main types identified, can these 
be shown to exist, in the sense that any given scheme is reliably used in a similar way in 
a number of different contexts? 
(5) How are such schemes used? How do they support making inferences and generating 
explanations in situations of interest in science? 
(6) How is one scheme rather than another selected for use? On what basis are schemes 
entertained or rejected? 
(7) What differences can be found between schemes available relatively early (6-7 years) 
and in early adolescence (13-14)? 
Two tasks directly addressed question (4): the Prototypes task and the Ontologies task. 
The first showed that schemes identified by example and name (tag) could be identified 
in a variety of physical contexts. The second showed that schemes analysed into 
component entailments could be recovered as clusters or factors across a wide range of 
objects, including several where schemes apply metaphorically. Less directly, the set of 
other tasks taken together, by showing that similar schemes emerge spontaneously in 
generative tasks, play a role in transformations, and are used in metaphor, further sustains 
the result that schemes can be shown to 'exist'. 
Question (5) was addressed so far as science is concerned in the Event Analogies and 
Examples tasks. The first shows that children's analogies for processes of scientific 
interest have an articulated structure making use of concrete reasoning schemes. The 
second shows that particular examples of scientific ideas are understood through 
everyday physical schemes, each constraining the other to focus on how the example is 
an example. It also shows that scientific ideas themselves (e.g. potential energy) have 
intelligible concrete schematic representations. 
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Questions (6) and (7) may be addressed together. All three tasks done with both ages 
indicated that the basic schemes to do with physical movement and change were available 
by the earlier age, able to be recognised and produced spontaneously. There- was however 
evidence of development with age. Schemes appear to start associated with common 
directly experienced contexts, but with age expand to cover a wider range of contexts, 
being used to account for less obvious situations. Schemes like support and effort causing 
movement are established very early, and by age 13-14 are being used metaphorically. 
Schemes like flow and floating are rather tied to common contexts at age 6-7 and are just 
beginning to expand their applicability by age 13-14. However, even at age 6-7 schemes 
like support and effort involve substantial abstraction, being used in a variety of different 
contexts. For younger children, schemes tend to be evoked when their potentials are 
obviously at issue (e.g. a waiter supporting a tray might drop it). Older children also see 
these potentials at work when they might have been taken for granted (e.g. support given 
to a person sitting in a chair). Schemes are entertained or rejected on the basis of their 
direct entailments (e.g. flow is smooth; discrete motion isn't flow). The Anomalies task 
shows the dynamics of changing the fit of schemes. When an expectation from one 
scheme is violated, a scheme which provides the required behaviour is sought, and then 
its other potentials are considered. The need to think again was strongly tied to action. 
Lastly, we address the two original Methodological research questions: 
(8) What combinations of methods are needed to sustain a claim that a scheme has been 
adequately identified and characterised? 
(9) Can generic forms of tasks be developed for investigating different schemes in varied 
contexts, so that one might claim comparability between schemes or contexts? 
Our view is (as above) that the 'existence' of schemes is over-determined - that they 'exist' 
in language and discourse, in action, in imagined action, and in mental models. For this 
reason, we looked for data of these different kinds, perhaps giving primacy to imagined 
action as a bridge between the others. 
We claim to have developed a range of generic tasks able to be used more widely to 
investigate schematic reasoning. The Ontologies and Prototypes tasks are clearly 
adaptable to a variety of different schemes. The Topsy Turvy strategy of imaginatively 
denying rules has general application manipulating schemes evoked by varying the goal 
set. Similarly the Metaphors task provides a generally usable framework. Other tasks 
could be adapted, but the above seem the strongest candidates for generic tasks. 
Activities 
We worked within the research network of the London Mental Models Group. 
Presentations at seminars and conferences included: 
• Institute of Education, University of London (Autumn 1995, Autumn 1996); 
• University of Sussex (Autumn 1996); 
• ECER/BERA conference (Exeter Autumn 1995); 
• European Research Student Summer School in (Barcelona Summer 1996); 
• Situated Cognition Task Force (European Science Foundation Summer 1996); 
• Human and Machine Learning Conference (Belgium Autumn 1996). 
Papers have been accepted for the European Association for Research in Learning and 
Instruction (Athens Summer 1997) and for the European Association for Research in 
Science Education (Rome Summer 1997). 
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Outputs 
Two papers (provided with this report) have been submitted for publication:-  
Empirical Abstraction and the imaginative denial of rules 
Minds, buckets and paper bags: Are there stable physical reasoning schemes? 
Further papers are in draft form: 
Empirical abstraction and concrete reasoning schemes: a theoretical analysis 
The. Lonely Giant: from abstract to concrete? 
Recognising prototypes of schemes 
Concrete physical reasoning schemes in metaphor: analysis of some texts 
Dealing with anomalous objects - dynamics of fitting schemes 
Mr Tsatsarelis is writing up his work for the PhD thesis, and has presented papers at 
conferences, with further conference papers accepted. 
We intend to produce a book presenting the work within a wider perspective. 
Impacts 
The project was designed to develop methods and theory to impact on future research - a 
proposal has already been generated. There has been valuable synergy with a concurrent 
ESRC project (Visual communication in science - Kress and Ogborn). 
Future research priorities 
Our original proposal explicitly offered the present work as establishing a number of 
research tools for further research. Future priorities might be: 
• to look at a wider variety of schemes using similar tools. 
• using the tools to follow more carefully the development in generic level of 
schemes, over the years 6 to 16 or so. 
• to use the tools to trace the relationship of concrete physical reasoning schemes 
to scientific ideas as they are learned. 
• to study of the use in popularised science of metaphors drawing on common-
sense schemes. 
• to investigate in greater depth the process of using concrete physical schemes in 
reasoning about problems. 
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Appendix 2 
Description of and results from tasks 
This appendix amplifies the account of tasks and specific results from them given in the 
section Method: 2 Task development and specific results in the body of the Report. 
Imaginative Transformations 
Imaginative denial of rules (Topsy Turvy World) 
In this generative task, nineteen 6 - 7 year old children and six of 13 - 14 years old were 
asked to imagine a world in which everything is 'topsy turvy'. They are asked to imagine 
carrying out a number of familiar actions, but in a world where everything is the opposite, 
in every imaginable way, of everything in the everyday world. They had to think of the 
ways in which things might be 'topsy turvy'. Four familiar actions were used as 
scenarios: 
• Making tea; 
• Diving into a swimming pool from a spring board; 
• Playing football; 
• Flying a kite. 
Time required prevented the younger children from considering every scenario; the 
majority gave accounts for the first two. 
Analysis focused on inferring schemes underlying attempts to 'invert' events or actions, 
and their interactions. For example, in 'making tea' the 'up-down' scheme may be 
reversed; as a result a number of associated schemes are affected, notably falling, support 
and containment. Equally interesting are schemes which resist inversion: for example a 
container retains its 'inside-outside' scheme. Rigidity and containment go together, 
defining boundaries. In the 'diving' scenario again the up-down' scheme is reversed, but 
now calls in question the nature of water in the pool-container; one solution is to alter the 
fluid nature of the water into something more rigid, rather than imagining water 
'contained upside down'. The two examples show how the context can determine the way 
in which individuals put schemes together into packages. In doing so, schemes veer 
towards conservatism; not allowing too much change; nor allowing reasoning about the 
impossible. For example, there were no instances of objects being transformed into 
spaces or vice-versa; the existence of 'before and after' sequences was retained; there 
were always cause- effect relations. In other words, the basic Kantian schemes or 
dimensions remained unchanged. 
Imaginative constructions (Lonely Giant) 
This generative task required children to imagine constructing an entity (e.g. a car) from 
more or less unsuitable materials (e.g. bricks, paper, boxes, trees) so that these materials 
had to be transformed in imagination. We expected this to let us see how objects and 
materials were schematised. 
Five 6-7 year-olds and six 13-14 year-olds were interviewed. The interview scenario 
proposed an island, with a range of resources shown in pictures on cards: trees, water (a 
river, a lake), bricks, boxes, paper, plastic, old engines, together with tools: knife, 
hammer, saw, string and rope, glue. Older children were asked to imagine themselves on 
the island. For the younger children, the island was presented as the home of a lonely 
giant who had to make things for himself. 
313 
Results for 'making a car' were those analysed. A clear difference appeared between 
younger and older children. Younger children worked mainly from the available 
materials, focusing on a particular resource (e.g. paper bag, plastic) and suggesting how it 
could be used for a specific component (e.g. a seat, seat-belts), constructing the car ad 
hoc. They were influenced by appearance - e.g. metal is shiny so use that for a roof. By 
contrast, older children used a more generic notion of 'a car' - uniformly a body, wheels, 
engine - and set about constructing these. They thought in functional schemes - e.g. a 
body contains so look for a container. Realising all the functions they needed often 
proved difficult - for instance steering or braking - but they kept the functions in mind 
and improvised a variety of (often implausible) solutions with the materials to hand. 
This task highlights some basic questions about abstraction, similar to those raised by 
Simons and Keil (1995). Older children worked with an explicit generic (and in that 
special sense abstract) notion of a car. Younger children limited attention to particular 
resources and their potential, but in a sense also thought abstractly though implicitly - to 
make a seat from a paper bag is to treat both as containers ("You could sit in it"). 
Probably their reasoning is best characterised as transductive - going from one particular 
to another via some feature they share. 
Transforming an object into another (Object transformation) [Tsatsarelis] 
The generative task had eight sub-tasks. In each children were given pairs of objects and 
asked to imagine transforming one object, say a duck, into the other, say an eagle. The 
researcher drew each suggested change and then asked whether there was anything else to 
change, finally asking whether the original object had been transformed into the new 
object or whether there was still something wrong with it. The sample consisted of 38 
Greek children on average 11.8 years old. 
The objects were of two ontological categories: natural living kinds (e.g. human, eagle) 
and artefacts (e.g. aeroplane, toy car). In four sub-tasks the pair of objects belonged to the 
same ontological category, (e.g. duck to eagle); in the other four they belonged to 
different categories, (e.g. bird to toy car). In two of the latter sub-tasks the objects shared 
clear common functional schemes (e.g. eagle to aeroplane; both able to fly) while in the 
other two they did not (e.g. bird to toy car). 
Transformations between objects of the same category were all easy (an 'easy' change is 
one where children finally agreed that their transformation was successful). In the four 
sub-tasks using objects in different categories, half the children were asked to transform 
natural objects into artefacts and the other half the reverse. In general children found it 
easier to move from natural objects to artefacts than the reverse. Transformations of 
objects in different categories were always easier when they shared functional schemes; 
this also eased the more difficult transformations from artefact to natural object. 
Children used four different sorts of transformational device: adding, modifying, 
removing and keeping constant particular features. More changes were attempted in tasks 
where there were common functional schemes; it was only in these that the 'keep 
constant' device was used. The devices of 'modifying' and 'removing' features tended to 
be more heavily used in the (difficult) transformations from artefact to natural kind. 
Other research (Keil 1989) suggests that transformations between different ontological 
kinds are not possible. These data show that, while difficult, children can make them, and 
that making them is helped if the objects have schemes in common, which help 'bridge'  
the objects. Such schemes construct of boundaries between categories. 
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Transforming one event into another (Event analogies) [Tsatsarelis] 
This task focused on the use of schemes in the context of taught school scientific 
knowledge. Children were presented with pictures taken from school science text books 
of processes of scientific interest: the flow of current in an electric circuit lighting a lamp 
when a switch is closed, pushing a heavy object, the expansion and sagging of metal 
power lines when warm, the flow of heat from a hot object to a cooler one. After being 
asked what they could see in the pictures, they were asked to suggest an analogy - "It is 
like...". 39 Greek children, average age 11.6, took part. 
The children were in general able to produce analogies, some of them surprising (the 
battery is like a carton of orange juice with a straw - you can get something to come out 
of it). In the analysis, elements of analogies could be characterised as being physical 
objects (e.g. switch), non-object-like entities (e.g. light) and processes (e.g. go along a 
wire). Counts were made of the numbers of times each kind of element was or was not 
associated with each other kind, in the analogies produced. 
The analogies produced had distinctive schematic structures. The presence of some 
elements of analogies statistically predicts the presence or absence of others, in ways 
corresponding to broad schematic patterns. At the most general level of analysis, 
elements of analogies were seen to divide on two dimensions: cause vs. effect and static 
vs. dynamic. At a more specific level, broad possible types of structure could be seen, 
such as 'a source/container provides something which can flow, if acted on dynamically'. 
The existence of such patterns underlying the analogies suggests that they are not simply 
ad hoc fragments of knowledge pieced together, but reflect a number of basic schemes. 
Their interaction with scientific knowledge appears to have left them with broad pictures 
of what is going on in a number of processes, not simply with surface facts. 
Thinking of something as... 
Fitting schemes to counter-expectations (Anomalies) 
This generative task was developed in order to examine schemes that pupils use when 
encountering objects that behave in unexpected way thus violating pupils' expectations. 
We had three anomalous objects: 
• "Potty putty" or silicone gel, which shows viscous flow but also bounces elastically and 
if hit hard is brittle. 
• a toy gyroscope which spins stably resting on its point. 
• an executive toy in which a magnetic roller rests horizontally in mid air and will spin 
without appreciable slowing down. 
Seven 14 year old children were interviewed individually about two objects each. They 
were asked to make predictions about the objects' behaviour, to test predictions, and to 
provide explanations and in the light of what they had seen. 
A given object evokes a package of schemes, e.g. movement, rigidity and support. The 
behaviour of these anomalous objects violated such schemes, allowing us to see how they 
interact in packages. For example, potty putty is soft and soft things cannot be broken, so 
'hardness' became an issue, nor did it squash flat when hit, thus 'force' was problematic. 
Both the rolling magnet and the gyroscope violated the 'support' scheme, the gyroscope 
the 'balance' scheme, and the rolling magnet the 'force' scheme ("magnets can pull or push 
but they cannot cause spinning!"). We observed a dynamic process of scheme fitting and 
revision. Action on the objects was crucial to produce revision of scheme fitting. 
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Dimensions of schemes (Ontologies) 
This task, using a questionnaire format with simple yes/no answers was designed to 
complement small scale interview tasks which require much interpretation of responses. 
It uses a method adapted from Mariani and Ogborn (1991, 1995). 
The aim was to discover whether hypothesised schemes could be recovered from patterns 
of responses to simple ontological questions, and if so, how a variety of physical entities 
were understood in terms of such schemes. Five putative schemes were chosen: 'object in 
motion', 'source of motion', 'support', 'container/carrier', and 'fluid flow'. 22 questions 
thought to be diagnostic of these schemes were created - for example "Does it hold 
something up?"; "Does it stop something falling?" for 'support'. The questions were asked 
about 22 exemplars, 12 chosen to be relatively unproblematic to characterise in these 
respects (e.g. a car, a table) and 10 chosen to be problematic (e.g. music, the mind). The 
'unproblematic' exemplars were tried on two very different samples: a group of adults and 
a group of 13-14 year olds. The 'problematic' exemplars were tried on a comparable 
group of 13-14 year olds. Numbers in groups varied from 22 to 30. 
The analysis looked for factors and clusters in a matrix of questions treated as variables 
and exemplars as cases, data in a matrix cell being the proportion of 'yes' responses to one 
question about one exemplar (e.g. Does it make sense to say that the mind stops 
something falling?"). In each case simple factor and cluster structures could be identified. 
The results suggest that all three groups, differing in age and in the exemplars they were 
given, use a broadly similar set of schemes, close to but not always identical with those 
hypothesised in the design. A not wholly anticipated scheme emerged, which we term 
'tillable space' (e.g. the surface of a table). Although the factors and clusters extracted for 
different groups varied somewhat, they were all always composed of combinations of the 
same elements: movement, action, container, carrier, support, barrier, space, fluid. The 
'problematic' exemplars all had intelligible (but not a priori predictable) descriptions in 
terms of these elements. For example the mind was seen as a container and carrier; music 
as rather fluid-like. 
We conclude, from the relative stability of schemes across a wide variety of exemplars at 
two very distinct ages, that something like such schemes can be taken to 'exist' in 
participant's thinking about the physical world, and that their literal and metaphorical uses 
are closely related. 
The task in its generic form offers a way of getting at the use of schemes, and at 
differences between people in their use of schemes, able to be used in a wide range of 
domains and relatively easy to apply. The value of results does, however, clearly depend 
critically on the analysis of supposed schemes into a full range of diagnostic questions, 
and on an appropriate and varied selection of exemplars. 
Instances of something like... 
Application of Schemes (Prototypes) 
This selection task aimed to examine the extent to which children identify schemes in a 
variety of contexts. Four target schemes - support, flow, containment and floating - were 
chosen. Four prompt pictures embodied these target-schemes (e.g. flow - liquid flowing 
from a bottle into a glass). Nine different contexts were drawn asopictures: 
• astronauts working in space, 
• a narrow-boat being pulled along a canal. 
• a bath overflowing, 
• a woman pushing a baby's pram also containing shopping, 
• a loaded lorry going over a bridge, over fast flowing stream; 
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• a waiter serving customers wine in a restaurant, 
• children jumping on a trampoline, 
• bird carrying a branch flying against wind above river, 
• trapeze artists performing in a circus. 
There were twenty-nine 6-7 year olds, and six 13-14 year olds. A child was first shown a 
target-scheme picture and agreement obtained about the scheme shown. For the nine 
pictures in turn, they were asked to choose a good example of the target-scheme, and then 
asked for further examples in that picture. Finally they chose the best example found 
from all the pictures. 
There are three scenarios where 'support' is not found: children-jumping-on-trampoline, 
astronauts-working-in-space, narrow-boat-pulled-laboriously-by-shoreman. The first two 
are obvious for the young children but the narrow-boat is unexpected. However for young 
children 'support' is probably secondary to the activity of the man-pulling-laboriously-
boat. For older children only the astronaut scenario has no 'support' examples. Such 
examples are used differently in the two groups. For younger children examples are either 
obvious, waiter-tray, or local, bath-legs. Older children mention less obvious examples 
with objects, such as chairs, tightropes and trampolines, supporting people. 
The trampoline, the circus, and the bird-flying-against-wind scenarios take place in fairly 
open spaces, major actors being humans or animals, not objects. For young children 
'containment' is only seen in a local sense, cups-containing-drinks. This is reversed for 
the older children where these spaces now 'contain' people but space suits no longer 
'contain' people, the case for young children. Here we see how with use the notion of 
'containment' transforms itself and becomes more generic. 
Woman-pushing-pram, children-jumping-on-trampoline and astronauts-working-in-space 
are scenarios which all imply doing something and making an effort. Older children 
argued that 'flow' needed to be an effortless, natural movement that was continuous and 
so ruled out these three scenarios. Younger children were more attached to salience - to 
smoothness of flowing, so including the last two examples but not the first. Again we 
see how a scheme has transformed itself in use. 
Broadening the notion of doing something and making an effort to that of activity then 
we have: woman-pushing-pram, waiter-serving-people, bird-flying-against-wind, people-
performing-in-circus, children-jumping-on-trampoline (astronauts-working-in-space 
excluded since for most children they 'float'). Interviews revealed that for young children 
'floating' implied non-volitional movement without direction nor any real speed, 
involving partial support, thus excluding 'float' from the just listed scenarios. Older 
children modified their use of 'float', suggesting propulsion in some kinds of floating, as 
illustrated in last three earlier listed scenarios. Thus 'float' is being used in a more general 
sense and in a greater range of contexts. 
Fit of examples to scientific ideas (Examples) [Tsatsarelis] 
This study further investigated the notion of abstraction and generalisation - a necessary 
aspect of schemes - in the context of school science. It had two stages. In the tirst, 
examples of ideas related to school science were presented to 11-12 year old children. 
The ideas were: 'what goes up must come down', 'light travels in straight lines', and 'heat 
goes from hot to cold'. Three examples were given for each idea, one chosen to be a 
'good' example, one a parallel but probably less obvious example, and one a potential 
counter-example. Children were asked to say whether the examples were good or not, and 
why, and whether seeing the example might change the idea for them. 
Examples tended to be judged good on grounds of salience or immediacy (an effect is 
large or happens quickly). Counter examples tended to be dealt with either by 
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specialisation (light travels in straight lines but is still bent by a lens) or by over-ride 
principles (a flying bird will come down in the end, but because it chooses to). Parallel 
examples sometimes lead to a wider generalisation. 
In the second stage, a questionnaire study presented first a picture of a scene - for 
example a boy up a tree - and then the same scene but now described as an example of a 
scientific idea (e.g. potential energy). Six such ideas were used, each with two different 
picture-examples (e.g. replacing the boy up a tree by a pot on a balcony). All examples 
were taken from current text books used (in Greece) for children of 11-12 years. Each 
case - example and idea - was responded to by a group of between 30 and 40 children 
aged 11-12. They were asked about the elements of the picture before and after 
presenting it as an example of an idea. About each element, children were asked whether 
it could act by itself, block something, force something, contain something, be inside 
something, change shape, support something, and whether it is like an invisible idea of 
something. The questions are similar to those in the task Dimensions of Schemes. 
A small number of interpretable factors could be extracted. For example, in the case of 
the two examples of potential energy they related to autonomous action, static 
barrier/support, and particular or generic location. Factors for the six ideas were not 
identical, but were intelligibly related. Factor scores provide a characterisation of the 
elements of the examples in terms of schemes. For example, 'potential energy' comes out 
as invisible, not specifically located, able autonomously to cause movement. 
A notable result, stemming from the unusual design of asking questions about a scene 
before and after presenting it as an example of something, is the 'constraining' effect of 
seeing something as an example. In cases, frequencies of 'yes' answers to the range of 
questions asked became more differentiated, a few rising sharply and several dropping 
away. Seeing something as an example focuses attention on specific features, and inhibits 
thinking more broadly about possibilities. 
Thinking metaphorically with physical schemes 
Schemes as metaphors (Metaphors) 
Concrete reasoning schemes form the basis of metaphors and analogies about the non-
physical world. For each of the schemes support, flow, containment, block, float and 
balance we generated complementary pairs of scenarios; for one the scheme seemed able 
serve as a metaphor, for the other it appeared not to. For example: 
Possible example of 'containment': 
When Peter heard that he'd been selected to play the lead in the school play, he 
just smiled even though he was very excited. Could you say that Peter contained 
his feelings? 
Non-example of 'containment'• 
When Peter heard that he'd been selected to play the lead in the school play, he 
jumped up and down excitedly. Could you say that Peter contained his feelings? 
The non-examples each violated what we took to be one criterial aspect of the scheme 
(e.g. proximity for support). There were two such pairs for each scheme (three for 
'balance'); making 13 pairs, 26 in all. We interviewed individually six 14 year old 
females. Each was read aloud two scenarios for a scheme, a positive form from one pair 
and a non-example from another. Most responded to all schemes (total 67 responses). 
They were asked to judge whether each was an instance or non-instance of the scheme, 
and to explain why. 
Agreement with positive and non-examples was generally very good. Disagreements 
arose mainly with 'flow' and 'float'. In both cases metaphors were taken not to apply on 
grounds relating to broad schematic features: e.g. that 'flow' should be continuous and not 
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too rapid - discrete or rapid changes were disqualified. 'Floating' was sometimes rejected 
as a metaphor on rather literal grounds - that insubstantial things like ideas can't float. 
On the whole, children could marshal arguments for or against the applicability of 
schemes to non-physical scenarios. Their arguments showed clearly the scheme-related 
expectations necessary for the scheme to be used metaphorically. 
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Appendix 4.1 Exploratory study: Transformations of objects (pictures) 
Appendix 4.2 Main study: Transformations of objects (pictures) 
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Appendix 4.3 Statistical significant differences for ontological categories 
RESPONSE by TASK 	 (NATURAL -> ARTIFACT) 
TASK 
	
Page 1 of 1 
Count 
Exp Val 
Std Res 
RESPONSE 
Eagle-Ae Human 
roplane 	 bot 
1 
-Ro Bird 
2 
-Car Human 
cket 
3 
-Ro 
Row 
4 Total 
1 16 16 8 9 49 
Yes 12.3 12.3 12.3 12.3 64.5% 
1.1 1.1 -1.2 -.9 
2 3 3 11 10 27 
No 6.8 6.8 6.8 6.8 35.5% 
-1.4 -1.4 1.6 1.3 
Column 19 19 19 19 76 
Total 25.0% 25.0% 25.0% 25.0% 100.0% 
Chi-Square 
 
Value DF Significance 
      
Pearson 13.04006 3 .00455 
Likelihood Ratio 13.59869 3 .00351 
Mantel-Haenszel test for 9.53515 1 .00202 
linear association 
Minimum Expected Frequency - 	 6.750 
Statistic 	 Value 
Approximate 
ASE1 	 Val/ASEO 	 Significance 
Phi .41422 .00455 *1 
Cramer's V 
*1 	 Pearson 
RESPONSE 
.41422 
chi-square probability 
by 	 TASK (ARTIFACT -> NATURAL) 
.00455 *1 
TASKR 
	
Page 1 of 1 
Count 
Exp Val 
Std Res 
RESPONSR 
Aeroplan Robot 
e-Eagle 	 man 
1 
-Hu Bird 
2 
-Car Human 
cket 
3 
-Ro 
Row 
4 Total 
33 1 15 14 2 2 
Yes 8.3 8.3 8.3 8.3 43.4% 
2.4 2.0 -2.2 -2.2 
2 4 5 17 17 43 
No 10.8 10.8 10.8 10.8 56.6% 
-2.1 -1.8 1.9 1.9 
	
Column 
	 19 
	
19 
	
19 
	
19 
	
76 
	
Total 
	
25.0% 
	
25.0% 
	
25.0% 
	
25.0% 
	
100.0% 
Chi-Square Value DF Significance 
Pearson 33.58140 3 .00000 
Likelihood Ratio 37.00756 3 .00000 
Mantel-Haenszel test for 
linear association 
27.49471 1 .00000 
Minimum Expected Frequency - 8.250 
Approximate 
Statistic 	 Value 	 ASE1 Val/ASEO Significance 
Phi .66473 .00000 *1 
Cramer's V 
*1 Pearson chi-square probability 
.66473 .00000 *1 
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Appendix 5.1 Exploratory study: Transformations of events (pictures) 
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Appendix 5.2 Main study: Transformations of events (pictures) 
325 
Appendix 6.1 The questionnaire of the 3rd study in Greek 
HAPAAEITMATA 
AurO zo cpconi[taToXeryto wpopd ta Su/Topa napasSeiygata ROO gnopei Ketnotoc 
va xprictgonottioet, yta va icaTaVti3st rj va c4i1yfiact gla tSta 	 (Doom* Eivat 
ari[tartua5 va &pima on cot) 1.tnopeig va erlytjactg niv iSta 18ta, 
XPriotgonotthvtac 84thpopa, napasSeiwaTa. Na 6uµdoat, on Sev uncipxouv 
amatic rj XciOog anawrriagtq, wad ypdtire auto not) &alai oictvrecat. 
H ISia  
E' ova r3113Xio cDuctiolc, Opfixage 'my napatoduo t8ta: 
"Dray ra (Kiva= siva: avvyKopiva, exovv EvipyEza, irov z-77 
itipe Avvaguaj EviprEta" 
IIPOEEEE ! ! ! '0Xec of eixonioctg ROD Oa axoXou0ficopv wpopoi)v atmli tiriv tota. 
To Burn aou HapciSEtypia  
Extwou Eva napaSetyl.ta yta niv napanetwo 18ta. 1-Ottirc µE Xiya Myta TO 
napsftEetyga 
I 
   
       
       
       
       
TYPNA IIIESl E' AYTH TH EEAIAA, AN XPEIAETEI NA OYMHOEIE 
TO AIKO EOY TIAPAAEII-MA AYTH THN IAEA. 
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Hoto (71 nom) an' aura to niVTE 
pxopel va mitvgt Katt 	
—1, AEPAI IIAIAI AENTPO EAMOI 
AYNAMDCH 
ENEPTEIA 
Ti pxopotiv vac. Kcivotw 
 816,(popa icpawant; 
Ttoacpa nperyilwra nou yvcopgetc KaXd, eivat: 
Eva nal8t," 
o aepac 
TO e8avoc, 
Eva (5evrpo, 
Kat lowg yvovietc )(Curt yta T71 AVVailllai Evtpyeia 
Epteic Otkoupte va ilet0oui.te tt vogicetg sou, Ott Oka aunt to 7CpsimaTa iticopouv va. 
mivouv. 
ono); t vac (ppeuccric, ij t vac toixoc pcopei; 
(Smog Eva cniptip.ta yta to aXXa npermata, 
oncog Eva wangt, panopei; 
Oncoc Eva 8oxcio wropei va mivet, va 
imptket Katt OA° gcra 'rou; 
oncoc Eva maripo-cycepe6 npayga imropei va 
Kays', va txct aRttaf3A,rito crew; 
(Smog va 13picncetat pEcia GE mitt duo; 
onwc va mivet to npdypara va Kivotivtat; 
ono); va lava :tat ii va atagurd bray auto 
OtAzt; 
O 0000 
O 0000 
00000 
O 0000 
O 0000 
O 0000 
O 0000 
oncog va ondpxel, vopic va TO Oktncmgc ij va 0 
iztopoOpe va to ayyiougz; 0000 
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"rhav za o-thliaTa sival avvyfrogiva, 401)11 Evapysta, Kou 1-77 
EE Avvapuoi Evipysza ff 
HEPITPAOONTAE HAPAAEITMA TA 
Eivat atip,arcuoi va Ougetoat Ott cats µrtopsfS va e4qyflostc p,ta Iota gs noUsi, 
napaSeiygaza. Mepticet anO avid 'Ea 7CapaciwaTa sivat KaXtitspa anO xdtnota 
dtkXa, at gsprat siva' xstpoTepa. Ms auto To spcmgatoXOyto, OtXougs va 
Sotigs, no); sof) xatakaflaivstc toftnota napaSslygata iron U7tetpx0Ov OTO 1343Xio 
"spstwo3 To (pootico xocygo". Na Ougetoat OTi Bev incapxouv acootgc ri Xerfloq 
anartliaztq, a7tXd ypetws auto 7TOU cati oxtqnsoat. 
H 186a  
I' Eva f3t13X,io cbuotiolc flpftKags tqv napaKet-cco t8ta: 
IIPOEEEE ! ! '0Xec of sponfiaetc itou Oa axokotAhloouv wpopoOv atrni Triv tSta. 
'Eva HapciSctipa  
ETo fROXio "spetwth TO qmatico Koogo", Opijicage yta rrlv napanomo tSta TO 
napciSetyga: 
To ,tarsi yailci aro St rip° 
tier Avvaptioi Evipraa 
TYPNA 	 E' AYTH TH EEAIAA, AN XPEIAITEI NA OYMHOEIE 
AYTO To HAPAAEITMA (TOY BIBAIOY) riA THN IIAPATIANO IAEA. 
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IIota an' 401,DTCi ta nivte, 'fame,' to 
napaSetwa...  
1 AYNAMIKH AEPAE 
	
FIAIAI ENEPFEIA EAA(DOE AENTPO 
Koirge mat ro gapci(SEtypa rov fltAllov "Eva natSi tirriA.d oTO Savtpo" yta rip/ iSta 
"thav xa othttata eivat avolgogiva, ixouv evipyeta, not) Tr' Mite Atwap.tiori 
Evairicta". 
Eicetitov Til. KaVOIN ra (Stotvopa gpciy,uara (,rat(51," Stvrpo, ...) a' auto to 
napciSEtwa. 
civat orccoc Evac (ppetictric it  t vac wixoc; 	 0 	 0 	 0 	 0 	 0 
Eivat (Smog Eva otilptma yta 'CU 6.XXa 
npdtmata, OTccoc Eva tpaittt; 
Eivat Onwg Eva Soxsio not) 1.1topei va km, 
mitt gtaa TOD; 
EiVal 67C0); Mitt ataripo l_tc aRetaliknto 
artjp.a, Eva otEpeo npaygt; 
EIvui. 67C(Oc Mitt TC011 flpioxstat litaCt OE Mitt 
dako; 
civat ono); Mitt TC011 iciftvet ta petmata va 
KtvoUvtat; 
EiVal. OTC04 Mitt MO KlVEltal lj (nailer:La 6TGIN 
auto OtX61; 
0 0 CI 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 
O 0 0 0 0 
O 0 0 CI 0 
O 0 0 0 0 
O 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 eivat oruoc xcitt nou Sev grcopo6t.te va 8o61.w., 	 c- ii va ayygovi.I.F., akket triMpxst; 	 .) 
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HEPITPAOS2NTAE HAPAAEITMA TA 
Eivat cyrii.tavtixo va Ouithoat Oil Em5 pcopEic va EiTyficlEtc µla tUa [LE no? kdt 
TrapaSEiwta-ca. Mcptxdt ano atrcet 'La napaSEiyi.taTa Eivat KaXircEpa ane) Kanota 
caXa, Kat 1.tEptiod Eivat xEtpoTEpa. ME auto TO EporcTtatokoyto, Otkopp,E va 
80(41E, Tccoc Ea() icatakaPaivEtc xanota TrapaSEiygata not) UTCdtPXOUV GTO 131(3Xio 
"Epcowl) TO qmxstxo Koo 	 Na 014tetaat oil 8cv uncipxouv 430)(ItiC ri Xci0oc 
anart-Tjactc, aitXd ypome auto ROD Ed) Gid(pTEGal. 
H 186a  
E' tva 13-Oki° (Duatidic 13pijKapz triv Tcapamirco t•Sta: 
"Gorav ra (whitlow eival avvyfroiniva, ixouv gm-Preto, Nov rq 
MILE Avvaiuticri EvipyEta" 
IIPOEREE ! ! 'OXEc 01 Epoycfpustc 7E00 Oa axokot)Ofpouv a(popoth, au'ti triv tSz a.  
'Eva Hapciostwa 
ETO f3t13X,io "EpEuvd) 'to (puotwo KOcli.to", 13pfixap,E yta 'rTv Tcaparcavo) t8ga 'to 
napciactyga: 	 1111 
.......... .. .... 
id 
Or plciarpsc pplci aro pn-aAirdvr 
exovv Auvairtirrj Evipreza 
rYPNA Him E' AYTH TH EEAIAA, AN XPEIAETEI NA OYMHOEIE 
AYTO TO IIAPAAEITMA (TOY BIBAIOY) nA THN HAPAHANCI IAEA. 
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HEPITPAOONTAE HAPAAEITMA TA 
Eivat aip,avxmci va %Adam Ott sall gnopcic va crlyiiastc p,ta t8ta 1.1.£ TCOkbi 
napaSsi-ygata. Mcpucd auto myth tia napa8ciwata sivat xakkcpa anO Ketnota 
daka, Kat 1.1cputh sivat xetpkepa. Mc auto TO eparrigatoXOyto, Otkoupc va 
SoUps, ncog cm') KaTaXaflalvetc icetnota napaSclyp,ata ?COD llTrapX0OV ato r3t13Xio 
"speuvth TO (pouttozi x•501,to". Na Ougetaat Ott Bev untipxouv 0coatac ri A.clOoc 
anavtri0Etc, airXd ',moms auto nou eati axEqnsaat. 
H 186a  
Eva 11113Xio (I)uatmi; 13pfp<apc Triv napaioiTo.) t8ta: 
"Oov jugyaA,drepq itd‘a IZOVV ra othgara rdo-o 8vo-Koitorgpa 
va Kivq0orly, pail NapovcrldCovv prep1137 
a8pdvgza" 
IIPOEEEE ! ! '0Xcg of cpconjactc nou 8a axoXou011oouv wpopotiv atyrrl 
	 18ta. 
'Eva Ila.pciSetyga  
ETO 13113X1:0 "epeuvth do (puat-KO xciapo", f3pfocaps yta triv napancivo) iota TO 
napcioetyjm: 
...... Eva roaof sivai soico.lo va ,usralawicrei eva itax-pe• navvi5i-s/levavra, ailAci 
civat 7ro.115 Svo-Kacirepo va nivel va icivq0e1 Evac,ueyciA,oc E2.E(pavrac. 
TYPNA HIED E' AYTH TH EEAIAA, AN XPEIAETEI NA EIYMHOEIE 
AYTO TO HAPAAEITMA (TOY BIBAIOY) TIA THN HAPATIANS1 IAEA. 
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VA. 
HEPITPA0d2NTAE HAPAAEITMATA 
Eivat arip,avttwo va Oupdaat ott eat5 !Impel.; va erryilastg p,ta t6Ea µE TcokXd 
napaSelypata. Meptial anO auto to napaSelygata eivat KaXtitepa aro xcinota 
da,Xa, Kat geptioi eivat xelpotepa. ME auto to epompatoXoyto, OEXoupc va 
8001.1e, no); scni xataXa43aivet; xducota napaSeiwata iron wrapxouv GTO r3tr3Xio 
"epeuvth to (puatto5 KOago". Na Oupemat OT1, Bev uncipxouv awatgc n XclOoq 
anavtrioctc, wad wove auto 7C01) EMS csithrecrat. 
H 186a  
E' Eva f3t13kio Ouattoic flpiiKage tiv napaxetto) 18ta: 
"Ooo peraA,zi-repq itd‘a 11011V za ocogaza row 8vcrifroitozspa 
px-opoov va KlmOoov, pan' mapovaltiCoov pgyciftv 
a8ptivEza" 
IIPOEEEE ! ! °keg of epomicyetc nou Oa axokou0ficrotw wpopotiv autij rriv tota. 
'Eva flapciSetypia  
Eto 0113Xio "epeuvo5 to (pusatio5 Koago", (3pfp<ape yta triv napanetvw pSta to  
napciSetyp.a: 
‘,.., To rpopr77Yo 7r0V exel ,ugyailorEp4 ,uciCa ago To avroKivirro, Oa 'al/779st lie 
,u6Ta2Orepri SvcrKolla, Kai Oa Kiv77061 apyclrepa a2ri5 To avroKiviro. 
TYPNA HMG E' AYTH TH EEAIAA, AN XPEIAXTEI NA OYMHOEIE 
AYTO TO HAPAAEII-MA (TOY BIBAIOY) TIA THN HAPAHANSI IAEA. 
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HEPITPAOS2NTAE HAPAAEITMA TA 
Eivat arillavroco va Ougdoat of cat') miropsic va Erlyriastc pia tSta µs 7rokX6. 
napaosimaTa. Mcptioft amf) myth to napa•Ssfygata swat icaXtrytcpa ana xdurota 
ofaXa, Kat 1..teptith siva' xcipOtspa. Mc auto to spormp,atokOyto, OtXot)i.le va 
ootigs, 7ccoc sat5 Katakaflaivatc xecnota napaSsiwata not) tmetpxouv ato [3113Xio 
"cpcovth to (i)t)otx(5 icOap,o". Na Ougicat of Say URCipXOUV ooxyric it AtiOoc 
a7tavtA0Elq, wad ypetwe auto not) coti axthpicaat. 
H 186a  
E' Eva f3tf3Xio Othatioic )3pfixage tnv napalcdurco tSta: 
"OA,a ors8ov ra o-i-gpsd othpara, dray Ogpgalvorraz 
StaartA,ovz-az. To calvorgevo am-a TO As* Szaorobi 
IIPOIEEE ! ! '0X6c of cparijoct; nou Oa axoXou0fcotw wpopot5v anti tqv tSta. 
'Eva HapiSetyga  
ETO 1343Xio "cpsovc6 to qmorKe) Ktiogo", flptcallc yta 'my napandvo) tSta to 
napciSEtwa: 
p 
-..--;-_,-..-• 
To Kcaoicalpi 01 0787008poituceg wappeg, gam'ag T17;  ,uerciAlig Ocp,uoicpact'ag 
Sicto-reZtovrat, Kai erci oxquarg-ovv icaun-tacc gpog ra ,raves. 
TYPNA HIED E' AYTH TH EEAIAA, AN XPEIAETEI NA OYMHOEII 
AYTO To HAPAAEII-MA (TOY BIBAIOY) rIA THN IIAPAHANQ IAEA. 
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HEPITPAOONTAE HAPAAEITMA TA 
Eivat ari[tavitio5 va&Tat oil ca0 [tnopcic va s4Tivicystc Ina tSta µs nokket 
napa5eimata. Meptica anO auto. to napaSsiwata Eivat KaX0-ccpa anO Ketnota 
(5aXa, Kat geptioft Eivat xstpOtspa. ME auto to epommtatokOyto, OtX,ouge va 
Sot51.1s, mpg eat') KataXaDaivetc ithnota napa8Eiy;.tata nou unetpxouv CTO r3tAio 
"speuvth to tpuattco KOatto". Na Outtetcrat Ott 8cv uncipxouv acoatac ri XdOoq 
anarniaEtc, air? et. 7ff:we auto 7C00 Eoti axtgyczaat. 
H 186a  
E' Eva f3tf3Xio (Duattaig 13pfitca[tc tiv napaxetTo) tSta: 
"OA,a o-xcAfiv za az-gpEci oropara, (frav 0Eppalvovz-az 
StacTIA,ovz-az. To catvo'pevo aura TO itErpg 81a01-0171"  
IIPOLEEE ! ! '0Xcc of pormjactc itou Oa alcoXouOticsouv impopo6v alltii -my tota. 
'Eva IIapaSEtwa  
to (343Xio "speuvth to (puma KOcri.to", 13pfixage yta tiv napanetvco u5ta to 
napcloctva: 
To Ka/lox-al-pi ra 7leicrpovapa o-oguara nig AEH yeraeo Soo o-racov, gairia; 
rig- pEyttAiic Osp,uokpacrfac Siao-reA,Aovrai, Kal Ezra elvat xcolapci. 
TYPNA HIED E' AYTH TH EEAIAA, AN XPEIAETEI NA OYMHOEIE 
AYTO TO IIAPAAEITMA (TOY BIBAIOY) TIA THN HAPAIIANC1 IAEA. 
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HEPITPAODNTAE HAPAAEITMATA 
Eivat orip.avitx6 va Oui.tacrat ott E6t5 propEic va ETryflogic µla iota JAE noXlet 
TrapaSsi-ntaTa. MEputh ano aura to TcapaSEiyi.tata sivat xaXingpa mai icanota 
d? ka, Kat pxptica Eivat xEtpotEpa. ME auto TO EpommtatoXoyto, OtXoupic va 
Sot*E, Itcoc goi) KatakaDaivEtc mircota TrapaSEiip,ata 7COU UTC6PXODV GTO 13113X10 
"EpEuvc5 TO (puoixo Koago". Na Ouphoat ott 8Ev DltetpX0IN GCOGTgC n XcitOoc 
anavrriactc, anka ypotwE auto TCOU srni oithptgoat. 
H 186a  
E' Eval3113Xio Couoticfigr3pflKal.tE -new napaxdtto) t8ga: 
"Orav 8do othitara flpfo-Kovrat as =art q Ospgdrqz-a; 
ps'ca&8EZal ircivrors alio TO Ospprirspo acbga xpoc TO 
VIVXporEpO. 
IIPOEEEE ! ! '0A,Ec of Eporliamg nou Oa axoXouthloouv a(popot5v autii triv tSga. 
'Eva IlapiSetwa  
to (3t13kio "EpEuvo) TO (puovico Kool.to", 
napciSctiga: 
(3pfixaliE yta triv 7Capandtvw t8ga TO 
olivOgrooge goo goxela Ile vspo (To Eva 7rEpleXe1 av-T6 icat To ciA,Av xpoo vepo 
OE ETCOVoli. H Oggiorqra geraageraz ag5 TO av-TO ;wog To lip150 acoga. 
TYPNA IIIES2 E' AYTH TH EEAIAA, AN XPEIAETEI NA OYMHOEIE 
AYTO TO TIAPAAEITIVIA (TOY BIBAIOY) TIA THN TIAPAHANLI IAEA. 
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HEPITPAMONTAE HAPAAEITMATA 
Eivat otIttavitxo va Oup,acat Ott Erni pcopEic va Et-iyficsEtc ttta 18ta ttE Tcokket 
napaSgiyttata. MEptidt alto auto, ta TcapaSEiyttata sivat KakOtEpa ano tcetnota 
etkka, xat IlEptidt Eivai xEtpotEpa. ME auto TO Eporunp,atokoyto, Otkoul.te va 
SoOlig, ncoc gall KatakaDaivetc Kanota icapaSayttata nou unapxouv no 13tnio 
"EPEUVOr) TO (puatKo Koatto". Na Ouwicrat Ott 8EV uncipxouv acoatic ii kcitOoc 
anavripeic, wad ypetwE auto TCOU cat5 crid(ptEcyat. 
H 186a  
E' Eva 13113Xio Oucroolc Opflicapz triv napataitco tSta: 
"02-av 86o othfurra Max-0mm as ex-ari, q Oepporqra; 
jusra818grat Ncivrow an-o 2-o OgRitirepo oroga xpoc TO 
VIVXpoZEp0." 
IIPOEFEE ! ! 'Oksc of sparripEtc nou Oa axokouOficouv mpopotiv autfi try t8ta. 
'Eva Hapa.SEtwa  
ETO 131.13kio "EpEuvd) TO (puoixo xootto", OptiKalic yta triv naparcdtvco tSga TO 
icapciOetypa: 
%...._ TONDOET015,UE Eva pera22ua5 gozeio ILE Cearo vepo, pgaa a' Eva caylo 
geya2Orepo 80,refo ROU irepiexei xpoo vepo. H Osp,uoriira peragigerai wro TO 
CEOTO gpoc ro icptio acopa. 
TYPNA HIED E' AYTH TH EEAIAA, AN XPEIAETEI NA OYMHOEIE 
AYTO To HAPAAEITMA (TOY BIBAIOY) TIA THN IIAPAHANO IAEA. 
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HEPITPA012NTAE HAPAAEITMA TA 
Eivat arip,av-utid) va Otthaat ott Eat') gnopcic va giviostc [tta t8ta [te nokX6. 
napaSci-y[tata. MEptxdt airO aura to napaSciyl.taTa &Nat KaXirrepa altO xdnota 
dXXa, Kat 1.tsptioi, sivat xstpcitspa. Me auto to spayrwaToXOyto, OtXoupz va 
Sags, n()); eati xataXaDaivetc Ketnota napaSsiyi.tata nou unatpxouv GTO 13tAio 
"epetwth to qmatico KOcyl.to". Na 0141dcat ott SEN,  UnCipXOUV GOXYCEC tj X(1.00c 
anavtlioEtq, anUt ypettirs auto not) cati axtgyrcaat. 
H 186a  
E' Eva f3t13Xfo (1)txmoc Oplixapts niv napamitco t8ta: 
"EE insiDe ocopa Iwo flpfaxEraz pIoa a' Iva oypo 4ao-Karat 
alto ro !moo pza Szivapq aro xdru xpoc 	 Koivco. Tip  
Sovapq avr# rq Alpe Amon" 
IIPOE,EEE ! ! 'Ms; of cpcottioetc not) Oa axoXotaficopv wpopotiv atnii thy t6Ea. 
'Eva IlapaSetyga  
to 131f3Xio "spetwth to (puotico KOol.to", 13pilicapz yta triv napanomo t8ta to 
napciSetwa: 
duo-1mila propeic va fivOloric or vepc5 pm pgdAa. A v niv aviceic s2st5OspR, 
avrif Oa geraxref ercacvco, ganlac nig Avcoo-lig iz-ov Sexeraz are, TO veloa 
rYPNA IIIES2 E' AYTH TH EEAIAA, AN XPEIAETEI NA OYMHOEIE 
AYTO To HAPAAEITMA (TOY BIBAIOY) riA THN IIAPAIIANO IAEA. 
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HEPITPAOONTAE HAPAAEITMA TA 
Eivat crTwavtuai va Out.t6,aat oil col') wropEig va stlyficictc i.tta toga lac noXXO. 
7rapa5efwata. Meptioi auto auto to napa8ciygata eivat xakUtspa wto tainota 
etX,Xa, tau 1.1sputh sivat xetpOtspa. Me auto to spomb.tatokOyto, OtXoul.te va 
8°0E, rco.4 sat tataXa(lalvctc xdurota napaSsfygata TEOU undpxouv GTO f3t13?io 
"epsuvo5 to (puatia5 xOcsi.to". Na Ougtoat Ott BEV U71CipXOUV acootgc n A,c1.0oq 
anavrriogtq, wad ypo,ws auto itou Eau axt(ptzcat. 
H Ioaa  
va (43Xio Ouatidic Oplixage tTv napaxettco toga: 
"Es Araft9s athpa arm Maws-tar pith a' Iva typo s amcsiraz 
aird w vypd gra 8dvapq azo Kara) apog ra Nalvco. Try  
86vapq avrij ii itErpg Amoy" 
IIPOZEEE ! ! '0),cc of epcoviastg 7C011 Oa axoXoueficouv cupopoOv autij tqv toga. 
'Eva Hapetoetwa,  
ET° Ot(32io "epeuvo5 to (puctidi KOogo", fivixai.t& yta tiv napancivo) toga to 
7tapc1.8Etyp.a: 
Eva acAua valvcrat 	 eA,avpu pecia OTO vspo az' 6,17 gco az' can-6, Eearriag 
TIN civcocnig vac ra 71111/CO, rov Sexerai To acoya ago- TO vepo. 
TYPNA IIIES2 E' AYTH TH EEAIAA, AN XPEIAETEI NA OYMHOEIE 
AYTO TO ITAPAAEIFMA (TOY BIBAIOY) ruk. THN HAPAIIANS2 IAEA. 
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HEPITPA012NTAE HAPAAEITMATA 
Eivat cytigavnxo va Oup,daat Ott sot') gnopeic va gwyficyct; ptta tota 1-1,8 nokket 
napaosiwaTa. Mept-Ket anO auto to napaSeimata elvat Kaktitspa ano xdnota 
Cala, xat geptivi Eh/at xstpotepa. ME auto to spconwatokoyto, OE? ouptc va 
Sotiptz, mpg ecni KataXar3aivct; Ketnota napaociwtata nou IntapXOUV GTO f3ti3Xio 
"epsuvo5 to (pucrucO Kocrpto". Na Ouiletcat ott SEv uncipxouv aONYEgC>i kciOoq 
anavtimetq, wad ypengs auto 7t t) cu cTxt(frrecsat. 
H ISga  
H napaxem..) t8ta, nsptypthpst Katt nou csuvfjOcoc augi3aivet any Kaariptcptvfl i.tac 
co* 
"Orav ra othpara 91-civE eNtivw, xpixez va ipt9ovv Kcirco OTO 
18afoc)" 
IIPOEE'F-E ! ! "Okec of cpconloctc nou Oa axokouOficrouv wpopoOv atm"! niv 
'Eva IlapciSetwa. 
1,To 13tf3Xio "speovco to (pucrttai wiapto", Optixai.te Eva napaSetyp.a not) Sev 
Tatptcget µE niv napandvw t8ta: 
O IrOpaviloc eicro4titrai ano Tn mac razoriira irov e2repvci ra 40.000 
xalOyerpa 	 copa. Eral wrepvticci 	 pig Kai Scv ggiarp4si c' 
avrTj 
rYPNA 	 AYTH TH EEAIAA, AN XPEIAYTEI NA 8YMHOEIE 
AYTO TO HAPAAEITMA (TOY BIBAIOY) rIA THN HAPATIANS1 IAEA. 
339 
HEPITPAOONTAE HAPAAEITMA TA 
Eivat orulavttxci va Ouµdaat oil soli propel.; va sindioetc !Ala t8ta ps rcokkot 
napa8c171.tata. Meptioi arcc5 aura to rcapaaciwata eivat Kakirtzpa arcc5 ithrcota 
(aka, Kat [teptith civat xetpkspa. Ms atm') TO spcorratatokOyto, OEXou[ts va 
rccoc sot') KatakaPaivetc Karcota itapaosimata rcou undpxouv o.TO 13113Xio 
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licKa rlic 
YPNA 	 EAIAA, • N PEIAETEI A YMITOEIE 
AYTO TO HAPAAEIFMA (TOY BIBAIOY) TIA TIIN HAPAITANCI IAEA. 
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Appendix 6.2 Factor loadings and the factor scree plot for Potential Energy 
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Sampling adequacy = .57774 
Bartlett test = 130.62388, Significance = .00000 
Autonomy -.97899 .11329 .07794 
Force -.88949 -.11855 -.12099 
Container .20856 .90293 .02084 
Con.Subst -.51099 .84109 -.09845 
Rigidity .35904 .48711 .40905 
Barrier -.16816 -.14655 1.04217 
Support .21468 .15370 .78635 
Invisible E -.39954 -.38858 -.48729 
Factor Scree Plot 
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Appendix 6.3 Plots of factors for Potential Energy 
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Appendix 6.4 Potential energy: Percentages of 'yes' responses for each 
scheme 
Example with 
the 'pot' 
Mc Nemar 
Test 
Example with 
the 'Child' 
Mc Nemar 
Test 
Barrier V23-07 0.03 V24- 6 0.03 
Support 29-10 V41-21 0.04 
Container 3-3 12-15 
Scientific entity 	 Rigidity 8- 3 15- 6 
Cont. thing 32-21 *1S-;2 0.06 
Force 66-66 53-50 
Autonomous 32-40 18-29 
Invisible ent. 74-66 82-79 
Barrier 5- 5 44-26 
Support V61-.26 0.001 V82-29 0.000 
Container 92-79 V68-41 0.004 
Protagonist 	 Rigidity V89-53 0.000 56-50 
Cont. thing V61-39 0.04 V65-44 0.02 
Force 3- 3 V88-61 0.02 
Autonomous 0- 8 V97-79 0.03 
Invisible ent. 0- 3 6- 6 
Barrier 37-24 21-26 
Support V87-39 0.000 V85-59 0.01 
Container V55.16 0.000 V82-35 0.000 
Structure-related 	 Rigidity 37-29 41-38 
objects 	 Cont. thing 16- 8 32-15 
Force V45-21 0.004 35-24 
Autonomous 2113 6- 6 
Invisible ent. 3- 3 6- 0 
Barrier *29- .5'± 0.001 V76-53 0.008 
Support 95-89 85-88 
Container 18-32 50-44 
Surface-related 	 Rigidity 92-84 53-56 
objects 	 Cont. thing 8- 8 V41-24 0.03 
Force 3- 0 * 3-21 0,03 
Autonomous o- 0 3- 9 
Invisible ent. o- 0 6- 0 
Barrier 3- 0 15- 9 
Support 11- 	 0 6- 3 
Container 18-11 27-18 
Irrelevant 	 Rigidity 13- 5 29-12 
objects 	 Cont. thing V37-16 0.02 V50-24 0.004 
Force V95-71 0.004 V97-68 0.006 
Autonomous V71-47 0.004 50-47 
Invisible ent. V89-74 0.03 94-91 
The pairs of numbers show the percentages of the children who used each scheme to describe various 
objects in the non-exemplifying context (the first number) and in the exemplifying context (the second 
number). 'V' means statistically significant decrease and "" means statistically significant increase. 
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Appendix 6.5 Factor loadings and the factor scree plot for Expansion 
Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 1 Sampling adequacy = .53665 
Bartlett test = 50.64959, Significance = .00547 
SUPPORT .93418 -.10160 -.16259 
ENTITY -.86069 .00851 -.14807 
BARRIER .85065 -.07621 .18353 
CON. SUBS .48051 .45012 -.09110 
AUTONO -.18737 .88395 .12596 
CONTAINE .40764 .56223 -.22914 
RIGIDITY .14699 .30864 .78853 
FORCE .02217 .40814 -.69694 
Factor Scree Plot 
Factor Number 
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Appendix 6.6 Plots of factors for Expansion 
REGR factor score 1 for analysis 1 
2.5. 	  
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Appendix 6.7 Expansion: Percentages of 'yes' responses for each scheme 
Example with 
the 'railway' 
Mc Nemar 
Test 
Example with 
the 'wires' 
Mc Nemar 
Test 
Barrier 9- 3 10- 0 
Support 0- 6 8- 3 
Container 6- 0 3- 3 
Scientific entity 	 Rigidity 15- 6 5- 5 
Cont. thing 6- 6 13- 8 
Force 36-24 45-40 
Autonomous 9- 6 10-10 
Invisible ent. V67-36 0.002 55-43 
Barrier 18-27 13-13 
Support 85-75 V58-13 0.000 
Container 3- 6 V55-35 0.008 
Protagonist 	 Rigidity V67- 9 0.000 15- 8 
Cont. thing 12- 3 V30-13 0.02 
Force 58-48 V33-10 0.004 
Autonomous 0- 0 3- 0 
Invisible ent. 3- 0 3- 0 
Barrier 3- 0 10- 5 
Support 0- 0 3- 3 
Container 27-15 43-28 
Structure-related 	 Rigidity 54-61 45-48 
objects 	 Cont. thing 6- 3 15-13 
Force 18-12 *28-4,; ( 	 ),-,_ 
Autonomous 12- 6 13- 8 
Invisible ent. 42-33 33-20 
Barrier 30-18 V65-25 0.000 
Support V55-27 0.01 *50-6.; 0.01 
Container V73-30 0.000 10- 8 
Surface-related 	 Rigidity 42-39 63-65 
objects 	 Cont. thing V30- 6 0.007 V3013 0.02 
Force V70-21 0.000 3- 3 
Autonomous 64-67 8- 0 
Invisible ent. 3- 6 0- 5 
Barrier 33-52 V38-20 0.02 
Support V88-61 0.004 V90-48 0.000 
Container V79-30 0.000 V78-25 0.000 
Irrelevant 	 Rigidity 30-24 30-20 
objects 	 Cont. thing 9- 3 V33-13 0.02 
Force V39-15 0.007 V55-20 0.005 
Autonomous 6- 6 15-18 
Invisible ent. 6- 0 8- 5 
The pairs of numbers show the percentages of the children who used each scheme to describe various 
objects in the non-exemplifying context (the first number) and in the exemplifying context (the second 
number). 'V' means statistically significant decrease and "" means statistically significant increase. 
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Appendix 6.8 Factor loadings and the factor scree plot for Thermal 
Equilibrium 
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Sampling adequacy = .68402 
Bartlett test = 192.18099, Significance = .00000 
SUPPORT 1.01027 -.03841 .10371 
RIGIDITY .93020 .14897 -.07508 
CONTAINE .91714 -.23890 -.08456 
BARRIER .87975 .31265 -.03406 
CON.SUBS -.17208 -.92929 .08533 
AUTONOMO -.03353 .16543 .94326 
FORCE .00730 -.39979 .89635 
ENTITY -.27435 .55695 .62929 
Factor Scree Plot 
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Appendix 6.9 Plots of factors for Thermal Equilibrium 
1.5. 	  
a17,!rokat3c 
mpot5c 
mpot5i 	 mpot3i 
air3c 
	 mpot3c 
air3i 
heat3i 
.5 'n 174 
0.0. 
1.0. 
6 
a 
cold5i 
cold5c 
hot5c 	 hot3i 
° 	 hot3c 	 ° 
° 	 cold3c cold3i  
hot5i 
-2 (1,  
-1.0 	 -.5 	 0.0 	 .5 	 1.0 	 1.5 	 2.0 	 2.5 
REGR factor score 1 for analysis 1 
-1.0 	 -.5 	 0.0 	 2.0 	 2.5 
REGR factor score 1 for analysis 1 
-1.0 
-1.5 
348 
Appendix 6.10 Thermal Equilibrium: Percentages of 'yes' responses for 
each scheme 
Example: pots 
in 'contact' 
Mc Nemar 
Test 
Example:a pot 
inside another 
Mc Nemar 
Test 
Barrier 8- 0 7- 	 0 
Support 8- 0 3- 0 
Container 8- 5 7- 3 
Scientific entity 	 Rigidity 8- 0 7- 0 
Cont. thing '0.5-53 
*28-50 
33-28 
0 003 
0 01 
47-53 
424-64 
27-40 
0.002 i Force 
Autonomous 
Invisible ent. 78-88 83-87 
Barrier 0- 0 0- 0 
Support 18- 5 V34- 0 0 002 
Container 38-28 47-37 
Protagonist 	 Rigidity 10- 3 
Cont. thing 88-80 77-93 
Force 45-48 V50-73 0.04 
Autonomous 13- 5 20- 7 
Invisible ent. 0- 0 3- 0 
Barrier 3- 0 0- 0 
Support V25- 3 0.004 V40-10 0.01 
Container V48-15 0.001 60-53 
Structure-related 	 Rigidity 15- 	 3  
objects 	 Cont. thing 93-88 87-70 
Force V48-10 0.000 V60- 7 0.005 
Autonomous 13- 5 V27- 7 0.03 
Invisible ent. 0- 0 0- 0 
Barrier 55-65 V73-47 0.008 
Support V88-38 0.000 80-60 
Container 93-98 83-77 
Surface-related 	 Rigidity V78-60 0.04 V73-50 0.04 
objects 	 Cont. thing V38-10 0.001 30-17 
Force 0- 3 3-13 
Autonomous 0- 0 0- 
Invisible ent. 0- 0 0- 3 
Barrier 5- 0 7- 3 
Support 13- 5 17- 0 
Container 18- 5 V23- 3 0.03 
Irrelevant 	 Rigidity 3- 0 3- 3 
objects 	 Cont. thing V56-10 0.000 V57- 7 0.000 
Force V95-15 0.000 V97-23 0.000 
Autonomous V80-20 0.000 V67-27 0.004 
Invisible ent. V95-48 0.000 V8743 0.002 
The pairs of numbers show the percentages of the children who used each scheme to describe various 
objects in the non-exemplifying context (the first number) and in the exemplifying context (the second 
number). 'V' means statistically significant decrease and 	 means statistically significant increase. 
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Appendix 6.11 Factor loadings and the factor scree plot for Inertia 
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 
ENTITY -.90853 .06887 -.07320 
RIGIDITY .88285 .18295 .20258 
SUPPORT .86607 -.02185 -.07565 
CONTAINE .67082 -.05101 -.50426 
FORCE -.00250 .97703 .02296 
AUTONO .01247 .95778 -.09268 
CONT.SUB -.06421 .00232 -.87083 
BARRIER .00776 -.08493 .76339 
Sampling adequacy = .43409 
Bartlett test = 97.79008, Significance = .00000 
Factor Scree Plot 
3.5 	  
Factor Number 
6 	 6 	 7 	 8 
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Appendix 6.12 Plots of factors for Inertia 
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Appendix 6.13 Inertia: Percentages of 'yes' responses for each scheme 
The example 
with the 'car' 
Mc Nemar 
Test 
The example 
with the 
`elephant' 
Mc Nemar 
Test 
Barrier 55-68 39-26 
Support 3- 8 0- 4 
Container 11- 	 8 0- 9 
Scientific entity 	 Rigidity 16- 5 9- 4 
Cont. thing 26-21 22-22 
Force 16-26 9-27 
Autonomous 18- 8 4- 0 
Invisible ent. 50-58 65-87 0.06 
Barrier 18-21 
Support V84-45 0.000 V571 3 	 0.002 
Container V92-37 0.000 26- 9 
Protagonist 	 Rigidity V44-26 0.04 30-6 	 , 
17- 9 Cont. thing 47-37 
Force V50-37 0.06 74-83 
Autonomous 45-40 V96-61 0.08 
Invisible ent. 0- 0 4- 0 
Barrier 13-16 0- 4 
Support V82-35 0.000 9- 0 
Container V10032 0.000 V35- 9 0.313 
Structure-related 	 Rigidity V48-26 0.008 30-22 
objects 	 Cont. thing V71-32 0.000 V57-26 0.04 
Force 58-42 0- 0 
Autonomous 50-44 0- 0 
Invisible ent. 3- 0 
Barrier 
Support 
*r9-;37 
.. 	 , 
0.00 30-22 
V92-76 0.03 83-87 
Container V68-18 0.000 V61-27 0.007 
Surface-related 	 Rigidity 32-44 30-35 
objects 	 Cont. thing 8-13 4-13 
Force 40-24 V56-26 0.02 
Autonomous V24- 5 0.02 17- 9 
Invisible ent. 0- 0 0- 0 
Barrier 3-11 4- 0 
Support 3- 0 V65-I3 0.000 
Container 24-11 V35- 9 0.313 
Irrelevant 	 Rigidity 5 	 3 35-35 
objects 	 Cont. thing V53-18 0.001 V48-13 0.008 
Force V95-74 0.007 91-78 
Autonomous 71-61 V96-65 0.02 
Invisible ent. V84-68 0.03 4- 4 
The pairs of numbers show the percentages of the children who used each scheme to describe various 
objects in the non-exemplifying context (the first number) and in the exemplifying context (the second 
number). 'V' means statistically significant decrease and `*' means statistically significant increase. 
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Appendix 6.14 Factor loadings and the factor scree plot for Upthrust 
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Sampling adequacy = .39142 
Bartlett test = 69.57655, Significance = .00002 
FORCE .89936 -.33970 -.04092 
AUTONO .87522 .22258 -.10035 
ENTITY -.09373 -.80987 -.24993 
RIGIDITY -.41576 .80460 .08461 
CON.SUBS .09116 .61228 -.19947 
SUPPORT .52012 .21804 .78492 
BARRIER -.36022 -.24890 .68289 
CONTAINE -.09100 .02319 .50577 
Factor Scree Plot 
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Appendix 6.15 Plots of factors for Upthrust 
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Appendix 6.16 Upthrust: Percentages of 'yes' responses for each scheme 
The example 
with the 'ball' 
Mc Nemar 
Test 
The example 
with the 
`stone' 
Mc Nemar 
Test 
Barrier *14.61 0.000 29-14 
Support *11-36 0.01 14-33 
Container 11-17 19-10 
Scientific entity 	 Rigidity 19-11 4- 4 
Cont. thing 14-17 19-33 
Force 58-69 38-48 
Autonomous 17- 3 10- 5 
Invisible ent. 67-69 76-85 
Barrier 6- 6 V43- 5 0.007 
Support 14- 8 V52- 5 0.002 
Container V61-33 0.02 14-14 
Protagonist 	 Rigidity 36-42 V81-48 0.02 
Cont. thing V81-33 0.000 67-57 
Force V33-11 0.02 5-10 
Autonomous 19-11 5-10 
Invisible ent. 6- 3 5- 0 
Barrier *20.36 00:4 10-14 
38-24 Support 3 1 -3 6 
Container 50-42 86-91 
Structure-related 	 Rigidity 11-17 10- 5 
objects 	 Cont. thing 75-86 24-15 
Force V81-36 0.000 62-38 
Autonomous 11- 6 5- 5 
Invisible ent. 11-14 15-10 
Barrier 17- 6 5- 0 
Support V75-25 0.000 58-81 
Container V31-11 0.04 24-10 
Surface-related 	 Rigidity 19-25 19-29 
objects 	 Cont. thing V56- 8 0.000 8 	 6 
Force V94-64 0.001 81-86 
Autonomous 92-81 95-81 
Invisible ent. 11- 	 3 0- 5 
Barrier 47-56 38-24 
Support V72-50 0.02 V86-52 0.02 
Container V67-42 0.02 V67-24 0.004 
Irrelevant 	 Rigidity 58-25 38-38 
objects 	 Cont. thing V58-11 0.000 10-10 
Force 8-11 V34- 5 0.03 
Autonomous 6- 0 15-10 
Invisible ent. 0- 6 0- 0 
The pairs of numbers show the percentages of the children who used each scheme to describe various 
objects in the non-exemplifying context (the first number) and in the exemplifying context (the second 
number). 'V' means statistically significant decrease and 	 means statistically significant increase. 
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Appendix 6.17 Factor loadings and the factor scree plot for the 
transmission of heat 
Factor 1 Factor 2 Sampling adequacy = .42424 
Bartlett test = 57.64846, Significance = .00081 
Autonomy .93419 -.27605 
Force .93564 .01461 
Barrier .91059 .05294 
Support .70639 .63415 
Con.Subst .47948 -.25396 
Invisible E -.02529 -.94943 
Rigidity -.19423 .87541 
Container -.12253 .86082 
Factor Scree Plot 
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Transmission of heat: Percentages of 'yes' responses for each scheme 
The example 
with the 
`glass' 
Mc Nemar 
Test 
Barrier 5 - 5 
Support 3 - 3 
Container 11- 	 8 
Scientific entity 	 Rigidity 11- 	 8 
Cont. thing 34- 29 
Force 11- 16 
Autonomous 29- 26 
Invisible ent. 71- 79 
Barrier 0 - 8 
Support 8 - 8 
Container 32- 22 
Protagonist 	 Rigidity r47 
\, 5. 	 16 
0.02,, 
0.000 Cont. thing 
Force 8- 58 
Autonomous 8- 8 
Invisible ent. 5- 3 
Barrier 3- 5 
Support *`21-42,,  
Container 74- 84 
Structure-related 	 Rigidity 55- 47 
objects 	 Cont. thing 29- 13 
Force 8 - 3 
Autonomous 0 - 5 
Invisible ent. 8 - 3 
Barrier V32-11 0.008 
Support 84-68 
_ 
Container 0.02 
Surface-related 	 Rigidity 32-45 
objects 	 Cont. thing V50-21 0.003 
Force 87-89 
Autonomous V71-50 0.02 
Invisible ent. 5 - 3 
Barrier 13- 8 
Support 3 - 3 
Container 13- 3 
Irrelevant 	 Rigidity 18- 8 
objects 	 Cont. thing V42- 18 0.004 
Force V74- 21 0.000 
Autonomous V68- 16 0.000 
Invisible ent. V79- 50 0.001 
The pairs of numbers show the percentages of the children who used each scheme to describe various 
objects in the non-exemplifying context (the first number) and in the exemplifying context (the second 
number). 'V' means statistically significant decrease and s" means statistically significant increase. 
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Appendix 6.18 Factor loadings and the factor scree plot for gravity 
Factor 1 Factor 2 Sampling adequacy = .30786 
Bartlett test = 70.33438, Significance = .00002 
Invisible E -.88077 -.07181 
Container .84949 .12287 
Support .82863 -.10870 
Rigidity .76693 .13603 
Barrier .73754 .00848 
Autonomy .21670 .96392 
Con.Subst .23171 .90655 
Force -.40029 .83167 
Factor Scree Plot 
Factor Number 
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Gravity: Percentages of 'yes' responses for each scheme 
The example 
with the 
`rocket' 
Mc Nemar 
Test 
Barrier 0 - 8 
Support V25- 6 0.02 
Container 6- 14 
Scientific entity 	 Rigidity 11- 	 8 
Cont. thing 11- 17 
Force 44- 39 
Autonomous 8 - 8 
Invisible ent. 81-78 
Barrier '11-39 0.002 
Support 42-56 
Container 83-94 
Protagonist 	 Rigidity 69-86 
Cont. thing 42-56 
Force 36-42 
Autonomous 56-53  
Invisible ent. 11-6 
Barrier *28 
V94-42 0.000 Support 
Container V72-22 0.000 
Structure-related 	 Rigidity 22-14 
objects 	 Cont. thing 19-31 
Force 33-25 
Autonomous 22-14 
Invisible ent. 0 - 0 
Barrier V50-14 0.000 
Support V69-22 0.000 
Container V58-14 0.000 
Surface-related 	 Rigidity V39-8 0.001 
objects 	 Cont. thing 
Force 81-64 
Autonomous 89-78 
Invisible ent. 6- 3 
Barrier 6 - 8 
Support 11- 25 
Container 33- 25 
Irrelevant 	 Rigidity 14- 6 
objects 	 Cont. thing V58- 3 0.000 
Force 86- 81 
Autonomous 61-56 
Invisible ent. 81-92 
The pairs of numbers show the percentages of the children who used each scheme to describe various 
objects in the non-exemplifying context (the first number) and in the exemplifying context (the second 
number). 'V' means statistically significant decrease and ' means statistically significant increase. 
359 
7 6 
Appendix 6.19 Factor loadings and the factor scree plot for all examples 
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Sampling adequacy = .65276 
Bartlett test = 367.92691, Significance = .00000 
SUPPORT .81463 .16560 -.30793 
INV. ENTITY -.80742 .22828 -.11272 
CONTAINE .79020 -.04118 .22477 
RIGIDITY .74505 -.18400 -.22353 
FORCE -.17134 .92117 .13594 
AUTON.AC -.02439 .90913 .10386 
CON.SUBS .17591 .22209 .82796 
BARRIER .48602 -.03832 -.63902 
Factor Scree Plot 
Factor Number 
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Appendix 7.1 The questionnaire of the 4th study in Greek 
HEPITPAODNTAE HAPAAEITMATA 
Eivat arivavrwo va Ougdoat ott cot') ,nopcic va s4Tryilicsetc pm Iota ue noAlot 
napaSeiwaTa. Meputh anO auTO. to napaSciyuaTa civat xakinepa ano xdotota 
dXXa, xat gepucet eivat xetpoTepa. ME auto TO cpconivaToXOyto, fitXouue va 
Sotiue, moc Eau xaTakai3aivetc ice: mom napaSeiyi.taTa 7COU UnatpXOUV GTO 13tf3Xio 
"cc:cowl) TO (mama tcoouo". Na Ougetaat oTt SEv oncipxouv ooxyck rj XciOoc 
anarrnactq, airXd yodtwe auto not) c6t5 axtqacaat. 
H ISia  
va (343Xio Ouctictic Opfixage 	 rcapaxemo t8ta: 
"Orav ra oropara revaz avvyKoplva, lzovv svipycza, 71-01) T71 
Alps Avvapnaj Evlpysla" 
! ! '0Xec of epomricetc not) Oa aicokouffij000v wpopotiv anti i TT/ t8ta. 
'Eva IlapciSetypa  
ETO 13t(3Xio "cpcovth TO (puGua5 xocilo", 13pIlicapz yta Tqv napandvo) t8ta TO 
napciSuitta: 
To Naar yripl,ti aro 81vrpo 
exer Auvapucij Eve-prefix 
TYPNA HILO E' AYTH TH EEAIAA, AN XPEIAETEI NA OYMHOEIE 
AYTO To IIAPAAEITMA (TOY BIBAIOY) riA THN HAPAHANLI IAEA. 
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0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Eva gapcigetypa yta 177v tgea 	"Orav ra ozogara elvat avviiiceileva, e 
1rCaL3_112416 Avvaitual Evepyetaf elvat "'Eva natof wrati oto Siv-rpo" (Kolraes rtiv 
encOva ar77 oaf& 4). 1' avrO ro gapergety,ua irapvovv pepoc ro gala ro gevrpo, ro 
egavoc, o aepac Kat 17 AINall1K71 eVeprEla. lkoc Oa ligopoucec va ro aLitteetc avrO 
yta va ro ti-civEtc Eva icaltitEpo napii8Etip.a;  
Kays toirriv... 	 Na wry 	 Na Ketvel min 	 Na akXget TO 	 Nal3PiCIKETat 
	
—i. MEyaXutEpo YnapxEt 	 BapttEpo 	 rpriyopoupa 	 Ext.= TOU 	 /a° Maxine( 
nal& 
Stvtpo 
acpa 
Mapog 
Auv. Evtvela 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
exavec pa va ro taiveig Eva  xElperrEpo napaSEtwa;  
	
Na !Arty 	 Na Ketvet )(amt 	 Na aX164et to 
	
Mcyak6tEpo YnciPXE1 	 Bap61-spo 
	 roiyopotEpa 	 Ext.= 'you 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
Ti aAdlayeg- Oa 
Ketve whiv... 
--n 
Tccu8i 
Stvtpo 
aEpa 
toa(pog 
Auv. EvEp'yEta 
Na OPICSKETal 
MO Maxpla 
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Cases 
38 
Cochran Q 	 D.F. Significance 
28.5152 	 5 	 .0000 
Cases 
34 
Cochran Q 	 D.F. Significance 
65.5389 	 5 	 .0000 
POTENTIAL ENERGY 	 ***BETTER*** 
FEATURES 
EXAMPLE: 	 1 Pot 	 Cochran Q Test 
Cies  
= 0 = 1 Variable 
Column 1 = The number of 
children who chose this feature 
Column 0 = The number of 
children who did not choose it 
B = Making the 
example better 
OR 
W = Making the 
example worse 
I II 	  
35 3 BAAWA 
35 3 BABIG 
34 4 BAEXI 
36 2 BAHEA 
24 14 BAQUI 
37 1 BASHA 
AWA = away 
BIG = bigger 
EXI = not exist 
HEA = heavier 
QUI = quicker 
SHA = shape 
A= air 
B = pot/child 
C = balcony/tree 
D = ground 
E = potential 
energy 
Cases 	 Cochran Q 	 D.F. Significance 
38 	 26.8110 	 5 	 .0001 
EXAMPLE: 	 2 Child 	 Cochran Q Test 
Cases 
= 0 = 1 Variable 
34 0 BAAWA 
33 1 BABIG 
32 2 BAEXI 
33 1 BAHEA 
18 16 BAQUI 
33 1 BASHA 
Cases 	 Cochran Q 	 D.F. Significance 
34 	 55.1942 	 5 	 .0000 
EXAMPLE: 	 1 Pot 	 Cochran Q Test EXAMPLE: 	 1 Pot Cochran Q Test 
Cases 
= 0 = 1 Variable 
15 23 BBAWA 
19 19 BBBIG 
38 0 BBEXI 
22 16 BBHEA 
35 3 BBQUI 
29 9 BBSHA 
Cases 	 Cochran Q 	 D.F. Significance 
38 	 50.3200 	 5 	 .0000 
Cases 
= 0 = 1 Variable 
29 9 BCAWA 
26 12 BCBIG 
38 0 BCEXI 
34 4 BCHEA 
38 0 BCQUI 
26 12 BCSHA 
EXAMPLE: 	 2 Child 	 Cochran Q Test 
Cases 
= 1 = 0 Variable 
EXAMPLE: 	 2 Child 
Cases 
= 1 = 0 Variable 
Cochran Q Test 
25 9 BBAWA 
13 21 BBBIG 
0 34 BBEXI 
16 18 BBHEA 
8 26 BBQUI 
8 26 BBSHA 
Cases 	 Cochran Q 	 D.F. Significance 
34 	 45.1667 	 5 	 .0000 
8 26 BCAWA 
23 11 BCBIG 
0 34 BCEXI 
4 30 BCHEA 
0 34 BCQUI 
8 26 BCSHA 
Appendix 7.2 Cochran Q Test for potential energy 
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EXAMPLE: 	 1 Pot 	 Cochran Q Test 
Cases 
= 1 = 0 Variable 
11 27 BDAWA 
4 34 BDBIG 
2 36 BDEXI 
4 34 BDHEA 
0 38 BDQUI 
5 33 BDSHA 
	
Cases 	 Cochran Q 	 D.F. Significance 
38 	 17.3333 	 5 	 .0039 
	
EXAMPLE: 	 2 Child 	 Cochran Q Test 
Cases 
= 1 = 0 Variable 
24 10 BDAWA 
2 32 BDBIG 
0 34 BDEXI 
2 32 BDHEA 
1 33 BDQUI 
7 27 BDSHA 
	
Cases 	 Cochran Q 	 D.F. Significance 
34 	 76.4634 	 5 	 .0000 
	
EXAMPLE: 	 1 Pot 	 Cochran Q Test 
Cases 
= 0 = 1 Variable 
33 5 BEAWA 
29 9 BEBIG 
37 1 BEEXI 
34 4 BEHEA 
22 16 BEQUI 
37 1 BESHA 
	
Cases 	 Cochran Q 	 D.F. Significance 
38 	 33.2432 	 5 	 .0000 
	
EXAMPLE: 	 2 Child 	 Cochran Q Test 
Cases 
= 0 = 1 Variable 
33 1 BEAWA 
24 10 BEBIG 
33 1 BEEXI 
32 2 BEHEA 
32 2 BEQUI 
34 0 BESHA 
	
Cases 	 Cochran Q 	 D.F. Significance 
34 	 28.0556 	 5 	 .0000 
  
     
       
       
   
POTENTIAL ENERGY 	 ***WORSE*** 
EXAMPLE: 	 1 Pot 	 Cochran Q Test 
EXAMPLE: 	 2 Child 	 Cochran Q Test 
Cases 
= 0 = 1 Variable 
32 2 WAAWA 
30 4 WABIG 
24 10 WAEXI 
28 6 WAHEA 
27 7 WAQUI 
32 2 WASHA 
Cases 	 Cochran Q 	 D.F. Significance 
34 	 11.1832 	 5 	 .0479 
   
   
	
EXAMPLE: 	 1 Pot 	 Cochran Q Test 
Cases 
= 0 = 1 Variable 
30 8 WBAWA 
30 8 WBBIG 
16 22 WBEXI 
30 8 WBHEA 
32 6 WBQUI 
26 12 WBSHA 
	
Cases 	 Cochran Q 	 D.F. Significance 
38 	 23.2143 	 5 	 .0003 
	
EXAMPLE: 	 2 Child 	 Cochran Q Test 
Cases 
= 0 = 1 Variable 
31 3 WBAWA 
27 7 WBBIG 
10 24 WBEXI 
18 16 WBHEA 
26 8 WBQUI 
24 10 WBSHA 
	
Cases 	 Cochran Q 	 D.F. Significance 
34 	 35.1240 	 5 	 .0000 
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 EXAMPLE: 	 1 Pot 	 Cochran Q Test 
Cases 
= 0 = 1 Variable 
EXAMPLE: 	 1 Pot 	 Cochran Q Test 
 
 
23 15 WCAWA 
28 10 WCBIG 
24 14 WCEXI 
33 5 WCHEA 
31 7 WCQUI 
27 11 WCSHA 
	
Cases 	 Cochran Q 	 D.F. Significance 
38 	 10.4630 	 5 	 .0631 
	
EXAMPLE: 	 2 Child 	 Cochran Q Test 
Cases 
= 0 = 1 Variable 
32 2 WCAWA 
24 10 WCBIG 
13 21 WCEXI 
28 6 WCHEA 
29 5 WCQUI 
23 11 WCSHA 
	
Cases 	 Cochran Q 	 D.F. Significance 
34 	 35.7487 	 5 	 .0000 
	
EXAMPLE: 	 2 Child 	 Cochran Q Test 
Cases 
= 0 = 1 Variable 
33 1 WDAWA 
25 9 WDBIG 
17 17 WDEXI 
27 7 WDHEA 
30 4 WDQUI 
21 13 WDSHA 
	
Cases 	 Cochran Q 	 D.F. Significance 
34 	 28.4254 	 5 	 .0000 
 
 
	
EXAMPLE: 	 1 Pot 	 Cochran Q Test 
Cases 
= 0 = 1 Variable 
35 3 WEAWA 
35 3 WEBIG 
25 13 WEEXI 
31 7 WEHEA 
28 10 WEQUI 
30 8 WESHA 
	
Cases 	 Cochran Q 	 D.F. Significance 
38 	 13.8095 	 5 	 .0169 
	
EXAMPLE: 	 2 Child 	 Cochran Q Test 
Cases 
= 0 = 1 Variable 
33 1 WEAWA 
34 0 WEBIG 
21 13 WEEXI 
30 4 WEHEA 
30 4 WEQUI 
34 0 WESHA 
	
Cases 	 Cochran Q 	 D.F. Significance 
34 	 36.4000 	 5 	 .0000 
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POTENTIAL EXAMPLE ***BETTER*** 
OBJECTS 
EXAMPLE: 	 1 Pot 	 Cochran Q Test 
Cases 
= 0 = 1 Variable 
 
EXAMPLE: 	 1 Pot 	 Cochran Q Test 
  
  
35 3 BABIG 
19 19 BBBIG 
26 12 BCBIG 
34 4 BDBIG 
29 9 BEBIG 
	
Cases 	 Cochran Q 	 D.F. Significance 
38 	 22.5600 	 4 	 .0002 
	
EXAMPLE: 	 2 Child 	 Cochran Q Test 
Cases 
= 0 = 1 Variable 
33 1 BABIG 
21 13 BBBIG 
11 23 BCBIG 
32 2 BDBIG 
24 10 BEBIG 
	
Cases 	 Cochran Q 	 D.F. Significance 
34 	 44.8333 	 4 	 .0000 
  
EXAMPLE: 	 2 Child 	 Cochran Q Test 
  
  
	
EXAMPLE: 	 1 Pot 	 Cochran Q Test 
Cases 
= 1 = 0 Variable 
2 36 BAHEA 
16 22 BBHEA 
4 34 BCHEA 
4 34 BDHEA 
4 34 BEHEA 
	
Cases 	 Cochran Q 	 D.F. Significance 
38 	 24.6154 	 4 	 .0001 
	
EXAMPLE: 	 2 Child 	 Cochran Q Test 
Cases 
= 0 = 1 Variable 
33 1 BAHEA 
18 16 BBHEA 
30 4 BCHEA 
32 2 BDHEA 
32 2 BEHEA 
	
Cases 	 Cochran Q 	 D.F. Significance 
34 	 34.6667 	 4 	 .0000 
  
	
EXAMPLE: 	 1 Pot 	 Cochran Q Test 
Cases 
= 0 = 1 Variable 
24 14 BAQUI 
35 3 BBQUI 
38 0 BCQUI 
38 0 BDQUI 
22 16 BEQUI 
	
Cases 	 Cochran Q 	 D.F. Significance 
38 	 40.5333 	 4 	 .0000 
	
EXAMPLE: 	 2 Child 	 Cochran Q Test 
Cases 
= 0 = 1 Variable 
18 16 BAQUI 
26 8 BBQUI 
34 0 BCQUI 
33 1 BDQUI 
32 2 BEQUI 
	
Cases 	 Cochran Q 	 D.F. Significance 
34 	 38.1277 	 4 	 .0000 
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EXAMPLE: 	 1 Pot 	 Cochran Q Test 
Cases 
= 0 = 1 Variable 
37 1 BASHA 
29 9 BBSHA 
26 12 BCSHA 
33 5 BDSHA 
37 1 BESHA 
Cases 	 Cochran Q 	 D.F. Significance 
38 	 21.1556 	 4 	 .0003 
EXAMPLE: 	 2 Child 	 Cochran Q Test 
Cases 
= 0 = 1 Variable 
33 1 BASHA 
26 8 BBSHA 
26 8 BCSHA 
27 7 BDSHA 
34 0 BESHA 
Cases 	 Cochran Q 	 D.F. Significance 
34 	 14.9524 	 4 	 .0048 
EXAMPLE: 	 1 Pot 	 Cochran Q Test 
Cases 
= 0 = 1 Variable 
35 3 BAAWA 
15 23 BBAWA 
29 9 BCAWA 
27 11 BDAWA 
33 5 BEAWA 
Cases 	 Cochran Q 	 D.F. Significance 
38 	 32.2105 	 4 	 .0000 
EXAMPLE: 	 2 Child 	 Cochran Q Test 
Cases 
= 0 = 1 Variable 
34 0 BAAWA 
9 25 BBAWA 
26 8 BCAWA 
10 24 BDAWA 
33 1 BEAWA 
Cases 	 Cochran Q 	 D.F. Significance 
34 	 71.4699 	 4 	 .0000 
POTENTIAL ENERGY ***WORSE*** 
OBJECTS  
EXAMPLE: 	 1 Pot 	 Cochran Q Test 
Cases 
= 0 = 1 Variable 
27 11 WABIG 
30 8 WBBIG 
28 10 WCBIG 
25 13 WDBIG 
35 3 WEBIG 
Cases 	 Cochran Q 	 D.F. Significance 
38 	 10.1754 	 4 	 .0376 
EXAMPLE: 	 2 Child 	 Cochran Q Test 
Cases 
= 0 = 1 Variable 
30 4 WABIG 
27 7 WBBIG 
24 10 WCBIG 
25 9 WDBIG 
34 0 WEBIG 
Cases 	 Cochran Q 	 D.F. Significance 
34 	 12.6923 	 4 	 .0129 
EXAMPLE: 	 1 Pot 	 Cochran Q Test 
Cases 
= 0 = 1 Variable 
27 11 WAEXI 
16 22 WBEXI 
24 14 WCEXI 
30 8 WDEXI 
25 13 WEEXI 
Cases 	 Cochran Q 	 D.F. Significance 
38 	 12.4091 
	
4 	 .0146 
EXAMPLE: 	 2 Child 	 Cochran Q Test 
Cases 
= 0 = 1 Variable 
24 10 WAEXI 
10 24 WBEXI 
13 21 WCEXI 
17 17 WDEXI 
21 13 WEEXI 
Cases 	 Cochran Q 	 D.F. Significance 
34 	 17.5676 	 4 	 .0015 
EXAMPLE: 	 1 Pot 	 Cochran Q Test EXAMPLE: 	 1 Pot 	 Cochran Q Test 
EXAMPLE: 	 2 Child 	 Cochran Q Test 
Cases 
= 0 = 1 Variable 
28 6 WAHEA 
18 16 WBHEA 
28 6 WCHEA 
27 7 WDHEA 
30 4 WEHEA 
EXAMPLE: 	 2 Child 	 Cochran Q Test 
Cases 	 Cochran Q 	 D.F. Significance 
34 	 14.3226 	 4 	 .0063 
EXAMPLE: 	 1 Pot 	 Cochran Q Test EXAMPLE: 	 1 Pot 	 Cochran Q Test 
Cases 
= 0 = 1 Variable 
33 5 WAAWA 
30 8 WBAWA 
23 15 WCAWA 
33 5 WDAWA 
35 3 WEAWA 
Cases 	 Cochran Q 	 D.F. Significance 
38 	 17.4118 	 4 	 .0016 
EXAMPLE: 	 2 Child 	 Cochran Q Test 
Cases 
= 0 = 1 Variable 
32 2 WASHA 
24 10 WBSHA 
23 11 WCSHA 
21 13 WDSHA 
34 0 WESHA 
EXAMPLE: 	 2 Child 	 Cochran Q Test 
Cases 	 Cochran Q 	 D.F. Significance 
34 	 24.5091 	 4 	 .0001 
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Cochran Q Test EXAMPLE: 	 1 railway 
Cases 
= 1 = 0 Variable 
8 25 BCBIG 
0 33 BCEXI 
2 31 BCHEA 
2 31 BCQUI 
3 30 BCSHA 
12 21 BCAWA 
Cases 
33 
Cochran Q 	 D.F. Significance 
27.4779 	 5 	 .0000 
Cases 
40 
Cochran Q 	 D.F. Significance 
43.4492 	 5 	 .0000 
EXPANSION 	 ***BETTER*** 
FEATURES 
EXAMPLE: 	 1 railway 	 Cochran Q Test 
Column 1 = The number of 
children who chose this feature 
Column 0 = The number of 
children who did not choose it 
B = Making the 
example better 
OR 
W = Making the 
example worse 
29 4 IBIABIG 
3 30 BAEXI 
5 28 BAHEA 
1 32 BAQUI 
13 20 BASHA 
6 27 BAAWA 
AWA = away 
BIG = bigger 
EXI = not exist 
HEA = heavier 
QUI = quicker 
SHA = shape 
A= rail/wires 
B = ground 
C = sun 
D = train/pylons 
E =expansion 
Cases 	 Cochran Q 	 D.F. Significance 
33 	 78.1884 	 5 	 .0000 
EXAMPLE: 	 2 wires 	 Cochran Q Test 
Cases 
= 1 = 0 Variable 
31 9 BABIG 
0 40 BAEXI 
6 34 BAHEA 
5 35 BAQUI 
13 27 BASHA 
12 28 BAAWA 
Cases 	 Cochran Q 	 D.F. Significance 
40 	 68.5019 	 5 	 .0000 
EXAMPLE: 	 2 wires 	 Cochran Q Test 
Cases 
= 0 = 1 Variable 
33 7 BBBIG 
36 4 BBEXI 
38 2 BBHEA 
39 1 BBQUI 
31 9 BBSHA 
39 1 BBAWA 
Cases 	 Cochran Q 	 D.F. Significance 
40 	 15.8491 	 5 	 .0073 
EXAMPLE: 	 2 wires 
Cases 
= 1 = 0 Variable 
18 22 BCBIG 
0 40 BCEXI 
1 39 BCHEA 
15 25 BCQUI 
5 35 BCSHA 
8 32 BCAWA 
Cochran Q Test 
Cakes I 
= 1 = 0 Variable 
Appendix 7.3 Cochran Q Test for expansion 
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	EXAMPLE: 	 1 railway 	 Cochran Q Test 
Cases 
= 0 = 1 Variable 
26 7 BDBIG 
30 3 BDEXI 
22 11 BDHEA 
6 27 BDQUI 
28 5 BDSHA 
27 6 BDAWA 
	
Cases 	 Cochran Q 	 D.F. Significance 
33 	 58.6181 	 5 	 .0000 
	
EXAMPLE: 	 2 wires 	 Cochran Q Test 
Cases 
= 1 = 0 Variable 
12 28 BDBIG 
2 38 BDEXI 
6 34 BDHEA 
0 40 BDQUI 
12 28 BDSHA 
11 29 BDAWA 
	
Cases 	 Cochran Q 	 D.F. Significance 
40 	 25.9202 	 5 	 .0001 
	
EXAMPLE: 	 1 railway 	 Cochran Q Test 
Cases 
= 1 = 0 Variable 
13 20 BEBIG 
3 30 BEEXI 
1 32 BEHEA 
1 32 BEQUI 
4 29 BESHA 
0 33 BEAWA 
	
Cases 	 Cochran Q 	 D.F. Significance 
33 	 35.3061 	 5 	 .0000 
	
EXAMPLE: 	 2 wires 	 Cochran Q Test 
Cases 
= 1 = 0 Variable 
23 17 BEBIG 
2 38 BEEXI 
1 39 BEHEA 
9 31 BEQUI 
2 38 BESHA 
2 38 BEAWA 
	
Cases 	 Cochran Q 	 D.F. Significance 
40 	 64.8246 	 5 	 .0000 
 
EXPANSION ***WORSE*** 
	
EXAMPLE: 	 1 railway 	 Cochran Q Test 
Cases 
= 0 = 1 Variable 
32 1 WABIG 
19 14 WAEXI 
30 3 WAHEA 
30 3 WAQUI 
20 13 WASHA 
23 10 WAAWA 
	
Cases 	 Cochran Q 	 D.F. Significance 
33 	 28.4706 	 5 	 .0000 
	
EXAMPLE: 	 2 wires 	 Cochran Q Test 
Cases 
= 0 = 1 Variable 
38 2 WABIG 
12 28 WAEXI 
32 8 WAHEA 
33 7 WAQUI 
13 27 WASHA 
26 14 WAAWA 
	
Cases 	 Cochran Q 	 D.F. Significance 
40 	 65.4412 	 5 	 .0000 
	
EXAMPLE: 	 2 wires 	 Cochran Q Test 
Cases 
= 0 = 1 Variable 
34 6 WBBIG 
26 14 WBEXI 
35 5 WBHEA 
37 3 WBQUI 
23 17 WBSHA 
28 12 WBAWA 
	
Cases 	 Cochran Q 	 D.F. Significance 
40 	 24.7382 	 5 	 .0002 
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EXAMPLE: 	 1 railway 	 Cochran Q Test 
Cases 
= 0 = 1 Variable 
29 4 WCBIG 
21 12 WCEXI 
27 6 WCHEA 
30 3 WCQUI 
24 9 WCSHA 
24 9 WCAWA 
Cases 	 Cochran Q 	 D.F. Significance 
33 	 11.1006 	 5 	 .0494 
EXAMPLE: 	 2 wires 	 Cochran Q Test 
Cases 
= 0 = 1 Variable 
33 7 WCBIG 
16 24 WCEXI 
31 9 WCHEA 
31 9 WCQUI 
20 20 WCSHA 
24 16 WCAWA 
Cases 	 Cochran Q 	 D.F. Significance 
40 	 29.9791 	 5 	 .0000 
EXAMPLE: 	 1 railway 	 Cochran Q Test 
Cases 
= 0 = 1 Variable 
31 2 WDBIG 
31 2 WDEXI 
23 10 WDHEA 
20 13 WDQUI 
26 7 WDSHA 
28 5 WDAWA 
Cases 	 Cochran Q 	 D.F. Significance 
33 	 19.6309 	 5 	 .0015 
EXAMPLE: 	 2 wires 	 Cochran Q Test 
Cases 
= 0 = 1 Variable 
33 7 WDBIG 
23 17 WDEXI 
28 12 WDHEA 
31 9 WDQUI 
23 17 WDSHA 
21 19 WDAWA 
Cases 	 Cochran Q 	 D.F. Significance 
40 	 15.6550 	 5 	 .0079 
EXAMPLE: 	 1 railway 	 Cochran Q Test 
Cases 
= 0 = 1 Variable 
32 1 WEBIG 
22 11 WEEXI 
29 4 WEHEA 
29 4 WEQUI 
31 2 WESHA 
26 7 WEAWA 
Cases 	 Cochran Q 	 D.F. Significance 
33 	 18.0631 	 5 	 .0029 
EXAMPLE: 	 2 wires 	 Cochran Q Test 
Cases 
= 0 = 1 Variable 
37 3 WEBIG 
15 25 WEEXI 
33 7 WEHEA 
33 7 WEQUI 
28 12 WESHA 
30 10 WEAWA 
Cases 	 Cochran Q 	 D.F. Significance 
40 	 40.3670 	 5 	 .0000 
EXPANSION 	 * * *BETTER* * * 
OBJECTS 
EXAMPLE: 	 1 railway 	 Cochran Q Test 
Cases 
= 1 = 0 Variable 
29 4 BABIG 
1 32 BBBIG 
8 25 BCBIG 
7 26 BDBIG 
13 20 BEBIG 
	
Cases 	 Cochran Q 	 D.F. Significance 
33 	 57.1139 	 4 	 .0000 
	
EXAMPLE: 	 2 wires 	 Cochran Q Test 
Cases 
= 1 = 0 Variable 
31 9 BABIG 
7 33 BBBIG 
18 22 BCBIG 
12 28 BDBIG 
23 17 BEBIG 
	
Cases 	 Cochran Q 	 D.F. Significance 
40 	 33.4095 	 4 	 .0000 
	
EXAMPLE: 	 1 railway 	 Cochran Q Test 
Cases 
= 0 = 1 Variable 
28 5 BAHEA 
29 4 BBHEA 
31 2 BCHEA 
22 11 BDHEA 
32 1 BEHEA 
	
Cases 	 Cochran Q 	 D.F. Significance 
33 	 15.3000 	 4 	 .0041 
EXAMPLE: 	 1 railway 	 Cochran Q Test 
Cases 
= 0 = 1 Variable 
32 1 BAQUI 
33 0 BBQUI 
31 2 BCQUI 
6 27 BDQUI 
32 1 BEQUI 
	
Cases 	 Cochran Q 	 D.F. Significance 
33 	 90.4667 	 4 	 .0000 
	
EXAMPLE: 	 2 wires 	 Cochran Q Test 
Cases 
= 0 = 1 Variable 
35 5 BAQUI 
39 1 BBQUI 
25 15 BCQUI 
40 0 BDQUI 
31 9 BEQUI 
Cases 	 Cochran Q 	 D.F. Significance 
40 	 29.8039 	 4 	 .0000 
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	EXAMPLE: 	 1 railway 	 Cochran Q Test 
Cases 
= 1 = 0 Variable 
13 20 BASHA 
3 30 BBSHA 
3 30 BCSHA 
5 28 BDSHA 
4 29 BESHA 
	
Cases 	 Cochran Q 	 D.F. Significance 
33 	 15.4783 	 4 	 .0038 
	
EXAMPLE: 	 2 wires 	 Cochran Q Test 
Cases 
= 0 = 1 Variable 
27 13 BASHA 
31 9 BBSHA 
35 5 BCSHA 
28 12 BDSHA 
38 2 BESHA 
	
Cases 	 Cochran Q 	 D.F. Significance 
40 	 13.5625 	 4 	 .0088 
	
EXAMPLE: 	 1 railway 	 Cochran Q Test 
Cases 
= 1 = 0 Variable 
6 27 BAAWA 
2 31 BBAWA 
12 21 BCAWA 
6 27 BDAWA 
0 33 BEAWA 
	
Cases 	 Cochran Q 	 D.F. Significance 
33 	 18.8444 	 4 	 .0008 
	
EXAMPLE: 	 2 wires 	 Cochran Q Test 
Cases 
= 0 = 1 Variable 
28 12 BAAWA 
39 1 BBAWA 
32 8 BCAWA 
29 11 BDAWA 
38 2 BEAWA 
	
Cases 	 Cochran Q 	 D.F. Significance 
40 	 19.7692 	 4 	 .0006 
EXPANSION 	 ***WORSE*** 
OBJECTS  
EXAMPLE: 	 1 railway 	 Cochran Q Test 
	
EXAMPLE: 	 1 railway 	 Cochran Q Test 
Cases 
= 0 = 1 Variable 
19 14 WAEXI 
29 4 WBEXI 
21 12 WCEXI 
31 2 WDEXI 
22 11 WEEXI 
	
Cases 	 Cochran Q 	 D.F. Significance 
33 	 16.1159 	 4 	 .0029 
	
EXAMPLE: 	 2 wires 	 Cochran Q Test 
Cases 
= 1 = 0 Variable 
28 12 WAEXI 
14 26 WBEXI 
24 16 WCEXI 
17 23 WDEXI 
25 15 WEEXI 
	
Cases 	 Cochran Q 	 D.F. Significance 
40 	 14.4421 	 4 	 .0060 
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EXAMPLE: 	 1 railway 	 Cochran Q Test 
Cases 
= 0 = 1 Variable 
30 3 WAQUI 
30 3 WBQUI 
30 3 WCQUI 
20 13 WDQUI 
29 4 WEQUI 
Cases 	 Cochran Q 	 D.F. Significance 
33 	 16.3404 	 4 	 .0026 
	
EXAMPLE: 	 1 railway 	 Cochran Q Test 
Cases 
= 0 = 1 Variable 
20 13 WASHA 
27 6 WBSHA 
24 9 WCSHA 
26 7 WDSHA 
31 2 WESHA 
	
Cases 	 Cochran Q 	 D.F. Significance 
33 	 10.3492 	 4 	 .0349 
	
EXAMPLE: 	 2 wires 	 Cochran Q Test 
Cases 
= 1 = 0 Variable 
27 13 WASHA 
17 23 WBSHA 
20 20 WCSHA 
17 23 WDSHA 
12 28 WESHA 
	
Cases 	 Cochran Q 	 D.F. Significance 
40 	 15.7403 	 4 	 .0034 
	
EXAMPLE: 	 1 railway 	 Cochran Q Test 
Cases 
= 1 = 0 Variable 
10 23 WAAWA 
1 32 WBAWA 
9 24 WCAWA 
7 26 WDAWA 
5 28 WEAWA 
	
Cases 	 Cochran Q 	 D.F. Significance 
33 	 10.0392 	 4 	 .0398 
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Appendix 7.4 Cochran Q Test for thermal equilibrium 
THERMAL EQUILIBRIUM 	 ***BETTER*** 
FEATURES 
EXAMPLE: 	 1 	 contact 	 Cochran Q Test 
Cakes 
= 0 = 1 Variable 
36 4 BIBBIG 
27 13 BBEXI 
37 3 BBHEA 
33 7 BBQUI 
37 3 BBSHA 
35 5 BBAWA 
Column 1 = The number of 
children who chose this feature 
Column 0 = The number of 
children who did not choose it 
B = Making the 
example better 
OR 
W = Making the 
example worse 
AWA = away 
BIG = bigger 
EXI = not exist 
HEA = heavier 
QUI = quicker 
SHA = shape 
A= air 
B = cold water 
C = metallic pots 
D = hot water 
E = heat 
Cases 	 Cochran Q 	 D.F. Significance 
40 	 15.7194 	 5 	 .0077 
EXAMPLE: 	 1 contact 
Cases 
 
Cochran Q Test 
 
= 1 = 0 Variable 
34 6 BCBIG 
2 38 BCEXI 
6 34 BCHEA 
2 38 BCQUI 
20 20 BCSHA 
1 39 BCAWA 
	
Cases 	 Cochran Q 
40 	 100.7678 
	
EXAMPLE: 	 2 inside 
Cases 
= 1 = 0 Variable 
26 4 BCBIG 
1 29 BCEXI 
4 26 BCHEA 
2 28 BCQUI 
13 17 BCSHA 
3 27 BCAWA 
D.F. Significance 
5 	 .0000 
Cochran Q Test 
Cases 
30 
Cochran Q 	 D.F. Significance 
76.1765 	 5 	 .0000 
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EXAMPLE: 	 1 contact 	 Cochran Q Test 
Cases 
= 0 = 1 Variable 
27 13 BDBIG 
39 1 BDEXI 
24 16 BDHEA 
26 14 BDQUI 
38 2 BDSHA 
39 1 BDAWA 
Cases 	 Cochran Q 	 D.F. Significance 
40 	 42.4317 	 5 	 .0000 
EXAMPLE: 	 1 contact 	 Cochran Q Test 
Cases 
= 1 = 0 Variable 
23 17 BEBIG 
0 40 BEEXI 
2 38 BEHEA 
21 19 BEQUI 
1 39 BESHA 
0 40 BEAWA 
Cases 	 Cochran Q 	 D.F. Significance 
40 	 87.1053 	 5 	 .0000 
EXAMPLE: 	 2 inside 	 Cochran Q Test 
EXAMPLE: 	 2 inside 	 Cochran Q Test 
Cases 
= 0 = 1 Variable 
16 14 BDBIG 
30 0 BDEXI 
13 17 BDHEA 
25 5 BDQUI 
29 1 BDSHA 
30 0 BDAWA 
Cases 	 Cochran Q 	 D.F. Significance 
30 	 50.2071 	 5 	 .0000 
Cases 
= 1 = 0 Variable 
23 7 BEBIG 
0 30 BEEXI 
1 29 BEHEA 
18 12 BEQUI 
0 30 BESHA 
3 27 BEAWA 
Cases 	 Cochran Q 	 D.F. Significance 
30 	 82.5393 	 5 	 .0000 
POTENTIAL ENERGY 	 ***WORSE*** 
EXAMPLE: 	 1 contact 	 Cochran Q Test 
Cases 
= 0 = 1 Variable 
39 1 WABIG 
28 12 WAEXI 
38 2 WAHEA 
34 6 WAQUI 
39 1 WASHA 
33 7 WAAWA 
Cases 	 Cochran Q 	 D.F. Significance 
40 	 23.9076 	 5 	 .0002 
EXAMPLE: 	 2 inside 	 Cochran Q Test 
Cases 
= 1 = 0 Variable 
4 26 WABIG 
8 22 WAEXI 
1 29 WAHEA 
3 27 WAQUI 
1 29 WASHA 
5 25 WAAWA 
Cases 	 Cochran Q 	 D.F. Significance 
30 	 12.3256 	 5 	 .0306 
EXAMPLE: 	 1 contact 	 Cochran Q Test 
Cases 
= 0 = 1 Variable 
28 12 WBBIG 
21 19 WBEXI 
26 14 WBHEA 
35 5 WBQUI 
33 7 WBSHA 
25 15 WBAWA 
Cases 	 Cochran Q 	 D.F. Significance 
40 	 15.6923 	 5 	 .0078 
EXAMPLE: 	 1 contact 	 Cochran Q Test EXAMPLE: 	 1 contact 	 Cochran Q Test 
 
Cases 
= 0 = 1 Variable 
36 4 WCBIG 
11 29 WCEXI 
33 7 WCHEA 
37 3 WCQUI 
23 17 WCSHA 
22 18 WCAWA 
	
Cases 	 Cochran Q 	 D.F. Significance 
40 	 60.7087 	 5 	 .0000 
	
EXAMPLE: 	 2 inside 	 Cochran Q Test 
Cases 
= 0 = 1 Variable 
29 1 WCBIG 
9 21 WCEXI 
28 2 WCHEA 
25 5 WCQUI 
16 14 WCSHA 
15 15 WCAWA 
	
Cases 	 Cochran Q 	 D.F. Significance 
30 	 46.0185 	 5 	 .0000 
Cases 
= 0 = 1 Variable 
37 3 WDBIG 
7 33 WDEXI 
38 2 WDHEA 
36 4 WDQUI 
35 5 WDSHA 
19 21 WDAWA 
	
Cases 	 Cochran Q 	 D.F. Significance 
40 	 92.4242 	 5 	 .0000 
	
EXAMPLE: 	 2 inside 	 Cochran Q Test 
Cases 
= 0 = 1 Variable 
28 2 WDBIG 
11 19 WDEXI 
29 1 WDHEA 
29 1 WDQUI 
26 4 WDSHA 
20 10 WDAWA 
	
Cases 	 Cochran Q 	 D.F. Significance 
30 	 47.4845 	 5 	 .0000 
 
	
EXAMPLE: 	 1 contact 	 Cochran Q Test 
Cases 
= 0 = 1 Variable 
40 0 WEBIG 
5 35 WEEXI 
39 1 WEHEA 
39 1 WEQUI 
39 1 WESHA 
31 9 WEAWA 
	
Cases 	 Cochran Q 	 D.F. Significance 
40 	 132.5117 	 5 	 .0000 
	
EXAMPLE: 	 2 inside 	 Cochran Q Test 
Cases 
= 0 = 1 Variable 
29 1 WEBIG 
5 25 WEEXI 
27 3 WEHEA 
27 3 WEQUI 
30 0 WESHA 
23 7 WEAWA 
	
Cases 	 Cochran Q 	 D.F. Significance 
30 	 78.9521 	 5 	 .0000 
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POTENTIAL EXAMPLE ***BETTER*** 
OBJECTS  
	
EXAMPLE: 	 1 contact 	 Cochran Q Test 
Cases 
= 0 = 1 Variable 
37 3 BABIG 
36 4 BBBIG 
6 34 BCBIG 
27 13 BDBIG 
17 23 BEBIG 
	
Cases 	 Cochran Q 	 D.F. Significance 
40 	 70.0202 	 4 	 .0000 
	
EXAMPLE: 	 2 inside 	 Cochran Q Test 
Cases 
= 0 = 1 Variable 
27 3 BABIG 
21 9 BBBIG 
4 26 BCBIG 
16 14 BDBIG 
7 23 BEBIG 
	
Cases 	 Cochran Q 	 D.F. Significance 
30 	 45.7500 	 4 	 .0000 
	
EXAMPLE: 	 1 contact 	 Cochran Q Test 
Cases 
= 0 = 1 Variable 
33 7 BAEXI 
27 13 BBEXI 
38 2 BCEXI 
39 1 BAEXI 
40 0 BEEXI 
	
Cases 	 Cochran Q 	 D.F. Significance 
40 	 28.5854 	 4 	 .0000 
	
EXAMPLE: 	 1 contact 	 Cochran Q Test 
Cases 
= 0 = 1 Variable 
37 3 BAHEA 
37 3 BBHEA 
34 6 BCHEA 
24 16 BDHEA 
38 2 BEHEA 
	
Cases 	 Cochran Q 	 D.F. Significance 
40 	 27.3469 	 4 	 .0000 
	
EXAMPLE: 	 2 inside 	 Cochran Q Test 
Cases 
= 0 = 1 Variable 
29 1 BAHEA 
25 5 BBHEA 
26 4 BCHEA 
13 17 BDHEA 
29 1 BEHEA 
	
Cases 	 Cochran Q 	 D.F. Significance 
30 	 35.7551 	 4 	 .0000 
	
EXAMPLE: 	 1 contact 	 Cochran Q Test 
Cases 
= 0 = 1 Variable 
34 6 BAQUI 
33 7 BBQUI 
38 2 BCQUI 
26 14 BDQUI 
19 21 BEQUI 
	
Cases 	 Cochran Q 	 D.F. Significance 
40 	 30.1333 	 4 	 .0000 
	
EXAMPLE: 	 2 inside 	 Cochran Q Test 
Cases 
= 0 = 1 Variable 
28 2 BAQUI 
26 4 BBQUI 
28 2 BCQUI 
25 5 BDQUI 
12 18 BEQUI 
	
Cases 	 Cochran Q 	 D.F. Significance 
30 	 38.4681 	 4 	 .0000 
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	EXAMPLE: 	 1 contact 	 Cochran Q Test 
Cases 
= 0 = 1 Variable 
39 1 BASHA 
37 3 BBSHA 
20 20 BCSHA 
38 2 BDSHA 
39 1 BESHA 
	
Cases 	 Cochran Q 	 D.F. Significance 
40 	 52.7843 	 4 	 .0000 
	
EXAMPLE: 	 2 inside 	 Cochran Q Test 
Cases 
= 0 = 1 Variable 
30 0 BASHA 
27 3 BBSHA 
17 13 BCSHA 
29 1 BDSHA 
30 0 BESHA 
	
Cases 	 Cochran Q 	 D.F. Significance 
30 	 40.4000 	 4 	 .0000 
POTENTIAL ENERGY ***WORSE*** 
OBJECTS  
	
EXAMPLE: 	 1 contact 	 Cochran Q Test 
Cases 
= 0 = 1 Variable 
39 1 WABIG 
28 12 WBBIG 
36 4 WCBIG 
37 3 WDBIG 
40 0 WEBIG 
	
Cases 	 Cochran Q 	 D.F. Significance 
40 	 25.0000 	 4 	 .0001 
	
EXAMPLE: 	 2 inside 	 Cochran Q Test 
Cases 
= 1 = 0 Variable 
4 26 WABIG 
7 23 WBBIG 
1 29 WCBIG 
2 28 WDBIG 
1 29 WEBIG 
Cases 	 Cochran Q 	 D.F. Significance 
30 	 9.6296 	 4 	 .0472 
	
EXAMPLE: 	 1 contact 	 Cochran Q Test 
Cases 
= 0 = 1 Variable 
28 12 WAEXI 
21 19 WBEXI 
11 29 WCEXI 
7 33 WDEXI 
5 35 WEEXI 
	
Cases 	 Cochran Q 	 D.F. Significance 
40 	 43.5455 	 4 	 .0000 
	
EXAMPLE: 	 2 inside 	 Cochran Q Test 
Cases 
= 0 = 1 Variable 
22 8 WAEXI 
19 11 WBEXI 
9 21 WCEXI 
11 19 WDEXI 
5 25 WEEXI 
	
Cases 	 Cochran Q 	 D.F. Significance 
30 	 26.7733 	 4 	 .0000 
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EXAMPLE: 	 1 contact 	 Cochran Q Test 
Cases 
= 0 = 1 Variable 
38 2 WAHEA 
26 14 WBHEA 
33 7 WCHEA 
38 2 WDHEA 
39 1 WEHEA 
Cases 	 Cochran Q 	 D.F. Significance 
40 	 33.0000 	 4 	 .0000 
	
EXAMPLE: 	 1 contact 	 Cochran Q Test 
Cases 
= 0 = 1 Variable 
39 1 WASHA 
33 7 WBSHA 
23 17 WCSHA 
35 5 WDSHA 
39 1 WESHA 
	
Cases 	 Cochran Q 	 D.F. Significance 
40 	 39.2727 	 4 	 .0000 
	
EXAMPLE: 	 2 inside 	 Cochran Q Test 
Cases 
= 0 = 1 Variable 
29 1 WASHA 
26 4 WBSHA 
16 14 WCSHA 
26 4 WDSHA 
30 0 WESHA 
	
Cases 	 Cochran Q 	 D.F. Significance 
30 	 29.3333 	 4 	 .0000 
	
EXAMPLE: 	 1 contact 	 Cochran Q Test 
Cases 
= 0 = 1 Variable 
33 7 WAAWA 
25 15 WBAWA 
22 18 WCAWA 
19 21 WDAWA 
31 9 WEAWA 
	
Cases 	 Cochran Q 	 D.E. Significance 
40 	 20.2899 	 4 	 .0004 
	
EXAMPLE: 	 2 inside 	 Cochran Q Test 
Cases 
= 0 = 1 Variable 
25 5 WAAWA 
22 8 WBAWA 
15 15 WCAWA 
20 10 WDAWA 
23 7 WEAWA 
	
Cases 	 Cochran Q 	 D.F. Significance 
30 	 11.1538 	 4 	 .0249 
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Appendix 7.5 Cochran Q Test for inertia 
INERTIA 	 ***BETTER*** 
FEATURES  
EXAMPLE: 	 1 lorry 	 Cochran Q Test 
Column 1 = The number of 
children who chose this feature 
Column 0 = The number of 
children who did not choose it 
B = Making the 
example better 
OR 
W = Making the 
example worse Cakes I 
= 1 = 0 Variable 
J 
12 26 BABIG 
2 36 BAEXI 
6 32 BAHEA 
23 15 BAQUI 
10 28 BASHA 
13 25 BAAWA 
AWA = away 
BIG = bigger 
EXI = not exist 
HEA = heavier 
QUI = quicker 
SHA = shape 
A= car/toy elephant 
B = ground/child 
C = lorry/elephant 
D = air/ground 
E = inertia 
Cases 	 Cochran Q 	 D.F. Significance 
38 	 33.3913 	 5 	 .0000 
EXAMPLE: 	 1 lorry - - - - Cochran Q Test 
EXAMPLE: 	 1 lorry Cochran Q Test 
Cases 
= 1 = 0 Variable 
10 28 BBBIG 
1 37 BBEXI 
4 34 BBHEA 
2 36 BBQUI 
11 27 BBSHA 
2 36 BBAWA 
Cases 	 Cochran Q 	 D.F. Significance 
38 	 23.2258 	 5 	 .0003 
Cases 
= 1 = 0 Variable 
13 25 BCBIG 
4 34 BCEXI 
14 24 BCHEA 
17 21 BCQUI 
12 26 BCSHA 
11 27 BCAWA 
Cases 	 Cochran Q 	 D.F. Significance 
38 	 11.4257 	 5 	 .0436 
EXAMPLE: 	 2 elephant 	 Cochran Q Test EXAMPLE: 	 2 elephant Cochran Q Test 
Cases 
= 1 = 0 Variable 
12 11 BBBIG 
3 20 BBEXI 
4 19 BBHEA 
13 10 BBQUI 
3 20 BBSHA 
2 21 BBAWA 
Cases 	 Cochran Q 	 D.F. Significance 
23 	 25.0680 	 5 	 .0001 
Cases 
= 0 = 1 Variable 
12 11 BCBIG 
19 4 BCEXI 
9 14 BCHEA 
18 5 BCQUI 
19 4 BCSHA 
18 5 BCAWA 
Cases 	 Cochran Q 	 D.F. Significance 
23 	 19.3262 	 5 	 .0017 
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EXAMPLE: 	 1 lorry 	 Cochran Q Test 
Cases 
= 1 = 0 Variable 
10 28 BEBIG 
3 35 BEEXI 
6 32 BEHEA 
2 36 BEQUI 
4 34 BESHA 
2 36 BEAWA 
EXAMPLE: 	 2 elephant 	 Cochran Q Test 
Cases 
= 0 = 1 Variable 
22 1 BDBIG 
20 3 BDEXI 
23 0 BDHEA 
23 0 BDQUI 
18 5 BDSHA 
23 0 BDAWA 
Cases 	 Cochran Q 	 D.F. Significance 
23 	 15.0000 	 5 	 .0104 
Cases 	 Cochran Q 	 D.F. Significance 
38 	 11.9748 	 5 	 .0351 
POTENTIAL ENERGY 	 ***WORSE*** 
EXAMPLE: 	 1 lorry 	 Cochran Q Test 
Cases 
= 0 = 1 Variable 
24 14 WABIG 
31 7 WAEXI 
16 22 WAHEA 
33 5 WAQUI 
25 13 WASHA 
31 7 WAAWA 
Cases 	 Cochran Q 	 D.F. Significance 
38 	 25.8120 	 5 	 .0001 
EXAMPLE: 	 2 elephant 	 Cochran Q Test 
Cases 
= 1 = 0 Variable 
8 15 WABIG 
7 16 WAEXI 
9 14 WAHEA 
5 18 WAQUI 
1 22 WASHA 
3 20 WAAWA 
Cases 	 Cochran Q 	 D.F. Significance 
23 	 10.7143 	 5 	 .0573 
EXAMPLE: 	 1 lorry 	 Cochran Q Test 
Cases 
= 1 = 0 Variable 
11 27 WBBIG 
9 29 WBEXI 
6 32 WBHEA 
4 34 WBQUI 
13 25 WBSHA 
6 32 WBAWA 
Cases 	 Cochran Q 	 D.F. Significance 
38 	 10.2023 	 5 	 .0697 
	EXAMPLE: 	 1 lorry 	 Cochran Q Test 
Cases 
= 0 = 1 Variable 
32 6 WCBIG 
32 6 WCEXI 
28 10 WCHEA 
20 18 WCQUI 
24 14 WCSHA 
24 14 WCAWA 
	
Cases 	 Cochran Q 	 D.F. Significance 
38 	 13.8583 	 5 	 .0165 
	
EXAMPLE: 	 2 elephant 	 Cochran Q Test 
Cases 
= 1 = 0 Variable 
2 21 WDBIG 
1 22 WDEXI 
1 22 WDHEA 
0 23 WDQUI 
10 13 WDSHA 
1 22 WDAWA 
	
Cases 	 Cochran Q 	 D.F. Significance 
23 	 30.2174 	 5 	 .0000 
	
EXAMPLE: 	 1 lorry 	 Cochran Q Test 
Cases 
= 0 = 1 Variable 
35 3 WEBIG 
25 13 WEEXI 
36 2 WEHEA 
36 2 WEQUI 
34 4 WESHA 
34 4 WEAWA 
	
Cases 	 Cochran Q 	 D.F. Significance 
38 	 20.7937 	 5 	 .0009 
EXAMPLE: 	 2 elephant 	 Cochran Q Test 
Cases 
= 0 = 1 Variable 
22 1 WEBIG 
16 7 WEEXI 
20 3 WEHEA 
21 2 WEQUI 
22 1 WESHA 
22 1 WEAWA 
Cases 	 Cochran Q 	 D.F. Significance 
23 	 11.9565 	 5 	 .0354 
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 POTENTIAL EXAMPLE ***BETTER*** 
OBJECTS  
EXAMPLE: 	 2 elephant 	 Cochran Q Test 
  
 
Cases 
= 0 = 1 Variable 
19 4 BABIG 
11 12 BBBIG 
12 11 BCBIG 
22 1 BDBIG 
20 3 BEBIG 
  
 
Cases 	 Cochran Q 	 D.F. Significance 
23 	 20.1633 	 4 	 .0005 
  
 
	
EXAMPLE: 	 1 lorry 	 Cochran Q Test 
Cases 
= 0 = 1 Variable 
32 6 BAHEA 
34 4 BBHEA 
24 14 BCHEA 
38 0 BDHEA 
32 6 BEHEA 
	
Cases 	 Cochran Q 	 D.F. Significance 
38 	 20.3922 	 4 	 .0004 
	
EXAMPLE: 	 2 elephant 	 Cochran Q Test 
Cases 
= 0 = 1 Variable 
18 5 BAHEA 
19 4 BBHEA 
9 14 BCHEA 
23 0 BDHEA 
20 3 BEHEA 
	
Cases 	 Cochran Q 	 D.F. Significance 
23 	 24.0870 	 4 	 .0001 
	
EXAMPLE: 	 1 lorry 	 Cochran Q Test 
Cases 
= 0 = 1 Variable 
15 23 BAQUI 
36 2 BBQUI 
21 17 BCQUI 
35 3 BDQUI 
36 2 BEQUI 
	
Cases 	 Cochran Q 	 D.F. Significance 
38 	 51.7368 	 4 	 .0000 
	
EXAMPLE: 	 2 elephant 	 Cochran Q Test 
Cases 
= 0 = 1 Variable 
22 1 BAQUI 
10 13 BBQUI 
18 5 BCQUI 
23 0 BDQUI 
22 1 BEQUI 
	
Cases 	 Cochran Q 	 D.F. Significance 
23 	 29.7436 	 4 	 .0000 
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	EXAMPLE: 	 1 lorry 	 Cochran Q Test 
Cases 
= 1 = 0 Variable 
10 28 BASHA 
11 27 BBSHA 
12 26 BCSHA 
3 35 BDSHA 
4 34 BESHA 
	
Cases 	 Cochran Q 	 D.F. Significance 
38 	 13.4615 	 4 	 .0092 
	
EXAMPLE: 	 1 lorry 	 Cochran Q Test 
Cases 
= 0 = 1 Variable 
25 13 BAAWA 
36 2 BBAWA 
27 11 BCAWA 
36 2 BDAWA 
36 2 BEAWA 
	
Cases 	 Cochran Q 	 D.F. Significance 
38 	 23.4615 	 4 	 .0001 
EXAMPLE: 	 2 elephant 	 Cochran Q Test 
Cases 
= 0 = 1 Variable 
16 7 BAAWA 
21 2 BBAWA 
18 5 BCAWA 
23 0 BDAWA 
23 0 BEAWA 
Cases 	 Cochran Q 	 D.F. Significance 
23 	 14.3704 	 4 	 .0062 
POTENTIAL ENERGY ***WORSE*** 
OBJECTS  
	
EXAMPLE: 	 1 lorry 	 Cochran Q Test 
Cases 
= 0 = 1 Variable 
24 14 WABIG 
27 11 WBBIG 
32 6 WCBIG 
27 11 WDBIG 
35 3 WEBIG 
	
Cases 	 Cochran Q 	 D.F. Significance 
38 	 10.2632 	 4 	 .0362 
	
EXAMPLE: 	 2 elephant 	 Cochran Q Test 
Cases 
= 1 = 0 Variable 
8 15 WABIG 
8 15 WBBIG 
5 18 WCBIG 
2 21 WDBIG 
1 22 WEBIG 
	
Cases 	 Cochran Q 	 D.F. Significance 
23 	 11.2632 	 4 	 .0238 
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	EXAMPLE: 	 1 lorry 	 Cochran Q Test 
Cases 
= 0 = 1 Variable 
16 22 WAHEA 
32 6 WBHEA 
28 10 WCHEA 
31 7 WDHEA 
36 2 WEHEA 
	
Cases 	 Cochran Q 	 D.F. Significance 
38 	 32.1111 	 4 	 .0000 
EXAMPLE: 	 2 elephant 	 Cochran Q Test 
Cases 
= 0 = 1 Variable 
14 9 WAHEA 
14 9 WBHEA 
19 4 WCHEA 
22 1 WDHEA 
20 3 WEHEA 
Cases 	 Cochran Q 	 D.F. Significance 
23 	 12.2791 	 4 	 .0154  
	
EXAMPLE: 	 1 lorry 	 Cochran Q Test 
Cases 
= 0 = 1 Variable 
33 5 WAQUI 
34 4 WBQUI 
20 18 WCQUI 
28 10 WDQUI 
36 2 WEQUI 
	
Cases 	 Cochran Q 	 D.F. Significance 
38 	 23.8841 	 4 	 .0001 
	
EXAMPLE: 	 2 elephant 	 Cochran Q Test 
Cases 
= 1 = 0 Variable 
5 18 WAQUI 
9 14 WBQUI 
3 20 WCQUI 
0 23 WDQUI 
2 21 WEQUI 
	
Cases 	 Cochran Q 	 D.F. Significance 
23 	 13.3714 	 4 	 .0096 
	
EXAMPLE: 	 1 lorry 	 Cochran Q Test 
Cases 
= 0 = 1 Variable 
25 13 WASHA 
25 13 WBSHA 
24 14 WCSHA 
35 3 WDSHA 
34 4 WESHA 
	
Cases 	 Cochran Q 	 D.F. Significance 
38 	 17.4925 	 4 	 .0016 
	
EXAMPLE: 	 2 elephant 	 Cochran Q Test 
Cases 
= 0 = 1 Variable 
22 1 WASHA 
17 6 WBSHA 
15 8 WCSHA 
13 10 WDSHA 
22 1 WESHA 
	
Cases 	 Cochran Q 	 D.F. Significance 
23 	 15.1818 	 4 	 .0043 
	
EXAMPLE: 	 1 lorry 	 Cochran Q Test 
Cases 
= 0 = 1 Variable 
31 7 WAAWA 
32 6 WBAWA 
24 14 WCAWA 
33 5 WDAWA 
34 4 WEAWA 
	
Cases 	 Cochran Q 	 D.F. Significance 
38 	 10.4667 	 4 	 .0333 
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AWA = away 
BIG = bigger 
EXI = not exist 
HEA = heavier 
QUI = quicker 
SHA = shape 
A= ball/stone 
B = child 
C = water/sea 
D = wash basin/ground 
E = upthrust 
Column 1 = The number of 
children who chose this feature 
Column 0 = The number of 
children who did not choose it 
B = Making the 
example better 
OR 
W = Making the 
example worse 
Appendix 7.6 Cochran Q Test for upthrust 
UPTHRUST 	 * * *BETTER* * * 
FEATURES 
EXAMPLE: 	 1 ball 	 Cochran Q Test 
Cles I 
= 0 = 1 Variable 
31 5 BAIBIG 
35 1 BAEXI 
24 12 BAHEA 
30 6 BAQUI 
32 4 BASHA 
35 1 BAAWA 
Cases 	 Cochran Q 	 D.F. Significance 
36 	 19.5669 	 5 	 .0015 
EXAMPLE: 	 2 stone 	 Cochran Q Test 
Cases 
= 0 = 1 Variable 
19 2 BABIG 
19 2 BAEXI 
14 7 BAHEA 
20 1 BAQUI 
14 7 BASHA 
20 1 BAAWA 
Cases 	 Cochran Q 	 D.F. 	 Significance 
21 	 14.7619 	 5 	 .0114 
EXAMPLE: 	 1 ball 	 Cochran Q Test 
Cases 
= 0 = 1 Variable 
22 14 BBBIG 
33 3 BBEXI 
33 3 BBHEA 
21 15 BBQUI 
33 3 BBSHA 
32 4 BBAWA 
	
Cases 	 Cochran Q 	 D.F. Significance 
36 	 36.4286 	 5 	 .0000 
	
EXAMPLE: 	 2 stone 	 Cochran Q Test 
Cases 
= 1 = 0 Variable 
9 12 BBBIG 
0 21 BBEXI 
6 15 BBHEA 
9 12 BBQUI 
2 19 BBSHA 
2 19 BBAWA 
	
Cases 	 Cochran Q 	 D.F. Significance 
21 	 21.3208 	 5 	 .0007 
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EXAMPLE: 	 1 ball 	 Cochran Q Test 
Cases 
= 0 = 1 Variable 
24 12 BDBIG 
35 1 BDEXI 
34 2 BDHEA 
35 1 BDQUI 
25 11 BDSHA 
32 4 BDAWA 
Cases 	 Cochran Q 	 D.F. Significance 
36 	 32.5214 	 5 	 .0000 
UPTHRUST ***WORSE*** 
	
EXAMPLE: 	 1 ball 	 Cochran Q Test 
Cases 
= 0 = 1 Variable 
25 11 WABIG 
31 5 WAEXI 
23 13 WAHEA 
32 4 WAQUI 
21 15 WASHA 
24 12 WAAWA 
	
Cases 	 Cochran Q 	 D.F. Significance 
36 	 14.2857 	 5 	 .0139 
	
EXAMPLE: 	 2 stone 	 Cochran Q Test 
Cases 
= 0 = 1 Variable 
14 7 WABIG 
11 10 WAEXI 
9 12 WAHEA 
15 6 WAQUI 
9 12 WASHA 
16 5 WAAWA 
	
Cases 	 Cochran Q 	 D.F. Significance 
21 	 11.0938 	 5 	 .0496 
	
EXAMPLE: 	 1 ball 	 Cochran Q Test 
Cases 
= 1 = 0 Variable 
7 29 WBBIG 
16 20 WBEXI 
4 32 WBHEA 
7 29 WBQUI 
6 30 WBSHA 
14 22 WBAWA 
	
Cases 	 Cochran Q 	 D.F. Significance 
36 	 19.5506 	 5 	 .0015 
	
EXAMPLE: 	 2 stone 	 Cochran Q Test 
Cases 
= 1 = 0 Variable 
7 14 WBBIG 
10 11 WBEXI 
6 15 WBHEA 
2 19 WBQUI 
13 8 WBSHA 
10 11 WBAWA 
	
Cases 	 Cochran Q 	 D.F. Significance 
21 	 17.3438 	 5 	 .0039 
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EXAMPLE: 	 1 ball 	 Cochran Q Test 
Cases 
= 0 = 1 Variable 
34 2 WCBIG 
26 10 WCEXI 
29 7 WCHEA 
28 8 WCQUI 
34 2 WCSHA 
28 8 WCAWA 
Cases 	 Cochran Q 	 D.F. Significance 
36 	 11.9231 	 5 	 .0359 
EXAMPLE: 	 2 stone 	 Cochran Q Test 
Cases 
= 0 = 1 Variable 
19 2 WCBIG 
9 12 WCEXI 
20 1 WCHEA 
18 3 WCQUI 
12 9 WCSHA 
10 11 WCAWA 
Cases 	 Cochran Q 	 D.F. Significance 
21 	 27.1212 	 5 	 .0001 
EXAMPLE: 	 1 ball 	 Cochran Q Test 
Cases 
= 0 = 1 Variable 
32 4 WDBIG 
26 10 WDEXI 
31 5 WDHEA 
33 3 WDQUI 
23 13 WDSHA 
29 7 WDAWA 
Cases 	 Cochran Q 	 D.F. Significance 
36 	 15.6338 	 5 	 .0080 
EXAMPLE: 	 2 stone 	 Cochran Q Test 
Cases 
= 0 = 1 Variable 
16 5 WDBIG 
12 9 WDEXI 
19 2 WDHEA 
14 7 WDQUI 
9 12 WDSHA 
17 4 WDAWA 
Cases 	 Cochran Q 	 D.F. Significance 
21 	 16.5126 
	 5 	 .0055 
EXAMPLE: 	 1 ball 	 Cochran Q Test 
Cases 
= 0 = 1 Variable 
32 4 WEBIG 
26 10 WEEXI 
35 1 WEHEA 
27 9 WEQUI 
31 5 WESHA 
30 6 WEAWA 
Cases 	 Cochran Q 	 D.F. Significance 
36 	 13.3740 	 5 	 .0201 
EXAMPLE: 	 2 stone 	 Cochran Q Test 
Cases 
= 0 = 1 Variable 
18 3 WEBIG 
11 10 WEEXI 
20 1 WEHEA 
20 1 WEQUI 
11 10 WESHA 
18 3 WEAWA 
Cases 	 Cochran Q 	 D.F. Significance 
21 	 23.1034 	 5 	 .0003 
	UPTHRUST 	 ***BETTER*** 
OBJECTS  
	
EXAMPLE: 	 1 ball 	 Cochran Q Test 
Cases 
= 0 = 1 Variable 
31 5 BABIG 
22 14 BBBIG 
34 2 BCBIG 
24 12 BDBIG 
32 4 BEBIG 
	
Cases 	 Cochran Q 	 D.F. Significance 
36 	 19.1724 	 4 	 .0007 
EXAMPLE: 	 2 stone 	 Cochran Q Test 
Cases 
= 0 = 1 Variable 
19 2 BABIG 
12 9 BBBIG 
17 4 BCBIG 
18 3 BDBIG 
17 4 BEBIG 
Cases 	 Cochran Q 	 D.F. Significance 
21 	 8.5882 	 4 	 .0723 
	
EXAMPLE: 	 1 ball 	 Cochran Q Test 
Cases 
= 1 = 0 Variable 
12 24 BAHEA 
3 33 BBHEA 
1 35 BCHEA 
2 34 BDHEA 
3 33 BEHEA 
	
Cases 	 Cochran Q 	 D.F. Significance 
36 	 19.7000 	 4 	 .0006 
	
EXAMPLE: 	 1 ball 	 Cochran Q Test 
Cases 
= 0 = 1 Variable 
30 6 BAQUI 
21 15 BBQUI 
31 5 BCQUI 
35 1 BDQUI 
31 5 BEQUI 
	
Cases 	 Cochran Q 	 D.F. Significance 
36 	 20.2264 	 4 	 .0005 
EXAMPLE: 	 2 stone 	 Cochran Q Test 
Cases 
= 0 = 1 Variable 
20 1 BAQUI 
12 9 BBQUI 
17 4 BCQUI 
20 1 BDQUI 
17 4 BEQUI 
Cases 	 Cochran Q 	 D.F. Significance 
21 	 12.9697 	 4 	 .0114 
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	EXAMPLE: 	 1 ball 	 Cochran Q Test 
Cases 
= 0 = 1 Variable 
32 4 BASHA 
33 3 BBSHA 
34 2 BCSHA 
25 11 BDSHA 
36 0 BESHA 
	
Cases 	 Cochran Q 	 D.F. Significance 
36 	 17.5000 	 4 	 .0015 
EXAMPLE: 	 2 stone 	 Cochran Q Test 
Cases 
= 0 = 1 Variable 
14 7 BASHA 
19 2 BBSHA 
21 0 BCSHA 
18 3 BDSHA 
19 2 BESHA 
Cases 	 Cochran Q 	 D.F. Significance 
21 	 11.1667 	 4 	 .0248 
UPTHRUST ***WORSE*** 
OBJECTS  
	
EXAMPLE: 	 1 ball 	 Cochran Q Test 
Cases 
= 0 = 1 Variable 
25 11 WABIG 
29 7 WBBIG 
34 2 WCBIG 
32 4 WDBIG 
32 4 WEBIG 
	
Cases 	 Cochran Q 	 D.F. Significance 
36 	 10.2500 	 4 	 .0364 
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	EXAMPLE: 	 1 ball 	 Cochran Q Test 
Cases 
= 1 = 0 Variable 
13 23 WAHEA 
4 32 WBHEA 
7 29 WCHEA 
5 31 WDHEA 
1 35 WEHEA 
	
Cases 	 Cochran Q 	 D.F. Significance 
	
36 	 14.5455 	 4 	 .0057 
	
EXAMPLE: 	 2 stone 	 Cochran Q Test 
Cases 
= 1 = 0 Variable 
12 9 WAHEA 
6 15 WBHEA 
1 20 WCHEA 
2 19 WDHEA 
1 20 WEHEA 
	
Cases 	 Cochran Q 	 D.F. Significance 
	
21 	 26.2353 	 4 	 .0000 
	
EXAMPLE: 	 1 ball 	 Cochran Q Test 
Cases 
= 1 = 0 Variable 
15 21 WASHA 
6 30 WBSHA 
2 34 WCSHA 
13 23 WDSHA 
5 31 WESHA 
	
Cases 	 Cochran Q 	 D.F. Significance 
	
36 	 22.7407 	 4 	 .0001 
	
EXAMPLE: 	 2 stone 	 Cochran Q Test 
Cases 
= 0 = 1 Variable 
16 5 WAAWA 
11 10 WBAWA 
17 4 WCAWA 
10 11 WDAWA 
18 3 WEAWA 
	
Cases 	 Cochran Q 	 D.F. Significance 
21 	 14.3784 	 4 	 .0062 
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Cochran Q Test 
Cases 
= 0 = 1 Variable 
35 1 BEBIG 
28 8 BEEXI 
33 3 BEHEA 
32 4 BEQUI 
35 1 BESHA 
32 4 BEAWA 
Cases 	 Cochran Q 	 D.F. Significance 
36 
	
10.8065 	 5 	 .0554 
Appendix 7.7 Cochran Q Test for gravity 
GRAVITY 
	
***BETTER*** 
FEATURES 
Example with rocket 	 Cochran Q Test 
Column 1 = The number of 
children who chose this feature 
Column 0 = The number of 
children who did not choose it 
B = Making the 
example better 
OR 
W = Making the 
example worse 
Case 
= 1 = 0 Variable 
25 11 ILBIG 	  
4 32 BAEXI 
7 29 BAHEA 
26 10 BAQUI 
18 18 BASHA 
17 19 BAAWA 
Cases 	 Cochran Q 	 D.F. Significance 
36 	 46.5094 	 5 	 .0000 
Cases 
= 0 = 1 Variable 
36 0 BBBIG 
28 8 BBEXI 
35 1 BBHEA 
34 2 BBQUI 
34 2 BBSHA 
34 2 BBAWA 
Cases 	 Cochran Q 	 D.F. Significance 
36 	 17.1739 	 5 	 .0042 
Cases 
= 0 = 1 Variable 
29 7 BCBIG 
35 1 BCEXI 
35 1 BCHEA 
35 1 BCQUI 
30 6 BCSHA 
28 8 BCAWA 
Cases 	 Cochran Q 	 D.F. Significance 
36 	 16.1538 	 5 	 .0064 
Cases 
= 0 = 1 Variable 
32 4 BDBIG 
33 3 BDEXI 
36 0 BDHEA 
27 9 BDQUI 
34 2 BDSHA 
34 2 BDAWA 
AWA = away 
BIG = bigger 
EXI = not exist 
HEA = heavier 
QUI = quicker 
SHA = shape 
A= rocket 
B =air 
C = ground 
D = people 
E = gravity 
GRAVITY 
Cases 
= 0 = 1 Variable 
27 9 WABIG 
14 22 WAEXI 
19 17 WAHEA 
33 3 WAQUI 
21 15 WASHA 
24 12 WAAWA 
***WORSE*** 
Cases 	 Cochran Q 	 D.F. Significance 
36 	 15.4348 	 5 	 .0087 
Cases 	 Cochran Q 	 D.F. Significance 
36 
	
27.9487 	 5 	 .0000 
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Cochran Q Test 
Cases 
= 1 = 0 Variable 
3 33 WBBIG 
9 27 WBEXI 
6 30 WBHEA 
9 27 WBQUI 
1 35 WBSHA 
8 28 WBAWA 
Cases 	 Cochran Q 	 D.F. Significance 
36 	 10.7692 	 5 	 .0565 
Cases 
= 0 = 1 Variable 
28 8 WCBIG 
20 16 WCEXI 
33 3 WCHEA 
29 7 WCQUI 
23 13 WCSHA 
31 5 WCAWA 
Cases 	 Cochran Q 	 D.F. Significance 
36 	 19.7826 	 5 	 .0014 
GRAVITY 	 ***BETTER*** 
OBJECTS  
Example with rocket 	 Cochran Q Test 
Cases 
= 1 = 0 Variable 
25 11 BABIG 
0 36 BBBIG 
7 29 BCBIG 
4 32 BDBIG 
1 35 BEBIG 
Cases 	 Cochran Q 	 D.F. Significance 
36 	 64.1846 	 4 	 .0000 
Cases 
= 0 = 1 Variable 
32 4 BAEXI 
28 8 BBEXI 
35 1 BCEXI 
33 3 BDEXI 
28 8 BEEXI 
Cases 	 Cochran Q 	 D.F. Significance 
36 	 9.2381 	 4 	 .0554 
Cases 
= 1 = 0 Variable 
7 29 BAHEA 
1 35 BBHEA 
1 35 BCHEA 
0 36 BDHEA 
3 33 BEHEA 
Cases 	 Cochran Q 	 D.F. Significance 
36 	 13.5652 	 4 	 .0088 
Cases 
= 1 = 0 Variable 
26 10 BAQUI 
2 34 BBQUI 
1 35 BCQUI 
9 27 BDQUI 
4 32 BEQUI 
Cases 	 Cochran Q 	 D.F. Significance 
36 	 62.5294 	 4 	 .0000 
      
   
Cases 
= 1 = 0 Variable 
18 18 BASHA 
2 34 BBSHA 
6 30 BCSHA 
2 34 BDSHA 
1 35 BESHA 
Cases 	 Cochran Q 	 D.F. Significance 
36 	 37.8868 	 4 	 .0000 
Cases 
= 0 = 1 Variable 
19 17 BAAWA 
34 2 BBAWA 
28 8 BCAWA 
34 2 BDAWA 
32 4 BEAWA 
Cases 	 Cochran Q 	 D.F. Significance 
36 	 26.5333 	 4 	 .0000 
  
      
      
   
	
GRAVITY 	 ***WORSE*** 
OBJECTS  
Example with rocket 	 Cochran Q Test 
Cases 
= 0 = 1 Variable 
27 9 WABIG 
33 3 WBBIG 
28 8 WCBIG 
23 13 WDBIG 
29 7 WEBIG 
Cases 	 Cochran Q 	 D.F. Significance 
	
36 	 9.4545 	 4 	 .0507 
Cases 
= 1 = 0 Variable 
22 14 WAEXI 
9 27 WBEXI 
16 20 WCEXI 
9 27 WDEXI 
7 29 WEEXI 
Cases 	 Cochran Q 	 D.F. Significance 
	
36 	 21.8333 	 4 	 .0002 
Cases 
= 0 = 1 Variable 
19 17 WAHEA 
30 6 WBHEA 
33 3 WCHEA 
26 10 WDHEA 
34 2 WEHEA 
Cases 	 Cochran Q 	 D.F. Significance 
36 	 24.0645 	 4 	 .0001 
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Cases 
= 0 = 1 Variable 
21 15 WASHA 
35 1 WBSHA 
23 13 WCSHA 
26 10 WDSHA 
35 1 WESHA 
Cases 	 Cochran Q 	 D.F. Significance 
36 	 26.6667 	 4 	 .0000 
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Appendix 7.8 Cochran Q Test for transmission of heat 
TRANSMISSION OF HEAT ***BETTER*** 
FEATURES 
Example with glass 	 Cochran Q Test 
Castis 
	 I 
1 = 0 Variable 
Column 1 = The number of 
children who chose this feature 
Column 0 = The number of 
children who did not choose it 
B = Making the 
example better 
OR 
W = Making the 
example worse 
A= glass 
B = air 
C = gas stove 
D = hand 
E = heat 
14 24 LBIG 	  
0 38 BAEXI 
6 32 BAHEA 
1 37 BAQUI 
11 27 BASHA 
8 30 BAAWA 
AWA = away 
BIG = bigger 
EXI = not exist 
HEA = heavier 
QUI = quicker 
SHA = shape 
Cases 	 Cochran Q 	 D.F. Significance 
38 	 29.4805 	 5 	 .0000 
Cases 
= 0 = 1 Variable 
36 2 BBBIG 
31 7 BBEXI 
37 1 BBHEA 
29 9 BBQUI 
35 3 BBSHA 
33 5 BBAWA 
Cases 	 Cochran Q 	 D.F. Significance 
38 	 14.3939 	 5 	 .0133 
Cases 
= 0 = 1 Variable 
Cochran Q Test 
Cases 
= 0 = 1 Variable 
25 13 BEBIG 
35 3 BEEXI 
38 0 BEHEA 
29 9 BEQUI 
34 4 BESHA 
36 2 BEAWA 
Cases 	 Cochran Q 	 D.F. Significance 
38 
	
28.5200 	 5 	 .0000 
33 5 BCBIG 
37 1 BCEXI 
33 5 BCHEA 
31 7 BCQUI 
26 12 BCSHA 
36 2 BCAWA 
Cases 	 Cochran Q 	 D.F. Significance 
38 	 17.8462 	 5 	 .0031 
TRANSMISSION OF HEAT 
Cases 
= 0 = 1 Variable 
29 9 WABIG 
21 17 WAEXI 
30 8 WAHEA 
35 3 WAQUI 
20 18 WASHA 
24 14 WAAWA 
***WORSE*** 
Cases 
38 
Cochran Q 	 D.F. Significance 
22.0130 	 5 	 .0005 
Cases 
= 0 = 1 Variable 
38 0 BDBIG 
36 2 BDEXI 
37 1 BDHEA 
31 7 BDQUI 
36 2 BDSHA 
31 7 BDAWA 
Cases 	 Cochran Q 	 D.F. Significance 
38 	 16.1494 	 5 	 .0064 
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Cases 
= 0 = 1 Variable 
36 2 WEBIG 
21 17 WEEXI 
34 4 WEHEA 
31 7 WEQUI 
33 5 WESHA 
30 8 WEAWA 
Cases 	 Cochran Q 	 D.F. Significance 
38 	 26.5287 	 5 	 .0001 
TRANSMISSION OF HEAT ***BETTER*** 
OBJECTS  
Example with glass 	 Cochran Q Test 
Cases 
= 1 = 0 Variable 
14 24 BABIG 
2 36 BBBIG 
5 33 BCBIG 
0 38 BDBIG 
13 25 BEBIG 
Cases 	 Cochran Q 	 D.F. Significance 
Cases 
38 28.0690 	 4 	 .0000 
= 0 = 1 Variable 
38 0 BAEXI 
31 7 BBEXI 
37 1 BCEXI 
36 2 BDEXI 
35 3 BEEXI 
Cases 	 Cochran Q 	 D.F. Significance 
38 	 12.6957 	 4 	 .0129 
Cases 
= 0 = 1 Variable 
32 6 BAHEA 
37 1 BBHEA 
33 5 BCHEA 
37 1 BDHEA 
38 0 BEHEA 
Cases 	 Cochran Q 	 D.F. Significance 
38 	 12.6957 	 4 	 .0129 
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Cases 
= 1 = 0 Variable 
11 27 BASHA 
3 35 BBSHA 
12 26 BCSHA 
2 36 BDSHA 
4 34 BESHA 
Cases 	 Cochran Q 	 D.F. Significance 
38 	 19.8222 	 4 	 .0005 
TRANSMISSION OF HEAT ***WORSE*** 
OBJECTS  
Example with glass 	 Cochran Q Test 
Cases 
= 0 = 1 Variable 
29 9 WABIG 
35 3 WBBIG 
31 7 WCBIG 
27 11 WDBIG 
36 2 WEBIG 
Cases 	 Cochran Q 	 D.F. Significance 
38 	 11.6078 	 4 	 .0205 
Cases 
= 1 = 0 Variable 
18 20 WASHA 
5 33 WBSHA 
9 29 WCSHA 
11 27 WDSHA 
5 33 WESHA 
Cases 	 Cochran Q 	 D.F. Significance 
38 	 23.0400 	 4 	 .0001 
Cases 
= 1 = 0 Variable 
14 24 WAAWA 
3 35 WBAWA 
13 25 WCAWA 
15 23 WDAWA 
8 30 WEAWA 
Cases 	 Cochran Q 	 D.F. Significance 
38 	 14.0556 	 4 	 .0071 
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